



**REPORT OF THE MEETING  
OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES**

**Virtual, 7–11 September 2020**

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A virtual meeting of the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Commission) was held from 7 to 11 September 2020.

**1. Welcome**

Deputy Director General (International Standards and Science) Dr Matthew Stone welcomed the Commission and thanked the members for taking time from their busy schedules to support the work of the OIE, extending this thanks to their employers and national governments. He thanked the Commission for its support during the organisation's response, including the reports prepared to ensure OIE Members remain well briefed on the activities of the Specialist Commissions following the cancellation of the General Session for 2020. Dr Stone noted the OIE's ongoing adaptation of its work programmes to the restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with many successful virtual expert meetings now having been held ensuring that the OIE's productive output has continued thanks to the hard work of staff and the understanding and dedication of our expert community. Although the impacts of the global pandemic continue, and the scientific understanding of its root causes, mitigating and exacerbating factors is not yet complete, the OIE continues its internal reflection on the role of the OIE to support its Members in the face of new priorities around emerging disease risk mitigation, resilience and preparedness. Concrete proposals in this respect will soon emerge, and the OIE will look to the expert networks of its Members and partners for implementation support, and funding support from its resource partners. These activities will also engage the Specialist Commissions, and therefore need to be considered in work programme prioritisation.

Dr Stone noted the open call for nominations for the elections in 2021 for Specialist Commissions. He also provided the Commission with a summary of the performance evaluation process that all experts of Specialist Commissions would be participating in, as the concluding phase of the new Specialist Commission performance management system. This would result in a confidential report to OIE Council in February 2021.

Dr Cristóbal Zepeda, president of the Commission, thanked Dr Stone for the information and stated that the Commission remains ready to take on the upcoming tasks. Dr Zepeda also thanked the members of the Commission and the secretariat for their support in preparing the report and the video presentation outlining the work of the Commission between June 2019 and May 2020 that was made available online<sup>1</sup> in response to the 88<sup>th</sup> General Session being postponed to 2021. *Terrestrial Code* and *Manual* Chapters that were proposed for adoption in 2020 have been postponed to 2021, but a few key resolutions that could not be postponed, such as approval of budget, status recognition, designation of OIE reference centres, registration of diagnostic kits, and

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.oie.int/en/for-the-media/press-releases/detail/article/overview-of-the-activities-of-the-oie-specialist-commissions/>

the exceptional extension of the mandate of the Director General were adopted by the World Assembly of OIE Delegates through an adapted procedure. Finally, it was shared that the first list of Members having OIE endorsement of their official control programmes for dog mediated rabies would be adopted at the next General Session.

## 2. Adoption of the agenda

The draft agenda was adopted by the Commission. The meeting was chaired by Dr Zepeda and the OIE Secretariat acted as rapporteur. The agenda and list of participants are attached as Annexes 1 and 2, respectively.

## 3. Terrestrial Animal Health Code

### 3.1. Member comments received for SCAD consideration

#### a) Chapter 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations listed by the OIE

In response to a Member comment, the Commission noted that there is scientific evidence<sup>2</sup> that *M. tuberculosis* can affect animals and transmit from animals to humans or other animals. The Commission also acknowledged that the prevalence of *M. tuberculosis* in animals may be underestimated, as the diagnostic methods used in practice do not differentiate between *M. bovis* and *M. tuberculosis*. Lastly, the Commission stressed the impact of *M. tuberculosis* in public health.

Based on this rationale, the Commission was of the opinion that *M. tuberculosis* should continue to be considered as a component of Mycobacterium complex for the purpose of the *Terrestrial Code*. As an *ad hoc* Group on tuberculosis would be convened in September 2020, it was advised to seek their expert's opinion and provide recommendations on the listing of *M. tuberculosis*. The Commission suggested that the experts be provided with the Commission's position and supporting references to inform their discussion.

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

#### b) Chapter 1.6. Procedures for self-declaration and for official recognition by the OIE

The Commission noted that the 24 months deadline to benefit from the procedure for recovery of status may not be appropriate for the recovery of African horse sickness free status, and proposed to amend the text under Article 1.6.2 to refer to the Standard Operating Procedures (available on the OIE website). Further details can be found under agenda item 5.4.

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

#### c) Chapter 8.15. Infection with Rift Valley fever virus

The Commission discussed the Member comments and suggested that expert opinion be sought on the range of issues raised during the review of the Chapter, in particular the duration of infectivity of semen after RVF infection, infectivity of semen in seropositive animals, and RVFV inactivation in milk.

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<sup>2</sup> Adesokan H.K., Akinseye V.O., Streicher E.M., Van Helden P., Warren R.M. & Cadmus S.I. (2019). – Reverse zoonotic tuberculosis transmission from an emerging Uganda I strain between pastoralists and cattle in South-Eastern Nigeria. *BMC Vet. Res.*, 15 (1), 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12917-019-2185-1>.  
Miller M.A., Buss P., Roos E.O., Hausler G., Dippenaar A., Mitchell E., van Schalkwyk L., Robbe-Austerman S., Waters W. R., Sikar-Gang A., Lyashchenko K.P., Parsons S.D.C., Warren R. & van Helden P. (2019). – Fatal tuberculosis in a free-ranging African elephant and One Health implications of human pathogens in wildlife. *Front. Vet. Sci.*, 6, 18. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2019.00018>.  
Ocepek M., Pate M., Žolnir-Dovč M. & Poljak M. (2005). – Transmission of *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* from human to cattle. *J. Clin. Microbiol.*, 43 (7), 3555–3557. <https://doi.org/10.1128/jcm.43.7.3555-3557.2005>.  
Romero B., Rodríguez S., Bezos J., Díaz R., Copano M. F., Merediz I., Mínguez O., Marqués S., Palacios J.J., García de Viedma D., Sáez J.L., Mateos A., Aranaz A., Domínguez L. & de Juan L. (2011). – Humans as source of *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* infection in cattle, Spain. *Emerg. Infect. Dis.*, 17 (12), 2393. <https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1712.101476>.  
Romha G., Gebru G., Asefa A. & Mamo G. (2018). – Epidemiology of *Mycobacterium bovis* and *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* in animals: Transmission dynamics and control challenges of zoonotic TB in Ethiopia. *Prev. Vet. Med.*, 158, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2018.06.012>.

The rationale for the proposed amendments is attached in [Annex 3](#).

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

**d) Draft Chapter 8.Y. Infection with animal trypanosomes of African origin**

The Commission disagreed with a Member proposal to restrict the case definition of animal trypanosomes of African origin to infection only being cyclically transmitted by the tsetse flies, as the chapter targets both tsetse- and non-tsetse-transmitted African trypanosomes (with exception of *T. evansi* and *T. equiperdum*), and because the mode of transmission is not always known and can include vertical or iatrogenic transmission.

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

**e) Chapter 14.7. Infection with Peste des Petits Ruminants virus**

Regarding a Member suggestion to include cattle, camels and buffaloes as host species in the case definition of PPR for the purpose of the Terrestrial Code, the Commission disagreed and noted that currently there is not enough evidence on the epidemiological role of these species and wildlife in the transmission of PPRV. As additional data emerges on the role of wildlife and other species in the epidemiology of the disease, this Chapter will be revised accordingly.

The Commission considered a Member comment suggesting prohibiting the importation of vaccinated animals only for the purpose of rearing. The Commission reiterated its position from February 2020 that in the absence of marker vaccines or a test to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) and the demanding level of surveillance that would be required to ensure the traceability of all vaccinated animals, the prohibition of imports of vaccinated sheep and goats by a country or zone having an official PPR free status should be maintained. The Commission acknowledged however that the Chapter requirements can be revised once evidence on the use and effectiveness of a DIVA vaccine for PPR becomes available.

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

**f) Chapter 15.2. Infection with Classical swine fever virus**

The rationale for the Commission's proposed amendments is attached in [Annex 4](#).

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration.

**4. Ad hoc and Working Groups**

**4.1. Meeting reports for endorsement**

**a) Ad hoc Group on FMD – electronic consultation on Chapter 8.8 regarding importation of fresh meat from countries and zone infected with FMDV: June to August 2020**

The Commission reviewed the report of the *ad hoc* Group of FMD which proposed provisions for the importation of the following commodities from countries and zones infected with FMDV: a) fresh meat of domestic and captive wild ruminants and pigs, b) fresh meat of wild ruminants and wild boar and c) fresh meat (deboned) of domestic sheep, goats and pigs (excluding feet, head, viscera and skin).

The Commission emphasised the importance of preventing cross-contamination with potentially FMD-infected animals or carcasses entering the slaughterhouse between the last disinfection carried out before the slaughter of the animals and dispatch of the meat. In this regard, animals/carcasses introduced should be only from those susceptible animals and carcasses originating from establishments compliant with these provisions and not of a lesser animal health status.

Following the consultation of the *ad hoc* Group, the Commission agreed that maturation and deboning are also applicable to pigs and suggested changes accordingly.

The Commission endorsed the report and forwarded it and the amended draft articles to the Code Commission for its consideration at its February 2021 meeting.

The endorsed report of the *ad hoc* Group is attached as [Annex 5](#).

#### 4.2. Planned *ad hoc* Groups and confirmation of proposed agendas

Considering the situation on COVID-19, the Commission was informed that the following list of *ad hoc* Group meetings would take place virtually. With regard to the *ad hoc* Groups on the evaluation of disease status and official control programmes for OIE endorsement, the Commission was briefed on the proposed agendas including information on the applications submitted to the OIE so far.

- a) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of AHS status:** 22–24 September 2020 (no applications; cancelled)
- b) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of BSE risk status:** 28 September–2 October 2020
- c) ***Ad hoc* Group on tuberculosis: 29 September 2020**

The Commission was informed that the OIE would convene an *ad hoc* Group on tuberculosis with the aim of discussing and proposing strategies other than ‘test and cull’ that can be used to prevent, control, or eradicate tuberculosis in livestock. The *ad hoc* Group would also be tasked with providing recommendations on whether or not *M. tuberculosis* continues to meet the OIE criteria to be included in the OIE List. The Commission agreed with the draft terms of reference of the *ad hoc* Group on tuberculosis.

- d) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of CBPP status:** 6–8 October 2020
- e) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of FMD status:** 12 October–4 November 2020
- f) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of PPR status:** 27–29 October 2020
- g) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of the endorsement of official control programmes for dog-mediated rabies:** 17–19 November 2020
- h) ***Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of CSF status:** 7–9 December 2020 (*tbc*)
- i) **Working Group on Wildlife:** 2–4 December 2020

The Commission was provided with the draft agenda for the next virtual meeting of the Working Group on Wildlife, to be held in December 2020, and was invited to provide additional topics for discussion at the meeting. The Commission appreciated the request but had no suggestions at this time.

#### 4.3. Meeting reports for information

- a) ***Ad hoc* Group on ASF compartmentalisation: 3–5 March 2020**

The Commission was informed of the OIE *ad hoc* Group that was convened by the Director General of the OIE to contribute in the development of practical guidelines on compartmentalisation for ASF, which would incorporate the general principles outlined in the *Terrestrial Code* and also provide specific guidance for application and validation of compartmentalisation in support of its Members to minimise the impact of ASF through ensuring business continuity.

A meeting was held at the OIE Headquarters in Paris from 3 to 5 March 2020, at which the draft outline of the guidelines proposed by the consultant was reviewed and key technical items such as biosecurity, supply chain and surveillance were discussed. The meeting was also attended by members from the Commission and the Code Commission. Following the meeting, the *ad hoc* Group continued to contribute to the development of the guidelines and to align their views through electronic consultations. The guidelines, consisting of the main document, tools and examples, are now undergoing a refinement of the general layout, which should be finished by the end of November 2020. The guidelines will then be made publicly available.

The Commission reviewed the report of the meeting ([Annex 6](#)) and the text of the guidelines, and commended the work done by the consultant and the experts.

