Annex XXIV

GLOSSARY

CASINGS

means bladders and intestines which, after cleaning, have been processed by tissue scraping and defatting.

Annex XXV

CHAPTER 1.1.

NOTIFICATION OF DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS, AND PROVISION OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Article 1.1.1.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code* and in terms of Articles 5, 9 and 10 of the OIE Organic Statutes, Member Countries shall recognise the right of the *Headquarters* to communicate directly with the *Veterinary Authority* of its territory or territories.

All *notifications* and all information sent by the OIE to the *Veterinary Authority* shall be regarded as having been sent to the country concerned and all *notifications* and all information sent to the OIE by the *Veterinary Authority* shall be regarded as having been sent by the country concerned.

Article 1.1.2.

1) Member Countries shall make available to other Member Countries, through the OIE, whatever information is necessary to minimise the spread of important animal *diseases*, and their aetiological agents, and to assist in achieving better worldwide control of these *diseases*.

2) To achieve this, Member Countries shall comply with the *notification* requirements specified in Articles 1.1.3. and 1.1.4.

3) To assist in the clear and concise exchange of information, reports shall conform as closely as possible to the official OIE *disease* reporting format.

4) The detection of the aetiological agent of a *listed disease* in an *animal* should be reported, even in the absence of clinical signs. Recognising that scientific knowledge concerning the relationship between *diseases* and their aetiological agents is constantly developing and that the presence of an aetiological agent does not necessarily imply the presence of a *disease*, Member Countries shall ensure, through their reports, that they comply with the spirit and intention of point 1 above.

5) In addition to notifying new findings in accordance with Articles 1.1.3. and 1.1.4., Member Countries shall also provide information on the measures taken to prevent the spread of *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*. Information shall include quarantine measures and restrictions on the movement of *animals*, animal products, biological products and other miscellaneous objects which could by their nature be responsible for their transmission. In the case of *diseases* transmitted by *vectors*, the measures taken against such *vectors* shall also be specified.

Article 1.1.3.

Veterinary Authorities shall, under the responsibility of the Delegate, send to the *Headquarters*:

1) in accordance with relevant provisions in the *disease*-specific chapters, *notification* through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) or by fax or e-mail, within 24 hours, of any of the following events:

   a) first occurrence of a *listed disease*, *infection* or *infestation* in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;

b) re-occurrence of a *listed disease*, *infection* or *infestation* in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment* following the final report that declared the *outbreak* ended;

c) first occurrence of a new strain of a pathogen of a *listed disease*, *infection* or *infestation* in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;

d) a sudden and unexpected change in the distribution or increase in incidence or virulence of, or morbidity or mortality caused by, the aetiological agent of a *listed disease*, *infection* or *infestation* present within a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;

e) occurrence of a *listed disease*, *infection* or *infestation* in an unusual host species;

2) weekly reports subsequent to a *notification* under point 1 above, to provide further information on the evolution of the event which justified the *notification*. These reports should continue until the *disease*, *infection* or *infestation* has been eradicated or the situation has become sufficiently stable so that six-monthly reporting under point 3 will satisfy the obligation of the Member Country; for each event notified, a final report on the event should be submitted;

3) six-monthly reports on the absence or presence, and evolution of *listed diseases*, *infections* or *infestations* and information of epidemiological significance to other Member Countries;

4) annual reports concerning any other information of significance to other Member Countries.

Article 1.1.4.

Veterinary Authorities shall, under the responsibility of the Delegate, send to the *Headquarters*:

1) a *notification* through WAHIS or by fax or e-mail, when an *emerging disease* has been detected in a country, a *zone* or a *compartment*;

2) periodic reports subsequent to a *notification* of an *emerging disease*~~,~~ ~~as described under point 1.~~ These should continue~~ until:~~

a) for the time necessary to have reasonable certainty that:

i) the *disease*, *infection* or *infestation* has been eradicated; or

ii~~b~~) the situation has become~~s~~ ~~sufficiently~~ stable; ~~or~~

OR

b~~c~~) until sufficient scientific information is available to determine whether it meets the criteria for listing.

Article 1.1.5.

1) The *Veterinary Authority* of a country in which an *infected zone* was located shall inform the *Headquarters* when this zone is free from the *disease*, *infection* or *infestation*.

2) An *infected zone* for a particular *disease*, *infection* or *infestation* shall be considered as such until a period exceeding the *infective period* specified in the *Terrestrial Code* has elapsed after the last reported *case*, and when full prophylactic and appropriate animal health measures have been applied to prevent possible reappearance or spread of the *disease*, *infection* or *infestation*. These measures will be found in detail in the various chapters of Volume II of the *Terrestrial Code*.

3) A Member Country may be considered to regain freedom from a specific *disease*, *infection* or *infestation* when all relevant conditions given in the *Terrestrial Code* have been fulfilled.

4) The *Veterinary Authority* of a Member Country which sets up one or several *free zones* shall inform the *Headquarters* giving necessary details, including the criteria on which the free status is based, the requirements for maintaining the status and indicating clearly the location of the *zones* on a map of the territory of the Member Country.

Article 1.1.6.

1) Although Member Countries are only required to notify *listed diseases*, *infections* and *infestation* and *emerging diseases*, they are encouraged to inform the OIE of other important animal health events.

2) The *Headquarters* shall communicate by e-mail or World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) to *Veterinary Authorities* all *notifications* received as provided in Articles 1.1.2. to 1.1.5. and other relevant information.

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— Text deleted.

CHAPTER 1.2.

CRITERIA FOR THE INCLUSION OF DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS IN THE OIE LIST

Article 1.2.1.

Introduction

~~The aim of t~~This chapter ~~is to~~ describes the criteria for the inclusion of *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations* in ~~on~~ the OIE list.

The objective of listing is to support Member Countries~~'~~ by providing information needed to take appropriate action ~~efforts~~ to prevent the transboundary spread of important animal *diseases*, including *zoonoses*~~,~~. This is achieved by ~~through~~ transparent, timely and consistent *notification* ~~reporting~~.

Each *listed disease* normally has a corresponding chapter that ~~to~~ assists Member Countries in the harmonisation of *disease* detection, prevention and control~~.~~ and provides standards for safe *international trade* in *animals* and their products.

Requirements for *notification* are detailed in Chapter 1.1. ~~and *notifications* are to be made through WAHIS or, if not possible, by fax or e-mail as described in Article 1.1.3.~~

Principles for selection of diagnostic tests are described in Chapter 1.1.5. of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 1.2.2.

The criteria for the inclusion of a *disease*, *infection* or *infestation* in the OIE list are as follows:

1) International spread of the agent (via live *animals* or their products, *vectors* or fomites) has been proven.

AND

2) At least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom from the *disease*, *infection* or *infestation* in populations of susceptible *animals*, based on the ~~animal health surveillance~~ provisions of ~~the *Terrestrial Code*, in particular those contained in~~ Chapter 1.4.

AND

3) ~~A~~ Reliable means of detection and diagnosis exist~~s~~ and a precise *case* definition is available to clearly identify *cases* and allow them to be distinguished from other *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*.

AND

~~4~~3)

a) Natural transmission to humans has been proven, and human infection is associated with severe consequences.

OR

b) The *disease* has been shown to cause a significant impact on the health of ~~morbidity or mortality in~~ domestic *animals* at the level of a country or a *zone* taking into account the occurrence and severity of the clinical signs, including direct production losses and mortality.

OR

c) The *disease* has been shown to, or scientific evidence indicates that it would, cause a significant impact on the health of ~~morbidity or mortality in *wild*~~ *wildlife* ~~*animal* populations~~ taking into account the occurrence and severity of the clinical signs, including direct production losses and mortality, and ecological threats.

~~AND~~

~~4) A reliable means of detection and diagnosis exists and a precise *case* definition is available to clearly identify *cases* and allow them to be distinguished from other *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*.~~

CHAPTER 1.2.BIS

DISEASES LISTED BY THE OIE

~~Article 1.2.3.~~

Preamble

The following *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations* are included in the OIE list.

In case of modifications of this list of animal *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations* adopted by the World Assembly, the new list comes into force on 1 January of the following year.

Article 1.2bis.1.

1) The following are included within the category of multiple species *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*:

- Anthrax
- Bluetongue
- Brucellosis (*Brucella abortus*)
- Brucellosis (*Brucella melitensis*)
- Brucellosis (*Brucella suis*)
- Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever
- Epizootic haemorrhagic disease
- Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern)
- Foot and mouth disease
- Heartwater
- Infection with Aujeszky's disease virus
- Infection with *Echinococcus granulosus*

- Infection with *Echinococcus multilocularis*
- Infection with rabies virus
- Infection with Rift Valley fever virus
- Infection with rinderpest virus
- Infection with *Trichinella* spp.
- Japanese encephalitis
- New World screwworm (*Cochliomyia hominivorax*)
- Old World screwworm (*Chrysomya bezziana*)
- Paratuberculosis
- Q fever
- Surra (*Trypanosoma evansi*)
- Tularemia
- West Nile fever.

2) The following are included within the category of cattle *diseases* and *infections*:

- Bovine anaplasmosis
- Bovine babesiosis
- Bovine genital campylobacteriosis
- Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
- Bovine tuberculosis
- Bovine viral diarrhoea
- Enzootic bovine leukosis
- Haemorrhagic septicaemia
- Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvovaginitis
- Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)
- Lumpy skin disease
- Theileriosis
- Trichomonosis
- Trypanosomosis (tsetse-transmitted).

3) The following are included within the category of sheep and goat *diseases* and *infections*:

- Caprine arthritis/encephalitis
- Contagious agalactia
- Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
- Infection with *Chlamydophila abortus* (Enzootic abortion of ewes, ovine chlamydiosis)
- Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
- Maedi–visna
- Nairobi sheep disease
- Ovine epididymitis (*Brucella ovis*)
- Salmonellosis (*S.* abortus ovis)
- Scrapie
- Sheep pox and goat pox.

4) The following are included within the category of equine *diseases* and *infections*:

- Contagious equine metritis
- Dourine
- Equine encephalomyelitis (Western)
- Equine infectious anaemia
- Equine influenza
- Equine piroplasmosis
- Glanders
- Infection with African horse sickness virus
- Infection with equid herpesvirus-1 (EHV-1)
- Infection with equine arteritis virus
- Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.

5) The following are included within the category of swine *diseases* and *infections*:

- African swine fever
- Infection with classical swine fever virus
- Nipah virus encephalitis
- Porcine cysticercosis
- Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
- Transmissible gastroenteritis.

6) The following are included within the category of avian *diseases* and *infections*:

- Avian chlamydiosis
- Avian infectious bronchitis
- Avian infectious laryngotracheitis
- Avian mycoplasmosis (*Mycoplasma gallisepticum*)
- Avian mycoplasmosis (*Mycoplasma synoviae*)
- Duck virus hepatitis
- Fowl typhoid
- Infection with avian influenza viruses
- Infection with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity in birds other than poultry including wild birds
- Infection with Newcastle disease virus
- Infectious bursal disease (Gumboro disease)
- Pullorum disease
- Turkey rhinotracheitis.

7) The following are included within the category of lagomorph *diseases* and *infections*:

- Myxomatosis
- Rabbit haemorrhagic disease.

8) The following are included within the category of bee *diseases*, *infections* and *infestations*:

- Infection of honey bees with *Melissococcus plutonius* (European foulbrood)
- Infection of honey bees with *Paenibacillus larvae* (American foulbrood)
- Infestation of honey bees with *Acarapis woodi*
- Infestation of honey bees with *Tropilaelaps* spp.
- Infestation of honey bees with *Varroa* spp. (Varroosis)
- Infestation with *Aethina tumida* (Small hive beetle).

9) The following are included within the category of other *diseases* and *infections*:

- Camelpox
- Leishmaniosis.

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— Text deleted.

Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale | World Organisation for Animal Health | Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal

Annex XXVII

Original: English
December 2014

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON *SALMONELLA* IN CATTLE

Paris (France), 16–18 December 2014

The OIE *ad hoc* Group on *Salmonella* in cattle (the *ad hoc* Group) met at OIE Headquarters in Paris from 16 to 18 December 2014.

The members of the *ad hoc* Group and other participants are listed at Annex I. The adopted Agenda and Terms of Reference are given at Annex II and Annex III, respectively.

The *ad hoc* Group agreed that the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle will reduce the burden of disease in cattle and the risk of human illness through food-borne contamination, as well as reducing human infections resulting from direct or indirect contact with cattle. The *ad hoc* Group therefore considered that the development of the chapter on the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in commercial cattle production systems was appropriate.

The *ad hoc* Group developed the draft chapter taking into account the draft Chapter 6.X. Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in pig herds. The chapter complements the Codex Alimentarius Commission 'Guidelines for the control of nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in beef meat', currently under development.

The objective of this chapter is to provide recommendations for the reduction of *Salmonella* in cattle in primary production in order to reduce the level of the pathogen (i) entering the slaughterhouse/abattoir (and therefore decrease the risk of beef contamination during slaughter and dressing procedures); (ii) in milk and milk products; and (iii) in the farm environment, thereby reducing the risk of dissemination of *Salmonella* and contact infections in humans.

The *ad hoc* Group acknowledged the diversity of commercial cattle production systems. It also recognised the variable prevalence of *Salmonella* in different cattle populations, the variation in importance of different *Salmonella* serotypes to cattle and human health, and the differing country approaches to the control of *Salmonella* in primary production.

The *ad hoc* Group included an article on definitions for cattle production systems to capture the diversity of cattle production systems, and enable the development of recommendations that take into account of this diversity. These definitions are based on those found in the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 7.9. Animal welfare and beef cattle production systems.

The recommendations developed for prevention and control of *Salmonella* focus on the major sources and transmission pathways within and between cattle establishments. The generic biosecurity principles incorporated in these recommendations are also likely to assist in the control of other pathogens commonly encountered in commercial cattle production systems.

Annex XXVII (contd)

The *ad hoc* Group developed recommendations for different stages of cattle production, feed and water, intensive to extensive cattle production systems, transport, and lairage. They include generic biosecurity procedures as well as specific *Salmonella* prevention and control measures.

Sampling and testing procedures which may be used for detection of *Salmonella* in cattle were also considered where these are not currently covered in sufficient detail in Chapter 2.9.9. of the *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals*.

The new draft Chapter 6.X. Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in commercial cattle production systems is presented in Annex IV.

…/Annexes

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex I

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON *SALMONELLA* IN CATTLE

Paris (France), 16–18 December 2014

List of participants

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Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex II

MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON *SALMONELLA* IN CATTLE

Paris (France), 16–18 December 2014

Adopted agenda

Welcome

1. The OIE standard setting process and work in animal production food safety and relevant Codex Alimentarius standards.

2. Development of a new draft Chapter 6.X. on the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle in order to reduce the burden of disease in cattle and the risks to human health.

3. Preparation of a report for the Code Commission for consideration at its February 2015 meeting.

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex III

Terms of Reference

Purpose of the meeting

To develop a new draft Chapter 6.X. Prevention, detection and control of *Salmonella* in cattle, for Section 6: Veterinary Public Health of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, dealing with the management of this pathogen in cattle to manage risks to human health, taking account of relevant Codex guidelines, and OIE standards.

OIE standard setting work in animal production food safety

The OIE and the Codex Alimentarius (CAC) are two of the three international standard setting organizations recognized under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). In the context of the SPS Agreement, the OIE is responsible for setting standards in the domain of animal health (including zoonotic diseases) and the CAC in the domain of food safety.

Since 2001, at the request of its Members, the OIE mandate has included setting standards for animal production food safety, i.e. the management of risks arising at the level of the farm through to primary processing. In 2002, the OIE established a Working Group on Animal Production Food Safety with the aim of improving the coordination and harmonisation of standard setting activities of OIE and CAC. The Secretary of Codex and, on an observer basis, the Chair of Codex regularly attend the annual meeting of the Working Group. Through this mechanism and through participation in each other's standard setting procedures, the OIE and CAC collaborate closely in the development of standards relevant to the whole food production continuum, taking care to avoid gaps, duplications and contradictions within and between SPS standards.

***Salmonella* in cattle**

Salmonellosis is one of the most frequently reported food-borne diseases worldwide and cattle meat is considered to be an important source of this food-borne infection.

Since 2010 the APFSWG has been exploring the need for and feasibility of developing OIE standards on the control of *Salmonella* spp. in food producing animals other than poultry (i.e. pigs, cattle, small ruminants) with the purpose of reducing food-borne illness. Based on a recent literature review requested by the APFSWG, 'A review of the scientific literature on the control of *Salmonella* spp. in food producing animals other than poultry' (Simone Belluco *et al*., in press) and other publications, the APFSWG noted that a) salmonellosis attributed to cattle and pigs is an important cause of illness in humans, b) effective control measures can be implemented at the farm level and, c) Codex is undertaking work in this area.

They recommended that, should the Codex work proceed, the OIE should develop recommendations for the pre-harvest management and control of *Salmonella* spp. in pigs and cattle to complement the Codex guidelines and ensure a whole food chain approach to *Salmonella* risk management in these species.

At the February 2014 meeting of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission), they agreed that given that the Codex has commenced new work on guidelines for the Control of nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in pork and beef meat, the OIE should commence work in this area to complement the Codex work to ensure that standards cover the farm to fork continuum for this pathogen.

In September 2014, the OIE convened an *ad hoc* group to develop a draft chapter on the Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in pig herds. This chapter was reviewed by the Code Commission, at their September 2014 meeting, and circulated to Member Countries for comments as part of their report.

The OIE agreed that work on standard development for *Salmonella* in cattle should follow the work undertaken in pigs.

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex III (contd)

Relevant considerations

- The OIE has a mandate to develop international standards for animal production food safety, with a primary focus on measures applicable to zoonotic pathogens, for which measures can most effectively be implemented at the animal production level.
- As *Salmonella* in cattle is not an OIE listed disease and the impact on animal health (and direct economic impact) is low, this chapter will be part of Section 6: Veterinary Public Health of the *Terrestrial Code*.
- Standards for zoonotic pathogens at the animal production level should take into account:
    - feasible and cost effective means of controlling the pathogen at the animal level;
    - feasible and cost effective measures for animals and animal products that are internationally traded;
    - existing Codex standards and guidelines of the WHO and FAO.
- The *Terrestrial Code* contains general recommendations on veterinary public health and specific recommendations on controlling Salmonellosis in poultry.
- The OIE *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* (2014) includes a chapter on for Salmonellosis (Chapter 2.9.9.) which includes recommendations on diagnostic techniques, vaccines and competitive exclusion.
- The format of the new Chapter X.X. should follow the style of existing *Terrestrial Code* chapters.
- The draft *Terrestrial Code* chapter 6.X. on Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in pig herds.

Relevant documents

1. A review of the scientific literature on the control of *Salmonella* spp. in food producing animals other than poultry (Simone Belluco *et al*., in press).
2. The draft *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 6.X. on Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in pig herds.
3. *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 6.5. on Prevention, detection and control of *Salmonella* in poultry.
4. *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 6.4. on Biosecurity procedures in poultry production.
5. Draft Codex Guidelines for the Control of nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in pork and beef meat (under development).
6. Codex *Guidelines for the Control of* Campylobacter *and* Salmonella *in Chicken Meat* (CAC/GL 78-2011).

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex IV

DRAFT CHAPTER 6.X.

PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF *SALMONELLA* IN COMMERCIAL CATTLE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

Article 6.X.1.

Introduction

Nontyphoidal salmonellosis is one of the most common food-borne bacterial diseases in the world with *Salmonella* Enteritidis and *S.* Typhimurium (including monophasic variants) the predominant serotypes identified in most countries. In addition, a limited number of other serotypes associated with cattle may cause salmonellosis in humans, for example *S*. Dublin and *S*. Newport.

As is the case in most food producing *animals*, *Salmonella infection* in cattle is mostly subclinical, although clinical *disease* such as enteritis, septicaemia or abortion can occur. Subclinical *infection* can be of variable duration including a carrier state and can play an important role in the spread of *Salmonella* within and between *herds* and pose a public health risk.

Herd size and stocking density may influence the *risk* of introduction, dissemination or persistence of *Salmonella*; however, this is also dependent on geographical region, husbandry and other factors such as season and age.

Salmonella serotypes and their *prevalence* in cattle may vary considerably between farms, countries and regions. It is important for *Veterinary Authorities* to consider types of *Salmonella*, their occurrence and the *disease* burden in cattle and human populations if developing and implementing strategies for the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle.

Article 6.X.2.

Definitions

Commercial cattle production systems: means those systems where the purpose of the operation includes some or all of the breeding, rearing and management of cattle for the production of *meat* and *meat products* or *milk* and *milk products.*

Intensive cattle production systems: means commercial systems where cattle are in confinement and are fully dependent on humans to provide for basic animal needs such as food, shelter and water on a daily basis.

Extensive cattle production systems: means commercial systems where cattle have the freedom to roam outdoors, and where the cattle have some autonomy over diet selection (through grazing), water consumption and access to shelter.

Semi-intensive cattle production systems: means commercial systems where cattle are exposed to any combination of both intensive and extensive husbandry methods, either simultaneously or variably according to changes in climatic conditions or physiological state of the cattle.

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

Article 6.X.3.

Purpose and scope

The purpose of this chapter is to provide recommendations for the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle in order to reduce the burden of *disease* in cattle and the *risk* of human illness through food-borne contamination as well as human *infections* resulting from direct or indirect contact with cattle (e.g. via faeces or abortion material).

This chapter applies to cattle (*Bos taurus*, *B. indicus* and *B. grunniens*), water buffaloes (*Bubalus bubalis*) and wood bison (*Bison bison* and *B. bonasus*) kept in commercial cattle production systems.

This chapter should be read in conjunction with the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005) and the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice for Milk and Milk Products (CAC/RCP 57-2004).

