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REPORT OF THE MEETING

OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 1 – 4 February 2011

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A meeting of the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases was held at the OIE Headquarters in Paris, France from 1 to 4 February 2011. The Commission was welcomed by Dr Bernard Vallat, Director General of the OIE and Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima, Deputy Director General and Head of the OIE Scientific and Technical Department. In his address to the Commission, Dr Vallat reiterated the importance of the Scientific Commission not only to provide scientific guidance to Members but also to ensure and verify scientific integrity of the standards developed by the Code Commission. A good communication and interaction between the two Commissions were therefore important to exercise the different mandates given to them respectively. The Director General highlighted several important points on the agenda of the OIE for 2011 and 2012 which were of direct relevance to the work of the Commission. These included: a revised chapter for foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the *Terrestrial Code* to provide for the endorsement of national plans to control the disease; a second Global FMD Conference to be held in Thailand in 2012 to give further momentum and to try to elicit donor support for the global FMD eradication strategy; the ongoing work of the Commission to include, if possible, African Horse Sickness and Classical Swine Fever in the OIE list of diseases officially recognised for country or zonal freedom; and the initiatives underway to address the growing importance of the wildlife/livestock interface.

In his address to the Commission, Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima confirmed that the Council of the OIE endorsed the new OIE policy for the statements on confidentiality and on potential conflict of interest to be submitted by members of Specialist Commissions, Working Groups and selected *ad hoc* Groups. The need for this and the process that would be followed had been explained in detail by the OIE legal advisor during a meeting of the Presidents of the Specialist Commissions held at the OIE headquarters in November 2010. Under the confidentiality agreement, members of the Commission and *ad hoc* Groups responsible for the evaluations of country applications for official disease status recognition would have access to PVS reports (when Members accept the release to partners) to confirm or complement the information contained in the dossiers submitted by applicant Members. Dr Miyagishima informed the Commission that following decisions taken at the meeting of the Presidents of the Commissions, guidelines for the establishment and managing of OIE reference laboratory networks would be developed by the Biological Standards Commission. It was also agreed that members of the Specialist Commissions would be given access to the OIE Delegate website to enable them to have timely access to the reports of other Commissions.

During the second day of the meeting, Dr Bernard Vallat, in a combined session with the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission), stressed the importance of a global FMD control strategy and the role of both Commissions to present to the forthcoming World Assembly of OIE Delegates important changes to the *Terrestrial Code* to give further impetus to the global FMD control strategy. He informed the two Commissions on the sequence of events involving both the OIE and FAO related to the announcement of global freedom from rinderpest during the General Session as well as the Resolution on global rinderpest freedom that would be presented for adoption by the Scientific Commission to provide for post-eradication disease control activities such as sequestration of remaining stocks of rinderpest virus. Dr Vallat also expressed his concern over the worldwide situation in canine rabies and resultant concerns in human mortalities. He emphasised the importance of a new revised chapter on rabies in the *Terrestrial Code* to contribute to address these concerns. He indicated that these issues would also be addressed during the OIE Global Conference on rabies to be held in Seoul, Republic of Korea

in September 2011, which should have, before it, a draft of the revised chapter. Dr Vallat also informed the two Commissions on the involvement of the OIE in the 2011 events to celebrate 250 years of veterinary education, such as the forthcoming conference on veterinary education to be held in Lyons, France in May 2011 as well as the conference of the World Veterinary Association to be held in October 2011 in Cape Town, South Africa. He welcomed the discussions between the two Commissions on the wildlife/livestock interface and urged for further in-depth discussions to address several other related concerns such as disease reporting in wildlife, recognising disease free zones and countries, trade implications and the need for transparency.

The meeting was chaired by Dr Gideon Brückner, President of the Scientific Commission with Dr Kris De Clercq as rapporteur.

The agenda and the list of participants are attached as Appendices I and II.

1. Report of the meeting of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases of 7 to 10 September 2010

The Commission reviewed salient points from the report of its previous meeting. The President of the Commission expressed his gratitude to the staff of the Scientific and Technical Department of the OIE for their hard work during the past year and for preparing detailed working documents for the current meeting. The Commission acknowledged with thanks that actions had been taken to alleviate the staff shortage in the Scientific and Technical Department but indicated that should more diseases be added for official disease status recognition, additional personnel might be needed. The following issues emanating from and related to the previous meeting were discussed:

1.1. Guide on Terrestrial Animal Health Surveillance

The Commission noted with disappointment that a draft copy of the consolidated text of the proposed guide was not yet made available by the coordinating editor. As the completion of the Guide on Terrestrial Animal Health Surveillance was a priority on the programme of the Commission, it was agreed that the Scientific and Technical Department prepare a letter to the coordinating editor for signature by the Director General to convey the concern of the Commission and reiterate the urgent need to expedite and finalise the work.

1.2. Work programme of the Commission

The Commission reviewed and updated its work programme for 2011 and 2012. The need for additional *ad hoc* Groups and re-convening of some of the existing *ad hoc* Groups were identified and reflected on the work programme. Due to the increased work load of the Commission and the need to allow more time for in depth discussions of issues referred to the Commission, the convening of an additional meeting during the year was considered. However, due to an already fully scheduled programme of the OIE Headquarters, it was decided that for the time being, future meetings of the Commission, starting with the September 2011 meeting, be extended by one day.

1.3. Procedures for the evaluation of applications for disease status recognition

Following detailed discussions on this issue during the previous meeting of the Commission, it was noted with appreciation that an explanatory document outlining the standard operating procedures for official disease status evaluations was compiled by the Scientific and Technical Department for the benefit of Members. This document would be made available on the OIE website in an attempt to enhance transparency and understanding by Members of this important function of the Commission and the Scientific and Technical Department.

1.4. Maintenance of official disease status by Members

Following recent incidences of the re-occurrence of disease in countries having officially recognised disease free zones or free country status, the Commission identified the urgent need for a more direct involvement by the Commission in the monitoring of the application by Members of the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* to maintain their allocated disease free status. Although Members are obliged to annually confirm to the OIE the maintenance of their disease status, the Commission agreed that selective on-site expert missions to Members to verify the annual reports or to give guidance on the application of the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* for example in instances where the disease status

of a country or zone was threatened, would assist in enhancing the integrity of the OIE system for official disease status recognition. To give substance to the concerns of the Commission, it was agreed to request the Director General to mandate a mission to visit selected countries in southern Africa and to conduct a second expert mission to the Thrace region of Turkey during the first semester of 2011.

2. Meeting of the Presidents of Specialist Commissions: 25 November 2010

A summary on the outcome of the meeting was provided by the President of the Commission. The Commission acknowledged with thanks the decisions taken to allow access for members to the OIE Delegate website; the intention to develop guidelines for the establishment and management of networks for OIE reference laboratories and the procedures that will apply in future for members of Specialist Commissions, Working and *ad hoc* Groups to ensure confidentiality of information and to prevent conflict of interest in decision-making by these bodies. The Commission noted that the submission of confidentiality undertaking had already been put into practice since the beginning of the ongoing cycle of *ad hoc* Group meetings.

3. Scheduled OIE scientific conferences

Information was provided by the Scientific and Technical Department on the progress made with the planning of OIE scientific conferences scheduled for 2011 and 2012 - notably the global conference on wildlife (February 2011), the global conference on rabies (September 2011) and the global conference on FMD (June 2012). The Commission would be involved in all these conferences and the progress already made was acknowledged with appreciation.

4. Review of reports of a*d hoc* Group meetings

4.1. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology: 5 – 7 October 2010

The Commission acknowledged with appreciation the work conducted by the *ad hoc* Group to finalise a generic checklist for the practical application of compartmentalisation which now also included the salient features of the previously published checklist for avian influenza and Newcastle disease. The Commission resolved that the generic checklist be forwarded to the Code Commission for final review after which it should be made available to OIE Members and also be placed on the OIE website.

The Commission considered the comments of the Group on the possibility to review and amend the current definitions in the glossary of the *Terrestrial Code* related to surveillance and in particular as it applied to risk-based, pathogen-specific and targeted surveillance. The proposals for the OIE to reconsider the current definitions in the glossary of the *Terrestrial Code* had originated from a Pre-ISVEE workshop held in Durban, South Africa in 2009. The Commission did not agree to the proposed amendments, considering that by further dividing the definitions into subsets of concepts would confuse Members. The Commission recommended that the Code Commission do not make any changes to the current definitions in the glossary at this stage.

The Commission discussed the composition of the *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology and supported the changes that were proposed to the Director General. The draft agenda of the next meeting of the *ad hoc* Group was discussed and approved by the Commission. The need to develop generic guidelines for disease control was identified as a priority on the working programme of the *ad hoc* Group followed by the development of surveillance guidelines for emerging diseases.

The Commission adopted the report of the *ad hoc* Group. The report is attached as Appendix III.

4.2. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on Antimicrobial resistance: 2 – 4 November 2010

The Commission took with appreciation note of the progress made by the *ad hoc* Group in revising Chapter 6.7 (Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes) and Chapter 6.8 (Monitoring of the quantities of antimicrobials used in animal husbandry) of the *Terrestrial Code*. Chapters 6.9 and 6.10 would be reviewed at forthcoming meetings of the *ad hoc* Group.

Note was taken of the initiatives by the OIE to give more prominence to issues related to antimicrobial resistance and prudent use of antimicrobials in animals through training of OIE focal points on veterinary products and collaboration with the World Health Organisation. A seminar on 'Lessons learned and future approaches on the use of antimicrobials" would be organised at the conference of the World Veterinary Association to be held in Cape Town, South Africa, in October 2011.

The proposed revised chapter was submitted to the Code Commission for distribution to Members.

The report of the a*d hoc* Group was adopted and is attached as Appendix IV.

4.3. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) risk status evaluation of Members: 2 – 4 November 2010

The Commission reviewed the report of the *ad hoc* Group and noted with appreciation that the need for transparency was discussed in detail and acknowledged by the Group. The Commission supported the recommendation of the Group that Member applications for BSE risk status evaluation should indicate the specific BSE risk status a Member wish to be evaluated for. To avoid the withdrawal of the application after the assessment by the *ad hoc* Group, a Member would be asked, at the time of application, whether the Member would accept the allocation of controlled risk status should it happen that the *ad hoc* Group was of the opinion that a Member did not yet meet the requirements of a negligible BSE risk status.

The Commission supported the recommendation of the Group confirming that when indicated, the Director General could in selected cases be requested to mandate a visit by an expert group to assess a new application or to assess the maintenance of a given risk status (see also section 1.4 above).

As requested by the Commission, the *ad hoc* Group had discussed in detail the use of the BSurv model in the event where Members with small bovine populations or whose cattle demography was different from the baseline assumptions in the model, did not meet all the surveillance requirements as laid down in the *Terrestrial Code*. The *ad hoc* Group reviewed a series of provisions employed to date to address this issue and identified a number of additional possibilities. In assessing the proposals of the Group, the Commission considered that some of the proposals might have an effect on the current provisions of the *Terrestrial Code* such as the minimum time periods to be covered by surveillance to qualify for a particular risk category and the application of concepts such as compartmentalisation. Although the Commission favourably considered the suggestions of the *ad hoc* Group, it was decided that the current BSurv model should first be submitted for a review by the original authors to determine if the proposals of the *ad hoc* Group could be accommodated within a possible amendment of the current model. On receipt of the opinion of the authors, the Commission would re-consider the proposals. The Commission recommended that for the interim, the *ad hoc* Group continue to apply the provisions currently used to resolve such cases.

The Commission considered the comments of the *ad hoc* Group on proposals from the Commission to shorten the form for the annual reconfirmation of BSE risk status. The comments were in general supported except that the Commission decided to delete from the annual reconfirmation form data requirements for animals slaughtered between the ages more than 12 months and less than 24 months.

The Commission considered the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on the application of 3 Members for the evaluation of their BSE risk status. One application was referred back to the Member due to insufficient supporting data while the evaluation of the following countries was approved for recommendation to the OIE World Assembly of Delegates for adoption at the 79th General Session:

- ***Denmark*** – negligible risk status for BSE
- ***Panama*** - negligible risk status for BSE

The Commission was informed that the dossiers of two Members were received too late for analysis prior to the meeting of the *ad hoc* Group and could thus not be evaluated.

The report of the a*d hoc* Group was adopted and is attached as Appendix V.

4.4. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of the FMD status of Members: 6 – 8 December 2010

The Commission discussed and accepted the proposed changes recommended by the *ad hoc* Group to the draft Article 8.5.7 *bis* of the draft FMD chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* providing for the endorsement by the OIE of national FMD control programmes as well as the accompanying Questionnaire for applicant Members. The Commission did however not endorse the proposed amendments to Article 8.5.25 as it was acknowledged that an endorsed national FMD control programme remains in essence a voluntary process and should not be a prerequisite for the import of deboned beef from infected countries.

The Commission requested the Scientific and Technical Department to request further information from a Member who enquired about the need to still conduct probang testing for FMD virus isolation after two consecutive non-structural protein tests in animals from an infected zone destined for slaughter for consideration and advice by the FMD *ad hoc* Group.

The Commission considered the following recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on the request of Members for the evaluation of their FMD status:

a) Agreement of March 2007 between the OIE and the CVP: Re-instatement of high surveillance zones into FMD free zones where vaccination is practised

Applications had been received from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay to re-instate the high surveillance zone (HSZ) bordering the four countries as separate zones free from FMD where vaccination is practiced. The Commission recalled that the HSZ had been implemented following an agreement in March 2007 between the OIE and the CVP (*Comité Veterinario Permanente del Cono Sur*). Countries party to the agreement were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay. The thrust of the agreement was to implement a regional approach for FMD control in the southern cone region following outbreaks of FMD prior to the establishment of the agreement. The application of the agreement was monitored by expert missions of the OIE in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The conclusion of these missions was that there was full commitment by the participating countries and that excellent progress was made with the implementation of the agreement and the regional approach for the control of the disease.

The Commission was debriefed on a meeting held between the CVP, the Delegates of the four countries, the Director General of the OIE and the President of the Scientific Commission in Montevideo, Uruguay in November 2010, where the successful termination of the Agreement was discussed in depth. It had been agreed by the CVP that should the Scientific Commission consider their request favourably, the vigilance and disease control measures to prevent the introduction of FMD virus as was applied in the HSZ, would remain in force in the proposed zones free with vaccination.

The Commission acknowledged that the application of the participating countries to re-instate the HSZ zones into FMD free zones where vaccination is practised signalled the final stage of a successful project between the OIE and the CVP in the region.