**b) *Ad hoc* Group on COVID-19 and Safe Trade in Animals and Animal Products: 9 April; 5–8 May; 21–27 May 2020**

The Commission was informed that the OIE *ad hoc* Group was created in April 2020 to monitor current scientific knowledge and relevant risk assessments developed by stakeholders on the risks to human health and animal health associated with COVID-19 and international trade in animals and animal products. The accompanying report gave a high-level overview of the group and its activities, with full details of its consultations and outputs appended. The Group remains committed to meeting on an *ad hoc* basis in response to emerging information.

**c) Working Group on Wildlife: 10–13 March 2020 ([Report](#))**

The Commission was informed that the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic and other recent spillover events have highlighted the importance of the Working Group on Wildlife (WGW) in providing expert opinion and advice to the international community, as well as science-based risk management at the human-animal ecosystem interface. WGW has been supporting the OIE in its response to COVID-19 since January 2020. It developed a high-level statement on wildlife trade and emerging zoonoses, which formed the basis for further advocacy and balanced discussion on the development of strategies to reduce the risk of future spillover events.

Comprehensive information on emerging and noteworthy wildlife issues and disease occurrences worldwide was provided at the meeting.

The WGW provided recommendations to improve the implementation of existing global control strategies for PPR, ASF, rabies, HPAI, zoonotic tuberculosis, and FMD. Regarding PPR, the Commission noted the positive impact of the involvement of the WGW and recommended that this should be used as a model for supporting other global disease control strategies. For ASF, the WGW offered support for proposed activities on wild pigs under the GF-TADs initiative for the global control of ASF, including the recommendation of an expert to assist with training programmes on hunting biosecurity and mapping of wild pig population. Regarding the Global FMD Control Strategy, the WGW indicated interest in being represented in an advisory body that is proposed to be created at global level to share information on FMD control. The Commission noted that, as wildlife management is only a marginal component of FMD control in many Members, the modalities of the WGW membership in the advisory group may need not to be permanent, but rather to establish links to ensure the WGW becomes the reference for wildlife-related issues in the implementation of the Global FMD Control Strategy.

**d) Working Group on antimicrobial resistance: 7–9 April 2020 ([Report](#))**

The Commission was updated on the work of the Working Group on antimicrobial resistance and advised that further information is available in the report of the meeting.

## **5. Official disease status**

### **5.1. State of play and prioritisation of Expert missions to Members requested by the Commission**

**a) Proposal of alternative options to replace field missions**

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the missions that were to take place in 2020 were postponed until further notice. At this meeting, the Commission discussed alternative options to replace the field missions planned in 2020/2021, particularly those that may have an impact on the recognition of Members' official status in May 2021. Different options were discussed, such as re-submission of an updated dossier addressing the identified gaps, virtual interviews with the key persons of the Veterinary Services of the concerned Member, close follow-up through biannual reports for maintenance of status. The Commission proposed a different option or a combination of options for each mission prioritised at its February 2020 meeting.

Nonetheless, the Commission noted that these are temporary solutions during the COVID-19 pandemic and emphasised the importance and value of conducting official status recognition and maintenance mission and that these missions would resume as soon as the situation improves.

## **5.2. Specific update on official disease status**

### **a) Update on situation of countries/zone with suspended or re-instated disease status**

- *Thailand (AHS)*

The Commission was informed that following an immediate notification on an outbreak of AHS in Pak Chong, Nakhon Ratchasima district, the AHS free country status of Thailand was suspended with effect from 27 March 2020.

- *Romania (CSF)*

Based on the OIE mission that took place in Romania in January 2020 to assess the compliance with the OIE *Terrestrial Code* provisions for the maintenance of its CSF free country status, and following the examination of the mission report by the Commission via electronic consultation, this status was suspended with effect from 23 March 2020.

- *Malaysia (AHS)*

Following an immediate notification on an outbreak of AHS in the State of Terengganu, the AHS free country status of Malaysia was suspended with effect from 6 August 2020.

### **b) Follow-up of countries having a free status or an endorsed official control programme**

- *Indonesia (FMD)*

The Commission reviewed documents submitted by Indonesia as part of the continuous follow-up of Indonesia's 2019 annual reconfirmation for its FMD free status and progress made on the Commission's recommendations. The Commission noted that the results of the samples sent to FMD Reference Laboratory (Pirbright Institute) were negative for vesicular exanthema of swine virus, FMD, swine vesicular disease, and Seneca Valley virus but the Commission also noted that the volume of the sample was below the required volume for the tests.

The Commission reiterated its recommendation that Indonesia adapt its approach for the follow-up of FMD suspicions, particularly to conduct additional serological surveillance in the FMD susceptible animals of the same holding and others potentially in-contact to effectively rule out the presence of FMD. The Commission strongly recommended that the national laboratory uses both PCR primer sets for the detection of FMD genome in accordance with Point 1.3.5. of Chapter 3.1.8. of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

The Commission requested that the corrective actions and progress made on the aforesaid recommendations of the Commission be reported with supportive documented evidence when Indonesia reconfirms its FMD status in November 2020.

## **5.3. Disease status recognition procedure**

### **a) Selection of status for comprehensive review of 2020 annual reconfirmations**

The Commission selected the list of Members' 2020 annual reconfirmations for comprehensive review during its forthcoming meeting in February 2021. The selection was based on a set of criteria described in the SOPs. The Commission will review a total of 44 annual reconfirmations during its February 2021 meeting. The Members selected for comprehensive review of their annual reconfirmations will be notified officially by letter from the OIE in October 2020.

## 5.4. Standards related to official status recognition

### a) Deadline to benefit from fast-track procedure for recovery of official status

The Commission reviewed a draft paper prepared by the Status Department highlighting a potential discrepancy between the OIE Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on suspension, recovery or withdrawal of officially recognised disease status and the provisions for recovery of Chapter 12.1. on infection with African horse sickness virus. According to Articles 12.1.5. and 12.1.2. (point 1.d.), for countries/zones where *Culicoides* are present, a minimum period of two years should pass until a Member would be eligible to apply for recovery of AHS free status. However, the SOP state that Members may recover their official status within two years by proving they have complied with the relevant requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* for recovery of status.

Considering the above, the Commission proposed to extend the period from two to three years for Members to benefit from a fast track procedure for recovery of AHS-free status. The Commission also discussed the relevance for the other diseases that the OIE grants official recognition of animal health status, and concluded to retain the current period of two years. The Commission requested to update draft Chapter 1.6. (see agenda item 3.1.b.) and the SOP accordingly.

## 6. Global strategies and initiatives

### 6.1. Foot and mouth disease: Global Control Strategy

The Commission was updated on the activities that have been conducted since its previous meeting in February 2020 in the framework of the Global FMD Control Strategy. 79 Members and non-Members are involved in the FMD Progressive Control Pathway (PCP-FMD). As a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the activities with Members that were planned for 2020 had been rescheduled to the second half of the year and to 2021. The Working Group on FMD (FMD WG), which is composed of FAO, OIE and EuFMD, took this opportunity to update its annual workplan, improve the PCP-FMD tools, review and provide feedback to eight Members on their FMD control plans (official control programme, risk based strategic plan or risk assessment plan).

PCP-FMD support officers (PSOs) have been assigned and communication sent to seven Members in Africa and Europe and one non-Member in the Middle East. The PSOs provide technical assistance in updating and developing the FMD control plans and strategies for future submission and assessment to progress along the PCP-FMD stages. Some Members reported that their main challenge in updating their control plans was the restrictions imposed to control the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Commission was also updated on the ongoing work that was requested in its February 2020 meeting, to align the PCP-FMD guiding documents for Stage 3 with the *Terrestrial Code*, specifically with respect to the required stage at which a Member may submit an application for OIE endorsement of its official control programme for FMD. The technical staff of the OIE and FAO have met to define the approach and the type of questions in relation to the different sections of the Questionnaire (Article 1.11.5. of the *Terrestrial Code*) that would be relevant to ask the Member submitting its official control programme for OIE endorsement. This would apply to a Member participating in the FAO/OIE GF TADs PCP-FMD process. In addition, the requirements in terms of the PVS Critical Competencies related to FMD control for each of the PCP-FMD Stages in the PCP-FMD guidelines were updated to align them with the new OIE PVS tool for evaluation of performance of Veterinary Services, 7th edition, 2019.

The Commission took note of the work plan and activities for 2020 and 2021 and the importance of evaluating the implementation of the Global FMD Control Strategy. The view is to strengthen support to Members` effective control of FMD through various initiatives including capacity building to meet the objectives of the Strategy at the end of its lifespan. The ongoing work by the Regions to update their regional disease control strategies under the GF TADs was acknowledged.

## 6.2. Peste des petits ruminants: Global Control and Eradication Strategy

The Commission was updated on the activities that had been conducted since its previous meeting in February 2020 on the framework of the PPR Global Control and Eradication Strategy.

The Commission was informed that the in-depth review process of the PPR Monitoring and Assessment Tool (PMAT) was initiated in March 2020 as a priority activity for the OIE and FAO. In this regard, a joint OIE/FAO five-expert team was formed to undertake the revision, which was initially planned to be carried out through country missions and workshops with country representatives. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this approach was not feasible. As an alternative, the OIE/FAO expert team developed a questionnaire which was sent to 93 PPR infected and at-risk countries in order to report their experience with the use of the tool. More than 60 countries provided their feedback, which is currently being analysed by the team.

In addition, in June 2020 the fourth meeting of the PPR Advisory Committee was held virtually. The Committee discussed, among others, the work plan of PPR activities in 2020-2021 and how it can be adapted considering the COVID-19 situation. The Committee recommended the OIE and FAO to prioritise the different activities with emphasis on field activities and if meetings are needed, they should preferably be held virtually.

In the light of the above, it was decided that the 3rd PPR Global Research and Expertise Network meeting will take place through a teleconference in November 2020. Regional Roadmap meetings are postponed for next year and after the PMAT revision is finalised at the beginning of 2021.

The Commission was also informed that the document on “OIE/FAO Guidelines for the Control and Prevention of PPR in Wildlife Populations” was finalised and endorsed by both organisations, who agreed to proceed with publishing it electronically. As a next step, more specific technical appendices on different aspects, such as on wildlife diagnostics, surveillance strategies, carcasses disposal etc., will be developed and annexed to the guidelines.

Finally, the Commission took note of the various communication tools on PPR developed in the framework of the 2019 OIE Activity Report, as follows:

- a. Infographic : [the OIE responds to global challenges](#)
- b. Video : [PPR: an illustration of OIE's contribution to address global challenges](#)
- c. Video : [OIE's action in 3 regional project](#)
- d. Interview with the Delegate of Nigeria : [the PVS Pathway reports : tools for advocacy](#)
- e. Interview with the Delegate of Kenya : [Public-Private Partnership for the benefit of livestock vaccination](#)

## 6.3. Rabies: The Global Strategic Plan to End Human Deaths from Dog-Mediated Rabies by 2030. Zero by 30

The Commission was informed that the United Against Rabies (UAR) Forum is being established to build on the work of the United Against Rabies Collaboration and expand to include a more inclusive network alongside the Tripartite. The Forum will be a network of members who share a common vision for rabies elimination and are committed to working together to achieve it. The purpose of the UAR Forum is to provide a mechanism for implementing the objectives of ‘The Global Strategic Plan to end human deaths from dog-mediated rabies by 2030’ (GSP). Theme-specific and result orientated working groups will be formed to carry out the work of the Forum.

A UAR Stakeholder Meeting was being planned for September 2020 and would provide a platform to announce the creation of the UAR Forum and discuss priority activities to progress the implementation of the GSP. This meeting marks the transition from Phase 1 of the GSP to Phase 2, and presents an opportunity to unite stakeholders and attract the political attention and resources needed to end rabies and deliver the vision set out in the GSP. This meeting would also show a wider audience, including governments and funders, that rabies control and elimination can make a significant contribution to One Health implementation and the Sustainable Development Goals. The Directors General from WHO, FAO and OIE would offer opening remarks, highlighting the importance of rabies in the agenda of the Tripartite.

The members of the Commission were invited to participate in the meeting.