Article 6.X.4.

Objectives of prevention and control measures

It is recommended that prevention and control be focused on those types of *Salmonella* of greatest consequence to cattle or public health.

Reduction of *Salmonella* in cattle in primary production may reduce the level of the pathogen:

1) entering the *slaughterhouse/abattoir* and therefore decrease the *risk* of beef contamination during *slaughter* and dressing procedures;

2) in *milk* and *milk products*;

3) in the farm environment, thereby reducing the risk of dissemination of *Salmonella* and contact *infections* in humans.

Articles 6.X.5. to 6.X.14. provide recommendations for the prevention and control of *Salmonella* in cattle.

These recommendations may also have beneficial effects on the occurrence of other *infections* and *diseases*.

Article 6.X.5.

Location and design of cattle establishments

When making decisions on the location and design of cattle *establishments,* it is recommended that mitigation of the *risk* of transfer of pathogens, including *Salmonella*, from major sources of contamination be considered. Sources of *Salmonella* may include other livestock *establishments* or areas of application or disposal of contaminated waste or effluent. Transfer of *Salmonella* between *establishments* may involve carriage by wild birds, rodents, flies and other *wildlife*.

It is recommended that the design of intensive cattle systems consider the following:

1) adequate drainage for the site and control of run-off and untreated waste water;

2) use of materials for construction that facilitate effective cleaning and *disinfection*;

3) control of the points of entry;

4) cattle handling and movements to minimise stress and spread of *Salmonella infection*;

5) separation of cattle of different *risk* status;

6) restriction of entry of wild birds, rodents, flies and other relevant *wildlife*.

In extensive cattle production systems, location and design options may be limited; however, applicable biosecurity measures should be considered.

Article 6.X.6.

Biosecurity management plan

Biosecurity measures that include management and physical factors designed to reduce the *risk* of introduction, establishment and spread of animal *diseases*, *infections* or *infestations* to, from and within an animal population would also be expected to assist with the prevention and control of *Salmonella*.

When developing a biosecurity management plan it is recommended that the following be taken into consideration:

1) Veterinary supervision of cattle health.

2) Management of introduction and mixing of cattle.

3) Training of personnel in their responsibilities and their role in animal health, human health and food safety.

4) Maintenance of records including data on cattle health, production, movements, medications, *vaccination*, and mortality, and cleaning and *disinfection* of farm buildings and equipment.

5) Availability of test results to the farm operator when *Salmonella surveillance* is conducted.

6) Removal of unwanted vegetation and debris that could attract or harbour pests around cattle premises .

7) Minimising the entry of wild birds into cattle buildings and feed stores.

8) Cleaning and *disinfection* procedures for buildings in which cattle are handled or housed. For example, the cleaning and *disinfection* procedures for intensive calf housing, calving areas and sick pens after emptying may include feeders, drinkers, floor, walls, aisles, partitions between pens, and ventilation ducting.

   When disinfectants are used they should be applied at an effective concentration after a complementary cleaning procedure.

9) Control of pests such as rodents and arthropods when required and regular assessment of effectiveness.

10) Control of persons and *vehicles* entering the *establishment*.

11) Cleaning and *disinfection* of *vehicles* and equipment identified as a *risk*.

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

12) Storage and disposal of cattle carcasses, bedding, faeces and other potentially contaminated farm waste in a safe manner to minimise the risk of dissemination of *Salmonella* and to prevent the direct or indirect exposure of humans, livestock and *wildlife* to *Salmonella*. Particular care to be taken when cattle bedding and faeces are used as fertiliser for horticultural crops intended for human consumption.

Article 6.X.7.

Management of cattle introductions

To minimise the *risk* of introducing *Salmonella* through cattle introductions, it is recommended that:

1) There be good communication within the cattle industry to raise awareness of the *risk* of introducing *Salmonella* through cattle introductions.

2) The number of separate sources of cattle for breeding or rearing be kept to as few as possible. For example in a closed dairy *herd* it is possible to introduce new genetic material solely by semen or embryos.

3) If possible, cattle be sourced directly from *herds* of origin because live animal markets or other places where cattle from multiple properties are mixed for resale may increase the risk of spread of *Salmonella* and other *infections* among cattle.

4) Newly introduced cattle be kept separate from the rest of the *herd* for a suitable period before mixing with other cattle, e.g. four weeks.

5) Where appropriate, for example with cattle of unknown status, pooled faecal samples from introduced cattle could be taken to assess their *Salmonella* status.

Article 6.X.8.

On farm cattle management

To minimise the risk of transferring *Salmonella* among cattle, it is recommended that:

1) Cattle with suspected salmonellosis be separated from healthy cattle.

2) Care of healthy cattle be carried out prior to care of cattle with suspected salmonellosis.

3) Priority be given to the hygienic management of calving areas, for example keeping perinatal cattle separated from sick cattle and maintaining a clean environment.

4) When possible, the ‘all-in-all-out’ principle for production cohorts be used. In particular, the mixing of different age groups during rearing of calves should be avoided.

5) Consideration be given to the potential for between-herd transmission of *Salmonella* via rearing and grazing of cattle from multiple sources on a single site, for example shared pasture and heifer rearing.

6) Consideration be given to the potential for between-herd transmission of *Salmonella* through direct contact between cattle across boundary lines or indirectly through contamination of water courses.

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

Article 6.X.9.

Feed and water

1. Compound feed and feed ingredients

Compound feed and feed ingredients can be sources of *Salmonella infection* for cattle. For the effective control of *Salmonella* it is recommended that:

a) Where appropriate, compound feed and feed ingredients be produced, handled, stored, transported and distributed according to Good Manufacturing Practices, considering Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) principles and recommendations in accordance with Chapter 6.3.

b) Compound feed and feed ingredients be transported and stored in a hygienic manner that minimises access by wild birds, rodents and other *wildlife*.

2. Water

Where there is reason to be concerned about *infection* of cattle with *Salmonella* from contaminated water, measures be taken to evaluate and minimise the *risk*. For example sediment in water troughs may act as a reservoir for contamination.

Article 6.X.10.

Prevention, treatment and control measures

1) *Antimicrobial agents* may modify normal flora in the gut and increase the likelihood of colonisation by *Salmonella*. If *antimicrobial agents* are used, they should be used in accordance with Chapter 6.9.

Antimicrobial agents should not be used to control subclinical *infection* with *Salmonella* in cattle because the effectiveness of the treatment is limited, they may increase the risk of *Salmonella* colonisation, and their use can contribute to the development of antimicrobial resistance.

2) *Vaccination* may be used as part of a *Salmonella* control programme. Vaccine production and use should be in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual*. The protective effect of vaccines is generally serotype specific and few licensed vaccines are available for cattle.

3) Use of probiotics may reduce colonisation of cattle by *Salmonella* and shedding of *Salmonella;* however, efficacy is variable.

4) Because conditions such as liver fluke and infection with bovine viral diarrhoea virus may increase the susceptibility of cattle to *Salmonella*, control of these conditions is recommended.

5) The immune status of calves is important and therefore care should be taken to ensure that new-born calves consume adequate amounts of high quality colostrum.

Article 6.X.11.

Transportation

The relevant recommendations in Chapter 7.3. apply.

When transporting animals from multiple *establishments,* it is recommended that the *Salmonella* status of the *establishments* be considered to avoid cross-contamination of cattle.

Annex XXVII (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

Article 6.X.12.

Lairage

Relevant aspects of *lairage* management include consideration of effective cleaning and *disinfection* between groups, minimising mixing of separate groups and managing stress.

In addition the relevant recommendations in Articles 7.5.1., 7.5.3. and 7.5.4. apply.

Article 6.X.13.

Surveillance in cattle

Surveillance data provide information to assist the *Competent Authorities* in their decision making regarding the requirement for, and design of, control programmes. Sampling and testing methods, frequency and type of samples required should be determined by the *Veterinary Services.*

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*. In addition, other sampling and testing methodologies such as testing of bulk milk or serum samples by ELISA may provide useful information on herd or individual animal status. Boot swab samples from communal areas in cattle housing, slurry samples or lymph nodes collected post-mortem can also be useful for microbiological testing. Some types of *Salmonella* such as *S*. Dublin can be difficult to detect through microbiological methods.

If *vaccination* is used, it may not be possible to distinguish between vaccinated and infected cattle by means of serological testing.

Article 6.X.14.

Prevention and control in low prevalence regions

In regions where *Salmonella infection* of cattle is uncommon, it may be possible to eliminate *infection* from *herds* through a combination of *herd surveillance,* individual testing, movement controls, and possible removal of persistent carriers.

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— Text deleted.

Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale | World Organisation for Animal Health | Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal

Annex XXVIII

Original: English
January 2015

REPORT OF THE SECOND *AD HOC* GROUP ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH

Paris, 27–29 January 2015

The OIE *ad hoc* Group on Disaster Management and Risk Reduction in Relation to Animal Health and Welfare and Veterinary Public Health (the *ad hoc* Group) met at OIE Headquarters on 27–29 January 2015. Dr Gary Vroegindewey chaired the meeting.

1. Welcome and introduction

The members of the *ad hoc* Group and other participants at the meeting are listed at Annex I. The adopted Agenda is provided as Annex II.

On behalf of Dr Bernard Vallat, Director General of the OIE, the Head of the International Trade Department, Dr Derek Belton, welcomed all members and thanked them for their commitment to working with the OIE on this important topic. He reminded the members of the *ad hoc* Group that, in principle, the disaster management and risk reduction guidelines that they are developing are intended for publication on the OIE website, but in the future they could also become a chapter of the OIE Codes, as discussed during the previous meeting. An extract from the relevant section of the September 2014 report of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission) is presented in Annex V.

Dr Alejandro Thiermann, President of the Code Commission, also thanked the *ad hoc* Group for their work and noted that, regardless of the final placement of these guidelines, they should be very concise, and avoid replication of more detailed information already available in well-known reference sources.

Dr Belton indicated to the *ad hoc* Group that, in the first instance, the OIE intends to develop guidelines for use by the Veterinary Services of Member Countries and that these guidelines will take account of the existing global guidelines and standards on this topic.

An extract from the relevant section of the report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Animal Welfare Working Group, in June 2014, is presented in Annex IV.

2. Objectives of the meeting

Dr Vroegindewey stated that the *ad hoc* Group should focus on drafting guidelines for use by Veterinary Services. Dr Thierman emphasised that they should be concise and leave most of the more detailed and technical items for the annexes.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Dr Philippe Ankers noted that, as the document will focus on the activities of Veterinary Services, it will not be necessary to include detailed information on activities of other stakeholders in disaster situations.

Dr Paolo Dalla Villa indicated that one of the advantages of these guidelines is that they will enhance a common understanding of the terminology to be used among National Veterinary Services and with other stakeholders.

Dr María Percedo highlighted how important it is that Veterinary Services should engage with animal owners, producers, animal industry representatives, slaugtherhouses, laboratories, pharmaceutical industries and others. They are the people and organisations that will have to implement measures and activities for disaster management and risk reduction and they also have a key role in the response phase.

3. Terms of Reference

The *ad hoc* Group reviewed the Terms of Reference that had been adopted at the first meeting and confirmed them, but noted that to complete the work mentioned under point number 3, more work should be done at the regional level to detect gaps and needs.

The adopted Terms of Reference are shown in Annex III

4. Discussion of working documents and other relevant documents

The *ad hoc* Group analysed the documents sent by the different members of the group and assessed each one in order to decided if it should be included as a reference tool in the guidelines.

The list of the working documents is provided as Annex VI.

5. Development of draft guidelines

The *ad hoc* Group drafted Guidelines on disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health (Guidelines for National Veterinary Services) and developed guiding principles for the OIE as it engages with this new area of work. The draft guidelines are shown in Annex VII

6. Proposed strategy for the use of the guidelines and future work

The *ad hoc* Group drew up a proposed strategy to facilitate the use of the guidelines by Veterinary Services and their relevant partners.

The activities and elements included in the strategy are shown in Annex VIII

7. Review and finalise report of meeting

The *ad hoc* Group discussed and agreed on further work needed to complete the meeting report.

8. Next meeting

It was proposed that, if required, a final meeting should be held after the September 2015 meeting of the Code Commission.

…/ Appendices

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex I

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH

Paris, 27–29 January 2015

List of participants

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Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex I (contd)

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Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex II

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH

Paris, 27–29 January 2015

Agenda

1) Welcome and introduction – Dr Derek Belton

2) Review of the Report of the *ad hoc* Group on Animal Welfare and Disaster Management, April 2014

3) Discussion of working documents and other relevant documents provided by the *ad hoc* Group Members

4) Development of draft text for consideration by the Animal Welfare Working Group and the Code Commission

5) Programme for further work after this meeting

6) Review and finalise report of meeting

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex III

OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH

Paris, 27–29 January 2015

Terms of Reference

- To develop OIE Guiding Principles on disasters management and risk reduction with respect to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health taking account of all aspects of the Disaster Cycle and existing guidelines and standards (e.g. LEGS and OIE *Terrestrial Code*);
- to advise strategies for supporting Veterinary Services in OIE Member Countries to undertake disaster management and risk reduction;
- to identify any significant gaps in existing guidelines and standards available to Veterinary Services on disaster management and risk reduction with respect to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health and to develop guidelines addressing those gaps;
- to advise how disaster management and risk reduction with respect to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health should be addressed in OIE veterinary education recommendations;
- to make recommendations on how the OIE can strengthen linkages with key international stakeholders in the field of disaster management and risk reduction with respect to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex IV

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE OIE ANIMAL WELFARE WORKING GROUP

Paris (France), 24–26 june 2014

8. *Ad hoc* Group on Disaster Management and Risk Reduction in relation to Animal Health and Welfare and Veterinary Public Health

Dr Stuardo informed that the *ad hoc* Group had its first meeting from 15–17 April 2014. The meeting was chaired by Dr Gary Vroegindewey, the *ad hoc* Group discussed extensively the problems of dealing with disasters within the framework of the paper prepared by Dr Sarah Kahn, and agreed with the approach of developing a set of guidelines for OIE Member Countries for publication on the OIE website. Dr Stuardo also advised that the group agreed that the guidelines will focus on strategic, organisational and operational issues rather than technical issues, and cover animal health, welfare and veterinary public health. A second meeting of the ad hoc Group is proposed for the fourth quarter of 2014.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex V

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE

CODE COMMISSION

PARIS, 9–18 SEPTEMBER 2014

c) Report of the meeting of the *ad hoc* Group on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in Relation to Animal Health and Welfare and Veterinary Public Health

The Code Commission reviewed and endorsed the report of the *ad hoc* group meeting held on 15–17 April 2014. The Code Commission noted that though having developed a draft guideline document on disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health, the *ad hoc* group considered that more work needs to be done before circulating the draft document for Member Countries' comments.

The report of the meeting of the *ad hoc* group is attached as Annex XXV for Member Country information.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VI

SECOND MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH

Paris, 27–29 January 2015

List of documents

Item 1. Provisional list of participants and list of documents

Item 2. Draft Agenda

Item 3. Terms of Reference

Item 4. Report of the *ad hoc* group on AW and disaster management_April 2014

Item 5. Guiding Principles for the OIE for disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health

Item 6. Guidelines on disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health (Guidelines for National Veterinary Services)

Item 7. Extract of the Report of the Meeting of the OIE Code Commission – September 2014

Item 8. Glossary of the Common Agricultural Policy (update of 2014)

Item 9. LEGS flyer

Item 10. UNHCR Livestock Keeping and Animal Husbandry in Refugee and Returnee Situations

Item 11. Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (A/CONF.206/6)

Item 12. Good Emergency Management Practices GEMP FAO

Item 13. Good Emergency Management Practice -The Essentials

Item 14. Appendix XI (Shiro Inukai) - Report of the *ad hoc* group on AW and disaster management, April 2014

Item 15. Definitions (Shiro Inukai) - Guidelines on disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health (Guidelines for National Veterinary Services) 2014

Item 16. World Disasters Report 2013, Focus on technology and the future of humanitarian action

Item 17. 26th Conference of the OIE Regional Commission for Europe

Item 18. New Zealand's National Security System

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII

DRAFT

GUIDELINES ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RISK REDUCTION IN RELATION TO ANIMAL HEALTH AND WELFARE AND VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH (GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL VETERINARY SERVICES)

1. INTRODUCTION

The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has developed these guidelines for disaster management and risk reduction in relation to animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health with the goal of strengthening the capacity of Veterinary Services in Member Countries.

Recent disaster events highlight the need to bring all components of disaster management together in cohesive response plans at both national and international levels using a multidisciplinary approach to achieve optimal efficiency and effectiveness.

The OIE guidelines use an all-hazards approach to the management of natural and man-made and technological disasters and suggest that a wide range of stakeholders from both government and society take action, adapting their interventions to meet local and regional needs.

They advocate the integration of disaster management and risk reduction measures relevant to national Veterinary Services into broader resilience and disaster management and response networks and policies, i.e. those that promote the health and welfare of animals, safeguard human and environmental health and assist Member Countries to restore and enhance economic and societal conditions in the aftermath of a disaster.

1.1 SCOPE

These guidelines reflect the need for Veterinary Services to implement disaster management and disaster risk reduction measures with the objective of protecting animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health during disaster events in their respective countries.

The document is aligned with OIE standards for Veterinary Services and animal welfare.

These guidelines provide a framework that veterinary professionals can use to develop processes and procedures for managing the veterinary sector's actions to reduce the adverse consequences of disasters. They outline guiding principles and the roles that Veterinary Services play in reducing the impact of disasters in all phases of the Disaster Management Cycle (DMC). They also highlight the importance of intra- and inter-institutional coordination and emphasise that the mandate of Veterinary Services falls within the larger national legal framework.

These guidelines complement existing technical and legal instruments for disaster management, both those at international and regional levels and those adopted in each Member Country, all of which specify the mandate of relevant actors in disaster situations. They are meant to be applied in conjunction with these existing tools.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

The document does not prescribe how Veterinary Services should act, but leaves it to each OIE Member Country to adapt to local needs based on their context. It identifies inter-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approaches as essential principles in disaster management and stresses that the plans of Veterinary Services should be included in the National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans.

1.2 DEFINITIONS

There are many variations of definitions in the field of disaster management and risk reduction. The *ad hoc* Group of experts formed by the OIE to draft these guidelines has selected the following working definitions with the intent of following as closely as possible standard international definitions. Additional definitions on specific topics are included within the text of the guidelines. Individual countries and organisations may have different variations that they are required to use.

Disaster

means 'a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources'. (UNISDR, 2015)

Hazard

means 'a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage'. (UNISDR, 2015)

Technological/man-made hazard

means 'a hazard originating from technological or industrial conditions or caused by man, including complex emergencies/conflicts, famine, displaced populations, industrial accidents and transport accidents. These are events that are caused by humans and occur in or close to human settlements. This can include environmental degradation, pollution and accidents'. (IFRC, 2015)

Natural hazard

means 'the naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches and floods), climatological (extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires), meteorological (cyclones and storms/wave surges) or biological (disease epidemics and insect/animal plagues)'. (IFRC, 2015)

Resilience

means 'the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. It is determined by the degree to which the community has the necessary resources and is capable of organising itself both prior to and during times of need'. (UNISDR, 2015).

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

2. THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT CYCLE

The objectives for Veterinary Services in disaster management are to protect animal health and welfare, safeguard human and environmental health and assist Member Countries in restoring and enhancing economic and societal conditions.

Various disaster management models are available to provide a framework to develop disaster management programmes, actions, and activities. A simple, commonly used DMC model has been selected in order to illustrate the phases of the disaster that must be addressed.

The DMC phases include: mitigation and prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Disaster management programmes often focus on response, but effective disaster management includes activities in all four phases.

Mitigation means 'the lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters'. (UNISDR, 2015)

Prevention means 'any action aimed at reducing risks or mitigating adverse consequences of a disaster for people, the environment and property, including cultural heritage'. (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 2013)

Preparedness means 'a state of readiness and capability of human and material means, structures, communities and organisations enabling them to ensure an effective rapid response to a disaster, obtained as a result of action taken in advance'. (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 2013)

Response means 'the provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected'. (UNISDR, 2015)

Recovery means 'the restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors'. (UNISDR, 2015)

The Disaster Management Cycle is shown below.



Figure 1. Phases of the Disaster Management Cycle

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

The four phases of the DMC are used as a framework to plan and organise the processes, policies and procedures involved in disaster management, including disaster risk reduction. The phases are not always distinct, but flow into one another in a continuous cycle. In a specific disaster event, different agencies may be in different phases of the DMC. Using this common framework will assist Veterinary Services to align their activities with other governmental and non-governmental actors.

There are certain elements that should always be considered as they are common to all four phases of the DMC. These include: legislation and regulatory authority, budgeting and resourcing, internal and external communications (processes and infrastructure), training and education, information technology and knowledge management, and integration and coordination with other agencies, organisations and stakeholders.

2.1 MITIGATION AND PREVENTION

Mitigation and prevention activities occur prior to disaster events and they incorporate lessons learned from the response and recovery phases of previous disasters.

Most countries already have a National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan which has been developed at central level and which explains the roles and responsibilities of all government and non-government services in the case of disasters. Veterinary Services should be involved in the preparation or review of these National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans. Veterinary Services should involve all internal units in the preparation and review of the plan and consider the roles and responsibilities of actors such as farmers, animal owners, pharmaceutical industries, the food industry, feed producers, traders, slaughterhouses, laboratories, transportation and border control authorities, national governments, intergovernmental bodies, non-governmental organisations and private voluntary associations.

Veterinary Services should establish their own National Veterinary Service Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan.

Figure 2 illustrates how Veterinary Services Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans are nested within international and national guidelines and plans and how they are linked to private-sector plans.