The Commission endorsed the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group to reinstate the HZS bordering Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia to the status of free zones with vaccination as was the case prior to the Agreement between the OIE and the CVP, with the understanding that the re-instated FMD free zones would be kept as separate entities from the adjacent FMD free zones practising vaccination.

b) Brazil: Recognition of the protection zones located in the states of Bahia and Tocantins as a single distinct free zone with vaccination and the incorporation of the previous protection zone in the free with vaccination zone of Rondônia and expansion of the free zone 4 into the state of Amazonas

The Commission favourably considered the evaluation and recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group on the request of the Delegate of Brazil and agreed to request the OIE World Assembly of Delegates to endorse the following recommendations of the Commission:

- the recognition as a single, distinct FMD free zone with vaccination of the former protection zones located in the States of Bahia and Tocantins; and

- the incorporation of the current protection zone located in the State of Rondônia to the FMD free zone with vaccination, as well as the expansion of this free zone by inclusion of part of the municipalities Lábrea and Canutama, located in the State of Amazonas.

c) Japan: Re-instatement of a country free of FMD without vaccination

The Commission discussed in depth the evaluation and recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on the application of the Delegate of Japan for the reinstatement of their country free status of FMD without vaccination following the successful containment of the outbreak of FMD in Japan. The Commission endorsed the recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group and re-instated Japan as a country free from FMD where vaccination is not practised in accordance with the provisions and mandate provided to the Commission in Resolution XXII adopted at the 76th OIE General Session.

d) Botswana: Re-instatement of a zone free of FMD without vaccination

The Commission considered the request of the Delegate of Botswana and the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group and endorsed the recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group to re-instated Zone 7 as identified by the Delegate of Botswana, as a distinct zone free of FMD where vaccination is not practised, following the successful containment of an outbreak of FMD. The re-instatement took immediate effect in accordance with the provisions and mandate provided to the Commission in Resolution XXII adopted at the 76th OIE General Session.

e) Philippines: Recognition of a disease free status without vaccination of Zone 2 of the Luzon Province situated in the center of the Luzon Island

Within the policy of progressive zoning applied in the Philippines, Luzon's Zones 1 and 3 had previously been recognised by the OIE as free without vaccination, while Zone 2 situated between those two zones had remained without an officially recognized FMD free status by OIE. The Commission considered the evaluation and recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group and agreed to request the OIE World Assembly of Delegates to endorse the recommendation of the Commission that Zone 2 of the Luzon Province be recognised as a zone free from FMD where vaccination is not practised.

The Commission noted that Zones 1, 2 and 3 would be managed as separate entities and cautioned that strict movement control between the three zones needed to be maintained to ensure that in the event of an outbreak of FMD in one zone, the status of adjoining zones were not compromised.

The report of the a*d hoc* Group was adopted and is attached as Appendix VI.

4.5. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of the rinderpest disease status of Members : 11 – 12 January 2011

The Commission considered and supported the recommendations for rinderpest free status for the following OIE Members: Comoros, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Federated States of Micronesia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka and Turkmenistan.

The recommendation for rinderpest free status on historical considerations for Liberia (non-OIE Member) was also supported.

The Commission concluded that all countries with rinderpest susceptible livestock, both Members and non-Members of the OIE, and their non-contiguous territories were now considered rinderpest-free and that a declaration of global rinderpest freedom could be made by both the OIE and FAO. The Commission acknowledged that many role players contributed to realising this historical achievement and expressed its sincere gratitude and congratulations to all and in particular to the effort by the Scientific and Technical Department which managed the process for allocating free status to all countries and territories in such a manner to ensure the realisation of a declaration of global freedom in 2011 by the OIE and FAO.

The Commission reviewed a draft revised chapter on rinderpest developed by the *ad hoc* Group which was intended to replace the existing chapter 8.12 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The proposed new chapter provides for specific requirements for disease control in the post-eradication period and for the maintenance of global rinderpest freedom. The Commission made several changes to the draft chapter prepared by the *ad hoc* Group to avoid duplication of text and concepts that were already documented in other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. The draft chapter was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration and circulation to Members for comments. The possible need of a definition for "global disease freedom" for the glossary of the *Terrestrial Code* was discussed – especially as it related to determining the loss of global freedom and the re-instatement of global disease-free status. These concepts would be discussed in more detail with the Code Commission before finalisation. The Commission agreed with the proposal of the *ad hoc* Group that the annual reconfirmation by Members of their rinderpest free status would no more be necessary following the declaration of global disease freedom.

The Commission shared the concern of the *ad hoc* Group that the chapter on rinderpest in the *Terrestrial Manual* needed also updating to be *on par* with the actions needed in the post-eradication period. Provision should also be made to exercise control on the use of diagnostic kits for PPR (*Peste des petits ruminants*) in which live rinderpest antigen was used for rinderpest positive controls. The Commission decided to draw the attention of the Biological Standards Commission to these issues.

A draft Resolution that would be presented by the President of the Scientific Commission during the 79th General Session to officially acknowledge and endorse global rinderpest freedom was discussed and approved in principle by the Commission pending possible further amendments by both the OIE and FAO prior to the 79th General Session. The draft Resolution also provided for a mandate given to the Directors General of OIE and FAO to set up a new Advisory Committee that would assure oversight of continuing scientific activities on rinderpest, and ensure implementation of measures aimed at keeping the world free from rinderpest. The same Resolution was also to be presented for adoption at the FAO Conference in June 2011. The '*Guidelines for Rinderpest Virus Sequestration'*, as adopted by the Joint OIE/FAO Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication, would be annexed to the Resolution.

The Commission took note of the outcome of the 4th meeting of the Joint OIE/FAO Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication which was held at the OIE Headquarters from 13 to 14 January 2011. It was noted with appreciation that a book would be published as a joint venture by OIE and FAO on the history of rinderpest eradication. The Commission supported the suggestion of the *ad hoc* Group for the compilation of a compendium, for future use, of lessons learnt with global rinderpest eradication but suggested that the contributors could work through electronic communication rather than convening an *ad hoc* Group for that purpose.

The Commission expressed its concern on the many issues that were yet to be addressed or completed for a smooth advancement of activities in the post-eradication period such as updating of a database on live virus kept in stock, the development of a global contingency plan including guidelines on vaccination strategies and vaccine banks.

The report of the *ad hoc* Group was adopted and is attached as Appendix VII.

4.6 Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the official disease status recognition for Classical Swine Fever: 23 – 25 November 2010

The Commission discussed in detail the report and the amended draft chapter 15.2 prepared by the *ad hoc* Group on Classical Swine Fever (CSF) to make provision for official disease status recognition of CSF. The Commission acknowledged that the *ad hoc* Group had difficulty in harmonising issues related to the wildlife/livestock interface, new scientific advances in respect of CSF and trade facilitating requirements. The Commission agreed that an in-depth discussion on this issue between the Scientific and Code Commissions was needed to determine a consistent approach for OIE listed diseases where the presence of the disease in wildlife might have an effect on the recognition of disease-free zones and other trade facilitating initiatives. The non-availability of a DIVA test for an OIE listed viral disease should, in the view of the Commission, not be a disqualifying consideration to apply vaccination strategies or to establish disease free zones with vaccination. The Commission decided to refer the amended draft chapter back to the *ad hoc* Group with the request that the Group should reconsider the possibility of free status with vaccination and provide for surveillance based on virus circulation within the proposed surveillance strategy. The salient points on diagnostic tests and vaccines were forwarded to the Biological Standards Commission for their consideration.

The report of the a*d hoc* Group was not adopted and referred back to the Group for a review.

4.7 Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the Evaluation of Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) disease status: 25 – 27 January 2011

The Commission reviewed the report of the *ad hoc* Group and accompanying report of an expert mission to the People's Republic of China (PRC) to assess the disease control, surveillance and diagnostic programme for CBPP in selected provinces. The Commission commended the experts on an excellent report and the manner in which the mission was conducted under challenging circumstances.

In discussing the applications of Members for disease status recognition for CBPP, the Commission once again agreed that it was useful for *ad hoc* Groups involved in disease status evaluation to have access to PVS reports of applicant Members, where available, and to use these reports to complement or clarify information in the application dossiers. It was agreed that the matter be incorporated into a clear OIE policy in relation to the evaluation of disease status for other OIE listed diseases as well.

Based upon the mission report to the PRC as well as the scientific evidence provided by the Chinese authorities, the Commission recommended that the Code Commission consider including Yak (*Bos grunniens*) as susceptible species for CBPP within Article 11.8.1 of chapter 11.8 of the *Terrestrial Code.*

The Commission considered the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on the application of three Members for the evaluation of their CBPP status and agreed to recommend the following country status to the OIE World Assembly of Delegates for adoption at the 79th General Session:

- ***People's Republic of China***: Country free of CBPP

The applications of two other Members were not approved and referred back to the applicant Members.

The report of the *ad hoc* Group was adopted and is attached as Appendix VIII.

5. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)

5.1. Global strategy for foot and mouth disease control

Dr Joseph Domenech, Scientific and Technical Depratment, summarized the developments under the GF-TADs umbrella to coordinate activities between the OIE, FAO and other role players related to the global control of FMD. A Joint FAO/OIE FMD Working Group had been established under the GF-TADs Global Steering Committee. The FMD Working Group (WG) would work in a complementary manner with the OIE Scientific Commission and other OIE Specialist Commissions and would use recommendations of the Scientific Commission as basis for the GF-TADs initiatives. The Commission reviewed the report of a meeting of the FMD focal points within FAO and OIE under the GF-TADs initiative in which more detail was provided on the terms of reference and future activities of the WG. The Scientific Commission which had been tasked already in 2009 to develop a global strategy for FMD control and which was assumed to play a key role in further actions regarding the global FMD control, requested that a representative of the Scientific Commission be invited to attend the meetings of the WG where necessary. The Commission was of the opinion that it would enhance transparency and communication between the Commission and the WG. It was also noted that the role to be played by OIE Reference Laboratories for FMD within the global strategy was not yet clearly identified within the terms of reference of the WG and thus needed clarification.

As indicated by the Director General in his welcoming remarks, the Commission would also be involved in the Global FMD Conference to be held in Thailand in June 2012. The main objectives of the conference would be try to to elicit donor support for the global FMD control programme and to foster the buy-in and joint committment of relevant role players.

The Commission reviewed the updated version of the Progressive Control Pathway (PCP) for FMD provided by the WG and did not see a need for further amendments. It agreed that the PCP was a useful and valuable tool for countries wishing to use it and guide them towards eventual freedom from FMD, but that it should not be regarded as obligatory or a prerequisite to apply for the OIE endorsement of national FMD control programmes.

5.2. OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratories network

The Commission invited Dr Jef Hammond from the OIE Reference Laboratory at Pirbright, who was managing the OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratories network and vaccine bank, to provide an overview on the current global status of FMD and on the activities of the network.

An increase of 25% in samples submitted for diagnosis was experienced in 2010 (1218 samples from 26 countries) compared to the same period in 2009. These samples were mostly from Asia (46%), Africa (38%), Middle East (12%) and South America (4%). While the increase of samples submitted from across the globe to the OIE Reference Laboratory at Pirbright was welcomed, a substantial number of these samples, submitted mainly for diagnostic purposes, originated from countries or areas where other OIE FMD Reference Laboratories were operational and geographically closer to or even adjoining the submitting country. The Commission once again expressed its concern that the uncoordinated submission of samples for diagnosis not only placed an additional burden on certain larger laboratories but also defeated the purpose of having OIE Reference Laboratories well geographically distributed.

FMD virus serotype O remained the most commonly diagnosed (68%) followed by serotype A (16%), SAT1 (10%) and SAT2 (6%). The Commission noted with appreciation the initiative for a combined FMD/SVD (Swine Vesicular Disease) proficiency project in which 66 out of the 77 laboratories originally invited from 75 countries agreed to participate.

Good progress had been made with the project on vaccine matching tests mostly from samples submitted from Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Indications were that in some instances there was reason for concern on the low matching results especially as it related to serotype O indicating the use and application of vaccines that were not fully capable of controlling the disease.

Dr Hammons shared his concern and that of the other members of the network on the role that should be played by the FMD Reference Laboratories within the global FMD control strategy. He was informed of the developments under the GF-TADs initiative and of the request of the Commission that the role of the networks needs to be more clearly defined (see 5.1 above). Information was also provided on the discussion held at the meeting of the Presidents of the Specialist Commissions to consider giving more prominence and recognition to OIE laboratory networks, with the possibility to provide extra-budgetary funding to certain networks of strategic importance.

5.3. FMD outbreak in Bulgaria

The recent outbreak of FMDV serotype O in wild boar and livestock in Bulgaria was discussed in detail. The Commission took note of the measures taken and requested the OIE Animal Health Information Department to follow-up on measures taken in the adjacent Thrace region of Turkey with a view to preventing the introduction of FMD virus into the OIE-recognised free zone (see 1.4 above).

5.4. Inactivation of ruminant and porcine casings

On request of the Code Commission, data had been collected that scientifically justified an amendment of the *Terrestrial Code* to provide for a differentiation between risk mitigation measures of natural vs. artificial casings. These data were submitted to the Code Commission for their consideration.

6. Report of the meeting of the Working Group on Wildlife diseases (WGWD): 12 – 15 October 2010

The Commission discussed the report of the WGWD and noted with appreciation the excellent work done by the Working Group in support of the objectives of the Commission and the OIE. An update on the OIE activities for the training of national Focal Points for Wildlife was provided by the Scientific and Technical Department. The Commission noted with appreciation the contribution of members of the Working Group in support of this training, especially the provision of a training manual by the Canadian Collaborating Centre (CCWHC) and the willingness to develop a training manual for a second series of training workshops.

Amendments to chapters 6.11 and 5.10 of the *Terrestrial Code* (quarantine measures for non-human primates and model veterinary international certificate) proposed by the Working Group were discussed and endorsed by the Commission and were forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

The Commission considered the request of the Working Group for a review of the chapter on Theileriosis in the *Terrestrial Code* and acknowledged that the current chapter was out-dated and required a revision especially due to the wildlife involvement and the negative trade implications of the disease, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The review of the appropriate chapters was placed on the working programme of the Commission and would be addressed pending completion of other outstanding priorities.

Dr Billy Karesh, Chairman of the Working Group, was invited to join the Commission for discussions on the working programme of the Group and priority issues identified by the Commission. Dr Karesh gave an overview on the activities of the Working Group as reflected in the report. Special mention was made of the involvement of members of the Group in the OIE Wildlife Conference and the undertaking of the Group to edit and compile the presentations into post-conference proceedings. Valuable information was shared on the reporting of non-listed wildlife diseases and their potential impact on trade. The Commission acknowledged the need that this issue needed to be further discussed within the Working Group in liaison with the Animal Health Information Department. The Working Group should then formulate formal proposals for consideration by the Commission. The Commission also noted with appreciation the network of liaison initiated by the Working Group with other relevant organisations to complement the activities of the Group. The Commission reiterated the need for members of the Working Group to make themselves available to serve on OIE *ad hoc* Groups for diseases or topics where a wildlife involvement was or could be implicated.

The report of the Working Group was adopted (79 SG/13 GT).

7. Update on 'One Health' activities

The Commission was informed by the Scientific and Technical Department, with inputs by the chairman of the Working Group on Wildlife Diseases, on the IDENTIFY and PREDICT initiatives under the Emerging Pandemic Threats (EPT) Programme funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The OIE was a key participant in the EPT initiative, with a particular focus on improving laboratory capacity and laboratory networks, the aim of which was to improve the global capacity to predict and prevent emerging diseases with pandemic potential. A large focus of the programme was targeted to diseases associated with wildlife. Areas of work for the overall programme included: pathogen detection, risk modelling, risk reduction, wildlife surveillance capacity building, information sharing and management, and advanced training in human and veterinary public health. The Commission took note of these initiatives which were also discussed at a workshop held at the OIE headquarters in January 2011 and requested to remain updated on further developments.

Consistent with the guidance outlined in the OIE's 5th Strategic Plan, the Commission reaffirmed its role to serves as the advisory body to OIE on One Health activities. In this context, a brief update was provided on relevant activities including joint initiatives by OIE, FAO and WHO and the plans to deploy a first pilot "One Health" PVS mission in an OIE Member.