#### **6.4. African swine fever: Global Control Initiative**

The Commission was informed that the OIE, in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), launched a joint initiative for the global control of African Swine Fever (ASF) on 17 July 2020, with a global press release and communications to call on countries and partners to join forces against this disease by adopting the new Initiative.

The Initiative continues the long-standing collaboration between the FAO and OIE for the management of animal health-related risks, utilising the joint GF-TADs framework with the aim of fostering national, regional and global partnerships, to strengthen control measures and to minimise the impact of the disease.

A GF-TADs ASF Working Group (ASF WG) has also been established to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the initiative and to contribute to the development and support of ASF control strategies at the global and regional levels. Members consist of three representatives each from FAO and OIE, with the Chair rotating annually between the organisations. Dr Gregorio Torres, Head of Science Department of the OIE has been appointed as the Chair to lead the group in its first year.

The GF-TADs website has also been updated with a new section on ASF (<http://www.gf-tads.org/asf/asf/en/>) where detailed information on the initiative can now be accessed, including the logic framework and the operational plans that lists the ongoing and planned activities related to the initiative.

### **7. OIE Collaborating Centres**

7.1. n.a.

### **8. Liaison with other Specialist Commissions**

#### **8.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Standard Commission**

##### **a) Meeting of the Bureaus of the Code Commission and the Commission**

n.a.

#### **8.2. Biological Standards Commission**

##### **a) Definition of PPR virus containing material**

In its February 2020 meeting, the Commission requested the Code Commission to evaluate its proposal of integrating a reference to documentation of facilities holding PPR virus containing materials in Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Code Commission considered that the new text would be better placed in the *Terrestrial Manual* and forwarded it to the Biological Standards Commission (BSC) for consideration that made minor amendments. The Commission agreed with the amendments made by the BSC on the text.

### **9. Conferences, workshops, meetings, missions**

The Commission was updated on the main conclusions of the following meetings in which the OIE had been involved since the Commission's February 2020 meeting:

- 15th meeting of the GF-TAD Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in Europe, Virtual, 6 May 2020
- Virtual meeting of Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever for Asia, 28 April 2020
- 11th Meeting of the Regional Steering Committee of the GF-TADs for the Americas, Virtual, 16 June 2020.

## 10. Disease control specific issues

### 10.1. Evaluation of diseases against listing criteria

#### a) Evaluation of pathogenic agent against listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2

The Commission noted that while haemorrhagic septicaemia caused by *Pasteurella multocida* serotypes 6:b and 6:e is currently listed by the OIE (Chapter 11.7. Haemorrhagic Septicaemia - *Pasteurella multocida* serotypes 6:b and 6:e), other strains of *P. multocida* have been described in some countries as causative agents of this disease in *Bovidae*<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the Commission suggested assessing whether strains of *P. multocida* other than 6:b and 6:e, can cause haemorrhagic septicaemia in *Bovidae*.

Furthermore, the Commission pointed out that several countries do not always distinguish between haemorrhagic septicaemia in *Bovidae* and the disease caused by *Mannheimia haemolytica* (formerly called *P. haemolytica*), referring to both diseases as “Pasteurellosis”. The Commission proposed gathering expert opinion to assess infection by *M. haemolytica* in *Bovidae* against the criteria for inclusion in the OIE List, and to advise on potential advantages to Members of considering pasteurellosis of *Bovidae*, including both haemorrhagic septicaemia and infection by *M. haemolytica*, as one Listed disease.

#### b) Guiding document for application of the criteria for listing terrestrial animal diseases

The Commission was provided with the final version of the Guiding document for application of the criteria for listing terrestrial animal diseases, which was revised after having been presented for comments to the Commission and to the Code Commission in February 2020. This is one of the documents associated with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for (de)listing pathogens for terrestrial animals, which were agreed by the Specialist Commissions in September 2019.

The Commission commended the work done by the OIE to improve the consistency and transparency of the process of listing and delisting diseases, and praised the inclusion by the OIE Secretariat of a preliminary step to the assessment for checking compliance with Article 1.2.1. The SOPs and associated documents will be made available on the OIE website after the September Commission meeting.

### 10.2. Progress of the work on case definition

In February 2020, the OIE Secretariat drafted a concept note on case definitions to inform the Specialist Commissions of the need to revise or develop case definitions of OIE-listed terrestrial animal diseases for inclusion in disease-specific Chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commissions endorsed the approach presented in the note, which involves three steps to be implemented in a stepwise fashion: (i) the collection of information on case definitions currently provided in the Code disease-specific Chapters; (ii) the ranking of diseases according to the severity of notification issue linked to case definitions by the OIE World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department (WAHIAD); and eventually (iii) the prioritisation of diseases by combining the information collected with step (i) and (ii) with considerations of whether a Code disease-specific Chapter was under development/revision or on the work plan of the Code Commission.

Following the 2020 February Commission meeting, the OIE Secretariat implemented step (i) and (ii) and presented the results in a two-way contingency table (i.e. case definition status in the Code against the severity of notification issues). With step (iii), diseases were classified in three priority groups.

The first tranche of diseases proposed for attention to the Commissions consists of all priority group 1 diseases (i.e. equine influenza, theileriosis, Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever and surra ( *Trypanosoma evansi*)), plus the WAHIAD high priority items from Priority group 2 (i.e. leishmaniosis, Nipah virus encephalitis, Q fever, and tularemia).

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/hemorrhagic\\_septicemia.pdf](http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/hemorrhagic_septicemia.pdf)

The Commission was informed that the development or revision of case definitions for the first tranche of diseases would begin following the meeting with the support of subject-matter experts. The resulting case definitions will be presented for their consideration at the Commission February 2021 meeting.

### **10.3. Zoonotic potential of hepatitis B in gibbons**

The Commission was informed that the Working Group on Wildlife had conducted a review during its March 2020 meeting of the potential transmission of hepatitis B from gibbons to humans, in response to the request by the Commission, in February 2019, to address this issue that was raised by the European Association of Zoos and Aquaria (EAZA). The Working Group on Wildlife concluded that hepatitis B was a human disease and noted that recent diagnostic tests can differentiate hepatitis B viruses circulating in non human-primates, showing that great apes and gibbons were infected with different hepatitis B viruses that had never been demonstrated to infect humans.

Based on this rationale<sup>4</sup>, the Commission agreed with the recommendations to revise Article 6.12.4. of the *Terrestrial Code* to reflect that hepatitis B is a human disease and *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.9.11. to ensure differentiation between human hepatitis B and other hepadnaviridae, and to share this information with Code Commission and the Biological Standards Commission for their consideration.

### **10.4. Spread of Lumpy skin disease in Asia**

The Commission discussed the spread of lumpy skin disease (LSD) in Asia. The disease is now present in several Members in the Region, including Russia, China, and India, with recent notifications in Chinese Taipei, Nepal and Bangladesh. The risk of some of the Members becoming endemic continues to increase, causing anxiety in other Members in the South Eastern side of the Region.

The Commission acknowledged that several activities are now ongoing to support the Members and their laboratory capacities, including the provision of training courses (e.g. the one that will be organised at the end of September 2020 by the OIE Regional Commission for Asia, the Far East and Oceania and FAO) and the supply of vaccines. Nevertheless, the Commission pointed out that the disease is not listed as one of the priority diseases for GF-TAD in Asia, and recommended the Region to consider the priority list to be updated to include LSD, supporting the development of regionally specific recommendations for prevention, early warning and control.

## **11. For the Commission's information**

### **11.1. Update on rinderpest activities**

The *ad hoc* Group on rinderpest<sup>5</sup> met virtually from 24 to 26 March 2020. The Group, which had been charged with revising the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter on infection with rinderpest virus, worked in accordance with its Terms of Reference and provided a draft chapter that will be reviewed by the TAHSC. The lengthiest points under discussion were the definitions of 'case' and 'suspected case', and the introduction of a definition of 'potential case'. Such definitions must be re-defined after the decision not to refer back to previous editions of the *Terrestrial Code*, in order to support gradation of alert levels and in particular to ensure suspected cases are notifiable. The definitions would also support surveillance processes and alert levels during recovery of freedom following confirmation of an outbreak. The zoning, trade, and surveillance provisions were revised with minimal contention.

There were no meetings of the FAO-OIE Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) for Rinderpest since the last update to the Specialist Commissions. However, the FAO-OIE Rinderpest Secretariat contacted the JAC on numerous occasions to provide updates and to ask for the review of applications for research using rinderpest virus containing materials (RVCM). In the last 6 months the FAO-OIE Rinderpest Secretariat received applications from NIAH, Japan, for the production of 200,000 doses of LA-AKO rinderpest vaccine and a stock of bulk antigen equivalent to 300,000 doses, and from The Pirbright Institute, UK, for testing archived sera for the presence of anti-rinderpest virus antibodies. The sera tested by Pirbright was to be shipped to Japan to allow for the continuation of the ongoing research project concerning the assessment of the cross-reactivity of neutralizing antibodies raised against LA-AKO and RBOK vaccines.

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<sup>4</sup> [Report of the Working Group on Wildlife, point 4.1.a\)](#)

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.oie.int/standard-setting/specialists-commissions-working-ad-hoc-groups/code-commission-reports/meetings-reports/>

In relation to destruction of RVCM outside Rinderpest Holding Facilities (RHF), the Republic of Korea has notified the FAO-OIE Rinderpest Secretariat of the destruction of their holdings in March 2020. Currently there are 7 countries (India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam) holding RVCM outside RHF. There has been no progress in applications from institutes to become RHF in this reporting period.

The Commission requested further information regarding the potential timelines for the complete destruction of RVCM outside RHF. The Commission was informed that the OIE-FAO secretariat is actively attempting to persuade countries to either destroy their RVCM or apply to become RHF. India is currently in the process of applying to have an RHF while negotiations are ongoing with Vietnam toward the destruction of their RVCM, but these processes had been delayed by the current COVID-19 pandemic. Due to various reasons, negotiations with other countries are advancing at a slower pace, making it difficult to set a potential timeline for the destruction of RVCM.

### **11.2. Project update: replacement International Standard Bovine Tuberculin**

The Commission was provided with a summary report on the progress of the ongoing project to prepare and calibrate a new standard tuberculin to replace the current International Standard Bovine Tuberculin, which outlined the satisfactory performance (to date) of one of the two candidate tuberculins.

The Commission was informed that the final project report will be based on the report that was submitted to the BSC in February 2020, and will be presented at the next meeting of the Specialist Commissions in February 2021.

The final report will include additional data and statistical analyses to strengthen the estimate of the potency of the selected candidate tuberculin. To this end, the bovine Tuberculosis *ad hoc* Group is arranging one supplementary potency calibration and validation study. This study will be conducted in guinea pigs sensitised with a homologous strain of live *Mycobacterium bovis* AN5, and will be conducted in the second half of 2020. The Group is awaiting confirmation of a site to conduct the study.

The Commission was informed that the final adoption of the new tuberculin standard is scheduled for the General Session in May 2021.

### **11.3. Update on the STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium**

The Commission was updated on the activities of STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium on Animal Health (IRC), which to date is comprised of 28 partners, including both public and private research funders and international donors.

Working groups of experts are currently involved in the identification of research gaps and in the drafting of research roadmaps for a number of priority diseases/infections/issues, including antimicrobial resistance (AMR), ASF, bovine tuberculosis (bTB), brucellosis, FMD, and helminths. The activities of the working groups have been seriously impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused the cancellation of most of the planned meetings and delayed the delivery of research roadmaps.

Coronaviruses are one of the priority diseases identified by the STAR-IDAZ IRC, but a working group of experts has not yet been established. During the past six months, the STAR-IDAZ IRC Secretariat (SIRCAH) actively engaged with the Consortium members to collect information about ongoing research efforts on coronaviruses at the human animal interface. In order to identify research needs and improve the coordination of research in this area, the STAR-IDAZ IRC is now establishing a Global Research Alliance, to be structured in a similar way to the already existing ones on ASF (Global ASF Research Alliance, GARA), FMD (Global FMD Research Alliance) and bTB (Global Research Alliance on bTB, GRAbTB).