Figure 2. Relationship of Multi-sectoral Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plans and Guidelines

The National Veterinary Services Disaster and Risk Reduction Plan, which should be developed during the mitigation and prevention phase, should cover all four phases of the DMC. The plan will include the following chapters:

2.1.1 Veterinary Services and Other Stakeholders: Roles, Responsibilities, Cooperation and Collaboration

Central Government typically plays the lead role in preparing for and responding to disasters. The roles and responsibilities of the Veterinary Services should be clearly laid out and mechanisms for interaction with other Services and Ministries should be described.

The Veterinary Services will play a leadership role in advising the authorities on animal health, welfare and veterinary public health in disaster situations. The Veterinary Services should provide sufficient and appropriate input to ensure policies governing support for animals in disaster situations are effective.

The involvement of private veterinarians in all phases of the disaster management cycle is important as a primary link for producers and other animal owners. The roles and responsibilities of private veterinarians, livestock owners, producers, and other animal owners should also be described in the plan and, where relevant, they should receive appropriate training from Veterinary Services or other appropriate entities. Veterinary Services should support the development of disaster management plans by advising other actors as appropriate.

2.1.2 Legal Framework, Legislation

The plan should follow existing international frameworks where appropriate, such as the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction of the United Nations (UNISDR). The plan should be harmonised with the national legislation for disaster management and make provision for interaction between official and private institutions and organisations. Veterinary Services should include their mitigation and prevention activities in national and regional plans and harmonise them with those of other sectors and the government. When Veterinary Services lack established legal authority for action in disaster situations, specific requirements should be identified and new legislation developed to address the gaps.

2.1.3 Communication and Public Awareness

A clear communication strategy is central to the plan. The strategy should involve communication at all levels from government level to the general public. Prior agreements on communication responsibilities are essential to avoid any conflicting information. Communication should focus on transparency, listening, and responding, and will aim to build trust and distribute appropriate messages in a timely manner.

Communication is a two-way process, so communication tools, technologies, procedures and templates should be available for communication between central units and the field operational level, including field-based veterinarians, animal owners, and the general public. Communication should take into consideration the social and cultural aspects of content delivery to maximise effectiveness.

Public awareness campaigns in the mitigation and prevention phase help to maintain vigilance against disaster risks and improve the self-preparedness of animal owners. Making animal owners aware of their options in the case of disaster is a vital part of efficient disaster cycle management.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

2.1.4 Risk Analyses

Risk analysis means the overall cross-sectoral process of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication undertaken at national or appropriate sub-national level. Conducting a risk analysis prior to a disaster will enable stakeholders to prioritise investments for disaster risk-reduction activities and facilitate the decision process within the whole disaster management cycle. The risk analysis should include hazard identification and hazard mapping, risk assessment, vulnerability analysis, capacity analysis, risk evaluation, and risk communication.

2.1.5 Structure of Veterinary Services

The structure of Veterinary Services varies from one country to another and risks will vary from one region to another within the country. The plan should address regional specificities and address whether or not capacities are available for response within regions.

Response to disasters requires the ability to make quick evidence-based decisions and to convert those decisions into clear orders which can be conveyed down a very clear chain of command to those who are charged with the responsibility to carry them out. This requires the Veterinary Services in a country to be part of a well-defined command structure or line management system, at least for the duration of the emergency. This command system may differ from the structure in place for routine work and should be described in the National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan.

All key staff in both central and decentralised offices should have a detailed job description defining their roles and responsibilities during all phases of the DMC, including mitigation and prevention.

2.1.6 Human Resources

Different skills will be required during all phases of the DMC. It is important to provide on-the-job training, invest in early warning activities, and to provide for increasing the capacity of Veterinary Services for emergency responses.

2.1.7 Financing

Finances should be available without delay during the preparedness and response phases. Budgeting for interventions and identifying sources of funding in advance will allow for rapid action. Budgets should include both contingency funds and funds for ongoing risk-reduction activities (such as education/training, biosecurity, surveillance activities, maintenance of early warning systems)

2.1.8 Early Warning Systems, Surveillance Systems

Veterinary Services have the duty and responsibility to ensure that disease surveillance and livestock-related information is integrated into early warning systems and they should be actively engaged in their development. Veterinary Services need to engage with other governmental agencies so that any warning information regarding all types of hazards can be received and effectively disseminated.

2.1.9 Contingency Plans and Standard Operating Procedures

Contingency planning means a management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations. (EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 2013)

Veterinary Services should develop contingency plans for each type of event identified during risk assessment exercises using an all-hazards approach. The plans should cover natural disasters (e.g. flooding, hurricanes, wind storms, drought, earthquakes, extreme cold, volcano eruptions, transboundary epizootics and pandemics) and man-made ortechnological disasters (e.g. chemical release, radiologic accidents, oil spills, explosions, conflict and bioterrorism). Contingency plans cover sets of activities carried out as part of the response and recovery phases of the DMC. They comprise both long-term measures and measures implemented in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. There should be contingency plans for responding to animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health needs during natural and man-made disasters, including disease outbreaks. These contingency plans will be specific to each type of event: a flood, for example, will require a different contingency plan from a disease outbreak. Moreover, different disease types may require different contingency plans.

The process of developing a contingency plan provides valuable learning that helps successful implementation of the plan when a disaster occurs. It involves organising a team representing relevant authorities and stakeholders, identifying critical resources and functions, and establishing a plan for recovery beyond response (see point 2.2.).

To ensure the quality of the contingency plans, Veterinary services should develop Standard Operating Procedures for interventions that regularly recur during the preparedness and response phases.

The mitigation and prevention phase includes much more than just contingency plans. Mitigation and prevention requires ongoing capacity development, continuous monitoring and surveillance, and regular updating of risk analyses and risk reduction activities.

All activities included in the Veterinary Services Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan should be periodically reviewed and updated.

2.2 PREPAREDNESS

The preparedness phase often begins when warning of an impending disaster is received. Veterinary Services should get ready to activate their relevant contingency plans so that they are prepared for the foreseeable consequences as the disaster progresses. The implementation of contingency plans requires flexibility and adjustments according to the magnitude and circumstances of the disaster.

Relevant contingency plans should be put together by the Veterinary Authority in conjunction with representatives from the national and local governments, non-governmental organisations and relevant private-sector stakeholders. The contingency plans will include:

- Details of the types of disaster covered by the plan
- Systems for rapid assessment and situation awareness
- Legislation
- Established chain of command system
- Plans for coordination with other relevant governmental agencies, inter-governmental agencies, NGOs and private sector
- Finance arrangements (including compensation policy)
- Human resource plan
- Communication plan & public awareness measures
- Established sustainable continuity plan & recovery plan

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

During the preparedness phase, Veterinary Services will switch to emergency mode and start implementing the relevant command system, as described in the Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan, to maximise the response capacity and use early warning systems to communicate with relevant parties. Early in the preparedness phase the Veterinary Services will review the availability of human and financial resources as well as tailor the communication strategy to the specific disaster event.

2.3 RESPONSE

2.3.1 Implementation of National Veterinary Services' Contingency Plans

Impact assessment and situation awareness are the first steps to be taken following the activation of any contingency plan. The impact of the disaster on the Veterinary Services themselves and their capacity to implement the plan should be assessed. Veterinary Services need to prioritise activities in conjunction with key stakeholders. They must remain flexible and undertake appropriate action after an assessment of the impact on the health and welfare of animals, human safety and the environment. If there is no specific contingency plan for the type of disaster that is taking place, Veterinary Services should take a step-by-step approach to decision-making and refer to the contents described in the mitigation and prevention and preparedness phases of the contingency plans they have developed for generic guidance.

2.3.2 Governance

Each contingency plan (developed in the mitigation/prevention phase) will determine governance and the chain of command. Cooperation and coordination with stakeholders under clear lines of responsibility will be important to expand the capacity of Veterinary Services. Adaptability, efficiency, and continuity of support are critical to effective response.

2.3.3 Legislation activity

Contingency plans will be based on existing legislation that will enable immediate action. Emergency management ordinances and specific regulations may be issued when required.

2.3.4 Communication

Appropriate communication is critical for good governance, knowledge management and contingency planning. Veterinary Services should have detailed internal and external communication plans within their contingency plans.

2.3.5 Gap Analysis

Following an assessment of the impact of the disaster on the Veterinary Services themselves, a gap analysis should be carried out to identify Veterinary Services needs. All relevant stakeholders must be included so that all significant issues are identified and addressed. Gap analysis should also take into account what will be required during the recovery phase and consider whether some earlier risk mitigation actions could avoid some of those recovery needs.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

2.4 RECOVERY

2.4.1 Recovery Plan

Following gap analysis during the response phase, a recovery plan should be developed in order to detail human and material resource requirements, and the related budget. After identifying gaps within Veterinary Services, and after further consultation with key stakeholders, Veterinary Services should evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of their response to the disaster. The development of a recovery plan should include opportunities to '*build back better*' (i.e. provide greater resilience) and should be multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary where applicable. The plan should include monitoring and evaluation.

2.4.2 Governance

In the recovery phase, consideration should also be given as to how the Veterinary Services will continue to undertake their ongoing operations or 'business as usual'. This may require areas of governance to be reconsidered dependent upon current resources, and may even require changes to some aspects of legislation.

2.4.3 Communication

High-quality communication is necessary to keep all relevant stakeholders aware of developments. Failures in communication may result in stakeholders not giving input to vital areas of recovery and reconstruction, and may result in a lack of adequate resourcing and funding to ensure a successful recovery phase. The most significant stakeholders to be considered throughout both the response and recovery phases are the affected community. Community engagement will increase buy-in and speed up recovery from the disaster.

2.4.4 Gap Analysis

The recovery plan should identify the most probable recovery needs of the disaster and these should inform subsequent contingency plans. Veterinary Services should consider the different needs of both rural and urban communities, which are likely to include support for managing the consequences of livestock and production losses, companion animal displacement, and infrastructure loss. Veterinary Services should also consider how severely their buildings and facilities have been impacted and plan for their replacement during the recovery phase. These plans should take into account lag times for construction materials to be available and for key services, such as water and electricity supplies, to be reconnected.

Monitoring and evaluating the successes and failures of the recovery plan will identify both resource and process gaps. Like gap analysis from the response phase, gap analysis of the recovery phase may also identify areas for improvement in the mitigation phase.

2.5 TOPICS RELEVANT TO ALL DMC PHASES

2.5.1 Legislative framework

The National Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Plan should be supported by effective legislation at each level of government. Member Countries are encouraged to follow the OIE standards on veterinary legislation as described in Chapter 3.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*. It is recommended that Veterinary Services review and analyse current legislation and engage in developing appropriate legislation to support animal health, animal welfare, and veterinary public health activities in disasters within the framework of disaster management and disaster risk reduction contingency plans.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

2.5.2 Communications

Effective communication is essential throughout the DMC. There must be effective communication both within the Veterinary Services and between Veterinary Services and other stakeholders, i.e. other government departments, non-government stakeholders and the public. Veterinary Services should consider developing pre-scripted communications that can be modified for use in the preparedness and response phases. Veterinary Services are encouraged to incorporate disaster management communications in accordance with Chapter 3.3 'Communication' of the *Terrestrial Code*.

2.5.3 Training and Education

Training and education are necessary to prepare Veterinary Services to execute their responsibilities during disasters. Technical training is essential, and should be supplemented with training on organisational and operational aspects of disaster management, including inter-agency (inter-ministry) and inter-sectoral collaboration. Disaster management training should be included in veterinary education and in training courses for private-sector stakeholders.

2.5.4 Information Technology and Knowledge Management

Information technology and knowledge management capacity should be developed in order to maintain awareness of the activities of Veterinary Services and to facilitate information sharing with other government and non-government stakeholders throughout the DMC.

2.5.5 Integration and Coordination

For nearly all disasters, Veterinary Service disaster programmes will have to be incorporated into higher-level governmental frameworks for national disaster response. In addition, Veterinary Services should establish programmes and processes to coordinate their activities with non-governmental and public stakeholders.

2.6 CONCLUSION

Disaster Management and Disaster Risk Reduction programmes should be dynamic and in a continual process of development as hazards, technologies, legislation and standards evolve. Applying internationally accepted guidelines and standards adopted by national and regional authorities will allow Veterinary Service to provide efficient and effective programmes. Critical to success will be risk analysis; planning; training; resource allocation; integration and coordination with government; cooperation with private-sector and non-governmental stakeholders; and disaster simulation exercises. Prioritising risk reduction is vital to avoiding or successfully responding to future disasters.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

3. DISASTER MANAGEMENT TOOLBOX OF RESOURCES

International Guidelines and Standards

- The LEGS Project. 2014. Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards, 2nd edition. Practical Action Publishing, Rugby, UK.
- FAO. 2011. Good Emergency Management Practices: The Essentials. Edited by Nick Honhold, Ian Douglas, William Geering, Arnon Shimshoni and Juan Lubroth. FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No.11. Rome
- United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
  Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015

  http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
  Response and Contingency Planning Guide

  http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/40825/1220900-CPG%202012-EN-LR.pdf

  2007CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. www.ifrc.org

Additional Resources

United National High Commissioner for Refugees

Livestock Keeping and Animal Husbandry in Refugee and Returnee Situations

Environment, Technical Support Section, UNHCR Geneva and IUCN, 2005

United States Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA Online training

http://training.fema.gov/is/nims.aspx

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

References

1. UNISDR. 2015. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction –http://www.unisdr.org

2. IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies –http://www.ifrc.org/en/

3. EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Decision No. 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism Text with EEA relevance.

Annex XXVIII (contd)

Annex VIII

Proposed strategy for the use of the Guidelines and future work

a. Incorporate Guidelines elements where appropriate into the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*

b. Incorporate Guidelines elements into the PVS Pathway

c. Convene a Global Conference on Animals in Disasters

d. Identify and engage strategic partners in Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction activities

e. Market the Guidelines through presentations in appropriate venues

f. Consider incorporating animal health and welfare, veterinary public health and bioterrorism into the following OIE documents: "Competencies of graduating veterinarians – One Day competencies" and in the "Veterinary education core curriculum"

g. Publish a Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction issue of the OIE *Scientific and Technical Review*

h. Support the creation of a Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction OIE Collaborating Centre in each OIE region

i. Survey OIE regions on current status of authorities and capabilities in Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction

j. Incorporate Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction into Focal Point training

k. Develop and maintain a web-based reference resource for Disaster Management/Disaster Risk Reduction

Appendix XXIX

MODEL VETERINARY CERTIFICATE
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS
OF A HIGH HEALTH-HIGH PERFORMANCE HORSE FOR COMPETITION OR RACES

Certificate number: ……

Import permit number (if applicable): …… issued by …… (insert name of government authority) of …… (insert name of country of destination)

This certificate is issued for a High Health-High Performance (HHP) horse

☐ dispatched from the country of usual residence to a country of temporary residence[1]

☐ dispatched from a country of temporary residence to another country of temporary residence[1]

☐ returning from a country of temporary residence to the country of usual residence[1]

Numbers of attached reference certificates (if applicable): ……

Movement from: ……Movement to: …… Ref cert no: ……

Movement from: ……Movement to: …… Ref cert no: ……

Movement from: ……Movement to: …… Ref cert no: ……

Movement from: ……Movement to: …… Ref cert no: ……

I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE HORSE

I.1. Name: ……

I.2. Colour: ……

I.3. Sex: ……

I.4. Microchip number: …… Reading system other than ISO: ……

……

I.5. Universal Equine Life Number (UELN): ……

I.6. HHP[2] identification number: ……

I.7. Number of accompanying passport:……

issued by ……
(insert authority that issued the passport)

[1] Select as appropriate.

[2] The number attributed to the High Health-High Performance horse by the Fédération Equestre Internationale or the International Federation of Horseracing Authorities.

Appendix XXIX (contd)

II. ORIGIN OF THE HORSE

II.1. Country of dispatch: ……..

II.2. Name and address of consignor: ……

……

[3]II.3. Address and registration number of the premises of dispatch in the country of usual residence:

……

……

[3]II.3. Address and registration number of the premises of dispatch in the country of temporary residence:

……

……

III. DESTINATION OF THE HORSE

III.1. Country of destination:
……..

III.2. Name and address of consignee:
……

……
.....

[3]III.3. Address and registration number of the premises of destination in the country of temporary residence:

……

……

[3]III.3. Address and registration number of the premises of destination in the country of usual residence:

……

……

IV. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

Identification of transport: AEROPLANE (type of aircraft and flight number)[4] / VEHICLE (registration number)[4] / SHIP (name or registration number)[4]

……

[3] Select one of the options and delete the option(s) not applicable.
[4] Select the appropriate options and delete those not applicable.

V. DECLARATION BY THE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL VETERINARIAN

I, the undersigned official veterinarian, hereby certify that the horse described above:

V.1. has been examined today, this being within 48 hours prior to dispatch, and found free from clinical signs of infectious or contagious disease, free from obvious signs of ectoparasitic infestation and fit to travel the intended journey;

V.2. is a registered HHP horse accompanied by its passport in which all vaccinations related to this certificate are documented;

V.3. has during the 90 days prior to qualification as an HHP horse and during the period of registration as a HHP horse not been used for natural or artificial reproduction and has not been kept on premises where natural or artifical reproduction activities are carried out;

V.4. since HHP registration has not come into contact with any horse that was not a horse belonging to a high health status subpopulation and has originated from registered premises[4] and has been resident on HHP registered premises throughout its travel period

V.5. has not visited premises in the country of dispatch under official restriction for health reasons;

V.6. to the best of my knowledge for at least 15 days prior to certification has not come into contact with animals showing signs of infectious or contagious disease;

V.7. comes from the country of dispatch in which the following diseases are compulsorily notifiable: African horse sickness, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, eastern equine encephalomyelitis, western equine encephalomyelitis, Japanese encephalitis, equine infectious anaemia, glanders (*Burkholderia mallei*) and rabies;

V.8. comes from the country of dispatch, which:

[3]*either* [V.8.1. is officially free from African horse sickness in accordance with the requirements of the OIE;]

[3]*or* [V.8.1. is not offically free from African horse sickness in accordance with the requirements of the OIE, and the horse was not vaccinated within 40 days prior to the introduction into an approved vector protected quarantine station where it was isolated for at least 14 days and has been subjected to a validated PCR test carried out with negative results on samples taken on two occasions on ……[5] and on ……..[5], the first sample been taken immediately prior to or on entry into the quarantine station and the second sample been taken within 48 hrs prior to direct vector protected transport from the quarantine station to the place of dispatch;]

[3]*either* [V.8.2. has been free of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis for at least the last two years;]

[3]*or* [V.8.2. has not been free of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis for at least the last two years, and the horse was:

[3]*either* [V.8.2.1. vaccinated with a registered inactivated vaccine against Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions at least 60 days prior to dispatch;]]

[3] *or* [V.8.2.1. during the three weeks prior to dispatch kept under vector protection at all times and was subjected to a haemagglutination inhibition test for Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis carried out on ……..[5] on paired samples taken on ……..[5] and on ……..[5], at least 14 days apart, with either negative results or a stable or declining titre, the second sample been taken within 7 days of direct vector protected transport to the place of dispatch;]]

And appropriate vector protection is applied during transportation

[3]*either* [V.8.3. is the country of usual residence and is free from glanders for at least 3 years, and the horse was subjected to a complement fixation test for glanders carried out with negative result at a serum dilution of 1 in 5 on a sample taken on .....[5] during the 30 days prior to dispatch;]

[3]*or* [V.8.3. is the country of usual residence and is not known to be free from glanders for at least 3 years, and the horse has been permanently resident for at least 3 weeks prior to dispatch on a single establishment free of glanders for at least the past 6 months and has been subjected to a complement fixation test for glanders carried out with negative results at a serum dilution of 1 in 5 on samples taken on two occasions on .....[5] and on .....[5], at least 21 days apart, the second sample been taken within 10 days of dispatch;]

[3]*or* [V.8.3. is the country of temporary residence, and the horse was kept on premises which have been free from glanders for at least 6 months;]

[3]*either* [V.9. has been subjected to the indirect fluorescent antibody test (IFAT) or the competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (c-ELISA) for equine piroplasmosis (*Babesia caballi* and *Theileria equi*) carried out with negative results on a sample taken on .....[5] within 14 days of dispatch;]

[3]*or* [V.9. has previously been subjected to the indirect fluorescent antibody test (IFAT) or the competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (c-ELISA) for equine piroplasmosis (*Babesia caballi* and *Theileria equi*) carried out with positive result and does not show clinical signs of piroplasmosis on the day of examination and has been examined and treated against ticks during the 7 days prior to dispatch;]

V.10. has been subjected to an agar gel immunodiffusion test for equine infectious anaemia carried out with negative result on a sample taken on .....[5] within 120 days of dispatch;

V.11. has been vaccinated against equine influenza within 21 to 90 days of dispatch with either two consecutive inoculations with the same vaccine given 21 to 42 days apart on .....[5] and on .....[5] or with a booster given on .....[5] at least on an annual basis after a primary course;

V.12. was found free from external parasites following a systematic and thorough examination in particular of ears, false nostrils, intermandibular space, mane, lower body areas, including axillae, groin, and the perineum and tail, and was treated within 48 hours of dispach with a broad spectrum parasiticide licensed or registered for use on horses according to the manufacturer's recommendations.

VI. TRANSPORT CONDITIONS

After due enquiry and to the best of my knowledge the transport of the horse has been arranged to ensure that:

VI.1. the horse is consigned directly from the premises of dispatch to the premises of destination;

VI.2. during transport to destination the horse will not come into contact with horses that have no current HHP registration;

VI.3. the vehicle in which horse is being transported has been cleansed and disinfected prior to embarkation with a disinfectant approved in the country of dispatch. The vehicle has been designed to prevent the escape of droppings, litter or fodder during transportation;

VI.4. during transport to destination the health and welfare of the horse will be protected effectively.