8. Outbreak of glanders in the Middle East

The Commission was informed by the Animal Health Information Department on the progress with resolving the glanders outbreaks in the Middle East. The Commission was assured that the necessary strategies for surveillance (including the possibility of animal identification) had now been being implemented in certain countries in the region and that the situation would continue to be monitored in the Middle East. Following requests from several interested groups such as the FEI (International Equine Federation), a conference would be planned to address the problems related to glanders and also other related problems associated with the international movement of horses that might pose a risk for international equestrian events such as the Olympic Games scheduled for 2016 in South America.

9. Issues referred to the Scientific Commission by the Code Commission

The Scientific Commission reviewed several Chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* following Member comments. The comments of the Scientific Commission were added to the following Chapters for further consideration by the Code Commission:

Glossary: Comments forwarded to Code Commission

Chapter 1.2: *Criteria for listing of diseases:* Discussed between Commissions. Revised draft prepared during the meeting by the Animal health information Department was discussed and accepted by the Scientific Commission

Chapter 4.6: *Collection and processing of semen:* Comments forwarded to Code Commission

Chapter 8.3: *Bluetongue:* The Commission provided an opinion on several Member comments for consideration by the Code Commission.

Chapter 8.5: *Foot and mouth disease***:** Comments related to the endorsement of national FMD control programmes. The Commission acknowledge that Chapter 8.5 was in need of a thorough revision (for internal consistency) but in agreement with the Code Commission that this would be done once the adoption of new concepts had been finalised and accepted by Members.

Chapter 8.10: *Rabies:* Following extensive Member comments on the draft chapter prepared by the *ad hoc* Group and circulated to Members by the Code Commission, the Commission requested that the *ad hoc* Group reconvene before the September 2011 meeting of the Commission to address the proposals and concerns. A reviewed draft chapter should preferably be available before the OIE Global Conference on rabies scheduled for 7 – 9 September 2011 in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

Chapter 12.1: *African horse sickness:* Comments discussed in depth by the Commission and changes were made to accommodate Member comments. The Commission identified the need to have mutual discussions with the Code Commission on defining a common approach to enhance consistency in approaches for recognising disease free countries or zones for vector-borne diseases.

Chapter 12.7: *Equine Influenza:* Comments forwarded

Chapter 12.10: *Equine viral arteritis***:** Comments forwarded

Chapter 15.2: *Classical swine fever:* Comments on the current chapter forwarded. Draft chapter proposed by *ad hoc* Group referred back to Group for reconsideration.

Chapter 15.4: *Swine vesicular disease:* The Chapter was received too late by the Scientific Commission for discussion and consideration of Member comments and will be considered during the next meeting.

The Scientific and Code Commissions also held a combined meeting where the issues described above were discussed, as well as the following:

- *Re-ordering the chapters in the Terrestrial Code in accordance with the causative pathogen***:** Supported by both Commissions.

- *Nosematosis – possibility of adding it to OIE Listed diseases:* Referred to an appropriate *ad hoc* Group for opinion.

- *Wildlife/Livestock interface:* The need for in-depth discussions between the two Commissions at the next meeting was agreed.

- *Definition of global freedom from disease:* To be discussed in detail at the next meeting

- *Adding Mycobacterium caprae to the chapter on Bovine Tuberculosis:* More scientific justification was requested by Scientific and Technical Department. The information available did not allow for justification to include *M. caprae*.

- *Concept of herd freedom for bovine tuberculosis:* Response to Member comments at 78th General Session. Agreement that the chapter should provide for both compartmentalisation and herd freedom to accommodate needs and requests of African Delegates.

- *Host genotype for scrapie resistance:* Both Commissions agreed that the decision taken at previous meeting is still valid and need not be discussed again.

- *Chapters on diseases of honey bees:* Comments of Members will be referred to *ad hoc* Group on honey bee diseases for consideration.

- *Information on chapters on zoonotic parasitic diseases:* Would be made available to the Scientific Commission for their next meeting.

- *Updating of Terrestrial Code chapter on Rift Valley Fever:* The Scientific Commission indicated that the Director General will be requested to convene an *ad hoc* Group on Rift Valley Fever to review and update the current chapter.

10. Other matters discussed

- *Ad hoc Group on EHD (Enzootic haemorrhagic disease):* The terms of reference of the *ad hoc* Group and the composition of the Group was endorsed by the Commission and the preparations for the first meeting of the Group finalised.

- *Terms of reference for disease status evaluation expert missions:* The Commission drafted and endorsed the terms of reference for consideration by the Director General in mandating expert missions to Members.

- *Terms of reference for the ad hoc Group on PPR (Peste des petits ruminants):* The Commission discussed and endorsed the terms of reference of the *ad hoc* Group that will meet during the second semester of 2011.

- *Ad hoc Group on animal health and welfare and public health concerns during natural disasters:* The Commission discussed the request for guidance by the OIE in the event of natural disasters such as earth quakes, Tsunamis, etc. and resolved that a multidisciplinary team of experts would best be suited to provide guidance to the OIE and its Members. The Director General will be requested to mandate the composition of such an *ad hoc* Group under the auspices of the Scientific Commission and the involvement of the relevant Departments of the OIE Headquarters.

- *Official disease status recognition procedures and implications for zoning and implementation of protection zones:* The Commission requested the Scientific and Technical Department to elaborate a list of possible situations or combinations occurring in new applications or maintenance of disease status with emphasis on procedural or Terrestrial Code provisions to be considered for evaluation of such situations. This compilation would be discussed in more detail during the next meeting.

11. Next meetings of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases

The next meetings of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases will be from 29 August to 2 September 2011 and 13 to 17 February 2012, pending confirmation.

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…/Appendices

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 1 - 4 February 2011

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Agenda

1. Report of the meeting of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases of 7 to 10 September 2010

1.1. Guide on Terrestrial Animal Health Surveillance

1.2. Work programme of the Commission

1.3. Procedures for the evaluation of applications for disease status recognition

1.4. Maintenance of official disease status by Members

2. Meeting of the Presidents of Specialist Commissions: 25 November 2010

3. Scheduled OIE scientific conferences

4. Review of reports of a*d hoc* Group meetings

4.1. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology: 5 – 7 October 2010

4.2. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on Antimicrobial resistance: 2 – 4 November 2010

4.3. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) risk status evaluation of Members: 2 – 4 November 2010

4.4. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of the FMD status of Members: 6 – 8 December 2010

a) Agreement of March 2007 between the OIE and the CVP: Re-instatement of high surveillance zones into FMD free zones where vaccination is practised

b) Brazil: Recognition of the protection zones located in the states of Bahia and Tocantins as a single distinct free zone with vaccination and the incorporation of the previous protection zone in the free with vaccination zone of Rondônia and expansion of the free zone 4 into the state of Amazonas

c) Japan: Re-instatement of a country free of FMD without vaccination

d) Botswana: Re-instatement of a zone free of FMD without vaccination

e) Philippines: Recognition of a disease free status without vaccination of Zone 2 of the Luzon Province situated in the centre of the Luzon Island

4.5. Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of the rinderpest disease status of Members : 11 – 12 January 2011

4.6 Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the official disease status recognition for Classical Swine Fever: 23 – 25 November 2010

4.7 Report of the *ad hoc* Group on the Evaluation of Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) disease status: 25 – 27 January 2011

5. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)

5.1. Global strategy for foot and mouth disease control

5.2. OIE/FAO FMD Reference Laboratories network

5.3. FMD outbreak in Bulgaria

5.4. Inactivation of ruminant and porcine casings

6. **Report of the meeting of the Working Group on Wildlife diseases (WGWD): 12 – 15 October 2010**
7. **Update on 'One Health' activities**
8. **Outbreak of glanders in the Middle East**
9. **Issues referred to the Scientific Commission by the Code Commission**
10. **Other matters discussed**
11. **Next meetings of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases**

MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 1 – 4 February 2011

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Appendix III

Original: English
October 2010

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON EPIDEMIOLOGY

Paris, 5 – 7 October 2010

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The OIE *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology was welcomed by Dr Lea Knopf from the Scientific and Technical Department, who gave an overview on the main topics and priorities on the agenda. She provided additional information on the topic-specific discussions on the work of the *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology at the last meeting of the Scientific Commission held early September 2010.

1. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of a rapporteur

The meeting was chaired by Dr Cristóbal Zepeda and Dr Jeffrey Mariner was designated as rapporteur. The adopted agenda and list of participants are attached as Appendices I and II, respectively.

2. User-Friendly, Generic Checklist on the Practical Application of Compartmentalisation

To achieve the required style, the Group transformed the already published Checklist for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease into a generic checklist and then reviewed the document to clarify key points harmonising the new checklist with the previous version of the generic checklist drafted by the Group at their last meeting in March 2010 and the current *Terrestrial Code*. The Group added an Annex to the documents containing a short guide for collection of information needed when establishing compartments.

The updated version of the checklist indicated that in the event of an outbreak of the disease for which the compartment was intended, it was the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority in the country containing the compartment to notify all countries with which it had a bilateral agreement for recognition of the compartment. However, the provisions of Article 4.4.7 of the Chapter on Application of compartmentalisation of the *Terrestrial Code* specified that the importing countries should be notified following the provisions of Chapter 1.1 on notification of diseases and epidemiological information and through the OIE. Also, Chapter 1.1 did not have a provision for direct notification between OIE Members. As the recognition of compartments was through bilateral agreements between Members, it was suggested that Article 4.4.7 be changed to indicate that the importing countries should be notified directly by the exporting country. Therefore the reference to Chapter 1.1 should be deleted. In any case, the OIE would be notified through the normal sanitary reporting process (i.e. 6-monthly reports or immediate notification).

The document is attached as Appendix III.

3. Expert opinion on possible changes of definitions of the OIE *Terrestrial Code* glossary compared to the glossary and definitions resulting from the pre-ISVEE surveillance workshop

The Group reviewed the definitions provided in the report of the Pre-ISVEE workshop on animal health surveillance[1] and discussed selected definitions and the overall number of terms defined. A part from the *Terrestrial Code* glossary, additional standard encyclopaedias such as the "A Dictionary of Epidemiology" (5th Ed. M. Porta) were used to refine the reflections on the terms under discussion. It was noted that some used the terms 'targeted surveillance' and 'risk-based surveillance' interchangeably, but that the Pre-ISVEE

[1] Pre-ISVEE Workshop (6-8 August 2010, Durban, South Africa): Discussing the Development and Application of Methods for Effective Surveillance in Livestock Populations

workshop defined 'targeted surveillance' as surveillance for a specific disease or specific disease agent. Several disease specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, such as the Chapters on FMD, AI, CSF, and ND used the term 'targeted surveillance' as a term for risk-based surveillance. Targeted surveillance was defined in the text of the *Terrestrial Code* as surveillance based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular localities or species. The Group felt that surveillance could be targeted in many ways and that the term 'targeted surveillance' was inherently ambiguous. In addition, the term 'specific surveillance' was presently in the *Terrestrial Code* glossary and defined as pathogen-specific surveillance, but it was not consistently used in the texts of the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Group was of the view that for the purposes of the OIE *Terrestrial Code*, only those definitions that were of direct relevance to the *Terrestrial Code* should be included in the *Terrestrial Code*. For these purposes, the Group agreed that definitions for 'pathogen-specific surveillance' and 'risk-based surveillance' should be developed and added to the general glossary. If this change was adopted, it would require that several disease chapters be harmonised with the new terminology (i.e. 'targeted surveillance' should be changed to 'risk-based surveillance' and 'specific surveillance' should be changed to 'pathogen-specific surveillance').

It was agreed that advantages of the creation of definitions needed to be balanced against the disadvantages of proliferation of jargon. The Group observed that ease of understanding by animal health staff and good communication on surveillance would best be fostered by crafting documents with minimal jargon and sufficient elaboration of concepts using broadly understood terminology.

The Group reviewed the definitions of 'surveillance' in the glossary of the *Terrestrial Code* and the Pre-ISVEE surveillance workshop and found the definition contained in the Pre-ISVEE surveillance workshop to be preferable. The only reservation expressed was that the reference to 'measurement' in the Pre-ISVEE surveillance workshop definition may be problematic given the bias is often characteristic of surveillance data sets.

The Group suggested that all technical terms used in the *Terrestrial Code* and that require a definition to avoid ambiguity or incorrect use should be defined in the general glossary of the *Terrestrial Code*. Definitions contained in topic-specific chapters, such as in the Chapter 1.4. on animal health surveillance, should be moved to the general glossary. This would make the *Terrestrial Code* more user-friendly.

4. Generic Guidelines on Disease Control

The Group reviewed selected documents on disease control and developed an outline for a generic guidance document for OIE Members. The Group felt that this guide should focus at the strategic level in terms of helping countries to identify priorities, objectives and desired endpoints. The Group noted that it was important to clearly formulate goals such as disease control or eradication versus mitigation of impacts of diseases. The guidelines should also highlight economic analysis of potential disease intervention options taking into consideration effectiveness, feasibility of implementation, and costs and benefits.

The Group agreed that this was an important opportunity for the OIE to review customary approaches to disease control and critically redefine objectives, policies and strategies to aid OIE Members in the development of animal health programmes that are better adapted to the full range of national needs.

5. Information on the planned Expert Technical Consultation in Support of the OIE Emerging Pandemic Threats (EPT) Programme activities

The *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology was briefed by Dr Kate Glynn from the Scientific and Technical Department on the activities of the Emerging Pandemic Threats (EPT) Programme launched by the USAID and the plans of the OIE to hold an expert technical consultation on surveillance for emerging diseases in January 2011 within this framework. The Group was impressed by the breadth and scope of this important initiative and stressed that the success of the programme was contingent upon engagement of all stakeholders and adequate attention to lessons learnt in the development of surveillance and response systems. It was noted

that many developing countries and their population had a range of pressing problems requiring immediate attention. It was suggested that the OIE could play a leadership role in integrating the diverse priorities of the participants in surveillance systems (e.g. farmers, abattoirs, veterinary services or regional bodies) with the goals of EPT to assure engagement of stakeholders resulting in sustainable success.

The *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology fully agreed with the Scientific and Technical Department that one member of the *ad hoc* Group should participate in the surveillance expert technical consultation to assure good internal communication, so that both expert groups could benefit from each other's experience and expertise. The *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology delegated Dr Jeff Mariner to attend the EPT Surveillance Meeting on their behalf.

6. Adoption of the draft report

The *ad hoc* Group reviewed and amended the draft report provided by the rapporteur. The Group agreed that the report captured the discussions and therefore could be adopted without additional circulation to the Group for comments.

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…/Appendices

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON EPIDEMIOLOGY

Paris, 5 – 7 October 2010

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Agenda

1. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of a rapporteur
2. User-Friendly, Generic Checklist on the Practical Application of Compartmentalisation
3. Expert opinion on possible changes of definitions of the OIE *Terrestrial Code* glossary compared to the glossary and definitions resulting from the surveillance pre-ISVEE surveillance workshop
4. Generic Guidelines on Disease Control
5. Information on the planned Expert Technical Consultation in Support of the OIE Emerging Pandemic Threats (EPT) Programme activities
6. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

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Appendix II

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON EPIDEMIOLOGY

Paris, 5 – 7 October 2010

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Appendix III

Checklist on the Practical Application of Compartmentalisation

(revised version October 2010, *ad hoc* Group on Epidemiology)

Introduction

Compartmentalisation is a procedure to recognize the disease status of a group of animals based on management and biosecurity factors. The animals within the compartment should be contained in one or more establishments under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct health status for a specific disease within the territory of a Member.