Efforts are being made to keep regional networks active despite the COVID-19 situation, to map ongoing research and identify priorities at a regional level, as well as to improve collaboration. Regional meetings would be held virtually for Africa and the Americas in September followed by Asia and Europe in October and November.

#### **11.4. Update on the revision of Chapters 11.4 (BSE) and 1.8 (BSE Questionnaire)**

The Commission was updated on the activities related to the revision of the BSE standards. In September 2019, Chapter 11.4. was circulated for the first time for Member comments and Chapter 1.8. was included for information only. Due to the large number of comments received, the Code Commission requested expert opinion to review them and an *ad hoc* Group for that purpose was convened in June 2020. Further details can be found in the Code Commission's September 2020 report.

#### **11.5. OIE policy paper: Prepare for, Prevent, & Build Resilience against Health Crises**

The Commission was informed of the development of a policy paper to define how the OIE supports and could better support the Members to prepare for, anticipate, prevent, and build resilience against health crises. This will build a common and unified understanding of OIE strategic interventions, identify opportunities for synergies, coordination and collaboration across OIE (including Headquarters regional and subregional representations, OIE Reference Centres and OIE Partners), scope areas for new lines of work, or reprioritise work based on gaps/needs, and adapt strategies and interventions to address the needs across OIE regions and Members. The institutional policy will be developed using a whole-of-organisation approach.

The strategic interventions that have been identified include: emergency preparedness and contingency planning, disease emergence and integrated surveillance, resilient animal health services, sustainable laboratories, disease notification and data analysis, including for antimicrobial use, standards and guidelines, wildlife health management, risk communication and crisis communication, partnerships (including Public-Private Partnerships) biological threat reduction, and research & development.

The development of the policy paper is ongoing.

#### **11.6. Concept note on the wildlife health management framework**

The Commission was informed that OIE, in collaboration with the Working Group on Wildlife and its Members, has been developing a concept note that describes a broad programme of work aimed at reducing risks of pathogen spillover events by improving wildlife health management, addressing the risks of spillover whilst protecting animal health and welfare and biodiversity, and demonstrating OIE's relevance in delivering its mission. The work programme focuses on the role of Veterinary Services in improving wildlife health management, including ensuring the respective mandates and programmes of national Veterinary Authorities and any other Competent Authorities for wildlife are aligned and working in synergy without leaving important gaps in wildlife health risk management programmes. It aims to be coherent with the OIE's 7<sup>th</sup> strategic plan and to utilize existing tools, platforms, and networks.

The rationale for the concept note is that recent events that have affected human health and which have wildlife as a putative origin, in particular COVID-19, have re-affirmed the importance of zoonotic disease emergence at the One Health interface and highlighted a general lack of early warning, preparedness and response capacity for such scenarios. A common factor behind these events is the steady increase in the level of interaction between humans, domestic animals, and wild animals, principally due to human population interference and actions. An assessment of Members showed that few were well prepared to conduct assessment of potential spillovers, and there was a need to provide guidance to assist this process. In particular, it was identified that there is a need to integrate wildlife into existing and future surveillance guidelines at the human-animal interface, as current emphasis is on domestic animals despite the majority

of spillover events deriving from wildlife. National Veterinary Services should ensure surveillance, preparedness and response planning are conducted with a multisectoral approach, particularly important when wildlife is managed under different authorities, to quickly identify and mount effective responses to potential spillover events.

The concept note defines the overall objective being to pre-emptively reduce and manage spillover at the interface, and as specific objectives that the OIE Members apply best practices in wildlife health management (to benefit wildlife trade and sustainable use of wildlife), and that Members improve their capacity on prevention, early detection, mitigation, and notification to the OIE.

Six key outputs were identified, which are to promote multisectoral collaboration, strengthen capacity in wildlife health management, ensure quality data collection and analysis, develop and update control strategies, collect and disseminate scientific information, and develop and disseminate communication tools.

Work to date includes the development of a draft concept note which has been done in consultation with the OIE Working Group on Wildlife; OIE Regional and Sub-Regional Representations; stakeholders and external partners including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The work proposed in the concept note is broad, and includes activities relating to capacity building, advocacy, legislation, scientific networks, training, and the development of guidelines and standards. Next steps include developing a budget to support the work programme and seeking funding from investment partners.

## **12. Any other issues**

None at this meeting.

## **13. Programme and priorities**

### **13.1. Update and prioritisation of the work plan**

The Commission updated its work programme, identified the priorities, and scheduled the dates for the various *ad hoc* Group meetings, which will be accessible to Members on the OIE website.

The updated work programme is attached as [Annex 7](#).

## **14. Adoption of the report**

The Commission agreed to circulate the draft report electronically for comments before adoption.

## **15. Date of next meeting**

The next virtual meeting of the Scientific Commission is scheduled to take place between 1 and 12 February 2021, and will consist of 6 days distributed evenly throughout the period.

## **16. Meeting review**

In the context of the Commission Performance Management Framework, a meeting review was conducted.

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.../Annexes

**MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES**

**Virtual, 7–11 September 2020**

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**Agenda**

**Opening**

- 1. Welcome**
- 2. Adoption of the agenda**
- 3. Terrestrial Animal Health Code**
  - 3.1. Members' comments received for SCAD consideration**
    - a) Chapter 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations listed by the OIE
    - b) Chapter 1.6. Procedures for self-declaration and for official recognition by the OIE
    - c) Chapter 8.15. Infection with Rift Valley Fever virus
    - d) Draft Chapter 8.Y. Infection with animal trypanosomes of African origin
    - e) Chapter 14.7. Infection with Peste des Petits Ruminants virus
    - f) Chapter 15.2. Infection with Classical swine fever virus
- 4. Ad hoc and Working Groups**
  - 4.1. Meeting reports for endorsement**
    - a) *Ad hoc* Group on FMD – electronic consultation on Chapter 8.8 regarding importation of fresh meat from countries and zone infected with FMDV: June to August 2020
  - 4.2. Planned *ad hoc* Groups and confirmation of proposed agendas**
    - a) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of AHS status: 22–24 September 2020 (no applications; cancelled)
    - b) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of BSE risk status: 28 September to 2 October 2020
    - c) *Ad hoc* Group on tuberculosis: 29 September 2020
    - d) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of CBPP status: 6–8 October 2020
    - e) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of FMD status: 12 October to 4 November 2020
    - f) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of PPR status: 27–29 October 2020
    - g) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of the endorsement of official control programmes for dog-mediated rabies: 17–19 November 2020
    - h) *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of CSF status: 7–9 December 2020 (*tbc*)
    - i) Working Group on Wildlife: 2–4 December 2020
  - 4.3. Meeting reports for information**
    - a) *Ad hoc* Group on guidance for ASF compartmentalisation: 3–5 March 2020
    - b) *Ad hoc* Group on COVID-19 and Safe Trade in Animals and Animal Products: 9 April; 5–8 May; 21–27 May 2020.
    - c) Working Group on Wildlife: 10–13 March 2020
    - d) Working Group on antimicrobial resistance: 7–9 April 2020
- 5. Official disease status**
  - 5.1. Expert missions to Members requested by the Commission**
    - a) Proposal of alternative options to replace field missions
  - 5.2. Specific update on official disease status**
    - a) Update on situation of countries/zone with suspended or re-instated disease status
    - b) Follow-up of countries having a free status or an endorsed official control programme

## Annex 1 (contd)

- 5.3. Disease status recognition procedure
    - a) Selection of status for comprehensive review of 2020 annual reconfirmations
  - 5.4. Standards related to official status recognition
    - a) Deadline to benefit from fast-track procedure for recovery of official status
  - 6. Global Control and eradication strategies**
    - 6.1. Foot and Mouth Disease. Global Control Strategy
    - 6.2. Peste des Petits Ruminants. Global Control and Eradication Strategy
    - 6.3. Rabies. Global Strategic Plan to End Human Deaths from Dog-mediated Rabies. Zero by 30
    - 6.4. African swine fever. Global control initiative
  - 7. OIE Collaborating Centres**
    - 7.1. n.a.
  - 8. Liaison with other Commissions and Departments**
    - 8.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Standard Commission
      - a) n.a.
    - 8.2. Biological Standards Commission
      - a) Definition of PPR virus containing material
  - 9. Conferences, workshops, meetings, missions**
  - 10. Disease control specific issues**
    - 10.1. Evaluation of diseases against listing criteria
      - a) Evaluation of pathogenic agent against listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2
      - b) Guiding document for application of the criteria for listing terrestrial animal diseases
    - 10.2. Progress of the work on case definition
    - 10.3. Zoonotic potential of hepatitis B in gibbons
    - 10.4. Spread of Lumpy skin disease in Asia
  - 11. For the Commission information**
    - 11.1. Update on rinderpest activities
    - 11.2. Project update: replacement International Standard Bovine Tuberculin
    - 11.3. Update on the STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium
    - 11.4. Update on the revision of Chapters 11.4 (BSE) and 1.8 (BSE Questionnaire)
    - 11.5. OIE policy paper: Prepare for, Prevent & Build Resilience against Health Crises
    - 11.6. Concept note on the wildlife health management framework
  - 12. Any other issues**
  - 13. Programme and priorities**
    - 13.1. Update and prioritisation of the work plan
  - 14. Adoption of the report**
  - 15. Date of next meeting**
  - 16. Meeting review**
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**MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES**

**Virtual, 7–11 September 2020**

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**Rationale for the amendments to:**

**CHAPTER 8.15. INFECTION WITH RIFT VALLEY FEVER VIRUS  
provided by the Scientific Commission**

**Article 8.15.9. Recommendations for importation of semen and in vivo derived embryos of susceptible animals from countries or zones infected with RVFV**

In response to a Member comment, the Commission noted that no registered vaccines that differentiate infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) or associated serological tests are currently available, despite ongoing research. Therefore, the Commission proposed to keep the current text until the development and availability of DIVA vaccines allows for its inclusion to be considered in the future revision of the Chapter.

**Article 8.15.11. Recommendations for importation of milk and milk products of susceptible animals from countries or zones infected with RVFV**

Commission noted that certain time/temperature combinations used for pasteurisation may not be effective to inactivate RVFV. The Commission suggested that expert opinion be sought to address the pasteurisation requirements to ensure RVFV inactivation in milk. The Commission noted that laboratory reports highlighting this issue could also be provided to support this request.

**Article 8.15.12. Surveillance**

The Commission noted the requests by a Member for more detailed guidance for surveillance of RVF and reiterated its previous recommendation to consult subject-matter experts to revise Article 8.15.12. to this effect.

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**Rationale for the amendments to:**

**CHAPTER 15.2. INFECTION WITH CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER (CSF) VIRUS  
provided by the Scientific Commission**

**Article 15.2.3bis. Country or zone infected with CSFV**

In response to a Member proposal to delete this article as other chapters such as 15.1 (Infection with African swine fever) or 10.4 (Infection with avian influenza viruses) do not include it, the Commission agreed with the OIE Secretariat proposal to keep this article in line with other specific chapters for which the OIE grants official status. Similarly, a suggestion from a Member to align the requirements with those in Chapter 10.4 was not accepted as the harmonisation was carried out in line with disease chapters that are part of the official recognition procedure.

**Article 15.2.4. Establishment of a containment zone within a country or zone previously free from CSF**

The Commission disagreed with a proposal to remove the 12-month period in which the recovery of the CSF free status of the containment zone should be achieved. The Commission highlighted that a containment zone is an instrument to quickly control limited epidemiologically linked outbreaks to reinstate the CSF-free status of the rest of the territory outside the containment zone to minimise trade impact; thus the containment zone should be subjected to temporality. Should a more long-term strategy be needed for the control of outbreaks in a previously free country or zone, permanent establishment of zone(s) should be considered. The Commission proposed that this temporality for the containment zone concept should be reflected in the horizontal Chapter 4.4 as it would apply for all diseases.