VII. AUTHENTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE

This certificate is valid for 10 days from the date of signature.

The declaration signed by the owner or person responsible for the horse is part of this certificate.

Name in capitals of official veterinarian:
……

Position:
……

Office address:
……

……
...

Telephone: …… Fax:
……

Email address:
……

Signature:

Date: …… Place:
……

Official stamp:

Appendix XXIX (contd)

VIII. DECLARATION TO BE SIGNED BY THE OWNER OR DESIGNATED PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HORSE

I, the undersigned, …… (insert name in capitals) declare:

1. The horse described in this veterinary certificate, will be outside its country of usual residence for not more than 90 days.

2. Since the current registration as HHP horse, the horse has not been in direct contact with horses that did not have a current HHP registration.

3. The horse has

   ☐ resided in ..... (country of usual residence) since…….....[5]

   ☐ entered ..... (country of temporary residence) on .....[5]

4. During its temporary stay in the country of dispatch the horse has been kept only in the following premises that contain only HHP horses and are under supervision of the veterinary authority of that country:

Address of premises	Date of entry	Date of exit

5. The horse will be sent directly from the premises of dispatch to the premises of destination under conditions that ensure it will not come into contact with horses other than those that have current HHP registration, accompanied by the required veterinary health certificate, in a vehicle that was cleansed and disinfected in advance with a disinfectant approved in the country of dispatch.

Date: …….. Place: ……..…….

Signature:

[5] Insert date.

Annex XXX

NOTE :
The Code Commission encourages Member Countries to review all relevant reports when reviewing this document including followings:

- September 2014 report of the Scientific Commission for the rationale on the proposed amendments (http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Internationa_Standard_Setting/docs/pdf/SCAD/A_SCAD_Sept2014.pdf)
- April 2014 report of *ad hog* Group on African Swine Fever attached to the September 2014 report of Scientific Commission

CHAPTER 15.1.

INFECTION WITH AFRICAN SWINE FEVER VIRUS

Article 15.1.1.

General provisions

~~The~~ Suids (the pig and its close relatives) are the only natural hosts for African swine fever virus (ASFV). These include all varieties of *Sus scrofa*, both domestic and wild, warthogs (*Phacochoerus* spp.), bushpigs (*Potamochoerus* spp.) and giant forest hog (*Hylochoerus meinertzhageni*).

For the purposes of this chapter, a distinction is made among ~~between~~; ~~domestic pigs (permanently captive and farmed free-range pigs) and wild pigs (including feral pigs and wild boar) as well as between *Sus scrofa* and African pig species.~~

- domestic and *captive wild* pigs, permanently captive or farmed free range, used for the production of *meat*, or other commercial products or use, or for breeding these categories of pigs;
- *wild* and *feral* pigs;
- African *wild* suid species.

All varieties of *Sus scrofa* are susceptible to the pathogenic effects of ASFV, while the African *wild* suids ~~pigs~~ are not and may act as reservoirs of the virus ~~*infection*~~. Ticks of the genus *Ornithodoros* are natural hosts of the virus and act as reservoirs and biological *vectors* ~~of the *infection*~~.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, African swine fever (ASF) is defined as an *infection* of suids with ASFV.

The following defines *infection* with ASFV:

1) ASFV has been isolated from samples from a suid;

OR

2) viral antigen has been identified, or viral nucleic acid specific to ASFV has been demonstrated to be present in samples from a suid epidemiologically linked to a suspected or confirmed *outbreak* of ASF, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with ASFV, whether or not clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASF are present;

OR

3) antibodies specific to ASFV have been identified in samples from a suid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASF, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected *outbreak* of ASF, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with ASFV.

A Member Country should not impose bans on the trade in *commodities* of domestic and *captive wild* pigs in response to a *notification* of *infection* with ASFV in *wild* and *feral* pigs or African *wild* suids provided that Article 15.1.2. is implemented.

For the purpose of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* in *Sus scrofa* ~~is~~ shall be 15 days.

Standards for diagnostic tests are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 15.1.2.

General criteria for the ~~D~~determination of the ASF status of a country, zone or compartment

~~The African swine fever (ASF) status of a country, *zone* or *compartment* can only be determined after considering the following criteria in domestic and wild pigs, as applicable:~~

1) ASF ~~should be~~ is notifiable in the whole country, and all suids showing clinical signs suggestive of ASF are subjected to appropriate field and *laboratory* investigations;

2) an ongoing awareness programme is in place to encourage reporting of all cases suggestive of ASF;

3) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and *captive wild* pig *herds* in the country, *zone* or *compartment*;

4) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge about the species, population and habitat of wild suids ~~pigs~~ in the country or *zone*~~.~~;

5) for domestic and *captive wild* pigs, an appropriate *surveillance* programme in accordance with Articles 15.1.22. to 15.1.27. is in place;

6) for *wild* and *feral* pigs, and for African *wild* suids, if present in the country or *zone*, a *surveillance* programme is in place according to Article 15.1.26., taking into account the presence of natural and artificial boundaries, the ecology of the *wild* and *feral* pig and African *wild* suid populations and an assessment of the *risks* of *disease* spread including the presence of *Ornithodoros* ticks;

7) based on the assessed *risk* of spread within the *wild* and *feral* pig and African *wild* suid populations, and according to Article 15.1.26., the domestic and *captive wild* pig population should be separated from the *wild* and *feral* pig and African *wild* suid populations by appropriate measures.

Article 15.1.3.

Country or zone free from ASF ~~free country, zone or compartment~~

1. ~~Historically free status~~

A country or *zone* may be considered historically free from ASF without formally applying a specific *surveillance* programme if the provisions of point 1 of Article 1.4.6. are complied with.

2. ~~Free status as a result of an eradication programme~~

A country or *zone* which does not meet the conditions of point 1 above ~~or a *compartment*~~ may be considered free from ASF when:

a) there has been no *outbreak* of ASF in domestic and *captive wild* pigs during the past 12 months ~~three years~~; ~~this period can be reduced to 12 months when there is no evidence of tick involvement in the epidemiology of the *infection*;~~

~~b) no evidence of ASFV *infection* with ASFV in domestic and *captive wild* pigs has been found during the past 12 months~~;

b~~c~~) *surveillance* in accordance with Articles 15.1.22. to 15.1.27. has been in place in domestic and *captive wild* pigs for the past 12 months;

c~~d~~) imported domestic and *captive wild* pigs and pig *commodities* comply with the requirements of~~in~~ Articles 15.1.5. ~~or~~ to ~~Article~~ 15.1.~~6~~17.

~~AND~~

~~Based on *surveillance*, ASF *infection* has been demonstrated not to be present in any wild pig population in the country or *zone*, and:~~

~~e) there has been no clinical evidence, nor virological evidence of ASF in wild pigs during the past 12 months;~~

~~f) no seropositive wild pigs have been detected in the age class 6–12 months during the past 12 months;~~

~~g) imported wild pigs comply with the requirements in Article 15.1.7.~~

Article 15.1.3.bis

Compartment free from ASF

The establishment of an ASF free *compartment* should follow the relevant requirements of this chapter and the principles in Chapters 4.3. and 4.4.

Article 15.1.3.ter

Establishment of a containment zone within a country or zone free from ASF

In the event of limited *outbreaks* of ASF within a country or *zone* free from ASF, including within a *protection zone*, a *containment zone*, which includes all *outbreaks*, can be established for the purpose of minimising the impact on the entire country or *zone*.

In addition to the requirements for the establishment of a *containment zone* outlined in point 3 of Article 4.3.3., the *surveillance* programme should take into account the presence and potential role of *wild* and *feral* pigs and any measures in place to avoid their dispersion.

The free status of the areas outside the *containment zone* is suspended while the *containment zone* is being established. The free status of these areas may be reinstated irrespective of the provisions of Article 15.1.4., once the *containment zone* is clearly established. It should be demonstrated that *commodities* for *international trade* have originated outside the *containment zone* unless these *commodities* comply with the provisions in Articles 15.1.6., 15.1.9., 15.1.11. and Articles 15.1.13. to 15.1.17.

The recovery of the ASF free status of the *containment zone* should follow the provisions of Article 15.1.4.

Article 15.1.4.

Recovery of free status

Should an ASF *outbreak* occur in a free country~~,~~ or *zone* ~~or *compartment*~~, the free status may be restored where *surveillance* has been carried out with negative results, either:

1) three months after the last *case* where a *stamping-out policy* is practised ~~and in the case where ticks are suspected to be involved in the epidemiology of the *infection*,~~ followed by ~~acaricide treatment and~~ the use of sentinel pigs; or

2) where a *stamping-out policy* is not practised, the provisions of point 2 of Article 15.1.3. should be followed.

~~AND~~

~~Based on *surveillance*, ASF *infection* has been demonstrated not to be present in any wild pig population in the country or *zone*.~~

Article 15.1.5.

Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF

For domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the animals:

1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;

2) were kept in a~~n ASF free~~ country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF since birth or for at least the past ~~40 days~~ three months.

Article 15.1.6.

Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF

For domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the *animals*:

1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;

2) and either:

   a) were kept since birth or for the past ~~40 days~~ three months in a~~n ASF free~~ *compartment* free from ASF~~.~~; or

   b) were kept in a *quarantine station*, isolated for 30 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a virological test and a serological test performed at least 21 days after entry into the *quarantine station*, with negative results.

~~Article 15.1.7.~~

~~**Recommendations for importation from ASF free countries or zones**~~

~~For wild pigs~~

~~*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the *animals*:~~

~~1) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of shipment;~~

~~2) have been captured in an ASF free country or *zone*;~~

~~and, if the *zone* where the *animal* has been captured is adjacent to a *zone* with *infection* in wild pigs:~~

~~3) were kept in a *quarantine station* for 40 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a virological test and a serological test performed at least 21 days after entry into the *quarantine station*, with negative results.~~

Article 15.1.8.

Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF

For semen of domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor ~~*animals*~~ males:

   a) were kept in a~~n ASF free~~ country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF since birth or for at least ~~40 days~~ three months prior to collection;

   b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the semen;

2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with ~~the provisions of~~ Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 15.1.9.

Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF

For semen of domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor ~~*animals*~~ males:

   a) were kept in an ~~ASF free~~ *establishment* ~~*compartment*~~ free from ASF since birth or for at least ~~40 days~~ three months prior to collection;

   b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the semen and for the following ~~40~~ 30 days;

   c) were subjected to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection, with negative results;

2) the semen was collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with ~~the provisions of~~ Chapters 4.5. and 4.6.

Article 15.1.10.

Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF

For *in vivo* derived embryos of domestic pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor females~~:~~

   ~~a) were kept in an ASF free country, *zone* or *compartment* since birth or for at least 40 days prior to collection;~~

   a) were kept in a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF since birth or for at least three months prior to collection;

   b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the embryos;

2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with ~~the provisions of~~ Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 15.1.11.

Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF

For *in vivo* derived embryos of domestic pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the donor females:

   a) were kept in a~~n ASF free~~ *compartment* free from ASF since birth or for at least ~~40 days~~ three months prior to collection;

   b) showed no clinical sign of ASF on the day of collection of the embryos and for the following ~~40~~ 30 days;

   c) were subjected to a serological test performed at least 21 days after collection, with negative results;

2) the embryos were collected, processed and stored in ~~conformity~~ accordance with ~~the provisions of~~ Chapters 4.7. and 4.9., as relevant.

Article 15.1.12.

Recommendations for importation from ~~ASF free~~ countries, zones or compartments free from ASF

For fresh meat of domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the entire consignment of *fresh meat* comes from animals which:

1) have been kept in a~~n ASF free~~ country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF since birth ~~or for at least the past 40 days,~~ or which have been imported in accordance with Article 15.1.5. or Article 15.1.6.;

2) have been slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir*, have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2., and have been found free ~~of~~ from any sign suggestive of ASF.

Article 15.1.12.bis

Recommendations for importation from countries or zones considered infected with ASF

For fresh meat of domestic and captive wild pigs

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the entire consignment of *fresh meat* comes from animals which have been slaughtered in an approved *slaughterhouse/abattoir*, have been subjected to ante- and post-mortem inspections in accordance with Chapter 6.2., and have been found free from any sign suggestive of ASF;

2) appropriate samples have been collected from every animal killed and been subjected to a virological test and a serological test for ASF, with negative results.

Article 15.1.13.

Recommendations for importation ~~from ASF free countries or zones~~ of fresh meat of wild and feral pigs

~~For fresh meat of wild pigs~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that:

1) the entire consignment of *fresh meat* comes from *animals* which~~:~~

   ~~a) have been killed in an ASF free country or *zone*;~~

   ~~b)~~ have been subjected to a post-mortem inspection in accordance with Chapter 6.2. in an approved examination centre, and have been found free of any sign suggestive of ASF;

~~and,~~

2) if the country or the *zone* where the *animal* has been killed does not comply with the conditions of point 1 of Article 1.4.6., or is adjacent to a country or *zone* with *infection* in *wild* or *feral* pigs,

~~2)~~ appropriate samples ~~has~~ have been collected from every animal killed and ~~has~~ been subjected to a virological test and a serological test for ASF, with negative results.

Article 15.1.14.

Recommendations for the importation of meat products of pigs ~~(either domestic or wild), or for products of animal origin (from fresh meat of pigs) intended for use in animal feeding, for agricultural or industrial use, or for pharmaceutical or surgical use, or for trophies derived from wild pigs~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the products:

1) have been prepared:

   a) exclusively from *fresh meat* meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;

   b) in a processing establishment:

      i) approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes;

      ii) processing only *meat* meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;

OR

2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of ~~the~~ ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

Article 15.1.15.

Recommendations for the importation of pig products ~~of animal origin (from pigs, but~~ not derived from fresh meat~~) intended for use in animal feeding and for agricultural or industrial use~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:

1) ~~have been prepared:~~ originated from domestic and *captive wild* pigs in a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF and have been prepared in a processing establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes;

   ~~a) exclusively from *fresh meat* meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;~~

   ~~b) in a processing establishment:~~

      ~~i) approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes;~~

      ~~ii) processing only *meat* meeting the conditions laid down in Articles 15.1.12. or 15.1.13., as relevant;~~

OR

2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of ~~the~~ ASFV, for swill in accordance with Article 15.1.18., and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

Article 15.1.16.

Recommendations for the importation of bristles, litter and manure ~~(from pigs)~~

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:

1) originated from domestic and *captive wild* pigs in ~~come from~~ ~~an ASF free~~ a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF and have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes; or

2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of ~~the~~ ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

~~Article 15.1.17.~~

~~**Recommendations for the importation of litter and manure (from pigs)**~~

~~*Veterinary Authorities* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that these products:~~

~~1) come from an ASF free country, *zone* or *compartment*; or~~

~~2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of the ASFV, and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.~~

Article 15.1.17.

Recommendations for the importation of skins and trophies

Veterinary Authorities of *importing countries* should require the presentation of an *international veterinary certificate* attesting that the products:

1) originated from domestic and *captive wild* pigs in a country, *zone* or *compartment* free from ASF and have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes; or

2) have been processed in an establishment approved by the *Veterinary Authority* for export purposes so as to ensure the destruction of ASFV in accordance with one of the procedures referred to in Article 15.1.21., and that the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the product with any source of ASFV.

Article 15.1.18.

Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in swill

For the inactivation of ASFV in swill, one of the following procedures should be used:

1) the swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 90°C for at least 60 minutes, with continuous stirring; or

2) the swill should be maintained at a temperature of at least 121°C for at least 10 minutes at an absolute pressure of 3 bar.

Article 15.1.19.

Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in meat

For the inactivation of ASFV in *meat*, one of the following procedures should be used:

1. Heat treatment

   Meat should be subjected to one of the following treatments:

   a) heat treatment in a hermetically sealed container with a Fo value of 3.00 or more; or

   b) heat treatment for at least 30 minutes at a minimum temperature of 70°C, which should be reached throughout the *meat*.

2. Dry cured pig meat

   a) if salted, *meat* should be cured and dried for a minimum of six months; or

   b) if not salted, *meat* should be cured and dried for a minimum of 12 months.

Article 15.1.20.

Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in casings of pigs

For the inactivation of ASFV present in casings of pigs, the following procedures should be used: treating for at least 30 days either with dry salt (NaCl) or with saturated brine (Aw < 0.80), or with phosphate supplemented dry salt containing 86.5 percent NaCl, 10.7 percent Na_2HPO_4 and 2.8 percent Na_3PO_4 (weight/weight/weight), and kept at a temperature of greater than 12°C during this entire period.

Article 15.1.21.

Procedures for the inactivation of ASFV in skins and trophies

For the inactivation of ASFV in skins and trophies, one of the following procedures should be used:

1) boiling in water for an appropriate time so as to ensure that any matter other than bone, tusks or teeth is removed; or

2) soaking, with agitation, in a 4 percent (w/v) solution of washing soda (sodium carbonate – Na_2CO_3) maintained at pH 11.5 or above for at least 48 hours; or

3) soaking, with agitation, in a formic acid solution (100 kg salt [NaCl] and 12 kg formic acid per 1,000 litres water) maintained at below pH 3.0 for at least 48 hours; wetting and dressing agents may be added; or

4) in the case of raw hides, treating for at least 28 days with salt (NaCl) containing 2 percent washing soda (sodium carbonate – Na_2CO_3); or

5) treatment with 1 percent formalin for a minimum of six days.

Article 15.1.22.

Introduction to surveillance

Articles 15.1.22. to 15.1.27. define the principles and provide a guide on the *surveillance* for ASF, complementary to Chapter 1.4. and Chapter 1.5., applicable to Member Countries seeking to determine their ASF status. This may be for the entire country or a *zone*. Guidance is also provided for Member Countries seeking recovery of ASF free status for the entire country or for a *zone* following an *outbreak* and for the maintenance of ASF free status.

The impact and epidemiology of ASF may vary in different regions of the world. The *surveillance* strategies employed for demonstrating freedom from ASF should be adapted to the regional or sub-regional situation. For example, the approach should be tailored in order to demonstrate freedom from ASF for a country or *zone* where *wild* and *feral* pigs or African *wild* suids provide a potential reservoir of *infection*, or where ASF is present in adjacent countries. The method should examine the epidemiology of ASF in the region concerned and adapt to the specific risk factors encountered. This should include provision of scientifically based supporting data. There is, therefore, latitude available to Member Countries to provide a well-reasoned argument to demonstrate that absence of *infection* with ASFV is assured at an acceptable level of confidence.

Surveillance for ASF should be in the form of an ongoing programme designed to establish that susceptible populations in a country, *zone* or *compartment* are free from *infection* with ASFV or to detect the introduction of ASFV into a free population. Consideration should be given to the specific characteristics of ASF epidemiology which include:

– the role of swill feeding;

– the impact of different production systems;

– the role of *wild* and *feral* pigs and African *wild* suids on the maintenance and spread of the *disease*;

– whether *Ornithodoros* ticks are present and the role they may play in the maintenance and spread of the *disease*;

– the role of semen in transmission of the ASFV;

– the lack of pathognomonic gross lesions and clinical signs;

– the occurrence of apparently healthy carriers;

– the genotypic variability of ASFV.

Article 15.1.23.

General conditions and methods for surveillance

1) A *surveillance* system in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and under the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority* should address the following:

   a) a formal and ongoing system for detecting and investigating *outbreaks* of ASF;

   b) a procedure for the rapid collection and transport of samples from suspected *cases* to a laboratory for ASF diagnosis;

   c) a system for recording, managing and analysing diagnostic and *surveillance* data.

2) The ASF *surveillance* programme should:

   a) include an early warning system throughout the production, marketing and processing chain for reporting suspected *cases*. Diagnosticians and those with regular contact with pigs should report promptly any suspicion of ASF to the *Veterinary Authority*. The *notification* system under the *Veterinary Authority* should be supported directly or indirectly (e.g. through private *veterinarians* or *veterinary para-professionals*) by government information programmes targeted to all relevant stakeholders. Personnel responsible for *surveillance* should be able to seek expertise in ASF diagnosis, epidemiological evaluation and control;

   b) conduct, when relevant, regular and frequent clinical inspections and *laboratory* testing of high-risk groups (for example, where swill feeding is practised), or those adjacent to an ASF infected country or *zone* (for example, bordering areas where infected *wild* and *feral* pigs or African *wild* suids are present).

Article 15.1.24.

Surveillance strategies

1. Introduction

   The population covered by *surveillance* aimed at detecting *disease* and *infection* should include domestic and *wild* pig populations within the country or *zone*. *Surveillance* should be composed of random and non-random approaches using clinical, virological and serological methods appropriate for the *infection* status of the country or *zone*.

   The practicality of *surveillance* in African *wild* suids should be considered following the guidelines in Chapter 1.4.

   The strategy employed to establish the prevalence or absence of *infection* with ASFV may be based on randomised or non-randomised clinical investigation or sampling at an acceptable level of statistical confidence. If an increased likelihood of *infection* in particular localities or sub-populations can be identified, targeted sampling may be an appropriate strategy. This may include:

   a) specific high-risk *wild* and *feral* pig populations and their proximity;

   b) farms which feed swill;

   c) pigs reared outdoors.

   Risk factors may include, for example, temporal and spatial distribution of past *outbreaks*, and pig movements and demographics.

Member Countries should review their *surveillance* strategies whenever an increase in the *risk* of incursion of ASFV is perceived. Such changes include but are not limited to:

– an emergence or an increase in the prevalence of ASF in countries or *zones* from which live pigs or products are imported;

– an increase in the prevalence of ASF in *wild* or *feral* pigs in the country or *zone*;

– an increase in the prevalence of ASF in adjacent countries or *zones*;

– an increased entry of, or exposure to, infected *wild* or *feral* pig populations of adjacent countries or *zones*;

– evidence of involvement of ticks in the epidemiology of ASF as demonstrated by *surveillance* implemented in accordance with Chapter 1.5.