While zoning applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis, compartmentalisation applies to an animal sub-population defined primarily by management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity. In practice, spatial considerations and good management play important roles in the application of both concepts.

The recommendations for compartments in the *Terrestrial Code* cannot be applied in all situations. The effective implementation of the concept of compartmentalisation depends, amongst other things, on the epidemiology of the disease, country factors, environmental factors, the biosecurity measures which may be applicable, the health status of animals in adjacent areas, surveillance and the public/private sector relationship. Compartmentalisation may be particularly applicable in intensive industries where production systems are vertically integrated.

This Checklist advises on the practical implementation of the concept of compartmentalisation with the objective to facilitate trade in animals including germplasm and products of animal origin. It is not for the moment an OIE standard, nor is it part of the OIE *Terrestrial Code*. It is provided to help countries wishing to implement compartments.

In disease-free countries or zones, it is preferable to define compartments prior to the occurrence of a disease outbreak. In the event of an outbreak or in infected countries or zones, compartmentalisation may be used to facilitate trade.

Compartments must be under the responsibility of the Veterinary Authority in the country. For the purposes of these guidelines, compliance by the Members with Chapters 1.1. and 3.1 and 3.2. is an essential prerequisite.

In order to comply with the requirements of Chapters 4.3. and 4.4. the following information should be collated. The recognition of compartments is a bilateral agreement between the Veterinary Authorities of the countries involved.

Relevant supporting information may be found in the *Terrestrial Code*:

- Chapter 4.3 on Zoning and Compartmentalisation;
- Chapter 4.4 on the Application of Compartmentalisation;
- Chapters 3.1 on Veterinary Services and 3.2 on the Evaluation of Veterinary Services;
- Chapters 1.4 on Animal Health Surveillance and 1.5 on Surveillance for Arthropod Vectors on Animal Disease;
- Chapter 4.1 on General Principles on Identification and Traceability of Live Animals and 4.2 on Design and Implementation of Identification Systems to Achieve Animal Traceability;
- Relevant disease chapters for which the compartment is designed.

In addition other *Terrestrial Code* chapters might be applicable.

The document lists the principal issues that need to be addressed for the establishment of a compartment.

1. Principles for defining a compartment

A compartment must be clearly defined, indicating the location of all its components including establishments, as well as related functional units (such as feed mills, slaughterhouses and rendering plants), their interrelationships and their contribution to an epidemiological separation between the animals in a compartment and subpopulations with a different health status. The definition should include:

- the disease for which the compartment is intended. While a compartment might be free from several diseases, each disease should be addressed individually in the design of the biosecurity plan;
- a description of the animal subpopulation comprising the compartment including disease and vaccination status, as well as animal identification and traceability in accordance with the *Terrestrial Code*; depending on the sector, this may be done at the herd, flock, lot or individual animal level;
- the establishment(s) and/or other premises operated by an enterprise which would constitute the compartment, and the common biosecurity management system under which they operate (for example, animal housing facilities, animal transport routes, feed distribution systems, work procedures);
- a description of the functional relationships between components of the compartment, including maps and diagrams, showing their contribution to the epidemiological separation between animals in the compartment and other subpopulations, including:
  - common management or ownership;
  - relationship of the compartment with related functional units (such as feed mills, slaughterhouses and rendering plants);
  - adoption of industry plans that contain biosecurity guidelines e.g. health improvement plans and breed registries.

2. Separation of a compartment from potential sources of infection

The management of a compartment must provide to the Veterinary Authority documented evidence on the following:

a) Physical or spatial factors that affect the status of biosecurity in a compartment

A description of the spatial factors relating to pathways of disease transmission to ensure that there is adequate physical separation of the animals in the compartment from nearby animal subpopulations of different or unknown health status, including:

- the location, disease and vaccination status, and biosecurity of other epidemiologically relevant populations. Provide a map and distances. Consideration should be given to the distance and physical separation from:
  - flocks or herds with a different health status in close proximity to the compartment, including wildlife and their migratory routes;
  - slaughterhouses, rendering plants or feed mills;
  - markets, fairs, agricultural shows, sporting events, zoos and other points of animal concentration.
- a description of the relevant environmental factors that may affect exposure to the pathogen(s), including:
  - natural windbreaks, geographic features and other barriers to pathogen spread;
  - existence of factors that may contribute to pathogen spread;
  - expected pathogen survivability in the local environment;
  - climatic and seasonal factors.

b) Infrastructural factors

A description of the relevant infrastructural factors that may affect exposure to the pathogen(s), including buildings and equipment. For each unit of the compartment, provide details on physical separation relevant for the specific disease, such as:

- housing;
- fencing or other effective means of physical separation; provide details such as height, material, mesh size and depth;
- facilities for people entry including access control, changing area and showers;
- vehicle access including cleaning and disinfection procedures;
- control of use and routing of vehicles with access to the compartment;
- unloading and loading facilities;
- isolation facilities for introduced animals;
- facilities for the introduction of material and equipment;
- facilities to store feed and veterinary products;
- disposal of carcasses, manure and waste;
- water supply;
- measures to prevent exposure to living mechanical or biological vectors such as insects, rodents and wild birds;
- ventilation systems;
- describe the workflows within the unit;
- dedicated equipment coming into contact with animals as well as cleaning and disinfection procedures of equipment upon entry to the compartment;
- cleaning and disinfection procedures applied in the establishment
- for each unit, provide a diagram covering the above aspects.

c) Biosecurity plan

A biosecurity plan should address all relevant factors including:

- the partnership(s) between the Veterinary Authority and the relevant enterprise(s);
- an assessment of the financial, human and technical resources required and available;
- a description of the potential pathways of disease entry into the compartment and critical control points to prevent introduction. Consideration should be given to domestic animal movements, rodents, wild animals, aerosols, arthropods, vehicles, people, biological products, equipment, fomites, feed, waterways and to the survivability of the pathogen in the environment. In addition, a description of the procedures in place to regularly review scientific data relating to these pathways and risks should be provided;
- a description of the biosecurity measures adopted at each critical control point to mitigate the risk of introduction of the pathogen via the pathways described above;
- the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for implementation and audit of the biosecurity plan including regular review and updating of the biosecurity measures. In general, the SOPs should describe:
    - implementation, maintenance, monitoring of the measures;
    - application of corrective actions;
    - verification of the process;
    - record keeping and time period for which records are available for audit;
    - contingency plans in the event of a change in the level of exposure;
    - reporting procedures to the Veterinary Authority.

The SOPsS should provide specific details covering:

- personnel training:
  - generic hygiene and biosecurity principles and procedures;
  - procedures applicable to maintaining biosecurity;
  - the specific procedures to be followed, such as human and animal movement controls;
- quality assurance schemes (if any) in operation;
- animal movement controls:
  - measures and infrastructure are in place to prevent contact between animals in the compartment and others from outside the compartment;
  - all animals and germplasm introduced into the compartment should be of the same animal health status of the compartment
  - handling and transport procedures operate in a biosecure manner through the use of either equipment dedicated to the compartment or appropriately cleaned and disinfected equipment;
  - procedures are in place to ensure the appropriate separation between production groups and from newly introduced animals;
- animal health:
  - appropriate breeding and production records are available;
  - morbidity and mortality history is available;
  - details of medications used (including vaccines) and treatment outcomes are available;
  - arrangements for veterinary involvement in animal health, and disease diagnosis and reporting are appropriate;
  - procedures are in place for the identification, handling, storage and disposal of sick and dead animals in a biosecure manner;
- human movement controls:
  - there is functional boundary fencing, with cleared areas and secure access points, and appropriate signage;
  - procedures are in place, for example through the use of colour-coded clothing and one-way entries, to regulate the movement of humans within the compartment;
  - procedures are in place for regulating visitor access (including veterinarians, contractors, maintenance personnel, animal handlers, feed delivery personnel, and their equipment) to premises in the compartment, for example through the use of a visitor logbook, restrictions on prior contact with animals of susceptible species outside the compartment, the use of disinfectant footbaths at all entries, and procedures for hand-washing and the provision of clean clothing and footwear for visitors who may come into contact with animals in the compartment;
  - procedures are in place for ensuring that different groups of animals within the compartment are handled in a biosecure manner, for example segregating animals under suspicion of health problems;
  - restrictions are in place regarding employee contact with susceptible animals outside the compartment, for example: employees should not be permitted to own other epidemiologically relevant animals, and should have had no contact with animals of lesser or unknown health status prior to entering the compartment for a period relevant for the defined disease;
- controls over vehicles:
  - procedures are in place for regulating visitor vehicle access to the premises;

- procedures are in place for regulating the activities of work vehicles relevant to the compartment (such as feed delivery, animal delivery and pickup, bedding delivery and removal, and maintenance vehicles). Those operating solely within the compartment should be subject to regular cleaning and disinfection and those with access to premises outside the compartment should be subject to full cleaning and disinfection immediately prior to entering the compartment;

o security of feed and water sources:

- the water supply is known to be free from contamination with relevant pathogens through the use of mains water or appropriately treated water (for example chlorination or UV treatment) from other sources;
- if any feed is sourced from outside the compartment, that feed supply is known to be free from contamination with relevant pathogens through the use of approved/audited suppliers and production methods;
- the feed transport and storage facilities operate in a biosecure manner, for example, through the use of either dedicated equipment or equipment which is cleaned and disinfected before being used for feed destined for use in the compartment.

The Veterinary Authority should:

- provide epidemiological data for the disease in the country or zone where the compartments are established;
- where possible and relevant to the biosecurity plan, implement additional awareness programmes to ensure disease notification by all those involved in the livestock production sector including animal owners, private practitioners, handlers, transporters, butchers and processors among others;

The management of the compartment should work with the Veterinary Authority in the development of biosecurity plans. While these responsibilities should be addressed in partnership, the final authority for the purposes of disease surveillance and reporting, disease control and veterinary certification for international trade from the compartment lies with the Veterinary Authority.

d) Traceability system

The Veterinary Authority should ensure that an effective animal identification and traceability system is in place. Depending on the animal species and type of production, identification and registration may be done at the group or individual animal level. Describe in detail:

- the method of individual animal identification. Where individual identification may not be feasible, such as with broilers and day-old chicks, the Veterinary Authority should provide sufficient information concerning the assurance of traceability;
- the systems in place for traceability which should at least include recording of date of birth or hatching, date and type of vaccinations, testing and test results, and origin and movements of the animals and germplasm;
- the audit system for traceability. Describe the frequency and procedures including the reporting of results and corrective actions.

3. Surveillance for the agent or disease

The Veterinary Authority should ensure that:

- the necessary surveillance at the national level, the means to implement it, and the procedures for the investigation and reporting of disease incidents are in place.
- a good knowledge and understanding of the relevant disease within and outside the compartment, including in wild animals if appropriate is available.
- surveillance should be conducted in accordance with Chapters 1.4. on Animal Health Surveillance and 1.5. on Surveillance for Arthropod Vectors of Animal Diseases as well as the specific recommendations on surveillance for the disease in the *Terrestrial Code*.

Essential components include:

a) Internal surveillance

A description should be provided of:

- the documented baseline health status of the subpopulation before the compartment was established, indicating the dates of last disease occurrence (if any), the number of outbreaks and the methods of disease control that were applied;
- the procedures for the early detection of disease in the event that the disease enters the compartment; for example, through the detection of specific clinical signs, routine testing, monitoring of parameters such as increased morbidity or mortality, reduced feed or water consumption, changes in behaviour and reduced production;
- the procedures for investigation of a suspect case, including reporting and subsequent management;
- the documented records of suspect and confirmed cases;
- the medication and vaccination records.

For the disease for which the compartment is defined, the following information should be provided:

- type of surveillance applied, as described in Chapters 1.4. and 1.5., and the relevant disease chapter;
- types of test used, interpretation of results;
- target population;
- sample size;
- frequency of testing and clinical inspection;
- surveillance results: provide the number of suspect and positive cases;
- follow-up of suspect and positive findings;

The management of the compartment should report accurately and without delay to the Veterinary Services on disease incidents occurring in the compartment.

b) External surveillance

Describe in detail the following:

- type of surveillance applied as described in Chapter 1.4; including passive and targeted surveillance;
- relevant risk factors, in particular concerning the epidemiological units in close proximity to the compartment and those in areas posing a risk to the compartment;
- types of test used, interpretation of results;
- sample size;
- frequency of testing and clinical inspections;
- surveillance results: provide the number of suspect and positive cases;
- follow-up of suspect and positive findings;

4. Diagnostic capabilities and procedures

The Veterinary Authority should support surveillance through the testing of samples at laboratories operating in accordance with the OIE *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* (hereafter referred to as the Terrestrial Manual). Each laboratory that conducts testing should use systematic procedures for rapid reporting of results to the Veterinary Authority. Where appropriate, results should be confirmed by an OIE reference laboratory. The Veterinary Authority should provide:

- a list of the officially designated laboratories used for testing and confirming results;

- for each laboratory, the capacity of the laboratory to comply with the surveillance requirements;
- the type of tests applied for the defined disease;
- the volume of samples that can be handled for each test;
- the procedures and methods to ensure quality control;
- the procedures for general reporting of test results and rapid reporting of positive results.

5. Emergency response and notification

In case of a suspicion or occurrence of any OIE listed disease not previously present according to the baseline animal health report of the compartment, including the disease for which the compartment is defined, the management of the compartment should notify the Veterinary Authority.

The Veterinary Authority should immediately suspend export certification and should notify all countries with which it has bilateral agreements for the recognition of the compartment. Trade may only be resumed after the compartment has adopted the necessary measures to re-establish the biosecurity level and the Veterinary Authority re-approves the compartment for trade.

The Veterinary Authority should describe the procedures and measures applied:

- in the event of suspected or confirmed occurrence of disease for which the compartment was defined;
- in the event of a breach in biosecurity regardless of the suspicion of disease;
- in the event of a change of the disease situation of the surrounding area.

6. Supervision and control of a compartment

The responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority regarding the infrastructure supporting the compartment (which needs to be in place before the compartment is established) include:

- to develop and apply the necessary legislative base for the establishment, recognition and supervision of compartments;
- to develop effective partnerships with the management of the compartment; through such partnerships, to gain a good knowledge and understanding of the structure and operations of the various livestock sectors (production and non-production);
- to ensure that systems are in place to provide credible official certification of the health status of the compartment, and commodities that may be traded from it;
- to devise and publicize, in partnership with industry, generic criteria and model biosecurity plans applicable to compartmentalisation;
- to regularly review scientific data and re-assess the risk factors, to ensure that the SOPs continue to be appropriate to the situation;
- to develop and implement audit and review procedures to ensure that the agreed SOPs are being implemented.

The Veterinary Authority should provide details on:

- auditing authority
  - accreditation of auditors
  - training of personnel
- procedures for the approval of compartments
- procedures for carrying out audits

- frequency of audits
- reports of audits and follow-up action
- procedures for suspension, reinstatement or revocation of compartments
- communication of compartment approval, suspension or revocation to trading partners

The management of the compartment should be responsible for the following:

- to develop effective partnerships with the Veterinary Authority;
- to implement the biosecurity plan and compile the relevant documentation for audit;
- to notify immediately the Veterinary Authority of any significant change which might affect the health status of the compartment;
- to notify immediately the Veterinary Authority of any suspect cases of the disease for which the compartment was defined and any changes in the baseline animal health status.

7. Documentation

When the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country initiates bilateral agreements for the recognition of compartments, it should provide documentation covering all points in this checklist, including clear evidence that the biosecurity, surveillance, traceability, management and control practices defined for a compartment are effectively applied.