**Article 15.2.5bis. Direct transfer of pigs within a country from an infected zone to a free zone for slaughter**

The Commission discussed a Member comment stating that the current provisions are too restrictive given that CSF spreads primarily via direct contact or secretions. The Commission noted that these provisions were drafted using the example of the FMD chapter and acknowledged that the transmission pathways of the two diseases are different (i.e., possibility of airborne transmission in FMD which does not occur in CSF). However, based on the highly infectious nature of CSF, as well as its potential for not showing apparent clinical signs, its likelihood of delayed or under-reporting in backyard farms, the Commission considered that the 10-km radius together with the three month period without occurrence of CSF provides the adequate level of safety and confidence in moving pigs from an infected zone and proposed to maintain the current provisions.

The Commission agreed with a Member comment that the slaughterhouse should only be approved for export after disinfection has been completed for both the slaughterhouse and vehicles to prevent the risk of potential cross contamination. The Commission proposed to merge points 5 and 6.

**Articles 15.2.9. and 15.2.11. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones infected with CSFV**

The Commission disagreed with a Member proposal to replace the term “collection” with “vaccination” in point iii) of Articles 15.2.9. (for semen) and 15.2.11. (for in vivo embryos), as such amendment would imply that vaccination is a sufficient risk management measure regardless of the timing of vaccination in relation to collection, whereas the intent of the requirement is to demonstrate that, if a donor animal is seropositive in the period following collection this is due to vaccination and not to infection. The Commission also disagreed to specify that the antibodies present in the donor animals should be a result of vaccination as it is implicit.

**Article 15.2.12bis. Recommendations for importation from countries or zones infected with CSFV, where an official control programme exists**

In response to a Member comment enquiring if ‘shipment for export’ means ‘dispatch from the slaughterhouse’, the Commission clarified that there should be no case of CSF between the last disinfection and dispatch of meat from the slaughterhouse for export.

#### **Article 15.2.26. Surveillance for CSFV in wild and feral pigs**

The Commission agreed with a Member proposal and included the farms that feed swill, as a separate point, in the criteria of high risk areas for targeted surveillance.

In contrast, the Commission disagreed with a proposal to replace the current description of areas with a high level of hunting activity– where animal dispersion and feeding as well as inappropriate disposal of waste can occur – to a more general requirement for “opportunistic wildlife surveillance” in areas of high risk for CSF, as the current provision is more specific. The Commission noted that opportunistic collection of samples is mentioned in Article 1.4.4. and therefore should be applied.

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**REPORT OF THE ELECTRONIC CONSULTATION OF  
THE AD HOC GROUP ON FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD)  
Paris, June - August 2020**

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**1. Background and opening**

Dr Neo Mapitse, Head of the Status Department, welcomed the experts of the *ad hoc* Group on foot and mouth disease (the Group) and thanked them on behalf of the OIE Director General for having found the time to undertake the assignment within the time limitations and challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since the adoption in May 2015, Chapter 8.8 on infection with foot and mouth disease virus of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)* had been subject to an ongoing review by OIE Members, different *ad hoc* Groups and Specialist Commissions. When considering the recommendations for importation of animals and animal products, during the meeting of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code Commission (TAHSC) in February 2017, it was noted that there are no recommendations for the importation of fresh meat of domestic small ruminants from infected countries or zones as they are not covered by Article 8.8.22. Moreover, there are no provisions for the importation of fresh meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals. In order to address these gaps, the Specialist Commissions requested the OIE Secretariat to consult the experts of the *ad hoc* Group on FMD to assess and draft, where appropriate, recommendations for the importation of meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals or meat of domestic small ruminants from countries or zones infected with FMD virus (FMDv).

**2. Process of the electronic consultation, adoption of the agenda and appointment of chairperson and rapporteur**

Based on the literature review performed by the OIE Secretariat, some critical areas were identified for which experts' advice was requested electronically. Dr Wilna Vosloo acted as the chairperson and Dr David Paton as the rapporteur for the Group.

An electronic consultation was conducted between June and August 2020. All experts signed the forms for undertaking of confidentiality and declaration of conflicts of interest. The OIE reviewed the declared interests and agreed that none represented a potential conflict in the revision of the Chapter. The terms of reference and list of participants are presented in Appendices I and II, respectively.

**3. Review of relevant draft provisions and report of the *ad hoc* Group on FMD in June 2016**

The Group noted that domestic pigs were not included in the list of species category to be addressed in this consultation. The Group noted the report of the June 2016 *ad hoc* Group where provisions (draft article 8.8.22bis) for imports of fresh pig meat from infected countries or zones were drafted. The Group reviewed the report and the draft provisions for the imports of fresh meat of pigs from infected countries or zones from the meeting of the *ad hoc* Group in June 2016. The Group pointed out that:

- a) pigs do not act as carriers, and subclinical infection in pigs is not epidemiologically relevant;

- b) fresh meat from viremic pigs or pigs in the incubation period may pose a risk for FMDv transmission;
- c) the risk mitigation measures of maturation, deboning and removal of the lymph nodes in beef was not applicable to pork;
- d) the meat from pigs that would comply with Article 8.8.12. (import of live pigs from an infected country or zone) would be safe for trade provided that specific transport and slaughter conditions have been respected; and
- e) the provision, in draft article 8.8.22bis, for post-slaughter follow-up at the establishment of origin to reconfirm continuing FMD freedom needs to be clearer about when and what type of inspection should be conducted and about the requirements for remaining pigs.

The Group listed the specific sanitary conditions for slaughter in approved slaughterhouses. The carcasses from those pigs would be considered safe for trade when FMD had not occurred within a ten-kilometre radius of the establishment and after a sufficient time period had elapsed to allow the Veterinary Authority to confirm that FMDv was not incubating when the animals were being kept in the establishment.

#### **4. Considerations of provisions for importation of different FMD susceptible commodities from FMD infected countries or zones where an official control programme exists**

Considering the draft recommendations proposed for the importation of fresh meat of domestic pigs from infected countries or zones in the previous *ad hoc* Group meeting and the available scientific literature and knowledge, the feasibility of developing recommendations for domestic ruminants and pigs, and captive wild ruminants and pigs was further discussed. The Group considered that two approaches were possible, based on either Article 8.8.22 for deboned meat or draft article 8.8.22bis for bone-in meat. Whereas Article 8.8.22 requires deboning of carcasses and lymph node removal, in draft article 8.8.22bis, these mitigations are replaced by measures that include virological testing. The Group developed wording to adapt Article 8.8.22, which currently covers cattle and water buffaloes, to cover domestic sheep, goats and pigs (excluding feet, heads, viscera and skin). Draft article 8.8.22bis was used as a basis for developing an article covering meat from domestic and captive wild species and as a second draft article on wild ruminants and pigs. The Group considered the application of risk-mitigation measures before, during or after slaughter in the development of their recommendations. The Group considered it more difficult to provide satisfactory risk-mitigation measures prior to or during slaughter for ensuring the safety of meat from free-ranging wild animals. A further challenge highlighted by the Group was to avoid putting forward mitigations that are so onerous and/or costly as to render any newly recommended provisions unfeasible.

For the provisions for fresh meat of domestic ruminants and pigs, and captive wild ruminants and pigs, the Group considered the provisions of Article 8.8.12. on importation of domestic ruminants and pigs from FMD infected countries and zones.

Serological testing for the detection of antibodies against non-structural proteins (NSP) of FMDv would be a measure to provide confidence in substantiating the absence of FMDv infection. An alternative option to the NSP serological tests or in case these tests have not been validated for the species in question, would be the use of approved vaccines – matching with the circulating serotypes and strains. However, the performance of both NSP tests and FMD vaccines is not well documented for many wildlife species. The Group also discussed the testing of carcasses for the detection of FMDv genome using RT-PCR carried out on a pooled sample of blood and of one carcass lymph node from each animal. The rationale is that virus is present in the blood in the early stages of infection and persists longest in lymphoid tissues. The Group did not determine the maximum limit for pooling of samples but considered that combining two samples (of blood and lymph node) per animal would improve the economic feasibility of testing without significantly reducing the sensitivity of detection compared to testing the samples individually. Application of RT-PCR tests or equivalent tests (e.g. RT-LAMP) for FMDv detection in abattoir samples has not been formally validated as a procedure. However, the high sensitivity and sample matrix applicability of the test when properly performed means that a negative result should add considerably to confidence that the virus tested for is not present.

The Group took into consideration the risk of the feet, heads and viscera/offal in the transmission of FMDv through carcasses and the options for their removal. In the case of domestic ruminants and pigs, and captive wild ruminants and pigs, noting that FMDv may be present in the pharynx of ruminants much longer than in the lymph nodes and blood, the Group recommended removing the heads only of ruminants, and not pigs as pigs are not considered to be carriers of FMDv. The risk of FMDv being present in the viscera, skin and feet would be negligible if the blood and lymph nodes have been properly tested, since these are not tissues where FMDv is found after the resolution of acute infections. The Group also underlined the importance of continued absence of FMD on the establishment of origin and in the surrounding ten-kilometre area of the establishment from the time the animals or carcasses have left the establishment of origin until the release of the carcasses from the slaughterhouse.

Whilst the Group proposed provisions encompassing a broader range of domestic, captive wild and wild species, the Group underlined that these draft provisions would be restricted to Members having an OIE endorsed official control programme as this would provide additional assurance of the Member's capacity and advancement in the control of FMD, notably the timely reporting of suspicions, the match and efficacy of vaccines, the performance of official diagnostic laboratories. This approach was also in line with the Global FMD Control Strategy to encourage Members to progress in achieving OIE endorsement of their official control programmes for FMD and its objectives. The Group also emphasised the necessity for the species and husbandry systems concerned to be covered by and subject to the measures set out in the OIE endorsed official control programme operated in the exporting country.

With regard to wild ruminants and wild boar, based on the lack of sufficient evidence-based information, the Group also found it challenging to provide adequate risk-mitigation measures, before or during slaughter, to ensure the safety of the meat. Whilst the Group discussed the difficulty in drafting precise measures that would apply to all possible situations due to the broad diversity of possible circumstances associated with wild and feral animals, the Group made an attempt in describing general provisions that could assure safe trade. In these provisions, the exclusion of heads, viscera and feet was retained as an extra safety measure because there is so much reliance on the quality of the virological testing. This was considered unnecessary in the case of domestic and captive wild pigs, as both virological and serological testing are required to ensure the detection of FMDv if present.

Although the Group proposed requirements, based on Article 15.2.15, Chapter 15.2, Infection with classical swine fever virus, regarding the use of vaccines or the testing of carcasses and animals for the detection of antibodies against NSP of FMDv in wild ruminants and wild boar, it is important to note that the performance of both FMD vaccines and NSP tests in wildlife species has not been well validated.

Regarding meat from wild ruminants and wild boar, the Group considered that the animals would be less likely to become infected in an environment where there was systematic vaccination of bovine animals and surveillance in all susceptible species, including non-vaccinated domestic and wild/feral species. However, the primary safeguard would be the testing and maturation with controlled pH reduction in the meat.

While drafting the provisions for bone-in fresh meat of domestic ruminants and pigs, and captive wild ruminants and pigs, the Group thought it was reasonable to also offer provisions for deboned meat as they are not currently addressed in Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code*. Considering that sheep, goats and pigs are not routinely vaccinated species, the Group mentioned that systematic vaccination in cattle and water buffaloes would be necessary to reduce the risk of infection with FMDv in other domestic species. The Group also noted that no susceptible animals should have been introduced into the establishment during the 30-day isolation.

## 5. Adoption of the report

The Group reviewed the draft report provided by the rapporteur and agreed to circulate the draft report electronically for comments before the final adoption. Upon circulation, the Group agreed that the report captured the discussions.

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.../Appendices

Appendix I**ELECTRONIC CONSULTATION OF THE  
AD HOC GROUP ON FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD)****TERMS OF REFERENCE****Purpose**

The purpose of this consultation of the *ad hoc* Group is to consider the feasibility of having recommendations for the importation of meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals or meat of domestic small ruminants from FMD infected countries or zones, including the development of the recommendations for Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

This would provide, if feasible, the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (SCAD) with draft recommendations for the importation of the aforementioned commodities.