2. Clinical surveillance

Clinical *surveillance* is the most effective tool for detecting ASF due to severe clinical signs and pathology associated with *infection* with ASFV. However, due to the clinical similarity with other *diseases* such as classical swine fever, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome and erysipelas, and those associated with porcine circovirus 2 *infection*, clinical *surveillance* should be supplemented, as appropriate, by serological and virological *surveillance*.

Clinical signs and pathological findings are useful for early detection; in particular, any *cases* where clinical signs or lesions suggestive of ASF are accompanied by high mortality should be investigated without delay.

Wild and *feral* pigs rarely present the opportunity for clinical observation, but should form part of any *surveillance* scheme and should, ideally, be monitored for virus as well as antibodies.

3. Virological surveillance

Virological *surveillance* is important for early detection, differential diagnosis and for systematic sampling of target populations. It should be conducted:

a) to investigate clinically suspected *cases*;

b) to monitor at risk populations;

c) to follow up positive serological results;

d) to investigate increased mortality.

Molecular detection methods can be applied to large-scale screening for the presence of virus. If targeted at high-risk groups, they provide an opportunity for early detection that can considerably reduce the subsequent spread of ASF. Epidemiological understanding of the pathways of spread of ASFV can be greatly enhanced by molecular analyses of viruses in endemic areas and those involved in *outbreaks* in ASF-free areas. Therefore, ASFV isolates should be sent to an OIE Reference Laboratory for further characterisation.

4. Serological surveillance

Serology is an effective and efficient *surveillance* tool. Serological *surveillance* aims at detecting antibodies against ASFV. Positive ASFV antibody test results can indicate an ongoing or past *outbreak*, since some animals may recover and remain seropositive for a significant period, possibly life. This may include carrier animals.

It may be possible to use sera collected for other survey purposes for ASF *surveillance*. However, the principles of survey design and the requirement for statistical validity should not be compromised.

Annex XXX (contd)

Article 15.1.25.

Surveillance procedures for recovery of free status

In addition to the general conditions described in Articles 15.1.3. and 15.1.4., a Member Country seeking recovery of country or *zone* ASF-free status, including a *containment zone*, should show evidence of an active *surveillance* programme to demonstrate no evidence of *infection* with ASFV.

The domestic and *captive wild* pig populations should undergo regular clinical and pathological examinations and virological and serological testing, planned and implemented according to the general conditions and methods described in this chapter.

This *surveillance* programme should include:

1) *establishments* in the proximity of the *outbreaks*;

2) *establishments* epidemiologically linked to the *outbreaks*;

3) animals moved from or used to repopulate affected *establishments*;

4) all *establishments* where contiguous culling has been carried out;

5) *wild* and *feral* pig populations in the area of the *outbreaks*.

Article 15.1.26.

Surveillance for ASFV in wild and feral pigs

1) The objective of a *surveillance* programme is either to demonstrate that *infection* with ASFV is not present in *wild* and *feral* pigs or, if known to be present, to estimate the geographical distribution of the *infection*. A similar approach should be taken with respect to African *wild* suids where appropriate. While the same principles apply, *surveillance* in *wild* and *feral* pigs presents additional challenges including:

   a) determination of the distribution, size and movement patterns associated with the *wild* and *feral* pig population;

   b) relevance and practicality of assessing the possible presence of *infection* with ASFV within the population;

   c) determination of the practicability of establishing a *zone* taking into account the degree of interaction with domestic and *captive wild* pigs within the proposed *zone*.

   The geographic distribution and estimated size of *wild* and *feral* pig populations should be assessed as a prerequisite for designing a population monitoring system following Chapter 1.4.

2) For implementation of the *surveillance* programme, the limits of the area over which *wild* and *feral* pigs range should be defined. Subpopulations of *wild* and *feral* pig may be separated from each other by natural or artificial barriers.

3) The *surveillance* programme should include animals found dead, road kills, animals showing abnormal behaviour or hunted animals.

4) There may be situations where a more targeted *surveillance* programme can provide additional assurance. The criteria to define high risk areas for targeted *surveillance* include:

   a) areas with past history of ASF;

   b) sub-regions with large populations of *wild* and *feral* pigs or African *wild* suids;

   c) border regions with ASF affected countries or *zones*;

   d) interface between *wild* and *feral* pig populations, and domestic and *captive wild* pig populations;

   e) areas with farms with free-ranging and outdoor pigs;

   f) areas with a high level of hunting activity, where animal dispersion and feeding as well as inappropriate disposal of waste can occur;

   g) other risk areas determined by the *Veterinary Authority* such as ports, airports, garbage dumps and picnic and camping areas.

Article 15.1.27.

Surveillance for arthropod vectors

Vector surveillance aims at defining the type and distribution of ticks of the genus *Ornithodoros,* the only known arthropod *vectors* of ASFV. Any species of *Ornithodoros* ticks should be considered as potential *vector* or reservoir of ASFV. The virus is generally transmitted transstadially but transovarial transmission has only been observed in ticks of the *Ornithodoros moubata* complex.

The *Competent Authority* should have knowledge of the presence, distribution and identity of *Ornithodoros* ticks, also taking into account climatic or habitat changes which may affect distribution.

A sampling plan in accordance with Chapter 1.5. should take into account the biology and ecology of species present and, in particular, the favoured habitat of these species in burrows and structures associated with pig production. The plan should also take into account the distribution and density of pigs in the country or *zone*.

Sampling methods include CO_2 trapping and vacuuming of burrows or structures.

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— Text deleted.

Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale | World Organisation for Animal Health | Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal

Annex XXXI

Original: English
October 2014

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE ANIMAL PRODUCTION FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP

Paris, 28–30 October 2014

The OIE Working Group on Animal Production Food Safety (the Working Group) held its 14th meeting at the OIE Headquarters from 28 to 30 October 2014.

The members of the Working Group and other participants are listed at Annex I. The adopted agenda is provided at Annex II.

Dr Bernard Vallat, OIE Director General, welcomed the Working Group on behalf of the OIE Member Countries and thanked them for their work that was critical to the OIE achieving its objective of reducing food safety risks to human health due to infectious agents of animal origin. Dr Vallat welcomed the new members of the Working Group and explained that the Working Group had been created in 2002 at a time when there was no standing working relationship between the OIE and Codex other than the OIE having observer status in Codex. At that time Dr Vallat, together with the then Chairperson of the Codex Alimentarius Commission decided to make an informal arrangement to ensure that relevant standards developed by the two organisations did not overlap or contradict each other. Dr Vallat also noted that although it is difficult to formalise a bilateral agreement between the OIE and Codex, progress has being made, with the recent endorsement of text on OIE/Codex cooperation in the 2014 report of the Codex Committee on General Principles. The Working Group has been working to serve as a bridge between the OIE and Codex and to help to ensure both standard setting bodies take into account and support each other's work. Dr Vallat highlighted that since the creation of the Working Group there have been several examples where the OIE and Codex have worked very well together in the development of respective standards that have resulted in streamlined standards covering the whole farm continuum. Dr Vallat noted a recent example of *Salmonella* in poultry/poultry meat where the OIE developed a standard focused on surveillance and detection on farm and Codex focused on processing, with both standards cross referencing to each other's standard.

Dr Slorach, Working Group Chair, acknowledged that while a lot of progress has been made during the last ten years there are always opportunities for further strengthening cooperation in the future. The Working Group will explore ways of improving cooperation and synergies between the OIE and Codex. The Working Group is aware that the majority of Member Countries in the OIE and Codex are developing countries which must be considered in their work.

Dr Awilo, Chairperson of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, wished to note her appreciation at having been given the opportunity to participate in this meeting, as an Observer, and considered that this reflected the strong collaboration that exists between the two organisations. She informed the Working Group that the Codex Strategic Plan (2014-2019) includes a specific activity to promote collaboration in standards development in Codex with the OIE on standards that cover the farm to fork continuum and affect Codex and the OIE. She affirmed the vision of the Working Group and hoped to contribute to strengthening this collaboration during her term as Chairperson.

1. APFS Working Group Terms of Reference and Modus operandi

The Working Group was informed that the OIE Council had made some amendments to the Terms of Reference and *Modus operandi* of the Animal Production Food Safety Working Group which were adopted in May 2014.

Annex XXXI (contd)

The Working Group noted the revised Terms of Reference and *Modus operandi*.

The new Terms of Reference and *Modus operandi* are presented for information at Annex III.

2. Update on Codex Alimentarius Commission / WHO / FAO activities

2.1. Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC)

Dr Annamaria Bruno, representing the Codex Secretary, provided an update on the work of CAC. Detailed information is provided in Annex IV.

2.2. World Health Organisation (WHO)

Dr Kazuaki Miyagishima, representing the WHO, provided an update on the work of WHO. Detailed information is provided in Annex V.

2.3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Dr Katinka de Balogh, representing the FAO, joined the meeting via telephone and provided an update on the work of FAO. Detailed information is provided in Annex VI.

The Working Group was very positive about the excellent ongoing collaboration between the OIE and Codex, FAO and WHO, in the area of animal production food safety. The Working Group recognised the benefits that have resulted from the strong relationships forged between the OIE and Codex, and the relevant units at the FAO and WHO, which ensure continued close coordination of the relevant work of these organisations. Recent work on several standards developed by the OIE and Codex attest to the high level of integration and complementarity between relevant standards of both organisations in food safety.

3. OIE standard development work under development

3.1. Infection with *Taenia solium* spp. (new *Terrestrial Code* chapter X.X.)

Dr Thiermann, President of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission), informed the Working Group that the Code Commission had reviewed Member Country comments received on the new draft *Terrestrial Code* chapter on Infection with *Taenia solium* spp. during their September 2014 meeting. He noted that the revised draft chapter, to be proposed for adoption in May 2015, was presented as Annex XV in the September 2015 report of the Code Commission. Dr Thiermann noted that this work reflected the continuation of the OIE work on a pathogen that primarily impacted on public health.

The Working Group reviewed the draft chapter and noted that, while provisions of this draft imply a risk-based approach to the control of this important food-borne pathogen, the recommendations only cover control measures at the farm level.

Given the ambitious goal of world-wide control of *T. solium*, the Working Group were of the view that a risk model involving the whole food chain would provide valuable insights to enable further development of integrated control measures at the farm level and throughout the food chain. A similar framework to that used for the development of respective standards for *Trichinella* could be applied if Codex undertakes new work.

The Working Group recommended that OIE Delegates encourage their national Codex delegations to raise the issue of prioritisation of work on this important public health parasite by Codex.

The Working Group raised the issue of developing a horizontal chapter on biosecurity in animal production because of its importance in disease control and the commonality of many provisions in achieving biosecurity for a range of hazards. Dr Thiermann informed the Working Group that the Code Commission had recently developed a definition for biosecurity which is being presented for Member Country comment in the September 2014 report of the Code Commission. The Code Commission has already identified the need to develop a horizontal chapter on biosecurity in animal production and expects this will be undertaken by the Code Commission in the near future.

The Working Group endorsed this proposal as a positive step forward in effectively communicating guidance on biosecurity for Member Countries.

4. Review *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* chapters

4.1. Chapter 6.1. The role of the Veterinary Services in food safety

Given that Chapter 6.1. The role of the Veterinary Services in food safety has not been updated since its adoption in 2008, the Working Group reviewed the current chapter to determine whether an update is required.

The Working Group agreed that there has been considerable development in the roles and responsibilities of veterinarians and Veterinary Services in food safety since the adoption of this chapter which should be reflected in an updated version.

Chapter 6.1. describes the food safety areas that veterinarians are involved in but lacks an updated view of advances in food safety systems and the integration of components (from farm to fork) that is necessary to ensure safe and wholesome food.

4.2. Chapter 6.2. Control of biological hazards of animal health and public health importance through ante- and post-mortem meat inspection

As with Chapter 6.1., Chapter 6.2. Control of biological hazards of animal health and public health importance through ante- and post-mortem meat inspection has not been updated since its adoption in 2006, the Working Group reviewed the current chapter to determine whether an update was required.

The Working Group recognised the importance of this Chapter in providing recommendations on veterinary involvement in ante- and post mortem inspection. The Working Group noted that some of the content was duplicated in Chapter 6.1., in particular the section where meat inspection is described as being an important function of Veterinary Services. The Working Group also noted that the Codex Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005) emphasised that ante and post-mortem inspection are an important part of an overarching process control system for food safety. However, control of cross-contamination during primary processing is likely to have a far greater impact on mitigating food-borne risks. Therefore, veterinary responsibilities during all process control activities are important.

The Working Group was of the view that considerably more value could be added to the content of this chapter through a review process.

The Working Group recommended that an *ad hoc* Group be convened to review Chapter 6.2. in conjunction with the review of Chapter 6.1. and consider the possibility of merging these two chapters.

The Working Group recommended that the review of these chapters include consideration of the following points:

- a clearer description of the relative roles, supervisory activities and responsibilities of government and industry;
- a better recognition of the need for flexibility in regulatory systems as to inspection, verification and audit;
- current international practice and experiences;
- recognition of the content of relevant Codex standards as they apply to the intent of this chapter.

Annex XXXI (contd)

5. Cooperation between OIE and Codex

The Working Group noted that, although there has been continuous improvement in communication and cooperation between the two organisations, there is still room for improvement at the national level to promote dialogue between relevant national experts in the animal health, public health and trade sectors, to ensure better co-ordination in relevant standard setting activities of the OIE and Codex.

The Working Group emphasised the importance of OIE Delegates collaborating with their national delegations to Codex to ensure, at national level, alignment of their national approach to standards developed by the OIE and Codex.

6. Parallel OIE and Codex work

6.1. *Trichinella*

6.1.1. OIE Chapter 8.15. Infection with *Trichinella* spp.

Dr Thiermann informed the Working Group that Chapter 8.15. Infection with *Trichinella* spp. that had been adopted in May 2013, had some minor amendments made and adopted in May 2014. The objective of the chapter is to recommend control measures at the farm level to prevent food-borne illness in humans. The chapter includes provisions for establishing and maintaining a negligible risk compartment in pigs kept under controlled management conditions.

The Working Group was of the view that the OIE chapter was well founded and provided clear recommendations for the establishment and maintenance of a negligible risk compartment. They considered that the recommendations also provide for a flexible approach for the Veterinary Services in carrying out these functions. The Working Group was pleased to see that this chapter had been developed with a high level of collaboration between the OIE and Codex.

Given discussions currently underway in the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene concerning the Codex draft Guidelines for Control of Specific Zoonotic Parasites in Meat: *Trichinella* spp. (see Item 6.1.2.), the Working Group suggested that once the Codex guidelines are adopted, the OIE should consider the need for any amendments to the OIE chapter to ensure it is aligned with the Codex guidelines.

6.1.2. Codex draft Guidelines for Control of Specific Zoonotic Parasites in Meat: *Trichinella* spp.

Dr Bruno informed the Working Group that the 37th Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) had requested the 46th Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (that will be held in Lima [Peru], 17–21 November 2014) to further consider the draft Codex Guidelines for the Control of *Trichinella* spp. in meat of *Suidae*. In particular, the CAC requested that the Committee revise Sections 7.3 'Selection of Risk-based control measures' and 9 'Monitoring and Review' of the draft guidelines, taking into account the reports of the FAO/WHO Expert meetings on Risk-based Examples for Control of *Trichinella* spp.

The Working Group acknowledged the strong collaboration demonstrated by both the OIE and Codex in the development of their respective standards and recommended that the OIE continue to actively participate in relevant Codex activities to ensure synergies and consistencies of their respective work.

The Working Group also recommended that OIE Delegates:

- collaborate with their national delegations to Codex to ensure alignment of the OIE and Codex standards on *Trichinella*;
- encourage national delegations to the Codex to support a risk-based and flexible approach to establishing control measures in further developments of the Codex draft guidelines.

Annex XXXI (contd)

6.2. *Salmonella*

6.2.1. OIE work on *Salmonella* spp. in pigs and cattle

Dr Thiermann informed the Working Group that following the recommendation of this Working Group, an *ad hoc* Group was convened and developed a new chapter 6.X. 'Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in pig herds' which was circulated for Member Country comments in the September 2014 report of the Code Commission (at Annex XXIII of their report). Dr Thiermann reported that an *ad hoc* Group on *Salmonella* in cattle will meet in December 2014 to consider the feasibility of developing a relevant chapter for the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Working Group noted that OIE began work on chapters on *Salmonella* in pigs and cattle in parallel with Codex new work on *Salmonella* in beef and pork (see Item 6.2.2.). The Working Group noted that the high level of collaboration between OIE and Codex on this topic will result in the development of an integrated food chain approach.

The Working Group reviewed the OIE draft chapter and commended the *ad hoc* Group for the level of detail included in the draft chapter, noting that the on-farm recommendations are very complimentary to the content of the draft guidelines being developed by Codex on Control of Nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in beef and pork meat (see Item 6.2.2).

The Working Group recommended that the draft chapter for 'Prevention and control of *Salmonella* in pig herds' include recommendations on minimising faecal contamination of pig hides on farm and in transport pre-slaughter and slaughter through appropriate housing and handling conditions.

The Working Group supported the development of separate chapters for the *Terrestrial Code* on *Salmonella* in pigs and cattle.

6.2.2. Codex work on Guidelines for the Control of Nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in Beef and Pork Meat

Dr Bruno informed the Working Group that the 37th Session of the CAC had approved new work on the development of Guidelines for the Control of Nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in Beef and Pork Meat. The 46th Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene will consider the draft guidelines prepared by an electronic Working Group (CX/FH 14/46/8), in particular: the structure and format of the document; whether to seek scientific advice; and the need for a risk profile or a web-based tool.

As above, the Working Group applauded the parallel development of OIE and Codex guidelines on control of *Salmonella* in pigs and cattle, and pork and beef, respectively, and encouraged OIE Delegates to collaborate with their national delegations to Codex to ensure alignment of *Salmonella* standards under development by the OIE and Codex.

7. Potential standard development in the area of animal production food safety

7.1. Control of Shiga-like toxin producing *E. coli* (STEC) in food-producing animals

Dr Thiermann recalled that Shiga-like toxin producing *E. coli* (STEC) has been recognised by the Working Group as an important area for international standard development for some countries and would require a coordinated approach by the OIE and Codex to ensure an integrated food chain approach to the control of this pathogen. Dr Thiermann noted that the Code Commission had agreed that the OIE would undertake work on STEC once Codex starts new work on this pathogen.

The Working Group reiterated that STEC is an important pathogen in cattle for both public health and trade reasons, and that the OIE should maintain this item on its work programme and commences work at the same time as Codex.

The Working Group recommended that when OIE and Codex commence this work, appropriate mechanisms should be developed to gain the evidence base necessary for risk-based provisions.

Annex XXXI (contd)

8. Review of meat hygiene control measures

The Working Group had a wide-ranging discussion on reviewing meat hygiene control measures and the desire to apply a risk-based approach to the greatest extent practical in providing the evidence base for improvements. This is a topic of key interest to the Working Group, especially in light of the recommendation to review Chapters 6.1. and 6.2 of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* and the role of Veterinary Services in a number of meat hygiene activities (see Items 4.1. and 4.2).

The Working Group recognised the broad umbrella of risk-based provisions in current OIE and Codex texts but noted that specific advice on risk-based approaches is not available at the international level. Application of different scientific approaches by national governments can lead to difficulties in risk communication and determining the equivalence of different meat hygiene systems for meat in international trade.

The Working Group recommended that a discussion paper on the approach taken in improving meat hygiene programmes around the world be developed by the Working Group. This would focus on the 'why/what /how /where' of meat hygiene activities but not the 'who' i.e. competencies of people involved. The aim is to finalise this paper by mid-2015 and provide it to the proposed *ad hoc* Group that will review Chapters 6.1. and 6.2.

9. Presentation on simplifying food safety risk assessment for international standard setting

Dr Steve Hathaway gave a presentation on the value of simplified risk assessment for international standard setting for biological hazards. A risk assessment approach allows a number of options for the development of risk-based standards and informed choices should be made on use of an appropriate methodology on a case-by-case basis. This has direct relevance to agenda Item 4 and a general understanding of the means to gain sufficient evidence for decision-making.

The Working Group welcomed this presentation and will continue discussion on this important topic at their next meeting.

10. Antimicrobial resistance

The Working Group was informed by OIE, WHO and Codex on their activities related to antimicrobial resistance.

Dr Miyagishima, on behalf of WHO, informed the Working Group that the development of a WHO Global Action Plan on antimicrobial resistance was in its final stage of preparation for presentation at the WHO Executive Board in January 2015 and endorsement by the World Health Assembly in May 2015. Although the development of the plan is led by WHO it provides a common platform for all interested parties. The OIE and FAO are actively participating in the formulation and will be involved in the subsequent implementation of the Plan.

The Working Group was informed that the OIE is involved in the elaboration of the WHO Global Action Plan to provide input on the animal health related part of the plan. Many related activities take place on a global or regional basis and the AMR activities are coordinated by the tripartite technical focal points as much as possible. They have a yearly meeting to update on planned actions and coordinate activities.

The Working Group was informed that a number of international conferences and events highlighted the importance of antimicrobial resistance. The Global Health Security Agenda, launched by the USA and several other countries, which included the participation of the OIE, emphasised the importance of combating antimicrobial resistance. Dr Miyagishima informed the Working Group that the Second International Conference on Nutrition, to be organised jointly by WHO and FAO in November 2014, is expected to adopt recommendations on antimicrobial resistance to be addressed by WHO and FAO Member States.

The Working Group appreciated this update and encouraged the OIE to continue this important work in collaboration with FAO and WHO in a holistic approach involving all relevant interested parties.