Annex 1 – Guide for collection of information on compartments

Principles for defining a compartment

1. Disease for which the compartment is defined. Indicate the etiological agent
2. Description and location of all functional units within the compartment. Provide a map and a chart depicting the relationship and flow of animals, products, equipment, feed, personnel, etc. between units
3. For each unit provide information on the species present.
   a) Provide the current number of susceptible animals by species and indicate the maximum capacity for each
   b) Are non-susceptible animals allowed in the compartment? If so, provide the current number by species

Separation of the compartment from potential sources of infection

1. Physical or spatial factors that affect the status of biosecurity in a compartment

1. Describe the disease situation in adjacent areas and in areas posing a risk to the compartment.
   a. Indicate the prevalence or the number of cases for at least the last year. Has the epidemiological pattern changed over time?
   b. Is vaccination carried out? Describe the vaccination strategy and coverage

2. Indicate the location, disease status and biosecurity of the nearest epidemiological units or other epidemiologically relevant premises. Provide a map and distances.
   Consideration should be given to the distance and physical separation from:
   a. flocks or herds with a different health status in close proximity to the compartment, including wildlife and their migratory routes;
   b. slaughterhouses, rendering plants or feed mills;
   c. markets, fairs, agricultural shows, sporting events, zoos and other points of animal concentration.

2. Infrastructural factors

For each unit of the compartment, provide details on physical separation relevant for the specific disease:
1. fencing or other effective means of physical separation; provide details such as height, material, mesh size, depth, housing;
2. facilities for people entry including access control, changing area and showers;
3. vehicle access including washing and disinfection procedures;
4. control of use and routing of vehicles with access to the compartment;
5. unloading and loading facilities;
6. isolation facilities for introduced animals;
7. facilities for the introduction of material and equipment;
8. infrastructure to store feed and veterinary products;
9. disposal of carcasses, manure and waste;
10. water supply;
11. measures to prevent exposure to living mechanical or biological vectors such as insects, rodents and wild birds;
12. ventilation systems;
13. describe the workflows within the unit;
14. for each unit, provide a diagram covering the above aspects.

3. Biosecurity plan

Describe in detail:

1. potential pathways for introduction and spread into the compartment of the agents for which the compartment was defined, such as
    a. animal movements,
    b. germplasm (semen, embryos and oocytes)
    c. rodents,
    d. fauna,
    e. aerosols,
    f. arthropods,
    g. vehicles,
    h. people,
    i. biological products,
    j. equipment,
    k. fomites,
    l. feed,
    m. waterways,
    n. drainage and
    o. other pathways.

    Consideration should also be given to the survivability of the agent in the environment and effective disinfection procedures;
2. for each pathway provide a diagram and data used to determine the critical control points
3. measures to mitigate exposure for each critical control point;
4. standard operating procedures including:
    a. implementation, maintenance, monitoring of the measures,
    b. application of corrective actions,
    c. verification of the process,
    d. record keeping;
5. contingency plan in the event of a change in the level of exposure;
6. reporting procedures to the Veterinary Authority;
7. the programme for educating and training workers to ensure that all persons involved are knowledgeable and informed on biosecurity principles and practices;
8. Personnel policies with respect to private ownership of animals and other potential risk activities.
9. Additional documentation:
    a. feed sources;
    b. personnel policies;
    c. visitor logbook;
    d. vehicle logbook;
    e. any other criteria necessary for the evaluation of disease exclusion;
10. time period for which records are available for audit.

4. Traceability system

Describe in detail:

1. method of individual animal identification. Where individual identification may not be feasible, such as with broilers and day-old chicks, the Veterinary Authority should provide sufficient information concerning the assurance of traceability;
2. systems in place for traceability which should at least include recording of date of birth or hatching, date and type of vaccinations, testing and test results, and origin and movements of the animals and germplasm;
3. audit system for traceability. Describe the frequency and procedures including the reporting of results and corrective actions.

Surveillance for the agent or disease

1. Internal surveillance

Describe in detail the following:

1. baseline animal health report indicating the presence or absence of OIE listed diseases. (This report should be regularly updated to reflect the current animal health situation of the compartment);
2. historical status of a compartment for the disease(s) for which it was defined. This should be documented and demonstrate compliance with the requirements for freedom in the relevant *Terrestrial Code* chapter;
3. herd or flock production records, including fertility indicators;
4. herd or flock disease records;
5. medication and vaccination records;
6. baseline mortality rates;
7. for the disease for which the compartment is defined:
    a. type of surveillance applied, as described in chapter 1.4. and the relevant disease chapter;
    b. types of test used, interpretation of results;
    c. target population;
    d. sample size;
    e. frequency of testing and clinical inspection;
    f. surveillance results: provide the number of suspect and positive cases;
    g. follow-up of suspect and positive findings;
8. time period for which records are available for audit.

2. External surveillance

Describe in detail the following:

1. type of surveillance applied as described in chapter 1.4; including passive and targeted surveillance;
2. relevant risk factors, in particular concerning the epidemiological units in close proximity to the compartment and those in areas posing a risk to the compartment;
3. types of test used, interpretation of results;
4. sample size;
5. frequency of testing and clinical inspections;
6. surveillance results: provide the number of suspect and positive cases;
7. follow-up of suspect and positive findings;
8. time period for which records are available for audit.

Diagnostic capabilities and procedures

1. List the officially designated laboratories used for testing and confirming results
2. For each laboratory indicate the capacity of the laboratory to comply with the surveillance requirements
    a. the type of tests applied for the disease
    b. the volume of samples that can be handled for each test
3. Procedures and methods to ensure quality control
4. Procedures for general reporting of test results and rapid reporting of positive results

Emergency response and notification

1. Describe the procedures applied:
    a. in the event of suspected or confirmed occurrence of disease for which the compartment was defined;
    b. in the event of a breach in biosecurity regardless of the suspicion of disease;
    c. in the event of a change of the disease situation of the surrounding area.

Supervision and control of a compartment

1. The Veterinary Authority should provide details on:
    a. auditing authority
        i. accreditation of auditors
        ii. training of personnel
    b. procedures for the approval of compartments
    c. procedures for carrying out audits
    d. frequency of audits
    e. reports of audits and follow-up action
    f. procedures for suspension, reinstatement or revocation of compartments
    g. communication of compartment approval, suspension or revocation to trading partners

Appendix IV

Original: English
November 2011

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Paris, 2–4 November 2010

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1. Opening and purpose of the meeting

The meeting of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on Antimicrobial Resistance was held in Paris from 2 to 4 November 2010. Dr Bernard Vallat, OIE Director General and Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima, OIE Deputy Director General and Head of the Scientific and Technical Department, both welcomed the participants. Dr Vallat mentioned the importance to the OIE of the work of the Group and reminded the members that the List of Antimicrobials of Veterinary Importance needed to be updated during forthcoming meetings of this Group.

Following the finalisation of the Draft Guidelines for risk analysis of foodborne antimicrobial resistance within the framework of the Codex *Ad Hoc* Intergovernmental Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, which met for the last time in October 2010 in the Republic of Korea, and based on the fact that the different *Terrestrial Code* chapters related to the use of antimicrobials and the containment of antimicrobial resistance in veterinary medicine (Section 6 – in all five chapters) were last adopted in 2004, the OIE felt that it was necessary to update these chapters.

The general objective of the Group was to revise the relevant *Terrestrial Code* chapters mentioned above using, as far as possible, user friendly text and taking into account the draft guidelines and the definitions developed by the Codex *Ad Hoc* Intergovernmental Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance.

The specific objective of the first meeting was to start this revision with the *Terrestrial Code* Chapters 6.7. on Monitoring of the quantities of antimicrobials used in animal husbandry and 6.8. on Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes.

2. Designation of chairperson and rapporteur

The meeting was chaired by Dr Herbert Schneider, and Mr Christopher Teale acted as rapporteur.

3. Adoption of the Agenda and Terms of Reference

The Agenda adopted, List of Participants, and Terms of Reference are presented in Appendices I, II and III of this report, respectively.

4. Review and update of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 6.8. Monitoring of the quantities of antimicrobials used in animal husbandry

Chapter 6.8. was reviewed in depth and updated taking into account recent developments, including the recommendations from the Codex *Ad Hoc* Intergovernmental Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance. The chapter title was amended to read “Monitoring of the quantities and usage patterns of antimicrobial agents used in food producing animals”.

5. Review and update the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 6.7. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes

Chapter 6.7. was reviewed in depth and updated taking into account recent developments. Table 1 was referred for checking by an epidemiologist or statistician. An additional reference for sample size calculation was made to a document of the European Food Safety Authority.

6. Other matters

The Group was informed that the forthcoming World Health Day, to be held on 7 April 2011, would have antimicrobial resistance as its theme. The World Health Organization was planning to prepare documents on the containment of antimicrobial resistance in the human and non-human sectors. The event was already attracting significant interest from the media.

The revised chapters would be presented to the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases at its next meeting in February 2011 and would, if endorsed, be forwarded to the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission). Depending on the agreement of the Code Commission and the amount of comments received by Members, the chapters could potentially be presented for adoption at the General Session in May 2011. Otherwise the Group would have to examine Members comments at the next meeting.

The proposed dates for the next meeting of the Group to review Chapters 6.9. and 6.10. of the *Terrestrial Code* were either 20–22 June 2011 or 13–15 September 2011. The Group suggested, for consideration by the Headquarters, to have the next meeting at the OIE Collaborating Centre for Veterinary Medicinal Products in Fougères, France.

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…/Appendices

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Paris, 2-4 November 2010

Agenda

1. Opening and purpose of the meeting
2. Adoption of the agenda and terms of reference
3. Appointment of chairman and rapporteur
4. Review and update of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter. 6.8. Monitoring of the quantities of antimicrobials used in animal husbandry
5. Review and update of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 6.7. Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes
6. Other matters

Appendix II

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Paris, 2-4 November 2010

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List of Participants

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Appendix III

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Paris, 2-4 November 2010

Terms of Reference

Review and update the chapters of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* related to antimicrobials and antimicrobial resistance in the following order:

- Chapter 6.8.: Monitoring of the quantities of antimicrobials used in animal husbandry;
- Chapter 6.7.: Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes;
- Chapter 6.9.: Responsible and prudent use of antimicrobial agents in veterinary medicine;
- Chapter 6.10.: Risk assessment for antimicrobial resistance arising from the use of antimicrobials in animals

Appendix V

Original: English
November 2010

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
RISK STATUS EVALUATION OF MEMBERS

Paris, 2 - 4 November 2010

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A meeting of the ad hoc Group on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk Status Evaluation of Members was held at OIE Headquarters from 2 - 4 November 2010, to evaluate country submissions to assess compliance with the chapter on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2010* (the *Terrestrial Code*).

1. Opening comments, adoption of agenda and appointment of rapporteur

The members of the Group were welcomed by Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima, Head of the Scientific and Technical Department, and by Dr Bernard Vallat, Director General of the OIE. Drs Vallat and Miyagishima stressed the need ensure that there was no conflict of interest of evaluating experts when assessing the dossiers. Several members of the *ad hoc* Group pointed out that the potential conflict of interest was already being handled by the *ad hoc* Group through voluntary abstention by experts when assessing dossiers originating from their own countries. The *ad hoc* Group was informed of the ongoing work to establish a common procedure on official disease status recognition for reinforcing impartiality and confidentiality in expert meetings within the OIE. All participants were requested to sign a confidentiality clause at this meeting.

The Group was reminded that there were cases where a Member applied for the first time for a BSE risk status recognition and sought negligible BSE risk status, the *ad hoc* Group determined that controlled BSE risk, but not yet negligible BSE status, could be granted and the applicant member might have preferred not to receive any status if not negligible risk status. In order to avoid the withdrawal of the application after the assessment by the ad hoc Group, a country would be asked officially, at the moment of application, whether the Member wanted to obtain controlled risk status, even if the Member applied for negligible BSE risk status.

The meeting was chaired by Dr John Kellar and Dr Koen Van Dyck was appointed rapporteur.

Besides the list of country assessments scheduled for the meeting, the secretariat mentioned the additional points for consideration by the *ad hoc* Group. These included revisions of the BSE questionnaire contained in Chapter 1.6., solicitation of Member comments on SRM (intestines versus ileum) in Chapter 11.5. and tentative revisions of the form for annual reconfirmation of BSE risk status.

The *ad hoc* Group reaffirmed the following points regarding the introductory remarks:

- The BSE risk status determination and assessment of its continued applicability could incorporate field audits at any time, if deemed necessary. The *ad hoc* Group could recommend field audits to the Scientific Commission which may decide to request the Director General to deploy an expert mission to countries as part of the evaluation process or as a condition to maintain an allocated disease status.

- During the assessment, the Group communicates directly with the applicant Member, if expected information would support its judgement. The communications and information provided should always be documented.

- Annual re-assessments are an integral part of BSE risk status determination and are managed by the OIE Headquarters. In order to safeguard the integrity of this process, requested information should be provided in a timely manner allowing enough time for analysis by the OIE Headquarters and the ad hoc Group.

The agenda and list of participants are provided as Appendices I and II, respectively.

2. Review of new country status applications for BSE risk evaluation

Experts of the Group, in pairs, had accepted to conduct a thorough analysis of the dossiers of individual applicant Members (as allocated by the OIE Headquarters prior to the meeting) prior to the meeting. The experts presented their key findings to the plenary meeting of the Group, which proceeded with its in-depth discussion, application by application, on the applicant Member's compliance with the provisions on BSE risk status of the *Terrestrial Code*.

2.1. Denmark

In 2007 the OIE received a dossier from Denmark to evaluate the BSE risk status of its cattle population in accordance with the *Terrestrial Code*. The recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group was at that time that Denmark should be regarded as having met the requirements for recognition as complying with the BSE Chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* as 'controlled BSE risk'. Denmark had been listed as a Member having a 'controlled BSE risk' status since May 2008.

In October 2010 Denmark submitted an updated dossier seeking a negligible BSE risk status. The submission conformed to the guidelines circulated for countries wishing to make a formal evaluation of their BSE status according to the requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Code.*

a) Section 1: Risk Assessment — Article 11.5.2. point 1

- *Risk assessment for introduction of the BSE agent*

  The *ad hoc* Group considered that the conclusion of the release assessment was that there was a negligible risk that the BSE agent could have entered Denmark during the interval covered by the assessment.

- *Risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent*

  The *ad hoc* Group considered that the conclusion of the exposure assessment was that there was a negligible risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent if it were present in the country's cattle population during the interval covered by the assessment.

b) Surveillance according to Articles 11.5.20-11.5.22

The *ad hoc* Group noted that the surveillance undertaken exceeded the minimum requirements of type A surveillance according to Article 11.5.22. on surveillance for BSE in the 2010 *Terrestrial Code*.

c) Other requirements — Article 11.5.2 points 2–4

- *Awareness programme*

  The a*d hoc* Group determined that the awareness programme met the requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Code*.

- *Compulsory notification and investigation*

  The *ad hoc* Group noted that BSE had been declared a notifiable disease under relevant legislation since 1998 and determined that the system for compulsory notification and investigation met the requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Code*.

- *Laboratory examination*

  The *ad hoc* Group determined that the arrangements for laboratory examination met the requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Manual*.