The *ad hoc* Group is convened under the authority of and reports to the OIE Director General.

**Background**

Since the adoption in May 2015, Chapter 8.8 on infection with foot and mouth disease virus of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)* had been subject to an ongoing review by OIE Members, different *ad hoc* Groups and Specialist Commissions. When considering the recommendations for importation of animals and animal products, during the meeting of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code Commission (TAHSC) in February 2017, it was noted that there are no recommendations for the importation of fresh meat of domestic small ruminants from infected countries or zones as they are not covered by Article 8.8.22. Moreover, there are no provisions for the importation of fresh meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals. In order to address these gaps, the Specialist Commissions requested the OIE Secretariat to consult the experts of the *ad hoc* Group on FMD to assess and draft, where appropriate, recommendations for the importation of meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals or meat of domestic small ruminants from countries or zones infected with FMDv.

**Specific issues to address**

During its February 2020 meeting, the SCAD requested that OIE Headquarters (HQ) conduct a literature research to provide scientific support for further decisions by the experts of the FMD *ad hoc* Group

Therefore, in order to modify or develop the relevant Articles in Chapter 8.8 of the *Terrestrial Code*, the OIE HQ will convene the experts of the FMD *ad hoc* Group on FMD status of Members to assess and propose, where appropriate, draft recommendations for the importation of meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals or meat of domestic small ruminants from infected countries or zones.

**Actions to deliver**

The Members of this Group will provide their expertise to:

- Assess the current *Terrestrial Code* recommendations related to the importation of meat of susceptible animals from FMD infected countries or zones;
- Assess the feasibility of developing draft recommendations for the importation of meat of susceptible captive wild animals and wild animals or meat of domestic small ruminants from infected countries or zones based on the scientific and technical information provided or to provide additional evidence if needed;
- If feasible, to propose draft articles for Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code* containing these recommendations for consideration by the Specialists Commissions and a scientific rationale to support them.

**Consideration**

- Consider the summary of the literature survey reviewed by OIE HQ;
- Consider scientific evidence available in public domain (scientific references must be provided and included in the draft text)

**Expectations**

Prerequisites to participation

- Sign off the OIE Undertaking on Confidentiality of information (if not done already)
- Complete the declaration of Interest Form

Experts of the *Ad hoc* Group should:

- Agree on the appointment of the chair and rapporteur of the meeting
- Contribute to discussions electronically
- Contribute to drafting and finalising the report
- Expect that they may be consulted again to ensure continuity of the work

**Deliverables**

The expected outcome of the electronic consultation of the FMD *ad hoc* Group is a report on the assessment of the recommendations for importation of meat from FMD susceptible animals from infected countries/zones, including draft articles for Chapter 8.8 of the *Terrestrial Code* when appropriate.

**Reporting / timeline**

The experts will conclude their consultation and submit the draft report by 20 August 2020.

The report of the consultation will be submitted to the Director General of the OIE, and approved report will be considered by the relevant Specialist Commissions in accordance with the OIE Basic Texts.

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Appendix II

**ELECTRONIC CONSULTATION OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON FMD  
JUNE – AUGUST 2020**

**List of participants**

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**REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP  
ON COMPARTMENTALISATION FOR AFRICAN SWINE FEVER**

**Paris, 3 – 5 March 2020**

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The meeting of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on Compartmentalisation for African swine fever (hereafter referred to as the Group) was held at the OIE Headquarters in Paris from 3 to 5 March 2020.

**1. Opening**

Dr Matthew Stone, Deputy Director General of the OIE for International Standards and Science, welcomed the Group members, the representative from the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (Scientific Commission) and the vice-president of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission) on behalf of Dr Monique Eloit, Director General of the OIE.

He informed the Group of the role of the OIE expert network and *ad hoc* Groups in the standards setting process. He noted that when considering compartmentalisation challenges related to the epidemiology of the disease, the diverse global pig sector and the regulatory function of the Competent Authority should be addressed. The guidelines on compartmentalisation should be well structured, readable, and science based, and should avoid being prescriptive to allow for diversity in Member situations. He invited the *ad hoc* Group to consider good regulatory principles as they apply to defining the problem and its context, identifying options, and analysing impacts. He also noted that the guidelines—being developed to support Members to improve the implementation and recognition of compartmentalisation to facilitate business continuity—will be under the overarching framework of the FAO/OIE GF-TADS global initiative for the control of African swine fever (ASF).

**2. Adoption of the agenda and background introduction**

The meeting was chaired by Dr Nigel Gibbens. The OIE Secretariat served as rapporteur.

The draft agenda, including breakout groups and plenary discussions, was adopted by the Group. The terms of reference, agenda and list of participants are provided as Appendices I, II and III, respectively

The OIE Secretariat provided the Group with a brief update on the state of play of the GF-TADS global initiative for the control of ASF, and a summary of the international standards related to the Group's terms of reference.

Professor Pfeiffer (the consultant) outlined the key epidemiological features of ASF, including relevant risk pathways associated with the spread of ASF. He also presented the importance of considering these risk pathways in the context of value chains, which may differ from country to country.

As an introduction, each member of the Group was asked to identify one opportunity and one challenge related to the implementation of compartmentalisation for ASF. Challenges identified included a lack of understanding of compartmentalisation and the diversity of production systems that exist across the world. Opportunities identified included the establishment of public-private partnerships, and the ability for compartmentalisation (correctly applied) to serve as a tool for disease control and business continuity.

The Group was reminded that the objective of the meeting was to discuss the main principles and the supporting scientific evidence necessary for implementation of compartmentalisation for ASF. The Group will not be required to endorse the guidelines that will be developed as a follow-up of the meeting; however, the Group's contribution will be duly acknowledged. The guidelines will be circulated electronically for the Group's feedback prior to their finalisation.

### 3. General discussion on the outline of the compartmentalisation guidelines

The draft outline of the guidelines and the results of the Group's pre-meeting electronic consultation were discussed.

The Group agreed that the target audience of the guidelines should be both the private sector and Competent Authorities. While the *Terrestrial Code* provides the framework for compartmentalisation, the guidelines will provide practical recommendations for its appropriate implementation for ASF. The Group agreed that the guidelines should contain a comprehensive description of the key elements for a successful implementation of the compartment and make cross-references to relevant documents (e.g. existing guidelines, compartmentalisation checklists, international standards, scientific literature, etc). The guidelines should be readable and short, in the region of 20 pages of text (excluding annexes).

The Group emphasised that the guidelines should be based on current science and should be future-proofed. They should be treated as a living document to be revised as new evidence becomes available, and able to incorporate lessons learnt from their implementation. The guidelines should not be prescriptive. To illustrate how the guidelines may be applied in practice, examples or case studies may be included.

The Group agreed that the guidelines should be outcome focused and provide Members with the flexibility to develop and implement approaches appropriate to their context to achieve the outcomes required for successful compartmentalisation. The guidelines should consider the different epidemiological contexts, characteristics of pig production systems, and pork value chains. This outcome-based approach, while flexible, needs to meet regulatory requirements at the national level and allow for assessment of the compartments. The Group noted that the creation of the national regulatory framework for compartmentalisation should be drawn up in consultation with the private sector to facilitate and enable compliance. A bottom-up approach to this was recommended.

Given that there is varied understanding of the concept of compartmentalisation, the Group proposed to include a section on the general principles of compartmentalisation, including both what compartmentalisation is, and what it is not (e.g. a compartment is not just a high-biosecurity farm). It should emphasise the need for strong biosecurity management to ensure effective separation of animal subpopulations, traceability of all the inputs and outputs used or produced in the compartment, and surveillance to demonstrate the status of the compartment. Ultimately, pigs in the compartment and products derived from these must be protected against ASF, thus maintaining the compartment's free status. The Group also proposed to include an approach for identifying ASF risk pathways and associated risk mitigation measures, and highlight that compartmentalisation is a tool available to countries for disease control and to maintain business continuity, along with zoning and commodity-based trade.

The Group recognised that compartmentalisation relies on strong public-private partnerships (PPP) and noted that the guidelines should cross reference with the existing handbook<sup>1</sup> on the matter.

The Group suggested that tools to be included in the guidelines could include checklists, templates and case studies to be used by the different parties involved in the implementation of the compartment. The Group also considered that the principles of the hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) system could be useful in providing a model that may be adapted to guide the implementation of compartmentalisation.

The Group noted that the recognition of a compartment is likely to be facilitated if it is established during 'peace time' in free countries or zones. It agreed that implementation of compartmentalisation in endemic or epidemic settings is feasible, although it noted that this would be more challenging.

The revised outline of the guidelines is attached as Appendix IV.

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<sup>1</sup> [https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media\\_Center/docs/pdf/PPP/oie\\_ppp\\_handbook-20190419\\_ENint\\_BD.pdf](https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/PPP/oie_ppp_handbook-20190419_ENint_BD.pdf)

#### 4. Technical items

The following technical items were discussed during the breakout group and plenary sessions:

##### i) Biosecurity

The Group discussed the potential risk pathways and corresponding biosecurity measures to be considered in the guidelines. Risk pathways include (but are not limited to): live animals (domestic and wild pigs), people, vehicles, feed (animal or plant based), arthropod vectors, pork products. The relative risk of the different risk factors determined through risk assessment should be considered when defining appropriate and practical biosecurity measures. The Group recommended consideration of all plausible risk factors. Acknowledging the different epidemiological scenarios, the Group recommended inclusion of a template for considering risk pathways in the guideline toolkit.

The Group discussed risk pathways in abattoirs and processing plants and agreed that the risk mitigation measures should focus on traceability and segregation to prevention of cross contamination (see item 4.ii).

The Group discussed whether different levels of biosecurity could be allowed depending on the commodity to be traded. The Group considered that the level of biosecurity to be applied should not be influenced by the commodity being traded (*e.g.* live animals versus meat products). The biosecurity plan should be designed to address the level of risk expected should the disease be present outside the compartment.

The Group stressed the need to design a contingency plan describing corrective actions to be taken in case of challenges to the integrity of the compartment, and biosecurity breaches.

##### ii) Supply chain

The Group discussed the pork supply chain and the functional units that need to be included in the compartments. References were made to Article 4.5.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group agreed that not all the units (feed mills, abattoirs, rendering plants, etc) need to be included in the compartment. However, their locations and inter-relationships should be clearly described.

The Group discussed how a compartment should be defined and what should be included in a compartment. Members had different views on how far ‘upstream’ of the value chain the compartment should extend, such as great-grandparent stock and genetic facilities, but concluded that not all parts were essential depending on the product to be traded, which could be anything from elite/grandparent stock to meat products. Regardless of the chosen scope, the compartment should always include a ‘subpopulation of animals’, as described in the *Terrestrial Code*; hence, an abattoir cannot be a stand-alone compartment. The Group acknowledged that there are practical implications resulting from this decision. For example, excluding these breeding facilities would impose a higher demand on the quarantine and testing requirements for pigs newly introduced to the compartment (reference to Article 15.1.9 of the *Terrestrial Code*). The safety of inputs to the compartment (*e.g.* feed, biologicals) may be secured either by adhering to international standards that provide the necessary guarantee of freedom from ASF, or by sourcing from facilities included within the compartment.

The Group reviewed relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* (Chapters 4.4, 4.5, 15.1) and felt that it was not clear whether functional units within the compartment (*e.g.* abattoirs) had to be restricted to handling only animals from compartments and products of these animals. It concluded that live animals should be maintained within holdings dedicated to the compartment, and that linked downstream functional units should also be defined as part of the compartment to ensure that all animals or products leaving the compartment are maintained at the same status. This means that abattoirs, cutting plants, and processing functional units must be defined as part of the compartment when the purpose of the compartment is the trade of pig meat. They may either be dedicated to receiving animals and products only from ASF-free compartments, or if processing animals and products of a different status, operate effective segregation and biosecurity measures to ensure that the status of the animals and products derived from ASF-free compartments is maintained. This could be in the form of traceability and measures to prevent cross

contamination, such as strict segregation measures in time and space when operating with animals sourced from and outside of the compartment (e.g. different lines, different days, etc). To facilitate understanding, the Group recommended that the guidelines provide examples showing how this may be applied. The Group also determined that vehicles used to transport commodities produced in the compartment should be included as part of the compartment.