Annex XXXI (contd)

11. Creation of an OIE platform for the collection and management of genomic sequences of infectious agents in animals

The Working Group was informed that in response to rapid advances in complete genome sequencing for infectious disease diagnosis and management, the OIE initiated the development of a project on the collection and management of genomic sequences of infectious agents in animals.

The Working Group noted the importance of this work and the continuing involvement of international agencies.

12. OIE Capacity building activities

12.1. World Bank Global Food Safety Partnership

The Working Group was informed about the OIE's participation in the Global Food Safety Partnership (GFSP), a public-private partnership and resource mobilisation mechanism, managed by the World Bank, dedicated to improving the safety of food in middle-income and developing countries [http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/global-food-safety-partnership]. The OIE has been participating in relevant Technical Working Groups and will be represented at the upcoming Annual Conference (8–12 December 2014, Cape Town [South Africa]). The OIE is encouraging the GFSP to take account of relevant OIE standards in animal production food safety and the results of PVS Pathway missions, where relevant, when undertaking capacity building activities.

Dr Miyagishima reported that WHO, FAO and the OIE had been involved in the launching of the GFSP. Since then, WHO and FAO had been monitoring the GFSP work closely and with interest. So far, WHO's direct collaboration with GFSP has been relatively limited due to legal concerns regarding the governance structure of GFSP as well as differences between the World Bank and WHO in managing potential conflicts of interest especially in relation to funding by the private sector. It is hoped that the country needs assessment tools under development by WHO and FAO will be used by GFSP when identifying possible future capacity building projects in countries.

The Working Group noted this initiative and the contribution of the OIE to this work.

12.2. OIE APFS Focal Point seminars

The Working Group was informed that OIE regional seminars for National Focal Points in Animal Production Food Safety had been conducted during 2014 for the Middle East region (January 2014) and the Asia Pacific region (June 2014). Another indication of the strengthening collaboration between the OIE and both Codex and WHO was the presence of representatives from Codex at the Middle East seminar, and a representative from the WHO at both seminars.

During 2014, three training seminars for OIE National Focal Points for Veterinary Products had also been held for the Americas, Europe and Asia-Pacific regions.

The Working Group encouraged the OIE to continue to include presentations in the APFS Focal Point seminars on the importance of the Codex and OIE relationship and to take steps to ensure that OIE Delegates understand the importance of the role of their Focal Points for APFS, which includes taking into account Codex standards, where relevant, when commenting on OIE standards.

13. OIE Sixth Strategic Plan

The Working Group was informed that the draft sixth Strategic Plan (2016–2020) is in the final stages of development and will be proposed for adoption in 2015 after consideration of feedback from OIE Delegates and OIE Regional Commissions.

Annex XXXI (contd)

14. Other business

14.1. Biofortification

The Working Group was informed that the OIE had been asked to consider the topic of biofortification, a new technology, which allows a greatly increased micronutrient content of crops and animals to be bioavailable for human consumption. They were informed that the upcoming meeting of the Codex Committee on Nutrition and Foods for Special Dietary Uses (November, 2014) would consider a request for new work on this topic.

The Working Group noted this item and requested that they be kept updated on developments by Codex so that the OIE can consider undertaking new work if relevant.

14.2. Schedule of meetings

The Working Group noted that depending on the sequence of OIE and Codex meetings sometimes they were unable to provide timely advice on standards and other issues under consideration. To remedy this constraint, the Working Group agreed that it would also have an electronic meeting during the year, with the timing to be decided relative to possible agenda items.

14.3. Communicating Working Group achievements

The Working Group agreed that it was important to document and communicate its achievements since its inception in 2002 in order to highlight the progress made in the cooperation between the OIE and Codex. The Working Group undertook to develop a document that could be uploaded onto the APFS pages of the OIE website.

15. Work programme for 2015

The Working Group reviewed and revised its 2015 work programme.

The amended work programme for 2015 is presented at Annex VII.

16. Next meeting

To be confirmed.

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…/Annexes

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex I

OIE ANIMAL PRODUCTION FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP

Paris, 28 – 30 October 2014

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Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex I (contd)

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Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex II

MEETING OF THE OIE ANIMAL PRODUCTION FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP

Paris, 28–30 October 2014

Adopted agenda

Welcome by the OIE Director General

Adoption of the agenda

Report of the previous Working Group meeting

1. APFS Working Group Terms of Reference and *Modus operandi*
2. Update on Codex Alimentarius Commission / FAO / WHO activities
   - 2.1. Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC)
   - 2.2. World Health Organization (WHO)
   - 2.3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
3. OIE standard development work under development
   - 3.1. Infection with *Taenia solium* spp.
4. Review *Terrestrial Code* chapters
   - 4.1. Chapter 6.1. The role of the Veterinary Services in food safety
   - 4.2. Chapter 6.2. Control of biological hazards of animal health and public health importance through ante- and post-mortem meat inspection
5. Cooperation between OIE and Codex
   - 5.1. Discuss relevant work topics (current and future)
6. Parallel OIE and Codex work
   - 6.1. *Trichinella*
     - 6.1.1. OIE Chapter on Infection with *Trichinella* spp.
     - 6.1.2. Codex draft Guidelines for Control of Specific Zoonotic Parasites in Meat: *Trichinella* spp.
   - 6.2. *Salmonella*
     - 6.2.1. OIE work on *Salmonella* spp. in pigs and cattle
     - 6.2.2. Codex work on *Salmonella* spp. in pork and beef
7. Potential standard development in the area of animal production food safety
   - 7.1. Control of Shiga-like toxin producing *E. coli* (STEC) in food-producing animals - update

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex II (contd)

8. Draft paper on Describing advances and new tools in risk-based approaches to food safety throughout the food chain.

9. Antimicrobial resistance

10. Ad hoc Group on global database for mapping genomes of selected pathogens

11. OIE Capacity building activities

    11.1. World Bank Global Food Safety Partnership

    11.2. OIE APFS Focal Point seminars

12. OIE Sixth Strategic Plan - update

13. Other business

    13.1. Biofortification

14. Work programme for 2015

15. Next meeting

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex III

MEETING OF THE OIE ANIMAL PRODUCTION FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP

Paris, 28–30 October 2014

Terms of reference for, and *Modus Operandi* of the
OIE Animal Production Food Safety Working Group

In accordance with Resolution No.25 of the 82nd OIE General Session, the terms of reference for and *modus operandi* of the Animal Production Food Safety Working Group are:

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The scope for the Animal Production Food Safety Working Group includes:

1. Consideration of all foodborne hazards arising from animals before slaughter;

2. Giving a primary focus on risk based food safety measures applicable at the farm level;

3. Consideration of food safety measures applicable elsewhere, for example during animal transport and harvesting of wild animals for food;

4. Work criteria and priorities that take into account global food safety priorities and current work programmes of relevant international organisations, especially the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), FAO and WHO;

5. Ensuring harmonisation of the food safety standards developed and under development by the OIE and relevant international organisations, especially the CAC;

6. Improving coordination between competent authorities, such as Veterinary Services and Public Health Services, with animal health and food safety responsibilities at the national and regional levels, including participation by other interested parties, as appropriate;

7. Describing the role of Veterinary Services in food safety operations.

MODUS OPERANDI

Within the above terms of reference, the Working Group's role is to:

1. provide advice to the OIE Director General on policy and strategic issues relating to the OIE's work on animal production food safety, which has the goal of 'the development of standards on animal production food safety covering pre-slaughter issues and those prior to the first transformation of animal products, with a primary focus on food safety measures applicable at the farm level. This work will include hazards such as pathogens that do not normally cause disease in animals'.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex III (contd)

The priorities are:

a) identifying and addressing gaps, contradictions, areas where harmonisation is necessary and duplications in the work of the OIE and other intergovernmental organisations involved in food safety standards (in particular CAC);

b) promoting stronger public–private sector collaboration by providing opportunities for participation for international non-governmental organisations involved in food production, transformation and food safety that have cooperation agreements with the OIE;

c) strengthening the relationship to other relevant scientific and normative intergovernmental organisations working in the area of food safety (in particular CAC, FAO and WHO), through enhanced information exchange.

2. Support the work of the OIE Specialist Commissions on pre-slaughter animal production food safety;

3. Provide the following to the Director General and relevant Specialist Commissions:

a) annual work programme;

b) policy advice;

c) discussion papers;

d) reports.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex IV

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION

CODEX SESSIONS SINCE THE LAST MEETING OF THE OIE APFSWORKING GROUP (29-31 OCTOBER 2013)

In the period 15 October 2013 - 20 October 2014, 16 sessions of the Code Alimentarius Commission and its subsidiary bodies have been held. Among these sessions, those relevant to the work of the APFSWORKING GROUP, are:

- 37th Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC37), Geneva, Switzerland, 14-18 July 2014
- 45th Session of the Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH45), Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 11-15 November 2013
- 17th Session of Committee on Fish and Fishery Products (CCFFP17), Bergen, Norway,17-21 February 2014
- 8th Session of the Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF8), the Hague, Netherlands, 31 March-4 April 2014
- 28th Session of the Committee on General Principles (CCGP28), Paris, France, 7-11 April 2014
- 21th Session of the Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems (CCFICS21), Brisbane, Australia, 13-17 October 2014.

In addition, in the reporting period have been held the sessions of the FAO/WHO Coordinating Committees for North America and the South West Pacific Asia (CCNASWP13), Kokopo, Papua New Guinea, 23-26 September 2014 and for Europe (CCEURO29)m the Hague, Netherlands, 30 September-3 October 2014,

In particular, the APFSWORKING GROUP may wish to note the following:

CAC37

- Was attended by 170 Member countries, 1 Member Organization (European Union), and 28 international organizations. The Commission adopted new and revised food quality and safety texts for application by Governments and inclusion in the Procedural Manual. The Commission also approved 16 new work proposals.
- Elected as Chairperson Mrs Awilo Ochieng Pernet (Switzerland), and as Vice-Chairpersons: Mr Guilherme Antonio da Costa Jr. (Brazil), Ms Yayoi Tsujiyama (Japan) and Mr Mahamadou Sako (Mali); and appointed Thailand, as Coordinator for Asia;
- Endorsed the guidance to promote collaboration between Codex and OIE, developed by CCGP (see Annex 1);
- Established a monitoring framework for the implementation of the Strategic Plan 2014-2019;
- Reactivated the Committee on Milk and Milk Products (CCMMP), hosted by New Zealand, to start new work on a standard for processed cheese;
- Noted the continued interest in the FAO/WHO Project and Trust Fund for Enhanced Participation in Codex (CTF) and expressed support to the development and implementation of a successor initiative when current CTF ends in 2015; and .
- Was informed of the activities of international standard-setting organisations.

Annex 2 to this document provides a list of Codex texts and new work proposals relevant to OIE work that were adopted/approved by the CAC37.

With regard to the sessions of the other committees/task force, the following is an updated on matters particular relevant to the APFSWORKING GROUP:

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

CCFH45

- Finalised (i) Guidelines for the Control of *Trichinella* spp. in meat of Suidae and *Taenia saginata* in meat of domestic cattle; the guidelines for *Taenia saginata* were adopted by CAC37; while the Guidelines for *Trichinella* spp. were returned to CCFH for consideration of Section 7.3 "Selection of Risk-based control measures" and 9 "Monitoring and Review"; and (ii) amendments to the definitions of the *Principles and Guidelines for the Conduct of Microbiological Risk Assessment* (adopted by CAC37).
- Agreed to start new work on Guidelines for the control of nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in beef and pork meat and Guidelines on the application of general principles of food hygiene to the control of foodborne parasites, which was approved by CAC37.

Full report: ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/REPORTS/Reports_2014/REP14_FHe.pdf

CCFFP17

- Finalised work on the Standard for Fresh and Quick Frozen Raw Scallop Products and performance criteria for methods for the determination of marine biotoxins in bivalve molluscs (adopted by CAC37);
- Progressed work on the code of practice for processing of fish sauce; and will continue work on the codes of practice for processing of fresh and quick frozen raw scallop products and sturgeon caviar; histamine and food additives in standards for fish and fishery products
- The next session (19-23 October 2015) will consider a number of discussion papers on various issues related to industrial and environmental contaminants (e.g. methylmercury in fish, radionuclides in food following a radiological or nuclear emergency) and mycotoxins (e.g. mycotoxins in spices) including guidance papers on submission and use of data from GEMS/Food and the phasing-in of lower maximum levels.

Full report: ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/REPORTS/Reports_2014/REP14_FFPe.pdf

CCCF8

- Finalized work on the prevention and reduction of weed contamination with pyrrolizidine alkaloid in food and feed (adopted by CAC37).

Full report: http://www.codexalimentarius.org/download/report/906/REP14_CFe.pdf

CCGP28

- Finalised guidance to promote collaboration between Codex and OIE (approved by CAC37) (see Annex 1);
- Amended the definitions of risk characterization and risk estimate in the Procedural Manual (adopted by CAC37) and endorsed the provisions on extrapolation of Maximum Residue Levels (MRL) of veterinary drugs to additional species and on the use of the concern form prepared by the Committee on Resides of Veterinary Drugs in Food (adopted by CAC37);
- Agreed to consider at its next session the consistency of risk analysis texts across relevant committees;

Full report: http://www.codexalimentarius.org/download/report/798/REP14_GPe.pdf

CCFICS21

- Sent to CAC38 for approval proposals for new work on: (i) Principles and/or Guidelines for the Exchange of Information (including questionnaires) between Countries to Support Food Import and Export; (ii) Guidance for Monitoring the Performance of National Food Control Systems; (iii) revision of the *Principles and Guidelines for the Exchange of Information in Food Safety Emergency Situations* (CAC/GL 19-1995); and (iv) revision of *Guidelines for the Exchange of Information between Countries on Rejections of Imported Food* (CAC/GL 25-1997).

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

- Agreed to consider at its next session discussion papers on System comparability / equivalence and on (*see* para. 63); and on possibilities of the use of electronic certificates by competent authorities as well as the migration to paperless certification.

Full report: will be available as REP14/FICS on www.codexalimentarius.org

FORTHCOMING CODEX MEETINGS (work relevant to the OIE APFSWORKING GROUP)

CCFH46 (Lima, Peru, 17 -21 November 2014)

In addition to the consideration of the Guidelines for the Control of *Trichinella* spp. in meat of Suidae, the

- Guidelines for the Control of Nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in Beef and Pork Meat (new work approved by CAC37); and
- Guidelines on the Application of General Principles of Food Hygiene to the Control of Foodborne Parasites (new work approved by CAC37).

CCFH46 will also consider proposals for new work and forward plan.

The provisional agenda is available at: http://www.codexalimentarius.org/download/report/908/fh46_01e.pdf

CCCF9 (TBA, Netherlands, 16-20 March 2015)

The Committee will consider, among others, a discussion paper on maximum levels for methylmercury in fish.

The provisional agenda of the 8th CCCF will be posted on the Codex website: www.codexalimentarius.org as soon as available.

CCRVDF22 (San José, Costa Rica, 27 April – 1 May 2015)

The Committee will consider:

- MRLs for derquantel, emamectin benzoate, ivermectin, lasalocid sodium and monepantel in tissues of various species;
- Risk management recommendations (RMRs) for veterinary drugs for which no ADI and/or MRLs could be set due to health concern: dimitridazole, ipronidazole, metronidazole and ronidazole; and
- Provisions on establishment of MRLs for honey (for inclusion on the *Risk Analysis Principles applied by the CCRVDF)*

In addition the Committee will consider the report of the 78th Meeting of JECFA and a proposal for alternative approach to move compounds from the database on countries' need for MRLs to the JECFA Priority List. The OIE Representative will present a report of the OIE activities, including the harmonization of technical requirements for registration of veterinary medicinal products (VICH).

The provisional agenda is available at: http://www.codexalimentarius.org/download/report/925/rv22_01e.pdf

CAC38 will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, from 6 to 11 July 2015. The provisional agenda will be posted on the Codex website: www.codexalimentarius.org as soon as available.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

Annex 1

Extracts from Report of CCGP28 (REP14/GP)

Conclusion

72. The Committee agreed to forward the following guidance to the 37th Session of the Commission for endorsement, to promote collaboration between the CAC and OIE, noting that this guidance might be utilized to foster on-going collaboration between the two organizations and their members at the national and regional level, with the understanding that this guidance should be read in conjunction with the "Agreements between the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/ the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Office International des Épizooties (OIE)", the "Guidelines on Cooperation between the Codex Alimentarius Commission and International Intergovernmental Organizations in the Elaboration of Standards and Related Texts" and the "Organic Rules, Chapter III, Article 6 (k)[6] of the Office International des Épizooties".

- CAC and OIE should adopt a consistent systematic cross-referencing process for relevant Codex/OIE texts, which involves referencing formats and regular updates as necessary.

  Recommended Referencing Format:

  a. Codex Documents:

     CAC Reference Number. *Title of the standard/guideline/text*.

     Example: CAC/GL 78-2011. *Guidelines for the Control of Campylobacter and Salmonella in Chicken Meat.*

     Example: CAC/RCP 58-2005. *Code of Hygienic Practice Meat.*

  b. OIE Documents:

     For OIE Codes: *Title of the Code (Year),* Chapter Number, Chapter Title, and Article Number and Title (where relevant).

     Example: *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2012),* Chapter 5.3. OIE procedures relevant to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization, Article 5.3.2. Introduction on the judgement of the equivalence of sanitary measures.

     For OIE Manuals: *Title of the Manual (Year),* Chapter Number, Chapter Title.

     Example: *Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals (2012)* Chapter 2.3.5. Infectious Salmon Anaemia.
- Information exchanges should continue between the CAC and OIE to identify areas of mutual interest and share work program priorities.
- CAC and OIE should post a list of areas of mutual interest on their respective websites.
- Member governments are encouraged to strengthen collaboration at the national and regional level by promoting dialogue between their Codex Contact Point and the appropriate OIE focal point in their jurisdiction and through national and regional level working groups/subcommittee meetings. This will enable enhanced understanding and collaboration on the management of risks for the farm to fork/food production continuum approach.
- Member governments are also encouraged to share information and coordinate and align national positions on issues of mutual interest (e.g. relevant texts under development by each organization) between national delegates or representatives of Codex and OIE through deliberate dialogue (e.g. joint meetings and forums).

73. The Committee noted that the above guidance was not intended for use in, or for incorporation into any legally binding agreements.

[6] Chapter III, Article 6: (k) to establish with other international organisations such relationships as may assure collaboration in the achievement of their respective aims, and its own aims.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

Annex 2

PART 1 - LISTS OF STANDARDS AND RELATED TEXTS ADOPTED BY CAC37 RELEVANT TO THE OIE

Part 1 – Standards and Related Texts Adopted at Step 8

Standards and Related Texts	Reference
For inclusion in the Procedural Manual	
Extrapolation of Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) of Veterinary Drugs to Additional Species and Use of the Concern Form for the CCRVDF (for inclusion in the *Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the CCRVDF*)	REP14/RVDF Appendices VIII and XI
Definitions of Risk Analysis Terms related to Food Safety: hazard characterization and risk estimate (revision)	REP14/CCGP Appendix II
Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods (CCRVDF)	
Risk Management Recommendations (RMRs) for chloramphenicol, malachite green, carbadox, furazolidone, nitrofural, chlorpromazine, stilbenes and olaquindox	REP14/RVDF, Appendix IV
Performance Characteristics for Multi-Residues Methods (MRMs) for Veterinary Drugs (Appendix C of CAC/GL 71-2009)	REP14/RVDF, Appendix VI
Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH)	
Guidelines for the Control of *Taenia saginata* in Meat of Domestic Cattle	REP14/FH, Appendix IV
Committee on Fish and Fishery Products (CCFFP)	
Standard for Fresh and Quick Frozen Raw Scallop Products	REP14/FFP, Appendix VI
Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF)	
Code of Practice for Weed Control to Prevent and Reduce Pyrollizidine Alkaloid Contamination in Food and Feed	REP13/CF, Appendix VI

PART 2 - LISTS OF NEW WORK APPROVED BY CAC37 RELEVANT TO THE OIE

Standards and Related Texts	Reference
Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH)	
Guidelines for the Control of Nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in Beef and Pork Meat	REP14/FH Appendix VI

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex IV (contd)

Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods (CCRVDF)	
Priority List of Veterinary Drugs for Evaluation or Re-evaluation by JECFA	REP14/RVDF, Appendix X

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex V

ACTIVITIES OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION

(as of October 2014)

WHO Strategic Plan for Food Safety 2013-2022

The strategic plan was developed through consultation between the headquarters and Regional and Country Offices of WHO to guide the work of WHO in food safety for the coming decade. The document is also used for advocacy and fundraising purposes.

The Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2)

The conference will take place on 19-21 November 2014, organised jointly by WHO and FAO. The conference is expected to adopt two Member States-negotiated documents - A Rome declaration and a Framework for Action. The importance of food safety is recognised in these documents. The latter documents include specific recommendations to countries on improving food safety and containing antimicrobial resistance.

The World Health Day 2015 (WHD 2015)

Every year WHO celebrates a World Health Day on 8 April. The theme chosen for 2015 is food safety. An official launch is foreseen in mid-November. OIE, FAO and other partner agencies will be contacted in due course and will be invited to support the campaign. The year 2015 could be seen as a 'food safety year' as Milano Expo which will open in May 2015 also articulates around the themes of food security and food safety.

Global Foodborne Infections Network (GFN)

The GFN stakeholder meeting was conducted in Geneva Switzerland in June 2014 to:

- Agree on the network scope and how the network can support WHO to achieve its mandates,
- Establish a timeline for proposed changes in the scope of the network and how it operates,
- Identify activities with the roles and tasks assigned, and
- Improve fundraising and communication within the network.

Participants agreed that the network should be a network of networks where technically competent partners in the field of foodborne diseases are committed to enhancing the capability of countries to prevent, detect and respond to food related diseases. The network should be more problem focused, flexible to country requests, and globally integrated, encouraging collaboration across regions.