- *Appropriate level of control and audit of the feed ban*

  The *ad hoc* Group noted that the appropriate legislation, control and audit of the proper implementation of the feed ban had been in force for at least 8 years.

d) BSE history in the country:

The youngest birth cohort reported as affected by BSE was March 1999, meaning that all indigenous cases were born more than 11 years ago. Therefore, Denmark had met the provisions of Article 11.5.3. Point 3b). All cattle which, during their first year of life, were reared with the BSE cases during their first year of life, and which investigation showed consumed the same potentially contaminated feed during that period, if alive in the country, were completely destroyed.

e) Compliance with conditions for 'negligible BSE risk' status - Article 11.5.3

Based on the information provided, the *ad hoc* Group recommended that Denmark be regarded as having met the requirements for recognition as complying with the BSE Chapter of the 2010 *Terrestrial Code* as 'Negligible BSE risk'.

f) Conclusions

- *Recommended status*

  'Negligible BSE risk'

- *Recommended message to be conveyed to the Member by the Director General*

  - Status

    Negligible BSE risk

2.2. Panama

In February 2010 the OIE received a dossier from Panama to evaluate the BSE risk status of the cattle population of Panama in accordance with the *Terrestrial Code*. The recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group was at that time that Panama should be regarded as having met the requirements for recognition as complying with the BSE Chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* as 'controlled BSE risk'. Panama had been listed as a country having a 'controlled BSE risk' since May 2010.

In October 2010 Panama submitted an updated dossier seeking a negligible BSE risk status. The submission conformed to the guidelines circulated for countries wishing to make a formal evaluation of their BSE status according to the requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Code.*

a) Section 1: Risk Assessment — Article 11.5.2. point 1

- *Risk assessment for introduction of the BSE agent*

  In February 2010 the *ad hoc* Group had considered that the conclusion of the release assessment was that import risk, associated specifically with imported cattle, though minimal, was not negligible. In its submission of October 2010, Panama described the actual locations and means of disposal of imported cattle and the risk mitigation undertaken to preclude the entry of BSE

contamination into the feed chain. On the basis of the additional information provided, the *ad hoc* Group concluded that there was a negligible risk that the BSE agent could have entered Panama during the interval covered by the assessment.

- *Risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent*

  As during the assessment of the February 2010 submission, the *ad hoc* Group reconfirmed from the exposure assessment that the risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent was not negligible, if it were present in the country's cattle population. To improve the previous situation, Panama, in September 2010, promulgated legislation to reduce recycling and amplification of the BSE agent through a series of measures which included enhanced removal of SRM from the feed chain.

  A ruminant to ruminant feed ban was imposed in 2001.

b) Surveillance according to Articles 11.5.20-11.8.22

The *ad hoc* Group observed that subsequent to the assessment conducted by the *ad hoc* Group in February 2010, Panama had significantly increased its BSE surveillance. The *ad hoc* Group noted that surveillance undertaken met type A requirements according to Article 11.5.22 on surveillance for BSE in the 2010 *Terrestrial Code*.

c) Other requirements — Article 11.5.2 points 2–4

- *Awareness programme*

  The *ad hoc* Group determined that the awareness programme, which had been established since 1996 and reinforced in 2006 and 2010, met the requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Code*.

- *Compulsory notification and investigation*

  The *ad hoc* Group noted that BSE was declared a notifiable disease in 1997.

- *Laboratory examination*

  The *ad hoc* Group noted that the arrangements for laboratory examination met the minimum requirements of the 2010 *Terrestrial Manual.*

- *Appropriate level of control and audit of the feed ban*

  Although a negligible level of risk was found on the release assessment and cultural practices removed much of the SRM, the *ad hoc* Group noted that control of the proper implementation of the feed ban could be improved, because the level of inspection seemed low and testing to detect cross-contamination was not clearly specified.

  New legislation in the form of a decree was promulgated in September 2010 including the exclusion of SRM for food and feed and prescribing separate lines in the feed mills when producing feed for ruminants and non-ruminants.

d) BSE history in the country:

The Group noted that BSE had not been recorded in Panama.

e) Compliance with conditions for 'negligible BSE risk' status - Article 11.5.3

Based on the information provided, the *ad hoc* Group recommended that Panama had met the requirements for recognition as complying with the 2010 BSE Chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* as 'negligible BSE risk'.

f) Conclusions

- *Recommended status*

  Negligible BSE risk status

- *Recommended message to be conveyed to the country by the Director General*

  - Status

    Panama's achievement of negligible BSE risk status was considered a reflection of its negligible BSE import risk. Retention of its status is dependant in part on appropriate implementation of the 2010 Decree.

  - Annual update, specific requirements: For the OIE to confirm adherence to the negligible BSE risk status requirements, the annual report should include information regarding the implementation of the Decree, with particular emphasis on the controlled disposition of the imported cattle described in the October 2010 submission.

  - Specific comments with regard to the submitted dossier

    Surveillance: The *ad hoc* Group noted a rather high reliance on testing clinical suspects which might suggest a potential, slight lack of specificity in the clinical stream allocation.

2.3. Other Member request

The Group assessed one additional request of a Member for recognition of 'controlled BSE risk' status which did not meet the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code*; the dossier was referred back to the corresponding Member.

3. Review of the Chapter, Revision of the surveillance point model (BSurvE)

The Scientific Commission, at its past meetings in 2009 and 2010, had identified the concern expressed by OIE Members with small bovine populations or whose cattle demography did not meet all the criteria for surveillance, regarding the inability to meet the surveillance requirements as laid down in the *Terrestrial Code*. The *ad hoc* Group reviewed a series of provisions employed to date to address this issue and identified a number of additional possibilities.

Options already employed include the following:

- Countries with small cattle populations were encouraged to consider using the BSurvE model. The OIE surveillance points table, although based on the BSurvE model, was less sensitive than the model in its allotment of points by age and surveillance stream. OIE Collaborating Centres for Epidemiology could be approached for assistance in organising Members' data in the appropriate manner.
- When a Member's adult cattle population was smaller than 25,000, the *ad hoc* Group extrapolated on a linear basis from the mid point of the 25,000 to 50,000 category specified in the table of Article 11.5.22 point 3 to determine the points requirements.
- When a Member's surveillance points did currently not meet the requirements of the chapter, but showed an increasing trend, the seven years of accumulation was shifted forward to the date of the General Session to accommodate for the maximum possible accumulation of point-credits within the allotted timeframe.

- When point-credits were inadequate and the Member was exporting considerable amounts of cattle, the *ad hoc* Group offered to accept points accumulated in other countries from exported animals tested there.

Options put forward for future consideration and further study, some of which would require an amendment to the *Terrestrial Code*, are the following:

- Tables in the *Terrestrial Code* Articles on surveillance are based on the BSurvE model and its parameters. The authors of the model could be approached by the OIE Headquarters to determine whether, on the basis of empirical European evidence and since the model's initial release, one or more of those parameters might be modified with resulting changes in the allotment of points by age and surveillance stream in the related table.

- The length of time for accumulation of surveillance points could be extended in the case of countries having a limited cattle population so that the number of 'cattle years of BSE surveillance' accumulated is more proximal to that assessed in countries with larger cattle populations. This modification would represent a deviation from the current seven years term which respects the upper 95% limit of the incubation period of BSE in cattle.

- Contiguous countries which could not independently achieve the required point-credits could submit a joint application as a single zone.

- In the assessment of a Member's BSE status, a balance had always existed between the risk assessment and surveillance intensity, whereby relative deficiencies in one may be offset by relative strengths in the other. Greater flexibility could be adopted, whereby the surveillance points requirements could be reduced below current levels in the face of very strong risk analysis results, within certain bounds.

- The concept of historical freedom, although rejected at the inception of the assessment process, could be revisited in conjunction with surveillance, within certain bounds.

- The concept of compartmentalization could be applied in countries in which there existed a defined separation between extensively and intensively husbanded cattle populations, to determine the potentially reduced points requirements referable to the intensively husbanded cattle population from which they would then have to be derived.

- The concept could be explored whereby the BSE risk status of a Member with undetermined BSE risk could be assessed in part by extension from the status of contiguous countries of shared cattle demographics and common market areas.

- A pragmatic solution could be explored deviating from the scientific validation which underpins existing provisions. E.g. a fixed percentage surveillance with emphasis on risk categories could be explored.

In provision of these potential options, the *ad hoc* Group noted that empirical evidence indicated a probable existence of TSE-strains which would appear either unrelated to the current epidemic or represent its potential origin. Any permitted reduction in surveillance demands must be viewed against this evolving scientific knowledge.

4. Other Matters

4.1. Review of the Chapter 1.6. : BSE questionnaire

The *ad hoc* Group reviewed the answers of the Scientific Commission to OIE Member comments on Chapter 1.6. (questionnaire) and supported the response from the Commission.

4.2. Article 11. 5: OIE Members – Scientific Commission, Member comment: ileum – whole intestines

Three different papers regarding infectivity in intestinal tract were published recently (2007 – 2010). The *ad hoc* Group considered that although the data provided new scientific evidence regarding the pathogenesis and distribution of PrP^{Sc} in tissues, it only confirmed the general pathways and distribution of infectivity established by Wells G.A. et al. 2007, 2005, 1998, 1996, 1994. The *ad hoc* Group maintained the position originally advanced in the supporting Document update of 2006[1].

4.3. Review form for the annual reconfirmation of the BSE risk status

The *ad hoc* Group reviewed the tentative revisions suggested by the Scientific Commission and adopted a number of them, e.g. in Table 1, "other products" were excluded in order to focus on cattle and MBM imports; simplifications were made to the tables regarding rendering and feed mill controls. No changes were made to Table 6 as it should align with the provisions on surveillance of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter on BSE.

4.4. Additional general matters

As BSE risk status recognition relied on the integrity of the laboratory systems in applicant Members, the *ad hoc* Group recommended that national BSE reference laboratories participate in annual proficiency testing with one of the five OIE BSE reference laboratories.

Further to its discussions regarding current surveillance provisions, the *ad hoc* Group identified the possibility of having a meeting dedicated to the subject, to allow an interchange between the *ad hoc* Group and additional invited experts. This would facilitate a critical review of the provisions on surveillance in the light of experience gained over the past years.

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…/Appendices

[1] Supporting document for the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, Chapter 2.3.13 on BSE - edition 2006 – Report of the Meeting of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission, Paris, 2-13 October 2006 - Appendix XXVIII.

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) RISK STATUS EVALUATION OF MEMBERS

Paris, 2 - 4 November 2010

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Agenda

1. Opening comments, adoption of agenda and appointment of rapporteur

2. Review of new country status applications for BSE risk evaluation

- Denmark
- Panama
- Other Member request

3. Review of the Chapter, Revision of the surveillance point model (BSurvE)

3.1 Feedback from SCAD representative on decisions on need for increased transparency and user-friendly procedures

4. Other matters

4.1. Review of the Chapter 1.6.; Article 1.6.2. - BSE questionnaire

4.2. Review of the BSE Chapter 11.5. , Article 11.5.14. with OIE Member and Scientific Commission comments (SRM, jejunum)

4.3. Review of the form for the annual reconfirmation of the BSE risk status of OIE Members (revision made by Scientific Commission).

4.4. Additional general matters

5. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

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Appendix II

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
RISK STATUS EVALUATION OF MEMBERS

Paris, 2 - 4 November 2010

List of participants

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Appendix VI

Original: English
December 2010

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP ON THE EVALUATION OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE STATUS OF MEMBERS

Paris, 6 - 8 December 2010

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1. Opening

The meeting of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on the Evaluation of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) status of Members was held at OIE Headquarters, Paris from 6 - 8 December 2010. Dr Elisabeth Erlacher-Vindel, Deputy Head of the Scientific and Technical Department, welcomed the Group on behalf of Dr Bernard Vallat, Director General of the OIE and outlined the importance and purpose of the meeting. She thanked the participants of the *ad hoc* Group for their support to OIE's activities.

2. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of a rapporteur

The *ad hoc* Group was chaired by Dr Saraiva (6 and 7 December) and Dr Vosloo (8 December). Dr Füssel acted as rapporteur. The *ad hoc* Group endorsed the proposed agenda.

The Agenda and list of participants are presented as Appendices I and II, respectively.

3. Feedback on decisions on need for confidentiality, prevention of conflict of interest and user-friendly procedures of official disease status recognition

The *ad hoc* Group was informed of the ongoing work to establish a common procedure on official disease status recognition for ensuring more impartiality and confidentiality in expert meetings within the OIE, particularly to ensure that there was no conflict of interest of evaluating experts when assessing the dossiers. Members of the *ad hoc* Group pointed out that the potential conflict of interest, in the past, was already being handled by the *ad hoc* Group through voluntary abstention by experts when assessing dossiers originating from their own countries. All participants were requested to sign a confidentiality clause at this meeting.

In accordance with the established procedures, the participating expert from Botswana withdrew from the meeting during the discussions on the Botswana dossier by the *ad hoc* Group.

4. Evaluation of applications for recognition of FMD free status

4.1. Evaluation of a request from Members party to the OIE/CVP Agreement for the reinstatement of FMD free status with vaccination for certain zones that had this status prior to the Agreement:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay submitted dossiers requesting the reinstatement of the OIE recognised status of "free zone with vaccination" for those parts of their territories subjected to the measures described as "High Surveillance Zone" (HSZ).

Each of the dossiers described in detail the measures carried out since March 2007 as a result of the implementation of the HSZ, and provided evidence of compliance with the requirements of Articles 8.5.5 and 8.5.9 (2) for those parts of their territories.

All four countries committed themselves to maintain a heightened level of surveillance in the areas previously assigned to the HSZ.

The *ad hoc* Group however observed that the requests for zoning of the affected parts of the territories of those countries differed slightly or required additional clarifying information to be received by the *ad hoc* Group. In all cases where the current HSZ should be reinstated as a distinct free zone with vaccination, the information on future measures to be implemented in order to separate the populations of susceptible animals between the various free zones were not clearly explained in the dossiers, as reference was only made to the measures implemented currently within the HSZ.

a) Argentina

The Group reviewed the documentation submitted by Argentina on the reinstatement of a zone free of FMD with vaccination in the North of the country along the borders with Bolivia and Paraguay.

The proposed zone comprised the part of the territory of Argentina currently designated as the HSZ formalised in March 2007. The aim of the application was to establish a single, distinct zone free of FMD practising vaccination.

Based on the information provided by Argentina on its dossier, the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission the acceptance of the dossier for approval of the current HSZ in the North of the country as a distinct FMD free zone practising vaccination.

Furthermore, Argentina requested establishment of a new zone free of FMD with vaccination on the Northern border corresponding to the geographic perimeters of the historically established 'Border Cordon Area'. This new zone would also to be considered as a distinct free zone with vaccination, but subject to adoption by the World Assembly of OIE.

b) Bolivia

The Group reviewed the documentation submitted by Bolivia on the reinstatement of a zone free of FMD with vaccination along the border with Brazil.

The information provided indicated that this HSZ, which is adjacent to the eastern zone free with vaccination (Chiquitania) of the country, fulfilled the conditions for a zone free with vaccination. The Delegate of Bolivia indicated the country's intention to keep two adjacent free zones as separate zones. Additional information provided by the country indicated that no changes took place concerning the HSZ established in the non-free area in the South-East part of Bolivia which borders Argentina and Paraguay.

On the basis of the information provided by Bolivia, the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission the acceptance of the dossier for approval of the current HSZ in the North-East of the country as a FMD free zone with vaccination.

c) Brazil

The Group reviewed the documentation submitted by Brazil on the reinstatement of a zone free of FMD with vaccination, located along the border with Paraguay and Bolivia.