### iii) Surveillance

The Group noted that the objectives of surveillance in a compartment should be the early detection of disease, and the demonstration of disease freedom.

The Group discussed the surveillance requirements as described in Article 4.5.5. of the *Terrestrial Code* and the possibility of adapting them to the level of risk as defined by the location of the compartment. The Group agreed that, for a compartment located in an ASF-free country or zone, conducting pathogen-specific surveillance as well as clinical and syndromic surveillance (e.g. testing animals displaying ASF-compatible clinical signs or lesions, or testing triggered by mortalities which exceed the baseline rate) within the compartment, and implementing an early warning system outside of the compartment, may be sufficient. For a compartment located in a country or zone not free of ASF, additional targeted, risk-based surveillance may be required for external surveillance. Risk factors (such as the presence of ASF in the wild pig population, outdoor free-ranging pigs, or soft ticks) should be considered in the surveillance design. In addition, certain changes in the epidemiology of the disease outside of the compartment may require changes in the external surveillance strategy to better identify the increased risk of introduction of ASF into the compartment posed by particular pathways.

The Group was of the view that the internal surveillance for a compartment should be defined irrespective of the epidemiological situation outside it. The risk mitigation measures and surveillance applied inside the compartment should be capable of resisting the incursion of disease, provide early detection should an incursion occur, and be able to demonstrate freedom. Thus, there should be no need to adjust the internal surveillance design when there is a change in the country status of ASF; however, requests by trading partners for additional assurance could arise and may be accommodated.

A distinction was made between external surveillance required to detect epidemiological changes outside of the compartment (e.g. early warning system, targeted risk-based surveillance), and the surveillance conducted as part of the national control programme. The former form of surveillance is a requirement of the compartmentalisation, thus incurring extra costs that may or may not need to be borne by the private sector, i.e. compartment operator.

The Group acknowledged that the surveillance strategy employed should be appropriate to the epidemiological situation of the country or zone and recommended the use of outcome-based guidelines for surveillance. In this regard, the Group recommended that the guidelines provide tools to measure the desired surveillance outcomes such as defining the desired level of confidence and probability of detection of ASF if it were present in the compartment.

In terms of the detection of diseases other than ASF (Article 4.5.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*), the Group recognised that, while the detection of some diseases would not necessarily imply a breakdown in the biosecurity measures against ASF, it would affect the confidence in the integrity of the compartment and merit some form of investigation. The Group agreed that monitoring production diseases such as porcine epidemic diarrhoea could be a good indicator of the integrity of the compartment.

### iv) Approval of compartments and role of public-private partnerships

The Group discussed the approaches and steps for defining a compartment and recognised the important role of public-private partnerships (PPP) in ensuring the smooth implementation and recognition of a compartment. The existence of strong PPP was considered a prerequisite for the implementation of compartmentalisation.

In establishing a compartment, the private sector would require a supporting legislation framework that is in line with the *Terrestrial Code*, developed by the Competent Authority in consultation with the private sector. The private sector would have to ensure that its proposed ASF compartmentalisation operating manual is in line with relevant national regulations. Regulatory approvals for compartments should be issued by the Competent Authority, which also carries the responsibility of audits, although these may be outsourced to third party accreditors. The guidelines should consider the different possibilities for conducting audits.

Securing export markets rely on negotiations by the Competent Authority, supported by interactions between private sector trading partners. As per the WTO SPS Agreement, it is the responsibility of the Competent Authorities of trading partners to consider requests for recognition of a compartment, and they have the sovereign right to conduct appropriate inspections to inform their decision. Trading partners should communicate their decision on recognition along with the reasons for refusal if not agreed. Importing countries may have their own system for auditing and verifying the operations of a component. The Group noted that the specific procedures and requirements may differ from country to country, and that the guidelines should not be prescriptive in this regard but provide real-life examples.

**v) Business continuity (national and international benefits)**

The Group recognised that priorities between the private and public sector may differ. In the event of disease occurrence, the Competent Authority would often implement zoning which provides a public good benefit to all holdings within a free zone, whereas compartmentalisation could be perceived as a measure that would benefit mostly the business operator since trade would continue, albeit only from the recognised compartments. In contrast, when zoning alone is implemented, the business operator in a non-free zone would not have the option to continue trade, regardless of the level of biosecurity or the absence of disease in their establishments.

Given that the private sector is mainly responsible for establishing the control measures in a compartment and bearing the associated costs, the Group acknowledged that for compartmentalisation to be a viable option, the cost-benefit analysis would have to be favourable for the private sector. Benefits to be derived include a health status that allows gaining access to international markets and local trade regardless of the disease status of the country, as well as a greater ability to move animals in the event of implementation of disease control measures in the country. The Group also identified that in order to incentivise business operators to establish compartments, there should be an established demand for the trade along with sufficiently strong Competent Authority relationships to underpin the agreement of compartments and recognition of safe trade of commodities derived from these compartments.

**vi) Impact of changes of ASF status at national or regional level**

The Group discussed the concept of ‘zero down-time’<sup>2</sup> and considered the issue of trading partners losing confidence and not recognising the agreed compartment in the event of change in the ASF status of the country or zone where the compartment is located.

The Group agreed that while zero down-time should be the underlying principle of compartmentalisation to facilitate business continuity, some down-time might occur in practice, as the occurrence of disease could provoke concern by trading partners. Some members of the Group believed that interruption of business would be unnecessary and stressed that the biosecurity and management measures applied in the compartment should be robust enough to withstand external disease pressure and prevent disease incursion into the compartment. It was noted that the last paragraph of Article 4.5.7. of the *Terrestrial Code* could be misleading, as it could be interpreted that in the event of a change in the disease status of the country, the status of the compartment should be ‘re-evaluated’ which defeats the purpose of compartmentalisation. The Group agreed that the re-evaluation of the compartment status should not imply full evaluation of the compartment system, but an assurance by the Competent Authority to trading partners as to the integrity of the compartment.

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<sup>2</sup> No interruption of the trade in the case of ASF incursion in the country or zone where the compartment is located

The Group recommended that actions to be taken in the event of occurrence of ASF should be outlined and documented when compartments are agreed between Competent Authorities. The Group also recognised that prompt and transparent communication with the trading partners on disease occurrence and results of the epidemiological investigations is paramount in providing this assurance. These aspects should be covered in the guidelines, including model trade certificates.

The Group also noted on the importance of making specific provisions for actions in relation to compartments in the national ASF contingency plan to ensure that the above points are not neglected in case of disease incursion (*e.g.* compartmentalisation agreements drawn up with trading partners prior the incursion). In addition, the management of compartments in the event of disease incursion (*e.g.* in relation to movement standstills) should be covered by veterinary legislation and/or the national ASF contingency plan.

## 5. Next Steps

The consultant will consider the outline that was agreed by the Group and further develop the compartmentalisation guidelines based on the discussion at this meeting and circulate the guidelines electronically for the Group's feedback by mid-April 2020.

## 6. Other matters

Arising from a request at the Code Commission meeting of February 2020, the Group discussed the issue of 'swill'. It noted that while swill feeding is a major risk of transmission of the disease, the *Terrestrial Code* does not give clear definition of 'swill'. The Group reviewed several existing definitions used by some Competent Authorities and noted differences in coverage depending on the approach to regulate swill feeding as well as the pig production setting.

The Group also noted that the definition should facilitate proper management of swill feeding under the various settings in which it is used, taking into account the significance of the reuse of waste while ensuring prevention of disease spread, particularly where feed resources are limited. The representative of the Code Commission noted the discussion to inform further consideration by the Code Commission.

## 7. Adoption of the report

The Group reviewed the draft report and guidelines outline provided by the rapporteur and agreed to circulate it electronically for comments before the final adoption.

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.../Appendices

Appendix I**AD HOC GROUP ON COMPARTMENTALISATION FOR AFRICAN SWINE FEVER  
Paris, 3 – 5 March 2020**

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**Background**

African swine fever (ASF) is an infectious disease of domestic and wild pigs of all breeds and ages, with the acute form of the disease being characterised by high fever, haemorrhages in the reticuloendothelial system and a high mortality rate. In recent years, the number of countries or territories with ASF has increased with notification from Member Countries in Sub Sahara Africa, Europe and Asia. Understanding the complex epidemiology of ASF as well as the pig value chain is required for the effective control of the disease, and to establish and maintain a specific animal health status.

Due to the unprecedented spread of ASF and the growing global threat of the disease, a call was made at the 87th General Assembly of OIE National Delegates for the establishment of a global initiative to control ASF with an endorsement of a resolution to this effect. This included a recommendation regarding Member Countries to consider the potential impact of ASF incursion and manage risks to business continuity by making use of the OIE standards in relation to zoning, compartmentalisation and commodity-based trade that can be recognised by trading partners within certification arrangements.

Currently, *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 4.4 on zoning and compartmentalization and Chapter 4.5. on application of compartmentalisation provide recommendations on the principles to Member Countries wishing to establish and maintain different subpopulations with specific health status within their territory, and a structured framework for the application and recognition of compartments. In addition, Chapter 15.1. on African swine fever provides general criteria required for the determination of ASF status of a country, zone or compartment. However, there remains a need for a practical guideline that incorporates the general principles outlined in the *Terrestrial Code* but provides specific requirements and guidance for application and validation of compartmentalization that can be recognised internationally.

In this regard, the Director General decided to convene an *ad hoc* Group to contribute to the development of a guideline on compartmentalization for ASF that will support Member Countries in their efforts to prepare for and minimise the impact of ASF incursion through business continuity.

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**Terms of Reference**

Consider the latest scientific evidence regarding the epidemiology and control strategies for ASF and provide expert opinions and guidance for the development of a guideline on compartmentalisation for ASF based on the principles described in the *Terrestrial Code*.

The *modus operandi* of the *ad hoc* Group will include a combination of electronic consultations and physical meeting in OIE Headquarter-Paris (early March 2020).

The draft guidelines would take into account, but not be limited to:

- a. The relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*;
  - b. Separation from sources of infection by geography, infrastructure and biosecurity;
  - c. Key components, roles and responsibilities of Veterinary Authority and private sector
  - d. Process for the Veterinary Authority to designate and certify compartment for ASF
  - e. Process by which trading partners may validate and recognise the subpopulation designated by compartmentalisation
-

Appendix II

**AD HOC GROUP ON COMPARTMENTALISATION FOR AFRICAN SWINE FEVER  
Paris, 3 – 5 March 2020**

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**Agenda**

1. Opening of the meeting
  2. Adoption of the agenda and background introduction
  3. General discussion on outline of compartmentalisation guidelines
  4. Technical items
    - i) Biosecurity
    - ii) Supply chain
    - iii) Surveillance
    - iv) Approval of compartments and role of public-private partnerships
    - v) Business continuity (national and international benefits)
    - vi) Impact of changes of ASF status at national or regional level
  5. Next steps
  6. Other matters
  7. Adoption of the report
-

## Appendix III

**AD HOC GROUP ON COMPARTMENTALISATION FOR AFRICAN SWINE FEVER**  
**Paris, 3 – 5 March 2020**

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Appendix IV**Revised Outline for ASF Compartmentalisation Guidelines****1. Purpose and readership**

Brief description of the purpose of these guidelines and the target audience.

**2. Introduction**

This section introduces the concepts of zoning and compartmentalisation, and explains the incentive for implementing compartmentalisation.

**2.1. Zoning, compartmentalisation and commodity-based trade**

Introduce the Terrestrial Code concept of zoning, compartmentalisation and commodity-based trade. Explain the difference between the zoning and compartmentalisation, including advantages and disadvantages when choosing between the two in terms of disease control and safe trade. For the latter, commodity-based trade is an additional option.