They have also discussed and agreed on the new vision and mission (as below), both guiding and operating principles of the network, and on the new structure to set up a Steering Committee supported by five technical sub-committees, with respective chair and co-chair from partner organizations, taking a responsibility of different areas of work as follows: 1) laboratory and data collection and sharing, 2) country pilot projects and technical assistance, 3) surveillance and outbreak response training, 4) partnership and 5) fund raising and advocacy.

Vision*: A world where all countries have enhanced capacity to detect, control and prevent foodborne and other enteric infections.*

Mission*: to enable countries to detect, control and prevent foodborne and other enteric infections by building capacities for integrated surveillance and fostering collaboration among human health, veterinary, food and other relevant sectors, in and between countries.*

* * *

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex V (contd)

Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) and WHO Advisory Group on Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR

AGISAR Membership Renewal

The call for applications for the 2014-2019 term membership was widely distributed in March this year and 36 members have been selected for the term in 2014-2019. As for the previous committee, OIE and FAO are represented.

WHA Resolution on MR

The World Health Assembly at its 67th Session adopted a resolution WHA67.25 in May 2014. This resolution requested WHO to develop a Global Action Plan on antibiotic resistance under the leadership of WHO and in collaboration with partner organisations as FAO and OIE and a wide range of stakeholders. Furthermore, the resolution recommended to strengthen the FAO/OIE/WHO Tripartite collaboration on AMR.

http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA67/A67_R25-en.pdf

Ministerial conference on AMR: Joining Forces for Future Health

WHO DG, OIE DG, and FAO ADG as well as tripartite focal points on AMR participated in the ministerial conference on AMR on 25-26 June 2014 in The Hague, the Netherlands. The meeting was aimed to move the fight against AMR from advocacy to action at the global level, and to accelerate the political commitment to working together and give input for the GAP.

Tripartite Meeting

5th meeting of FAO-OIE-WHO technical focal points on collaborative activities related to AMR was held on 2-3 September 2014 in WHO HQ, Geneva, Switzerland. Tripartite focal points reviewed and shared information on ongoing and planned AMR activities, reviewed the recommendations FAO/ OIE/ WHO tripartite annual executive and coordination meeting, and discussed tripartite contribution to Global Action Plan.

Progress on the Global Action Plan on AMR

Final draft has been publically shared on the WHO website in October, and the consultations both online and face-to-face with the member states and multilateral agencies also took place in Fall. By mid-November, the almost-final draft will be submitted to the WHO Governing Bodies for its approval. It is planned that the draft Global Action Plan will be presented to the EB in January 2015 and be submitted to the 68th WHA in May 2015.

* * *

Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Microbiological Risk Assessment (JEMRA)

1) Infection with *Taenia solium* spp. (related to Item 3)

WHO convened an expert consultation on assembling a frame work for control/elimination of *Taenia solium* / Neurocysticercosis on 17-18 July 2014 in Geneva. The meeting discussed strategies for intensified control and improved case-management of *Taenia solium* infection. It recommended that a global network be established to support countries endemic for the infection, and that WHO be in close collaboration with FAO, OIE, the private sector, partners, NGOs and academia to accelerate control of the disease and lower its burden among affected populations. This network will assist countries in mounting intensified control programmes and to collect the relevant baseline data. The network will also explore opportunities to embed control interventions within neglected tropical disease or other disease control programmes.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex V (contd)

2) Foodborne parasites (related to Item 6.1)

Foodborne parasites, especially *Trichinella spp*. and *Taenia saginata*, are major public health concern and economic importance in some countries and therefore the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH) has been addressing the development of guidelines for control of these parasites. WHO and FAO convened a joint expert meeting on risk-based examples for the control of *Trichinella* spp. and *Taenia saginata* in meat in October 2013 in Geneva, and addressed requests from CCFH to develop examples to illustrate the level of consumer protection likely to be achieved with different pre- and/or post-harvest risk management options. The outcome, including several examples (scenarios) with a different level of consumer protection, was presented to the 45th Session of CCFH held in November 2013 in Hanoi, Viet Nam. The draft guidelines for *Taenia saginata* in meat of domestic cattle was adopted at the 37th Codex Alimentarius Commission (14-18 July 2014, Geneva) at Step 5/8, the draft Guideline for *Trichinella* spp. in meat of Suidae was adopted at Step 5. Additional requests from the 45th Session of CCFH to provide further scientific advice, using less conservative inputs into the developed models, developing examples related to ongoing verification of a negligible risk compartment and improving communication of the outcomes, were addressed with a second expert meeting on risk-based examples for the control of *Trichinella* spp. and *Taenia saginata* in meat held in September 2014, with participation of an OIE representative. The results of examples will be presented to the 46th Session of CCFH on 17-21 November 2014 in Lima, Peru.

3) *Salmonella* spp. in pork and beef (related to Item 6.2)

The 45th Session of CCFH agreed to start a new work to develop the Guidelines for the Control of Nontyphoidal *Salmonella* spp. in Beef and Pork Meat. The CCFH electronic working group (eWORKING GROUP) has developed the proposed draft where it recommended to CCFH that the Committee should consider if, and when, a consultation from FAO/WHO will be necessary. The particular recommendation to CCFH on requesting FAO/WHO for scientific advice was that:

a. Conduct a literature search to ensure that any relevant measures for control of Salmonella in beef and pork are identified for the Committee's effort.

b. Convene an expert consultation meeting to review the draft document for beef and pork, and use the literature review to assist them in their review.

The eWORKING GROUP also suggested that the Committee should consider whether another web tool for beef and pork would be useful to develop at this time. WHO and FAO will address the requests from the Committee in close collaboration with OIE.

4) Potential standard development in the area of animal production food safety (related to Item 7.1 Control of Shiga-like toxin producing *E. coli* (STEC) in food-producing animals – update)

The 45th Session of CCFH placed the work on Control of Verotoxigenic E. coli in beef in the second priority of their work plan, together with other two tasks. This work might be a new task if the 46th Session of CCFH agrees, and WHO and FAO will provide scientific advice when it is requested, taking into account the progress of the potential OIE standard.

* * *

Developing country needs for Maximum Residue Limits of veterinary drug residues in food

In response to a request of Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods (CCRVDF) to further assist in the work to prioritize countries need for veterinary drug residue MRLs, FAO and WHO, with the support of OIE, have undertaken a pilot survey in several countries on the use of veterinary drugs in food producing animals. The results of this pilot survey will feed into the work of CCRVDF in an effort to further prioritize the need for MRLs and the underlying scientific advice provided by JECFA.

* * *

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex V (contd)

The Foodborne Disease Burden Epidemiology Reference Group (FERG)

Back ground

In 2006, WHO established FERG. The members of FERG are a multi-disciplinary group of internationally renowned scientists that are working with WHO to estimate the global burden of foodborne diseases.

The work carried out in the last 7 years includes:

- Epidemiological reviews for mortality, morbidity and disability in each of the major foodborne diseases,
- Identification of models for the estimation of foodborne disease burden where data is lacking,
- Development of source attribution models and expert elicitation methods to estimate the proportion of disease that is foodborne,
- Development of user-friendly tools for burden of foodborne diseases studies and policy situation analysis at country level.

The expected results from FERG will be published in 2015 and will include:

- Burden of disease estimates for all relevant enteric, parasitic and chemically caused Foodborne Diseases published as a WHO report and Atlas
- A Peer-reviewed Paper Series in PLoS Medicine
- Foodborne Disease Burden and Policy Situation Analyses for the pilot country studies
- FERG toolkit to support countries in developing national burden of disease estimates

* * *

Promoting health by decreasing microbial contamination

WHO has developed a new Five Keys message to cover additional groups along the farm to fork continuum. The "Five Keys to safer aquaculture products to protect public health" were designed to support food safety education of small scale producers who grow fish for themselves, their families and for sales in local market. As small scale production is increasing all over the world, efforts to promote hygienic practices to ensure sustainability of safe and nutritious locally produced food supply are essential and timely. Pilot tested in Viet Nam and Lao DPR, the training manual should be available beginning 2015.

* * *

The International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN)

INFOSAN is a joint FAO/WHO initiative which includes the participation of national authorities in 181 Member States (including veterinary authorities). The aim of the network is to promote the rapid exchange of information during food safety related events, share information on important food safety related issues of global interest, promote partnership and collaboration between countries, and help countries strengthen their capacity to manage food safety emergencies. To accomplish this, INFOSAN works with a number of partners at the international and regional level. INFOSAN receives information from its members and monitors for food safety related events of potential international concern to alert to its network members.

During 2014, the INFOSAN Secretariat has been involved in the coordination of information between network members during more than 30 food safety events with potential international implications.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex V (contd)

As 2014 comes to a close, INFOSAN will mark its 10 year anniversary. To take INFOSAN to the second decade, the Secretariat is planning to organize a global meeting of network members in 2015 which comes 5 years after the first global meeting in 2010. More information about INFOSAN can be found at:
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/fs_management/infosan/en/index.html

* * *

Building capacity to prevent, detect and manage foodborne risks

WHO is willing to explore opportunities to collaborate with OIE on capacity building activities related to strengthening food safety systems in developing countries.

The exact nature of the capacity building activities would be dependent on the outcome of the country needs assessments but could involve support to develop/strengthen the following areas : laws and regulations, foodborne diseases surveillance, food monitoring and inspection, management and policy, coordination, information sharing and communication.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex VI

ACTIVITIES OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Since 2014, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has started to implement the first biennium (2014/2015) of its **new Strategic Objectives (SOs)**. FAO has identified key priorities to meet the demands posed by major global trends in agricultural development and challenges faced by member nations. A comprehensive review of the Organization's comparative advantages was undertaken and the SOs represent the main areas of work to achieve its vision and global goal focusing on the elimination of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. While there is sufficient capacity in the world to produce enough food to feed everyone adequately; in spite of progress made over the last two decades, 805 million people still suffer from chronic hunger. The world's population is predicted to increase to 9 billion people by 2050. Some of the world's highest rates of population growth are predicted to occur in areas that are highly dependent on the agriculture sector (crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries) and have high rates of food insecurity. Therefore the five strategic objectives relate to:

1. Help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition
2. Make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable
3. Reduce rural poverty
4. Enable inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems
5. Increase the resilience of livelihoods to disasters

The Animal Production and Health Division is integrated within the 5 SOs with special emphasis on SO2 in light of sustainable livestock production and intensification, SO3 livestock production as a way out of poverty, SO4 livestock production and food chains and a strong presence in SO5 related to addressing and reducing animal and zoonotic disease threats.

In the Twenty Fourth (24th) Session of the Committee on Agriculture (COAG) on 30 September to 3 October 2014[7], FAO Members considered the growing importance of AMR and provided guidance on FAOs role in contributing to global food chain intelligence and in assisting countries to contain the of **antimicrobial resistance (AMR)** and the potential negative impacts on food and agriculture in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the African Union and other partners. **Furthermore the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock**, a partnership uniting the forces of the public and private sectors, producers, research and academic institutions, NGOs, social movements and community-based organizations, and foundations also considers contributing to the management of health threats at the human-animal-environment interface, including antimicrobial resistance (AMR). The Agenda is a partnership of livestock sector stakeholders committed to the sustainable development of the sector, building consensus on the path towards sustainability and catalyzing coherent and collective practice change through dialogue, consultation and joint analysis.

In 2014 FAO and WHO published the **Multicriteria-based ranking for risk management of food-borne parasites**[8] based on an expert consultation held on this issue. The ranking exercise has provided a picture of the food-borne parasites of global importance and has created a transparent and reproducible tool. Diseases caused by Taenia solium ranked 1st and Echinococcus granulosus and E. multilocularis ranked 2nd and 3rd respectively. They all were considered to contribute to economic losses in human and animal populations in many parts of the world. In addition they are considered preventable diseases that can be controlled or eliminated and should therefore be prioritized.

[7] http://www.fao.org/3/a-ml159e.pdf

[8] http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/ee07c6ae-b86c-4d5f-915c-94c93ded7d9e/

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex VI (contd)

The Animal Production and Health Division (AGA) of FAO, in collaboration with ICIPE[9] Kenya and PATTEC[10] Ghana, has been testing a new technology, the Livestock Protective Fence (LPF, an insecticide impregnated net) to protect livestock from vectors, vector-borne diseases and nuisance insects in the small dairy production unit system in Kenya and in the semi-intensive pig production in Ghana.

In the field of feed safety, two laboratory manuals on determination of mycotoxins, E. coli 0157, Salmonella, Listeria etc. in animal feeds have been produced and disseminated. Various trainings and technical assistance to countries have been conducted as well as proficiency testing for 107 feed analysis laboratories in over 50 countries.

[9] ICIPE = African Insect Science for Food and Health

[10] PATTEC = Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Eradication Campaign

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex VII

WORK PROGRAMME FOR 2015

The Working Group agreed that its work programme for 2015 would include:

1. Support current work on:

   a) standard development work by OIE and Codex on *Trichinella*

   b) OIE standard development on *T. solium*

   c) OIE standard development on *Salmonella* in pigs and cattle

   d) standard development on *Salmonella* in pork and beef undertaken by Codex

   e) potential development of guidance on STEC in cattle

   f) Codex work on control of foodborne parasites

   g) develop a paper reviewing meat hygiene control measures.

2. Support potential future work on:

   a) revisions of Chapters 6.1. and 6.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*

   b) review of meat hygiene control measures and systems

   c) continued discussions on simplifying food safety risk assessment for international standard setting

   d) consider drafting a paper for the OIE Scientific and Technical Review on 'Risk based approaches to meat hygiene'.

3. Monitoring and advice in relation to animal production food safety

   a) antimicrobial resistance
   b) the role of genome sequencing in animal production food safety
   c) veterinary education
   d) veterinary legislation
   e) zoonoses at the human animal ecosystem interface ('One Health')
   f) food safety aspects of the PVS Pathway
   g) generic aspects of food safety control systems including microbiological target setting and linkages to Codex work
   h) linkage between food safety and animal welfare
   i) potential food safety implications of biotechnology vaccines
   j) developments in nanotechnology
   k) emerging food safety hazards.

Annex XXXI (contd)

Annex VII (contd)

4. Relationship between OIE and Codex

a) Strengthen and promote continued close collaboration between the Codex Secretariat and the OIE Headquarters.

b) Promote and encourage enhanced OIE input into Codex texts and vice versa, including the involvement of relevant experts.

c) Promote and encourage coordination between OIE National Delegates and national delegations to Codex to facilitate alignment of relevant standards of both bodies and their effective implementation.

d) Identify areas of potential collaboration between OIE and Codex on the development of standards.

5. Communication

a) Support to the OIE regarding communication on animal production food safety.

b) Review and propose updates for the OIE webpages on animal production food safety.

Annex XXXII

FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Topic		
Action	**How to be managed**	**Status (Feb. 2015)**
Restructuring of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Harmonisation of the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes*		
1) Work with AAHSC towards harmonisation, as appropriate, of the *Codes* 2) CH rename by disease agents 3) Revision and formatting of Section 7 4) Revision of the Users' guide 5) OIE policy on wildlife	1) TAHSC & ITD 2) TAHSC & ITD 3) TAHSC & AWWG 4) TAHSC & SCAD 5) TAHSC with WG on Wildlife & SCAD	1) Ongoing 2) Ongoing 3) Ongoing 4) Revised User's guide for adoption 5) Ongoing
Glossary		
1) Definition of OIE 'standards' 2) Definition of 'Veterinary Authority' and 'Veterinary Services' 3) Definition of 'Safe commodities' 4) Definition of 'Stamping-out policy'	1) TAHSC & AAHSC & BSC & SCAD 2) TAHSC 3) TAHSC 4) TAHSC	1) Ongoing 2) Ongoing 3) For adoption & ongoing 4) For adoption & ongoing
Horizontal issue		
Vaccination strategies	TAHSC & BSC & SCAD	Ongoing
Listed diseases		
Criteria for listing	TAHSC & SCAD & SIS	For comment
Evaluation of VS and OIE PVS pathway		
Veterinary education aspect	TAHSC & AHG & ITD	On hold
Veterinary products (AMR)		
1) Updating CH 6.9. 2) Updating CH 6.10. 3) Updating CH 6.7.	TAHSC & SCAD & AHG	1) Adopted 2) For adoption 3) For adoption
FMD		
Revise chapter	SCAD & TAHSC	For adoption
Horse diseases		
1) International movement of competition horses 2) Update Dourine CH 3) Update Glanders CH	1) AHG/SCAD & TAHSC 2) SCAD/TAHSC 3) AHG/SCAD/TAHSC	1) Revised CH for adoption and draft certificate for MC 2) Pending expert advice 3) Pending expert advice
CWD		
Decision on listing (new CH)	TAHSC & SCAD & AHG	Pending AHG
PRRS		
New CH	TAHSC/SCAD/AHG	Draft CH and MC pending expert advice

Annex XXXII (contd)

Other *Terrestrial Code* texts on diseases in need of revision		
Action	**How to be managed**	**Status (Feb. 2015)**
Review CH on BSE	SCAD/TAHSC	For adoption & ongoing
Update BT and EHD in line with AHS	TAHSC	For adoption
Update CH on brucellosis	TAHSC	For adoption
Update CH on tuberculosis	AHG/SCAD & TAHSC	Ongoing
Update CH on avian mycoplasmosis	SCAD and TAHSC	Seek expert opinion
Update CH on ASF	TAHSC	For comment
Pet food certificate CH	TAHSC	On hold
Update CH on scrapie	TAHSC	Ongoing
Update CH on theileriosis	TAHSC	Seek expert opinion
Update CH on lumpy skin disease	TAHSC	Seek expert opinion
Animal production food safety		
1) Collaboration with Codex 2) *Taenia solium* (Porcine cysticercosis) 3) Salmonellosis in pig herds 4) Salmonellosis in cattle	1) TAHSC and ITD 2) TAHSC 3) AHG & TAHSC 4) AHG & TAHSC	1) Ongoing 2) For adoption 3) Draft CH & MC for AHG 4) Draft CH for MC for AHG
Animal welfare		
1) Broiler production systems 2) Dairy cattle production systems 3) CH 7.5. and 7.6. 4) Disaster management 5) Working equids	AWWG & AHGs &TAHSC	1) Revised CH 7.10. for adoption 2) Draft new CH for adoption 3) Ongoing 4) Ongoing 5) Draft CH & MC for AHG

Note: MC: Member comments; CH: chapter; Q: questionnaire; SURV: surveillance; ITD: International Trade Department; S&T Dept: Scientific and Technical Department; SIS: World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department.

ITEM, ANNEX, CHAPTER NUMBERS AND CURRENT STATUS

Item	Annex	Chapter	Title	Provided for comments	GS83
1			General comments		
2	IV		User's guide	Sep 14	A
3	V		Glossary	Sep.14	A
4	XXV	1.1	Notification of diseases, infections and infestations, and provision of epidemiological information		C
	XXVI	1.2	Criteria for inclusion of disease, infections and infestations in the OIE list		C
5	VI	3.2.	Evaluation of Veterinary Services	Sep 14	A
6	VII	4.6.	Collection and processing of bovine, small ruminant and porcine semen	Sep 14	D
		4.7.	Collection and processing of *in vivo* derived embryos from livestock and equids	Sep 14	A
7	VIII	5.1. & 5.2.	General obligations related to certification & certification procedures	Sep 14	A
8	IX	6.5.	Prevention, detection and control of *Salmonella* in poultry	Sep 14	A
9		6.X.	Prevention, detection and control of *Salmonella* in pigs		E
10	XXVII	6.X.	Prevention, detection and control of *Salmonella* in cattle		C
11	X	7.X.	Animal welfare and dairy cattle production systems	Feb. 13	A
	XI	7.10.	Animal welfare and broiler chicken production systems	Sep. 14	A
	XII	7.5.	Slaughter of animals		A
	XXVIII	New	Guidelines for disaster risk reduction and management in relation to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health		I
		New	Animal welfare of working equids	Sep 14	D
12	XIII	8.X	Infection with epizootic haemorrhagic disease virus	Feb 13	A
	XIV	8.3.	Infection with bluetongue virus	Feb 13	A
13	XV	15.X.	Infection with *Taenia solium*	Feb 14	A
14	XVI	8.7.	Foot and mouth disease	Feb. 13	A
		1.6.	Procedure for self declaration and for official recognition by the OIE		
15	XVII	8.13.	Infection with Rift Valley fever virus	Sep. 14	A
16	XVIII	8.4.	Infection with *Brucella abortus*, *B. melitensis* and *B. suis*	Sep. 14	A
17	XIX	10.4.	Infection with avian influenza viruses	Sep. 14	A
18	XX	4.16.	High health status horse subpopulation	Sep. 14	A
	XXIX		Model veterinary certificate for HHP		C
19	XXX	15.1.	Infection with African swine fever virus		C
20	XXI	11.4	Bovine spongiform encephalopathy		A
21	XXXI		Report of the Animal Production Food Safety Working Group		I

Annex XXXII (contd)

Item	Annex	Chapter	Title	Provided for comments	GS83
22	XXII	6.7.	Harmonisation of national antimicrobial resistance surveillance and monitoring programmes		A
	XXIII	6.10.	Risk assessment for antimicrobial resistance arising from the use of antimicrobials in animals		A
23	XXXII		Work programme		C

A: proposed for adoption at 83rd General Session; C: For Member comments; E: under expert consultation (*ad hoc* groups, Specialist Commissions, etc.), D: deferred to Sep 2015 meeting; I: For Member Country information.

