Preparing before the emergency: New Zealand’s approach to HPAI 

When high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 began spreading across the world, New Zealand found itself in an unusual position.  

For several years, the country remained free from the strain, even as it caused unprecedented impacts across several continents including mortality events among wild birds, outbreaks in poultry and infections in mammals. 

Being free from the disease did not mean being free from threat. Rather than waiting for H5N1 to arrive, New Zealand used this window to prepare.  

Government agencies, the poultry sector, wildlife specialists, laboratories and other partners worked together to strengthen surveillance, improve biosecurity, develop response plans and explore ways of protecting some of the country’s most vulnerable native species. 

In July 2026, when H5N1 was detected for the first time in New Zealand in a pelagic seabird, that preparation was put to the test. The country’s experience illustrates a fundamental principle of emergency management: a successful response is built on time spent preparing.   

Preparing for a threat that had not yet arrived 

New Zealand had good reason to prepare. The global H5N1 panzootic has demonstrated that the consequences of the virus can extend far beyond poultry production. Wild birds have experienced severe mortality events, while infections have also been reported in an increasing number of mammalian species.

For New Zealand, the potential impact on biodiversity was a concern. The country is home to unique native birds found nowhere else in the world, including species with populations numbering only in the hundreds. 

Recognising these interconnected risks, New Zealand developed its preparedness through a One Health approach, bringing together the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI), the Department of Conservation (DOC), the Ministry of Health and Health New Zealand | Te Whatu Ora, alongside industry, iwi (Māori tribal groups), conservation partners and other stakeholders. 

Their planning recognised from the outset that H5N1 could not be addressed as an animal health issue alone. An incursion could simultaneously affect wildlife conservation, poultry production, trade and potentially public health. 

Preparedness means building systems, relationships, and capabilities before a disease arrives. HPAI has shown internationally how an animal health event can affect wildlife, food production and even human health. By bringing the relevant sectors together early, we have been able to understand the risks and ensure we are ready to respond quickly when needed.

Dr Mary van Andel, Chief Veterinary Officer and WOAH Delegate of New Zealand. 

Protecting species before they are exposed 

Perhaps the most distinctive part of New Zealand’s preparedness has been its work on vaccination of endangered native birds. 

Beginning before H5N1 was present in the country, DOC carried out a year-long vaccination trial involving up to 10 birds from each of five threatened species: kākāpō, takahē, kakī/black stilt, tchūriwat/tūturuatu/shore plover and kākāriki / parakeet. 

The objective was not to vaccinate wildlife at scale. For a disease circulating among free-ranging wild birds, this would be neither practical nor sufficient. Instead, authorities wanted to know whether vaccination could provide an additional layer of protection for small, intensively managed populations for which a major outbreak could threaten the survival of the species. 

The trial provided crucial evidence before the emergency occurred. All five species developed an initial antibody response and no adverse reactions were observed. Four maintained a strong response for at least six months in most individuals, while kakī antibody levels dropped at three months, showing the need for a different vaccination regime. 

“We knew it had been successfully used in overseas zoos, but we didn’t know how effective it would be on New Zealand’s unique native birds which are found nowhere else in the world,” explained Dr Kate McInnes, DOC Senior Science Advisor and wildlife veterinarian, following the trial. 

That evidence could then be translated into action. Following the detection of H5N1 in migratory seabirds in Australia in 2026, New Zealand activated plans to vaccinate around 300 core breeding birds from some of its most endangered species. The programme began before H5N1 was first detected in New Zealand. 

Vaccination was never intended as a stand-alone solution. It complemented biosecurity, surveillance, breeding programmes, predator control and other measures to strengthen the overall resilience of threatened populations. 

Readiness also depends on partnerships

New Zealand’s poultry industry and government had been working together to strengthen farm-level biosecurity and emergency response arrangements. Resources developed by the Poultry Industry Association of New Zealand and the Egg Producers Federation give producers practical guidance covering the entire emergency cycle, from preventing disease entering a farm to preparing response plans and knowing what to do during an outbreak. 

In 2025, the government and poultry sector also formalised an operational agreement covering HPAI and other exotic poultry diseases. It established joint decision-making arrangements and confirmed how readiness and response costs would be shared. 

While such arrangements may appear administrative, they help answer critical questions before an emergency begins: Who is responsible for what? How will decisions be taken? How will response activities be financed? And what incentives encourage rapid reporting? 

New Zealand had already demonstrated the value of rapid detection and cooperation during a separate HPAI H7N6 outbreak at a commercial egg farm in Otago in December 2024. Movement restrictions, testing and rapid response contained that outbreak to a single property.  

From preparedness to response 

On 15 July 2026, New Zealand confirmed its first detection of H5N1 in a brown skua seabird. The detection changed the epidemiological situation, but it did not mark the beginning of New Zealand’s work on HPAI. 

Surveillance systems were well established. Agencies had mechanisms for working together. Poultry producers had been preparing their biosecurity plans. Wildlife teams had spent time assessing risks to native species. The vaccination programme for threatened birds was already underway. New Zealand had a strong foundation, and was able to intensify, rather than begin, most readiness and response activities. 

This is precisely why preparedness matters. WOAH’s international standards emphasise that rapid and effective responses to animal health emergencies depend on the level of preparedness established beforehand. This includes risk analysis, contingency planning, surveillance and early-warning systems, training, simulation exercises, clear responsibilities and collaboration among the authorities and stakeholders who will need to act during an emergency. 

The experience of New Zealand helps to show what those principles can look like in practice. Preparedness cannot prevent every pathogen from crossing a border, particularly when wild animal movements are involved. Nor can it remove all uncertainty surrounding an emerging animal health threat. 

What it can do is ensure that when the threat arrives, countries are not starting from zero. For HPAI, and for the animal health emergencies of the future, that time gained can make a critical difference.