**2.2. National and international benefits of compartmentalisation**

Describe the main reasons for implementing compartmentalisation with particular reference to the benefits associated with business continuity and improvement of animal health.

**3. Outcomes required for successful ASF compartmentalisation**

This section focuses on the principles and outcomes of an ‘outcomes-based approach’ to compartmentalisation.

**3.1. Description of pork supply chain**

Explain the approach to describing the pork supply chain (including industry structure) associated with the proposed compartment. It needs to be explained that the compartment will be part of a particular pork supply chain, and that it directly or indirectly links to other pork supply chains within the same country or beyond. Need to recognise the diversity of supply chains between and within countries. An output will be a visual description of the pork supply chain.

**3.2. Definition of the compartment**

Describe the process of defining a compartment together with its functional units, with examples of what could be and what could not be a compartment, and considerations to bear in mind, such as the product intended for trade. This needs to be done within the context of the underlying pork supply chain.

**3.3. Protection from introduction of ASF virus**

Focusing on the ultimate outcome of ASF compartmentalisation, i.e. protection from introduction of ASF virus, describe the approaches to identifying and managing the associated risks.

**3.3.1. ASF risk pathways**

Identify the risk pathways for the compartment, based on an understanding of the pork supply chain of which the compartment is part or associated. An output will be a visual description of the risk pathways.

### **3.3.2. Risk assessment**

Utilising the ASF risk pathways, describe the approach to conducting a risk assessment for introduction of ASF virus to the compartment. The outputs will be estimates of risk and uncertainty associated with each risk pathway, and the contribution of each step in the pathway to overall risk for the particular risk pathway.

### **3.3.3. Risk management**

The section will describe the approach that utilises risk assessment to develop specific risk mitigation actions (including biosecurity, surveillance and traceability) that reduce the ASF virus introduction risk associated with each risk pathway.

*3.3.3.1. Biosecurity*

*3.3.3.2. Surveillance*

*3.3.3.3. Diagnostic capabilities and procedures*

*3.3.3.4. Traceability*

## **4. Implementation**

Describe the approaches and steps for implementation and recognition of a compartment.

### **4.1. Roles and responsibilities**

Identify the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders. Describe what is to be done by which party during the different stages of the implementation process.

#### **4.1.1. Veterinary authority**

*4.1.1.1. Exporting country*

*4.1.1.2. Importing country*

#### **4.1.2. Private industry**

#### **4.1.3. Third parties**

### **4.2. Public-private partnership**

Emphasise the importance of public-private partnerships (PPP) for compartmentalisation as a prerequisite for ensuring smooth implementation and recognition of a compartment. Refer to OIE Guidelines for PPP.

### **4.3. Regulatory framework**

Describe the legislation and national standards for compartmentalisation. Reference to OIE Code chapter 3.4. Veterinary legislation and chapters 5.1. and 5.2. on certification.

### **4.4. Submission of compartment application by industry partner**

Describe the details of the compartment submission, such as what information and documents are to be included in the application document for a compartment to the Competent Authority, including special considerations if the compartment is located in a zone not free from ASF.

### **4.5. Approval of compartment**

Describe the approval process of a compartment application. This includes a description of the independent auditing process and other relevant actions needed before compartment approval.

**4.6. Publication of approved compartment**

Emphasise the importance of public transparency of approved compartments with suggestions for publication including the official website of the Competent Authority, OIE Bulletins, OIE website.

**4.7. Compartment recognition between trading partners**

Describe the process for obtaining recognition of a compartment between trading partners based on bilateral negotiation and agreement between Competent Authorities of trading partners.

**4.8. Maintenance of compartment**

Describe the actions to be taken for maintenance of an approved compartment, emphasising the importance of independent auditing.

**4.9. Response to changes in ASF status outside compartment**

Describe the response in case of changes of ASF status at national or regional level where the compartment is located, such as requiring evaluation of the compartment integrity by the Competent Authority to give assurance to trading partners, in order to minimise down-time.

**4.10. Response to changes in ASF status of compartment**

Describe the response in case of changes of ASF status of the compartment, including a contingency plan that describes corrective actions to be taken and the procedure for recovery.

----- Targeting around 20 pages of text for the above sections -----

**5. Tools****5.1. General model for compartmentalisation**

Simple model to indicate the major elements that must be included in implementation of compartmentalisation.

**5.2. Flowchart of compartmentalisation process**

Flowchart summarising the major steps in the compartmentalisation process.

**5.3. Value chain, risk pathway diagram and risk assessment templates**

Templates to assist in conducting value chain analyses, develop risk pathway diagrams and risk assessments, including sample checklists or questionnaires.

**5.4. Template of national standards**

Template of national standards to provide guidance for development of legislation as a regulatory framework for compartmentalisation.

**5.5. Compartment checklists**

Outcome-based checklist for the requirements of a compartment, non-prescriptive in nature.

**5.6. Assessment criteria**

Describe the criteria and principles for assessing a compartment.

**5.7. Audit process examples**

Examples to assist the auditing process.

**5.8. Tools for estimating the statistical confidence of freedom of ASF virus for the compartment**

Tools for assessing the statistical sensitivity of the surveillance plan of a compartment and evaluating the confidence provided by the surveillance system in the compartment's freedom from ASF.

**5.9. Template of compartment operations manual**

Template of compartment operations manual to provide guidance with respect to the major elements to be included to facilitate effective operation of a compartment.

**6. Appendices****6.1. Abbreviations and definitions**

List of abbreviations and definitions of terms used throughout the guidelines, primarily based on the OIE Code.

**6.2. Examples of compartment experience**

Describe how compartmentalisation could benefit animal health using examples of experience with compartmentalisation, such as from aquatic animal health, preferably include both positive and negative examples.

**6.3. ASF virus epidemiology**

Briefly summarize recent reviews of ASF epidemiology, including but not limited to clinical signs, virus characteristics, transmission, geographic distribution.

**6.4. Risk mitigation measures**

Describe possible ASF virus risk mitigation measures considering their practicality and adaptation to different levels of risk as estimated by risk assessment and the specific steps included in relevant risk pathways.

**6.5. Reference examples for outcome-based criteria**

While the content of the guidelines will not be prescriptive, this Appendix provides examples to give a more detailed indication of the criteria, such as specifications of the physical barriers and distance for physical separations.

**6.6. Achieving recognition of compartments by trading partners**

Describe the steps and requirements to achieve compartment recognition by trading partners.

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**WORK PROGRAMME OF  
THE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES (SEP 2020)**

Issue and priority order (1-3; 1 being highest priority)		Status and action
<b>Update of OIE standards</b>		
1	Glossary	Not applicable.
2	Ch. 1.3. Diseases, Infections and Infestations listed by the OIE	Considered comments from Members on <i>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</i> and sent recommendations to TAHSC".
2	Ch. 1.4. Animal Health Surveillance	Not applicable.
1	Ch. 1.6. Procedures for self-declaration and official recognition by the OIE	Minor amendment on the period to benefit from the recovery procedure and sent to TAHSC
2	Ch. 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation	Not applicable.
3	Ch 4.Y. Official control of listed and emerging diseases	Not applicable.
1	Ch.8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease	<i>Ad hoc</i> Group report was endorsed, and draft articles sent to TAHSC.
2	Chapter 8.11. Infection with <i>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</i> complex	Not applicable.
1	Ch. 8.14. Infection with rabies virus	Not applicable.
3	Chapter 8.15. Infection with Rift Valley Fever virus	Proposed amendments and sent to TAHSC.
3	Ch. 8.16. Infection with rinderpest virus	Not applicable.
3	Ch 8.X. <i>Trypanosoma evansi</i> (not equine surra)	Not applicable
1	Ch. 8.Y. Animal African Trypanosomoses	Proposed amendments and sent to TAHSC
1	Ch.10.4. Infection with avian influenza virus	Not applicable.
1	Ch. 11.4. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy	Not applicable.
3	Ch. 11.9. Infection with lumpy skin disease virus	Not applicable.
3	Ch. 11.12. infection with <i>Theileria annulata</i> , <i>T. orientalis</i> , <i>T. parva</i>	Not applicable.
3	Ch. 12.3. Infections with Trypanozoon in equids	Not applicable
3	Ch. 12.2. Contagious equine metritis	Not applicable.
2	Ch. 12.6. Infection with equine influenza virus	Not applicable.
3	Ch. 12.7. Equine piroplasmiasis	Not applicable.
3	Ch. 14.X. infection with <i>T. lestoquardi</i> , <i>T. luwenshuni</i> , <i>T. uilenbergi</i>	Not applicable.
1	Chapter 14.7. Infection with PPR virus	Reviewed comments from Members, proposed amendments and sent to TAHSC.
1	Ch 15.2. Classical Swine Fever	Reviewed comments from Members, proposed amendments and sent to TAHSC.

Official disease status recognition		
1	Evaluation of Member dossiers	[Each February meeting] SCAD considers the <i>ad hoc</i> Groups' reports for evaluation of Members' status, analysis of the dossiers and other findings and recommends the final outcome for adoption by the World Assembly in May each year.
2	Experts missions to Member Countries	SCAD discussed and proposed alternative options to replace the field missions given the situation of the COVID-19 pandemic.
2	Follow up of Member Countries with official disease status or with suspended status	[Continuous process] Situation in the listed countries are reviewed and follow-up on recommendation of SCAD for certain countries; on-going process.
1	Review of annual reconfirmations	[Each February meeting] SCAD evaluates the annual reconfirmations of selected countries' disease status and endorsed official control programmes [Each September meeting] SCAD selects 10% of countries' disease status for comprehensive review at its February meeting.
2	Deadline to benefit from fast-track procedure for recovery of official status	SCAD noted the discrepancy between the OIE SOP and AHS Chapter, and recommended updating of draft Chapter 1.6. and the SOP accordingly.
1	Harmonisation of the requirements in the <i>Terrestrial Code</i> Chapters for official disease freedom	Not applicable.
1	Impact of revisions of BSE standards on Members BSE risk status	Not applicable.
Disease control issues		
2	Advise on Global strategies and initiatives (FMD, PPR, rabies, ASF)	Update on the progress made.
1	Assess and endorse non-disease-Status and non-standard-setting <i>ad hoc</i> Groups reports falling into the SCAD remit	Not applicable.
1	Assess recent developments in the practical problems of control and eradication of infectious diseases and the impact of these developments	Consideration and proposed recommendations on the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Definition of PPR virus containing material;</li> <li>- Zoonotic potential of hepatitis B in gibbons;</li> <li>- Update on the revision of Chapters 11.4 (BSE) and 1.8 (BSE Questionnaire);</li> <li>- OIE policy paper: Prepare for, Prevent &amp; Build Resilience against Health Crises;</li> <li>- Concept note on the wildlife health management framework;</li> <li>- Update on the STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium;</li> <li>- Update on the project on replacement of International Standard Bovine Tuberculin;</li> <li>- Update on Rinderpest.</li> </ul>
1	Define a procedure for the evaluation of diseases against the listing criteria of Chapter 1.2.	Endorsed the guidance document for the application and criteria for listing terrestrial animal diseases.
1	Define and implement procedure for updating case definition in the Code	Advised on the progresses of the work on case definitions.
Liaison with other Specialist Commissions		
1	Terrestrial Animal Health Commission	Not applicable.
1	Biological Standards Commission	SCAD agreed on the minor amendments made by the BSC on the PPR virus containing material.

<b>Working Groups</b>		
1	Antimicrobial resistance Working Group	The Commission was updated on the Working Group recent activities.
1	Wildlife Working Group	Advised on the activities. Agenda for the next meeting reviewed.
<b>Other activities that could impact SCAD work programme</b>		
1	Evaluation of applications for OIE Collaborating Centre status	Not applicable.
3	Update on the main conclusion/recommendations of meetings relevant for the work of the Commission	The Commission was updated on the outcomes of the most relevant meetings organised since February 2020.
	Any other business	Not applicable

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