Brazil requested that the current HSZ, consisting of a ca. 15 km wide strip along the border of the State of Mato Crosso do Sul (MS) with Paraguay and a small area bordering Bolivia, be recognised as a distinct free zone with vaccination within the State of MS.

On the basis of the information provided by Brazil, the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission the acceptance of the dossier for approval of the current HSZ in the South and West of MS as a single, distinct FMD free zone with vaccination.

Furthermore, Brazil had informed the OIE that its veterinary services planned to establish a protection zone comprising the entire territory of the municipalities in MS on the border with Paraguay and around Corumba bordering Bolivia. This future protection zone would then be larger than the current HSZ and thus affect the free zone reinstated from the current HSZ and the rest of the large central zone free from FMD with vaccination which includes the remaining territory of MS.

The Group drew its attention to the upcoming challenges posed by movement controls required for the separation of the animal populations of the two distinct zones free with vaccination and a future *protection zone*.

d) Paraguay

The Group reviewed the documentation submitted by Paraguay on the reinstatement of a distinct zone free of FMD with vaccination along the borders with Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil.

Additional information was provided on the movement controls of the populations of susceptible animals in the two zones. The two Paraguayan zones would be kept separated.

On the basis of the information provided by Paraguay, the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission the acceptance of the dossier for re-instatement of the current HSZ as a free zone with vaccination.

4.2. Evaluation of a request from a Member for recovery of FMD free status without vaccination

The Group reviewed the dossier submitted by Japan on the reinstatement of status for the country as free without vaccination which had been lost following an outbreak on 20 April 2010.

The Group requested additional information from the Delegate of Japan especially concerning difficulties in interpreting results presented on the last clinical cases and surveillance. A response from Japan clarified that the last clinical case was indeed on 4 July 2010. The Group observed that the dossier did not provide a lot of detail on the epidemiological investigations carried out to trace back and forward the individual cases and outbreaks, but was satisfied that the epidemiological teams performed backward tracing and only one such instance had occurred prior to the recognition of the outbreak. The Group accepted the additional information on the modified stamping out in the case of the outbreak affecting breeding bulls, given the circumstances that these bulls had been investigated over a sufficient period of time.

The Group agreed that Japan had proven that FMD was eradicated from its territory. The Group recommended to the Scientific Commission to re-instate Japan's FMD free status not practising vaccination.

4.3. Evaluation of a request from a Member for recovery of FMD free status without vaccination for a zone

The Group reviewed the dossier submitted by Botswana on the reinstatement of the status of the Veterinary Zone 7 as free without vaccination. The status of Zone 7 had been lost following an outbreak in April 2006.

Considering the following facts:

- Zone 7 had not had an outbreak or cases of FMD in the last two and half years,
- Botswana has undertaken a series of surveillance activities to ascertain absence of virus activity or virus circulation,
- No FMD vaccinated animals had been introduced into Zone 7 in the last two years,

- No FMD vaccination has been carried out in the zone in the last two years, last FMD vaccination was in September 2008 and
- Botswana had put appropriate preventative measures in place to guard against introduction of FMD into zone ;

the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission to approve the reinstatement of Veterinary Zone 7 as a distinct FMD free zone not practicing vaccination. The Member should be made aware that the dossier had contained certain shortcomings, which were compensated by the additional information timely submitted by Botswana (received on 7 December 2010), as requested by the Group.

4.4. Evaluation of a request from a Member for recognition of FMD free status without vaccination for a zone

The Group reviewed the dossier submitted by the Philippines for the recognition of a disease free status without vaccination of Zone 2 of the Luzon Province, situated in the centre of the Luzon islands in the North of the country.

Within the progressive zoning, Luzon's Zones 1 and 3 had previously been recognised as free without vaccination, while Zone 2 situated between those two zones remained without an officially recognized free status by the OIE. The dossier stated that the Luzon Zone 2 imported vaccinated buffaloes and cattle (2041 and 8 heads, respectively) from Brazil in January 2010. In view of several risk mitigating measures that were taken by the Philippines, the Group was confident that by January 2011, the Luzon Zone 2 would be fully compliant with the provisions of Article 8.5.5.

The Group noted that swill feeding was extensively addressed in the submitted dossier. Swill feeding was not forbidden and still practised on a large scale, although with a decreasing trend. Thus the Group considered this a risk factor. Considering the information provided, including the complementary information received by email prior to the meeting (30 November), the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission to approve the request for the recognition of Zone 2 in the Luzon Province of the Philippines as a distinct FMD free zone without vaccination. The Delegate of the Philippines confirmed that Zone 2 shall be kept separated from the other Luzon Zones 1 and 3 free without vaccination. The Group observed that unless movement control was maintained between the zones any future outbreak in either Zone 2 or the rest of that province would have mutual effect on the status of the other free zones established within that province.

4.5. Evaluation of a request of Brazil for the recognition of the protection zones located in the States of Bahia and Tocantins as a single distinct free zone with vaccination and the incorporation of the previous protection zone in the free with vaccination zone of Rondônia and expansion of the free zone 4 into the State of Amazonas

The Group reviewed the request submitted by Brazil on:

a) the recognition of the current protection zone located in the States of Bahia and Tocantins as a distinct recognised free zone with vaccination, affecting the territories of both States,

b) the incorporation of the previous protection zone on the territory of the State Rondônia into the adjacent FMD free zone with vaccination and expanding the free zone of Rondônia-Acre into the State of Amazonas by incorporation of two additional municipalities of that State into the Rondônia part of the Rondônia-Acre zone

Considering the facts provided in the application, the Group understood that the surveillance system implemented in the aforementioned zones was in conformity with the provisions of the *Terrestrial Code* and complied with the provisions of Article 8.5.5.

Emphasizing that

- there had never been registered any occurrence of FMD in the areas under evaluation;
- no evidence of FMD virus circulation had been detected in the last 12 months;

- FMD and FMD virus circulation were subject to surveillance, in compliance with the provisions of Articles 8.5.42 to 8.5.48 of the *Terrestrial Code*;
- guidelines and procedures aiming at early detection, prevention and control of FMD had been established and implemented;
- preventive vaccination against FMD was systematically established and verified; and
- FMD vaccines used complied with the guidelines of *Terrestrial Manual* and included viral strains predominating in South America;

the Group agreed to recommend to the Scientific Commission to approve the request of Brazil, as follows:

1. the recognition as a single, distinct FMD free zone with vaccination of the former protection zones located in the States of Bahia and Tocantins; and

2. the incorporation of the current protection zone located in the State of Rondônia to the FMD free zone with vaccination, as well as the expansion of this free zone by inclusion of part of the municipalities Lábrea and Canutama, located in the State of Amazonas.

5. Other matters:

5.1. Revisions to the chapter on FMD following the possible addition of the new Article for the endorsement national strategic plans for FMD control

The Group reviewed the proposed amendments to Chapter 8.5 of the *Terrestrial Code* which in particular introduced Article 8.5.7bis on the 'OIE endorsement of national FMD control programmes' and adaptations accordingly in Article 8.5.25 on imports of meat from countries with an endorsed vaccination programme.

The Group endorsed the proposed amendments to Chapter 8.5 as circulated to OIE Members for comments, but recommended to apply number 11 to the paragraph on withdrawal of endorsement and to assign letters to the conditions for such withdrawal and to include the failure to meet the timeline as a cause for withdrawal. The Group also recommended aligning the wording in Article 8.5.11. to the that in Article 8.5.10.

The Group noted that the amendments made to Article 8.5.25 in response to the new Article 8.5.7bis would make the conditions for de-boned meat stricter but possibly more acceptable to importers and thus in the end more useful.

The Group endorsed the draft questionnaire prepared by the OIE, but made some suggestions for linguistic improvements in particular:

- Renumbering in paragraph 3
- Adaptation of text in paragraphs 3(d),4(b) and 6(b).

5.2. Opinion of the *ad hoc* Group on the need for probang testing for viral isolation in the event of consecutive negative NSP tests, following observations of the expert mission to Turkey (May 2010)

The Group recalled that Turkey was applying Article 8.5.14. for animals coming from Anatolia (zone not free from FMD) destined for slaughter in the Thrace region (zone free with vaccination) as those animals could not or did not in all circumstances comply with the conditions laid down in Article 8.5.10.

In the absence of more detailed information on the circumstances on how the NSP testing was carried out in ruminants from Anatolia (e.g. exact timing of sampling), on the quality of the quarantine arrangements and on the delay of slaughter, the Group recommended to obtain more information from Turkey.

5.3. Briefing on progress with the OIE/FAO Global Pledging Conference on FMD – 2012

The Group was informed on plans of OIE and FAO to jointly organise a global pledging conference on FMD in 2012.

The Group emphasised that planning should also take into account, as much as possible, other FMD related events to avoid overlapping in time or duplication in content.

5.4. Report on the progress with the global FMD control strategy following the meeting of the Scientific Commission in September 2010

In December 2009 and June 2010 this Group reviewed an FAO document prepared as a follow-up to the Paraguay conference on the progressive control of FMD. These guidelines would become a joint document of FAO and OIE giving guidance to countries engaging in progressive FMD control and serving as a self-assessment tool. These guidelines needed further refinement before approval by the two organisations - OIE and FAO. The Group was informed about the recent work carried out by FAO and OIE in November 2010 in Pirbright, UK, to further elaborate the details of stages of progressive FMD control, and received for information a hard copy of the latest draft document prepared by FAO with contributions of OIE.

The international conference in 2012 would be decisive for promoting this progressive control pathway tool in as complementary to the OIE standards, including the new category of 'endorsed national FMD programmes'.

5.5. Briefing on possible OIE FMD expert missions to applicant Members to verify an allocated or new disease status

The Group was informed that no additional expert missions were planned to South America at this stage, but that the Scientific Commission was exploring the possibility to carry out an FMD expert mission to selected Southern African Members as well as in Thrace.

6. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

The *ad hoc* Group reviewed and amended the preliminary draft report provided by the rapporteur. The Group agreed that the report would be subject to a short period of circulation to the Group for comments and adoption, as a small number of participants had to leave earlier and minor supplementary information was still expected to be submitted by some applicant Members. Additional information of applicant Members would be circulated electronically to all participants of the Group as soon as available.

The *ad hoc* Group tentatively identified future meeting dates as follows: 21-23 June 2011 and 22-24 November 2011, subject to confirmation.

…/Appendices

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP ON EVALUATION
OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE STATUS OF MEMBERS
Paris, 6 - 8 December 2010

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Agenda

1. **Opening**
2. **Adoption of the agenda and appointment of a rapporteur**
3. **Feedback on decisions on need for increased transparency (conflict of interest) and user-friendly procedures of official disease status recognition**
4. **Evaluation of country dossiers**

   4.1. Evaluation of a request from Members party to the OIE/CVP Agreement for the reinstatement of FMD free status with vaccination for certain zones that had this status prior to the Agreement:

   - Argentina
   - Bolivia
   - Brazil
   - Paraguay

   4.2. Evaluation of a request from a Member for recovery of FMD free status without vaccination:

   - Japan

   4.3. Evaluation of a request from a Member for recovery of FMD free status without vaccination for a zone:

   - Botswana (Zone 7)

   4.4 Evaluation of a request from a Member for recognition of FMD free status without vaccination for a zone:

   - Philippines (Luzon 2)

   4.5. Evaluation of a request of Brazil for the recognition of the protection zones located in the States of Bahia and Tocantins as a single distinct free zone with vaccination and the incorporation of the previous protection zone in the free with vaccination zone of Rondonia and expansion of the free zone 4 into the State of Amazonas

5. **Other matters**

   5.1 Revisions to the chapter on FMD following the possible addition of the new Article for the endorsement national strategic plans for FMD control

   5.2 Opinion of the *ad hoc* Group on the need for probang testing for viral isolation in the event of consecutive negative NSP tests following observations of the expert mission to Turkey (May 2010)

   5.3 Briefing on progress with the OIE/FAO Global Pledging Conference on FMD - 2012

   5.4 Report on the progress with the global FMD control strategy following the meeting of the Scientific Commission in September 2010

   5.5 Briefing on possible OIE FMD expert missions to applicant countries to verify allocated or new disease status

6. **Finalisation and adoption of the draft report**

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Appendix II

MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP ON EVALUATION OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE STATUS OF MEMBERS

Paris, 6 - 8 December 2010

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List of participants

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Appendix VII

Original: English
January 2011

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP

ON EVALUATION OF RINDERPEST DISEASE STATUS OF MEMBERS

Paris, 11 – 12 January 2011

A meeting of the *ad hoc* Group on evaluation of rinderpest disease status was held at the OIE headquarters from 11 to 12 January 2011. The members of the *ad hoc* Group were welcomed by Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima, Head of the Scientific and Technical Department, on behalf of Dr Bernard Vallat, Director-General of the OIE.

1. Adoption of agenda and appointment of rapporteur

The meeting was chaired by Dr Peter Roeder and Drs Jeffrey Mariner and John Anderson acted as rapporteurs to provide a draft meeting report.

The Group reviewed and the draft agenda presented, adopted it with minor amendments. The amended agenda and list of participants are attached as Appendices I and II, respectively.

2. Feedback from the meeting of the Scientific Commission – September 2010

The Group was briefed by Dr Hassan Abdel Aziz Aidaros who is a member of the Scientific Commission. He reported that the Scientific Commission had noted and supported, during its meeting in September 2010, the concerns and recommendations of the Group on issues that need to be addressed for the post eradication period including the amendment of the current chapter in the *Terrestrial Code*.

3. Evaluation of country status for rinderpest freedom

The *ad hoc* Group discussed the submitted dossiers and reached conclusions as follows.

Dossiers for full evaluation

- **Comoros**

  The Group reviewed the dossier of Comoros and noted that the country was eligible to apply for freedom on a historical basis and the dossier reinforces the status of historical freedom. There was no evidence of outbreaks of disease in more than 25 years and vaccination in more than 10 years.

  Recommendation: Comoros be accredited as free from rinderpest on a historical basis

- **Kazakhstan**

  The Group reviewed the dossier of Kazakhstan and noted that there had been no evidence of rinderpest in the country since 1927. One episode of vaccination carried out in 2006 was unrelated to the suspicion of any rinderpest, and serological surveillance was carried out subsequently. The dossier fully documented the disease situation, serological surveillance, veterinary services and the cessation of vaccination. All information was consistent with the absence of rinderpest.

  Recommendation: Kazakhstan be accredited as free from rinderpest

- **Liberia (non Member Country)**

  The Group noted that given the region was free from rinderpest infection and that the limited cattle population of Liberia (21,000 animals) was unable to support the persistence of rinderpest. The dossier supported the conclusion of the Group that Liberia was free from rinderpest.

  Recommendation: Liberia be accredited as free from rinderpest

- **Sao Tome and Principe**

  The Group agreed that the dossier of Sao Tome and Principe was acceptable based on historical grounds. There was no evidence of outbreaks of disease in more than 25 years and vaccination in more than 10 years, and the necessary legislation and services are in place. There has been no importation of cattle since 2000.

  Recommendation: Sao Tome and Principe be accredited as free from rinderpest

- **Sri Lanka**

  The Group reviewed the dossier of Sri Lanka and noted that the dossier substantiated the presence of a functional Veterinary Service and a surveillance programme for rinderpest. The last documented outbreak was in 1994 and vaccination ceased in 1997. The results of clinical and serological surveillance were fully consistent with the absence of disease.

  Recommendation: Sri Lanka be accredited as free from rinderpest

- **Kyrgyzstan**

  The dossier of Kyrgyzstan had previously been evaluated by the Group and was considered to be satisfactory for granting rinderpest freedom on the historical basis. However, the application had been kept on pending subject to the OIE obtaining clarification on the situation of rinderpest being a notifiable disease in Kyrgyzstan. The Group noted that Kyrgyzstan had provided a formal letter to the OIE, declaring the responsibility for the prevention and control of rinderpest in Kyrgyzstan and satisfactorily addressing the OIE's concerns on the notifiable disease issue for granting rinderpest freedom. The Group concluded that the epidemiological evidence from the country and the region fully supported the absence of rinderpest in Kyrgyzstan. The Group recommended recognition of the Kyrgyzstan as free from rinderpest.

  Recommendation: Kyrgyzstan be accredited as free from rinderpest

- **Turkmenistan**

  As the OIE Headquarters had indicated that Turkmenistan did not fulfil all the horizontal requirements of the OIE *Terrestrial Code* for recognition of disease freedom, the Group was unable to formulate a recommendation to the Scientific Commission in January 2009. The Group noted that the dossier of Turkmenistan documented the absence of rinderpest. The group was assured that, following communications between Turkmenistan and the OIE Headquarters, there were no remaining impediments to the recognition of rinderpest freedom. Appropriate legislation, surveillance and official veterinary services for the accreditation of freedom from rinderpest were considered to be in place.

  Recommendation: Turkmenistan be accredited as free from rinderpest

Letter declaration presented for historical freedom

A letter had been received from one country claiming freedom from rinderpest on a historical basis :

- Federated States of Micronesia

The Group recognized that the application provided by the above Member complied with the requirements for historical freedom and recommended that it be recognized as rinderpest free.

Recommendation: Federated States of Micronesia be accredited as free from rinderpest

4. General feedback from Relevant Meetings

- 3rd FAO/OIE Joint Committee on the Global Eradication of Rinderpest, OIE, Vienna, July 2010
- GREP Symposium and FAO Workshop for the Post Rinderpest Eradication, FAO, Rome, October, 2010

The Group was briefed by Drs Taylor and Njeumi. The meeting of the Joint Committee on the Global Eradication of Rinderpest outlined the components of a strategic plan for the post eradication era and highlighted the need for a post eradication risk assessment on the re-emergence of rinderpest to inform the drafting of the strategic plan. In addition, the Group was informed as to the schedule of events foreseen to recognize and celebrate the global declaration of freedom.

The Group indicated that the lessons from the eradication of rinderpest might not have yet been fully captured and incorporated into future infectious disease control initiatives. The Group noted that inter-agency collaboration on the development of a strategic plan for the progressive control of Peste des petits ruminants (PPR) needed to be strengthened through the creation of a more inclusive process that brought together international, regional and national stakeholders. The strategic plan for the progressive control of PPR needed to be strengthened due to the similarity between rinderpest and PPR as well as the transferable skills and experiences gained through rinderpest control and eradication.

The Group recommended that a working meeting be convened to capture the lessons from rinderpest eradication. The Group recognized that this was a significant opportunity to inform future initiatives in 'One Health' and animal health. It was suggested that the process would complement the rinderpest book being jointly prepared by FAO and OIE. The output of the working meeting would be at least two peer reviewed papers. The first paper would focus on the lessons from rinderpest eradication. The second paper would address the application of the lessons learned from rinderpest eradication to progressive control of PPR. To this end, the Group requested that concept note be prepared to support this process and Dr. Mariner agreed to circulate a draft to the members of the Group by 18 January 2011.

5. Amendments to the existing Rinderpest Chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* for the global post-eradication area

The Group discussed the amendments to the Rinderpest chapter and noted that although some changes could be proposed at this time, the completion of the task might be dependent on the completion of the risk assessment, establishment of an agreed overall strategic plan, and a specific guidance for national and international contingency plan for responding to the suspicion and confirmation of rinderpest.

The Group agreed to continue its revision work of the current rinderpest chapter of the *Terrestrial Code*. Drs. Roeder and Mariner would circulate a revised draft to the members during the week of 17 January 2011. After incorporating comments from the Group, the draft Chapter would be submitted to the OIE by 27 January 2011.

In the event that the whole new *Terrestrial Code* chapter could not be presented for adoption at the 2011 General Session, the Group would recommends that as an interim measure the requirement for annual reconfirmation of the rinderpest free status in the existing *Terrestrial Code* chapter be deleted or suspended and a note be inserted indicating that the rinderpest chapter was under revision in light of the eradication of rinderpest.

6. List potential implications of changes in the other chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*

At the present time, the Group had not yet identified necessary changes to other chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*. Once the revisions to the rinderpest chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* had been completed and other activities such as the risk analysis and contingency plans developed, a need for changes to other chapters might be identified.

7. Diagnostic Kits containing rinderpest virus

The Group noted that immune capture ELISA test kits for rinderpest and PPR might include live rinderpest vaccine virus as a positive control antigen. Other diagnostic tests might also include live virus. These tests would continue to be important in future rinderpest and PPR surveillance. For the purposes of PPR diagnosis, the rinderpest positive control could be discontinued.

The Group recommended that an assessment of the current world-wide distribution of the kits should be completed together with the feasibility of discontinuing the use of live antigens in rinderpest diagnostic kits. International guidelines on the sequestration of rinderpest virus should clearly indicate that diagnostic tests that include live virus should be restricted to approved BSL3 laboratories. The Group recommended that the use of live virus in diagnostic test kits should be discontinued. The OIE should contact diagnostic kit producers to inform them that the use or storage of live virus in RP diagnostic kits would in the near future no longer be permissible outside of an approved BSL3 laboratory and inform the Biological Standards Commission of the issue to be addressed.

8. Finalisation and adoption of draft report

The draft report was reviewed by the Group, amended and accepted subject to circulation for minor comments to be received by the coming week.

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…/Appendices

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON EVALUATION OF RINDERPEST DISEASE STATUS OF MEMBERS

Paris, 11 - 12 January 2011

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Agenda

1. Adoption of agenda and appointment of rapporteur

2. Feedback from the meeting of the Scientific Commission – September 2010

3. Evaluation of country status for rinderpest

Dossiers for full evaluation

- Comoros
- Kazakhstan
- Liberia
- Sao Tome and Principe
- Sri Lanka

Letter declarations historical freedom

– Federated Micronesia

Pending dossiers

- Kyrgyzstan
- Turkmenistan

4. General feedback from relevant meetings

– 3rd FAO/OIE Joint Committee on the Global Eradication of Rinderpest, OIE, Vienna, July 2010

– GREP Symposium and FAO Workshop for the Post Rinderpest Eradication, FAO, Rome, October, 2010

5. Amendments to the existing Rinderpest Chapter of the *Terrestrial Code* for the global post- eradication area

6. List potential implications of changes in the other chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* and the *Terrestrial Manual*

7. Diagnostic Kits containing rinderpest virus
(Recommendation for reviewers of the Chapter on rinderpest of the *Terrestrial Manual*)

8. Finalisation and adoption of draft report

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Appendix II

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON EVALUATION OF RINDERPEST DISEASE STATUS OF MEMBERS

Paris, 11 - 12 January 2011

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Appendix VIII

Original: English
November 2010

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON OFFICIAL DISEASE STATUS RECOGNITION

OF CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER

Paris, 23 - 25 November 2010

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The OIE *ad hoc* Group on Official Disease Status Recognition of Classical Swine Fever was welcomed by Dr Lea Knopf from the Scientific and Technical Department. Dr Gideon Brückner, President of the Scientific Commission provided a brief introduction on the objectives of the meeting. The OIE was considering adding two diseases to the list of diseases for which the OIE granted official disease status recognition: Classical swine fever (CSF) and African horse sickness. The task of the *ad hoc* Group was to review and amend the *Terrestrial Code* chapter on CSF taking into consideration the existing concepts of free country, zone and compartment and draft provisions for consistency with the official disease status recognition procedures. This implied appropriate modifications in the CSF chapter, including the Articles on surveillance, and developing a questionnaire to support Members' applications for CSF free status. The Group was also asked to provide in its report any complementary observations related to the *Terrestrial Code* changes to support the future work of reviewers of the CSF chapter in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

1. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of a rapporteur

The meeting was chaired by Prof. Trevor Drew and Dr Cristóbal Zepeda was designated as rapporteur. The adopted agenda and list of participants are attached as Appendices I and II, respectively.

2. Adoption of the Terms of Reference

The Group adopted the proposed terms of reference which are attached as Appendix III.

3. Review and update the *Terrestrial Code* chapter on CSF taking into consideration the existing concepts on free country, zoning and compartmentalisation and draft provisions for consistency with the official disease status recognition procedures

The Group questioned the original statement that the pig was the only natural host of CSF virus. There was evidence in the literature that diverse species of the family suidae could be infected naturally and experimentally. As a result the original statement was modified to reflect this wider host range.

The chairman raised the need to review the definition of wild animals in the context of CSF given that captive wild boar were also farmed for meat production. The Working Group on Wildlife Diseases had provided definitions on domestic, wild, feral and captive wild animals; however these definitions were still under review. The Group decided to use the current definition in the glossary of the *Terrestrial Code.*

Accordingly, a definition of 'domesticated pigs' was created within the Chapter, to include captive, farmed wild boar as well as domestic pigs. The term "wild pigs" was retained, to cover free-living wild boar, feral pigs and their hybrids.

The Group agreed to use the chapter and the questionnaire on foot and mouth disease (FMD) as a template for revision of the CSF chapter and drafting the questionnaire. There were however major differences between the FMD and CSF chapters: the FMD chapter specified categories of freedom without vaccination and freedom with vaccination. In addition, it did not distinguish between wild and domestic animals (appendices IV and V).

The Group decided to retain Article 15.2.2. concerning the determination of the status of a country, zone or compartment, even though an equivalent article did not exist in the FMD Chapter. The Group considered that this article provided useful summary criteria that should be considered by Members when assessing their status.

The Group discussed whether it was possible to recognise free countries or zones with vaccination and whether countries or zones could be recognised free, if infection existed in wild or feral pigs. Although the *Terrestrial Manual* mentioned subunit vaccines and DIVA tests, their use was only at the herd level and recent concerns over stability had led to their withdrawal and removal from registration in the European Union. Given that to date there were no validated tests that could reliably distinguish infection from vaccination, the Group suggested that reference to these procedures in the *Terrestrial Manual* be removed. It was agreed that countries or zones in which vaccination was practised could not be recognised as free from disease. This would include countries or zones where vaccination was practised following an outbreak without slaughter of vaccinated animals. Additionally, the Group agreed that countries could not be declared free from the disease, if infection was present in wild or feral pigs. The group agreed that infection in wild pigs should not have an impact on trade from domesticated pig farms. Countries in this situation might apply for zonal freedom, might establish compartments and might additionally establish a protection zone to reduce the risk of introduction of disease via wild pigs.

The Group took note that the Republic of Korea had a licensed subunit vaccine/ELISA kit, used to determine CSF freedom of farms. However, the data to support its efficacy had not yet been published. The Group was very interested and agreed to await additional scientific evidence.

The Group included a case definition in the CSF chapter to harmonise it with the FMD chapter and following a request of OIE Members to include case definitions in existing disease specific chapters. Separate Articles for free country, free zone, free compartment and containment zone were developed. A reference to Article 1.4.6 on historical freedom was made to allow countries or zones to apply for freedom from CSF under these provisions. The provisions for movement of animals directly to slaughter from infected zones or containment zones to free zones, included in the FMD chapter, were also drafted for CSF.

Specific discussion items

The Group could not understand the rationale for the text in the last paragraph of Article 8.5.6. on compartmentalisation “The first approval should only be granted when no outbreak of FMD has occurred within the country or zone in which the compartment is situated, during the last 3 months.” and the Group decided to omit it from the relevant section for CSF. The Group considered that it was feasible to establish compartments in an infected country, i.e. even when outbreaks had occurred outside the compartment within the past 3 months, given that the CSF situation in the rest of the country was stable, under control or improving.

Quarantine for wild pigs. The length of the recommended quarantine period was changed from 40 to 30 days. The key point was to allow enough time for an animal to seroconvert or to show clinical signs. A quarantine period of 30 days was consistent with the time specified in other Articles and would allow pigs to seroconvert, and was equivalent to twice the maximum incubation period of 2-14 days as specified in the OIE technical disease card on CSF. The Group saw no justification for extending the quarantine period beyond 30 days.

Semen. It was clarified that virological results could either be virus isolation or PCR on the blood of donor animals. This was considered important as not all OIE Members had the capability to conduct PCR tests.

Recommendations for the importation of fresh meat of wild pigs. Wild pigs as defined in the revised chapter would be hunted animals. The recommendation of post-mortem inspection was deleted as internal organs were usually removed at the killing point by hunters and only carcasses were sent to inspection centres. In any event, every carcass would be tested by serological and virological tests.

In the questionnaire, under the section on vaccines and vaccination, it was decided to keep the word 'species' to accommodate the vaccination of zoo collections of wild suidae other than *Sus scrofa*.

Concerning the *Terrestrial Manual*, the Group emphasised the need for prescribed virological tests for international trade. The rationale was that persistently infected animals could not be detected serologically. Further, it would be necessary to provide more details on the RT-PCR test methodology for CSF to assist test accreditation and ensure a harmonised approach to molecular detection methods among laboratories. The Group agreed to request the Scientific Commission to bring these matters to the attention of the Biological Standards Commission.

4. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

The *ad hoc* Group reviewed and amended the preliminary outline of the draft report provided by the rapporteur. The Group agreed that the report and revised chapters would be subject to a short period of circulation to the Group for minor comments and final adoption.

In his concluding remarks, the chairman thanked the rapporteurs and all the participants of the *ad hoc* Group for their active participation and meaningful discussion.

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…/Appendices

Appendix I

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON OFFICIAL DISEASE STATUS RECOGNITION

OF CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER (CSF)

Paris, 23 – 25 November 2010

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Agenda

1. Adoption of agenda and appointment of a rapporteur

2. Adoption of draft Terms of Reference of the *ad hoc* Group

3. Review and update the *Terrestrial Code* chapter on CSF taking into consideration the existing concepts on free country, zoning and compartmentalisation and draft provisions for consistency with the official disease status recognition procedures

   - Draft a questionnaire for Members to submit applications for official recognition of disease status
   - General recommendations for reviewers of the chapter on CSF of the *Terrestrial Manual*
   - Potential implications of the changes in the chapter on procedural or policy aspects (e.g. at the livestock-wildlife interface)

4. Adoption of the draft report

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Appendix II

MEETING OF THE

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON OFFICIAL DISEASE STATUS RECOGNITION

OF CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER (CSF)

Paris, 23 – 25 November 2010

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Appendix III

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON OFFICIAL DISEASE STATUS RECOGNITION OF CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER (CSF)

Paris, 23 – 25 November 2010

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Terms of Reference

1. Review and update the *Terrestrial Code* chapter on CSF taking into consideration the existing concepts on free country, zoning and compartmentalisation.

2. Analyse and draft the provisions of the *Terrestrial Code* chapter for consistency with the official disease status recognition procedures.

3. Draft a questionnaire for Members to submit applications for official recognition of disease status.

4. If necessary, provide recommendations for updates to the *Terrestrial Manual.*

5. Potential implications of the changes in the chapter on procedural or policy aspects (e.g. at the livestock-wildlife interface)

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