List of abbreviations	
AAHSC	Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission
AHS	African horse sickness
APFSWG	Animal Production Food Safety Working Group
AWWG	Animal Welfare Working Group
EHD	Epizootic haemorrhagic disease
FMD	Foot and mouth disease
PPR	Peste des petits ruminants
PRRS	Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
SCAD	Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases
TAHSC	Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission

Annex XXXIII

Original: English

Explanatory document to the

MODEL VETERINARY CERTIFICATE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS OF A HIGH HEALTH, HIGH PERFORMANCE HORSE FOR COMPETITION OR RACES

List of contents

Introduction
1. Step-wise procedure to establish a compartment and to certify the HHP horse
1.1. Qualify premises as a compartment free from specific diseases
1.2. Procedure to qualify and register an HHP horse
1.3. Intention to travel and application for HHP Veterinary Certificate
1.4 Qualification of premises as a Compartment used for temporary residence during travel
2. Veterinary supervision
2.1. The role of the private Veterinarian
2.2. The role of the official Veterinarian
3. The international biosecurity plan
4. Procedures that apply when an HHP horse is not at its place of usual residence
4.1. Biosecurity measures and management during transport
4.2. Biosecurity measures and management at equestrian venues
5. Return to the country of usual residence
Annex 1: Graphical description of the HHP concept
Annex 2: Diseases considered of importance for the HHP concept

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Introduction

To facilitate the safe international movement of competition horses, the OIE in collaboration with the Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) and the International Federation of Horseracing Authorities (IFHA) has developed the concept of high health status sub-population of horses, based on the principles of compartmentalisation and described in the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 4.16.

From a compartment free of specific OIE listed diseases (see Annex 2), which comprises this subpopulation , individual high health-high performance (HHP) horses can be selected and sent for participation to international competitions, accompanied with a specific Veterinary Certificate for temporary international movements of such HHP horses.

HHP horses are subjected to thorough veterinary and management controls that do not apply to the equine population at large. Horses that are being used for reproduction are not eligible as HHP horses. The registration of the compartment and HHP horses with the industry bodies (on a dedicated database[11]) provides full traceability of the process to the Veterinary Authorities, who will have access to the database.

This paper describes in details some provisions outlined in Chapter 4.16 and links them with the International Veterinary Certificate. It explains the process of establishing the compartment, the selection and certification of the HHP horses and the rules for their sub-sequent travels, in view of facilitating comments by OIE Delegates on the draft Model Veterinary Certificate being circulated for Member Country comments as an annex to the Code Commission report of its February 2015 meeting. A graphic description of the entire process and its different options is provided in Annex 1.

[11] Under development.

Annex XXXIII (contd)

1. Step-wise procedure to establish the compartment and to certify the HHP horse

1.1. 1st Step: qualify premises as a Compartment free from specific diseases (premises of usual residence)

a) Health status of country or zone where premises are located

The equine health status of the country or zone is relevant to the qualification of premises as a Compartment. Countries and zones should meet the following criteria:

- The country has a good record of compliance with its OIE disease reporting obligations (in particular AHS, VEE, EIA, glanders, WEE, EEE, JE, rabies and EI), based on the information on diseases affecting equids provided to the OIE during at least the three years preceding the initial application of premises for qualification The record with respect to diseases of other species is not taken into account, as this criterion relates to the health status of the equid population.
- African horse sickness (AHS), Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE), Equine infectious anaemia (EIA), glanders, Western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE), Eastern equine encephalomyelitis (EEE), Japanese encephalomyelitis (JE) [12] and rabies are notifiable in the country.

For the purpose of describing the procedure in countries of different health status, countries are grouped in four categories.

(i) The first group of countries are those with a well-defined health status and no occurrence of glanders, VEE and AHS.

(ii) The second group are those countries which cannot substantiate a claim of freedom from glanders.

(iii) The third group are those countries which cannot substantiate a claim of freedom from VEE.

(iv) The fourth group is comprised of countries not officially free from AHS.

N.B.: These conditions are included in the HHP Veterinary Certificate as options to choose from, so it is left to the countries to place themselves in the correct category.

b) Biosecurity measures in the premises (detailed in the OIE Biosecurity Guidelines under development)

The fact that diseases other than the ones listed under a) do not occur in the premises is assured by certain management conditions and continuous veterinary supervision of the compartment during the qualification period:

- A daily health and at least a daily temperature check of each horse is carried out by responsible persons dedicated to the stable and these checks are documented;
- At least a weekly visit by the authorised supervising veterinarian is carried out (see also 2.1);
- Procedures for cleaning, disinfection, feeding and horse-management are documented;
- There is access control for people and other animals to the premises during the qualification period.

c) Health status of resident horses in the premises under qualification as a compartment

All horses residing in the premises need to be examined during the 90 days before the qualification as a compartment as follows:

i) Countries of known health status

- Test for EIA

  or

[12] If Japanese encephalitis is not notifiable in a country, the VA must provide evidence that animals are vaccinated; the same applies to rabies.

Free from EIA

- Vaccinate against EI

  and

  no clinical signs of EI during the entire approval period

  or

- Country free from EI

ii) Countries that cannot substantiate to be free from glanders[13]

- Same as under i) plus:
- no case of glanders will have occurred within the 6 months of the start of the qualification process and 2 serological tests are to be carried out; the first sample is taken not earlier than 21 days after the start of the approval process and at an interval of at least 21 days to the second sample that is taken within 10 days of approval of the premises

iii) Countries that cannot substantiate to be free from VEE[14]

- Same as under i) plus:
- No case of VEE will have occurred within the 6 months of the start of the qualification process

and

- All horses are tested for VEE by serology while they are stabled under vector protection during the qualification period; and at least 3 weeks before approval of the premises all horses are kept under vector protection at all times; and within 7 days of approval of the premises the horses are then retested for VEE with either a negative result or a stable or declining titre. (Note: it is advisable to register the selected HHP horses with the industry database as soon as possible after the premises is approved in order to avoid excessive length of stabling in vector protection at all times)

  or

  Vaccination with an inactivated licensed vaccine against VEE of all horses in the premises with primary course at least 60 days prior to the approval of premises and a record of regular revaccination according to the instructions of the manufacturer.

iv) Countries not officially free from AHS[15]

- Same as under i) plus:
- All horses are not vaccinated 40 days before the introduction into a vector protected stable at the beginning of the qualification period.
- No clinical signs of AHS upon inspection before introduction into a vector protected stable.
- During the 90 days approval period of the premises one agent identification validated test is done under vector protected stabling, while the last 14 days are managed under the conditions of a quarantine station. A 2nd PCR test is done at the time of entering the quarantine station (note: the vector protected premises can be any stable that provides vector protection, and horses are allowed to train during low vector activity periods of the day, under chemical vector protection; the vector protected quarantine station is understood to be of the type "Kenilworth" in South Africa).

In addition to these specific tests the following general requirements need to be fulfilled by the premises in order to qualify as a Compartment free of specific diseases, regardless to the category described above:

[13] By self-declaration to the OIE or by clear evidence of negative reporting to WAHIS indicative of an existing surveillance programme.

[14] By self-declaration to the OIE or by clear evidence of negative reporting to WAHIS indicative of an existing surveillance programme.

[15] Through the acceptance by the OIE of their country freedom dossier.

- All horses must have a passport by which they can be clearly identified
- There are no breeding activities in the stable and horses must not be used for breeding
- All horses show no signs of a contagious or infectious disease
- There is a biosecurity plan and a contingency plan in place
- There are isolation stables available

A supervisor dedicated to the premises applying for qualification as a Compartment is designated as responsible for ensuring that all horses fulfil these health criteria.

The step-wise procedure to qualify premises as a Compartment can be summarised as follows:

1) On request of a premises / stable operator, who wishes to qualify his premises as a Compartment free of specific diseases, holding a high health status horse subpopulation, the Veterinary Authority and the Industry is informed and they record this intention (Day 0 of the qualification/preparation period – **Point A** in the graph in Annex 1).

2) An inspection of the Veterinary Services of the premises is undertaken, the biosecurity measures are examined and the premise is approved as compliant.

3) Start of regular veterinary supervision by a dedicated private veterinarian and testing programme for all resident horses (see 2.1).

4) All new entrants have to come from premises that are under veterinary supervision, did not have an EIA outbreak in the previous 3 months, no glanders outbreak for 6 months and must undergo the same testing as resident horses[16] before entering the stables undergoing the approval process. Within the stables they must be isolated from the other horses for at least 2 weeks.

5) At the end of the 90-day qualification period the Veterinary Authority approves the subpopulation and premises as a Compartment free of specific diseases. (**Point B** in the graph in Annex 1)

1.2 2nd Step: Procedure to qualify and register a horse as HHP horse

All horses need to reside in an approved premises (the Compartment), that have undergone the 90-day approval process. They are selected on the basis of having qualified for competitions and they are registered with the Industry once the measures indicated below have been applied (**Point C** in the graph in Annex 1).

For additional measures to be applied to the individual horse to qualify as HHP horse, the same different categories of country/zone health status apply:

i) Horses in compartments in countries of known health status
   a) All horses in these premises can qualify as HHP horse in principle; they should have the required performance level;
   b) Selected HHP horses shall be tested for piroplasmosis to establish the serological status;
   c) Selected HHP horses shall be tested for glanders (single test within 30 days prior to travel).

ii) Horses in compartments in countries that cannot substantiate to be free from glanders
   a) Provisions as described in 1.1. c) *ii)* apply and selected horses need to remain residents in the compartment for the period after the second sample to the time of issuing the Veterinary Certificate;
   b) Selected horse shall be tested for piroplasmosis to establish the serological status.

iii) Horses in compartments in countries that cannot substantiate to be free from VEE

[16] If entry after the herd testing – test outside. If entry before herd testing – test together with herd.

a) Provisions of 1.1.c)*iii)* apply and horses have to remain in vector protection throughout until registration as HHP horse and subsequent travel;
b) Selected horses shall be tested for piroplasmosis to establish the serological status;
c) Selected horses shall be tested for glanders (single test within 30 days prior to travel).

iv) Horses in compartments in countries not officially free from AHS

a) Provisions of 1.1, c *iv* apply and horses remain in this quarantine station until dispatch (batches of horses need to be fully separated and managed as an "all in – all out" system);
b) Selected horses shall be tested for piroplasmosis to establish the serological status;
c) Selected horses shall be tested for glanders (single test within 30 days prior to travel).

1.3 3rd Step: Intention to travel and application for HHP Veterinary Certificate

After the registration of the horse as an HHP horse with the industry (on the database), the official veterinarian can issue the HHP Veterinary Certificate (**Point D** in the graph in Annex I). The official veterinarian should be notified of this intention at least 7 days prior to intended day of inspection.

It is strongly recommended to plan the qualification process for the compartment in such a way that certification of HHP horses for travel coincides with the approval of the compartment.

In case a horse has been registered in the international database as HHP horse and does not travel within 10 days after registration, the entry into the database shall be cancelled.

1.4 Qualification of premises as a Compartment used for temporary residence during travel

A horse, once qualified as HHP horse and travelling using the HHP Veterinary Certificate, can only reside on premises shared with other HHP horses, hence there is a need to establish also dedicated HHP stables (**Point E** in the graph in Annex 1).

These can be sub-units of premises already qualified as compartments or be set up particularly for this purpose. The only difference to qualified compartments is that they house only HHP horses and that they are isolated from other stables, should there be non-HHP horses on the same premises.

2. Veterinary supervision

Compliance with the policies and procedures of the HHP concept is assured and validated through continual veterinary supervision of horses at the home stables, during transport and at all temporary venues. This supervision is provided by authorised veterinarians.

2.1. The role of the private veterinarian

The responsibility for veterinary inspection of horses that are intended for qualification as HHP horses (see 1.1 and 1.2) lies with the veterinarian, who is engaged by the owner / Responsible Person to provide veterinary inspection to all horses on the premises. This veterinarian should be certified with the FEI or IFHA (if appropriate) and should be authorised for this purpose by the Veterinary Authority.

The entire period towards qualification of premises as compartments free of specific diseases is under continuous veterinary supervision, defined as being at least one visit per week by the authorised veterinarian. In addition, a veterinary check is carried out on the last day of the qualification period and a final inspection is done 48 hours before export of the HHP horse.

Records of veterinary supervision should be kept throughout the 90-day period. In the case that more than one veterinarian is responsible for supervising this period, the supervising veterinarian should make a ´hand over report´ to the veterinarian responsible for the subsequent period.

In the course of each veterinary examination of a horse, its passport is checked, its identity verified and the details of any official tests and treatments, including vaccinations, are recorded and signed by the examining veterinarian.

2.2. The role of the official veterinarian

The Official Veterinarian[17] should be informed prior to the intended start and at the end of the 90-day qualification period and also alerted on the date on which a visit for the purpose of health certification will be required.

The Veterinary Authority should be fully informed about the process of preparation of horses for export under the conditions that apply to HHP horses. In accordance with *Terrestrial Code* Article 5.2.2, for the purposes of official certification, the passport is examined, verified and signed by an official veterinarian.

The Veterinary Authority may conduct audits, including unannounced visits, of all parts of the HHP system (home stables and other premises, event venues, stop-over points).

3. The international biosecurity plan

The health status of HHP horses is maintained by ensuring compliance at all times with an international biosecurity plan recognised by the Veterinary Authorities of the importing and exporting countries, in accordance with the Biosecurity Guidelines of the OIE (under finalisation). Non-compliance can result in suspension of the horse´s membership of the HHP sub-population.

4. Procedures that apply when a HHP horse is not at its place of usual residence

When a HHP horse is not at its place of usual residence (home stable) it may be in the course of transport or at an equestrian event venue. The Biosecurity Guidelines describe the procedures that apply. Key points are summarised below.

4.1. Biosecurity measures and management during transport

Transportation entails the implementation of biosecurity and management in relation to:

(i) the means of transport, e.g. airplanes, vehicles, trains, boats and

(ii) temporary holding premises or lay-over points where HHP horses are held during journey breaks. These may be stables, show grounds, veterinary clinics, animal hotels, government quarantine stations or official control points. Conditions as described in 1.1 b apply.

HHP horses may only be transported with equids of equivalent or higher health status. Transporters should follow a documented SOP for the transport of HHP horses. Lay-over points should be approved and registered by relevant industry bodies before use by HHP horses. These temporary premises should comply with biosecurity criteria (see 3 above) to avoid the exposure of HHP horses to equids that are not of equivalent health status.

The final decision on the conditions that apply during transport, including the combining of horses in consignments, routes and lay-overs, rests with the Veterinary Authority hosting the equestrian event i.e. of the country into which the horse will be temporarily imported.

4.2. Biosecurity measures and management at HHP equestrian venues (see 1.4.)

The stables for HHP horses at equestrian events must meet similar criteria to those for home premises approved as compartments, particularly when horses visit countries of different health status as per description in 1.1. They should have dedicated personnel, biosecure arrangements for the provision of feed, and access to isolation facilities.

[17] In the *Terrestrial Code*, Official Veterinarian means a veterinarian authorised by the Veterinary Authority of the country to perform certain designated official tasks associated with animal health and/or public health and inspections of commodities and, when appropriate, to certify in conformity with the provisions of Chapters 5.1. and 5.2.

5. Return to the country of usual residence

When a HHP horse returns from international competition to the country of usual residence, its status as a member of the HHP may follow one of two options:

1) the HHP status is maintained, based on compliance with all criteria (**Point F** in the graph in Annex 1),

or

2) the HHP status is suspended (Point G in the graph in Annex 1). In this case, when the horse is required to regain its active HHP membership, it must follow the procedures outlined above under step 1 and 2 for initial qualification.

Annex XXXIII (contd)

Annex 1. Graphical description of the HHP concept



Annex 2. Diseases considered of importance for the HHP concept



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Annex XXXIV

Original: English

January 2015

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP

ON NOTIFICATION OF ANIMAL DISEASES AND PATHOGENIC AGENTS

Paris, 6–8 January 2015

The OIE *ad hoc* Group on Notification of Animal Diseases and Pathogenic Agents met at the OIE Headquarters from 6 to 8 January 2015.

The members of the Group and other participants are listed in Appendix I. The meeting was chaired by Dr Toni Tana and Dr Allan Sheridan acted as rapporteur.

Dr Alex Thiermann, Advisor of the Director General and President of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code Commission, welcomed the participants on behalf of the Director General, Dr Bernard Vallat, and thanked them for having accepted the OIE's invitation. He reminded the participants of the importance of this Group in the OIE's work, gathering together many experts coming from different regions. He reiterated that this Group has a unique and critical mandate. The aim is to review disease listing criteria bearing in mind all diseases, not just specific ones considered important at particular times. He also reminded the Group that a listed disease was not more important than other diseases, but the criteria define it as a disease, based on its epidemiologic characteristics, that requires rapid dissemination of information to facilitate control efforts by the veterinary services. The Group was also asked to consider providing more clarity and discipline on how to report on emerging diseases and when reporting ceases to be necessary. The conclusions of this Group should also help the OIE to find a way to encourage Member Countries to improve the level and quality of disease notification and events reporting.

Dr Paula Cáceres, Head of World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department, presented the objectives of the meeting: to examine and evaluate the disease listing criteria in both the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes* for inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the OIE Lists. The Group was requested to assess the need for further definition of disease notification obligations of Member Countries for emerging diseases. The Group was also asked to assist the OIE considering deleting the reporting of non OIE-listed diseases in the annual report and, based on the amended Chapter 1.1 adopted by the OIE World Assembly of May 2014, replacing it by the information on emerging diseases declared endemic. Dr Cáceres also spoke with the Group on day two and clarified the description of the role and responsibilities of expert members that was presented by Dr Thiermann. The aim of an expert member of an *ad hoc* Group appointed by the OIE is to work to further the OIE's mission, bringing their unique regional experiences and awareness to the task at hand without advocating a position at odds with that of the OIE.

The Group reviewed and agreed to its terms of reference; they are listed in Appendix II.

The Group endorsed the proposed agenda presented in Appendix III.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

Dr Vallat, the Director General, joined the meeting on day two to support the activities of the Group. He reminded the Group that the OIE organises such Groups periodically to review existing standards and improve them on the basis on new scientific information. He highlighted that one of the main missions of the OIE is to promote the transparency of the animal health situation worldwide using appropriate standards and reporting mechanisms. He explained that the system for disease notification was built and modernised over years, with increasing requirements for data collection and reporting. He also stated that the OIE's capacity building work with Member Countries through the network of focal points aims to facilitate disease reporting and improve the quality of information. He emphasised the importance of recent changes in the definition and obligations of emerging diseases due to increasing numbers and importance of these diseases.

He reminded the Group that one of the main objectives should be to simplify the criteria for the listing of diseases for the benefit of Members. Dr Vallat emphasised that the OIE continued to work on modernising the WAHIS reporting system aiming to improve the mapping system, official status displaying, data mining and analysis of the information collected, as well as to include the information on genotype collected from the network of reference laboratories and the information related to antimicrobial resistance. He added also that three departments, namely the Scientific and Technical Department, the International Trade Department and the World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department, worked on the harmonisation of definitions between the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes* and WAHIS guidelines.

The desire is to have this report discussed by three Specialist Commissions concerned during their February 2015 meetings. Observers from the three Commissions whose work is directly linked to this *ad hoc* Group are listed in Appendix I as other participants who attended this meeting.

The Group appointed a Chair and rapporteur and briefly discussed their role and responsibilities. The Group agreed that it was critically important to remember that the criteria for listing of diseases could not be looked at in isolation from each other or other elements of Chapters 1.1 and 1.2 in each of the OIE *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (*Terrestrial Code*) and *Aquatic Animal Health Code* (*Aquatic Code*). In addition the Group noted that the purpose of listing and reporting on diseases was subordinate to the OIE's overall mandate for animal health.

Chapter 1.3 of the *Aquatic Code* is equivalent to Article 1.2.3. of the *Terrestrial Code*. It consists of the *Aquatic Code*'s listed diseases.

1. Examine and evaluate the disease listing criteria in the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes*

Chapter 1.2

The Group discussed the need to clearly define for Members the purposes for listing diseases contained in Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* and Chapter 1.3 of the *Aquatic Code* .

The Group reviewed each article in the chapters related to the listing criteria for including terrestrial and aquatic animal diseases. The Group noted that there were some differences between the Chapters in the two Codes; however, and as per earlier requests by some Member Countries, the Group looked for ways to better harmonise the criteria for listing of terrestrial and aquatic diseases where it was feasible.

The Group noted that the titles of the two chapters and the first line of the introduction were different but conveyed the same information. For that reason the Group requested the Code Commissions to assess whether these aspects of the Chapters could be harmonised.

The Group also discussed the need for specificity when an *ad hoc* Group is appointed to consider whether a disease, infection or infestation is proposed for listing under these criteria. The Group advised the Code Commission representative that the criteria can be applied to either a disease or to a specified strain of a disease. The Group agreed it was essential that *ad hoc* groups are provided with clarity as to whether they are to consider a disease or a specified strain of a disease in their terms of reference.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

Terrestrial Code: Article 1.2.1

The Group agreed that the aim of listing was to facilitate notification by and to the Member Countries to allow them to take appropriate and (where possible) co-ordinated action to prevent the spread of diseases as far as possible through control exercised by the veterinary authorities over animals and animal products. The Group agreed that this should be clear in the first paragraph of this article and recommended also insertion of the term 'timely' to highlight the importance of providing information soon enough so other Members can take effective action.

The Group agreed that the role of the *Terrestrial Code* in providing standards for disease control and safe trade in animals and animal products was important and should be mentioned. This had already been done in the *Aquatic Code* and insertion of that form of wording in the second paragraph of the introduction was recommended by the Group.

The Group agreed that details on the mechanisms for notification are provided in Chapter 1.1 and there was no benefit gained by restating them.

The Group further agreed that it would assist Members to have reference in this section to the principles for selection of an appropriate diagnostic test. This was discussed when considering point C. 8 of Article 1.2.2. of the *Aquatic Code*.

Aquatic Code: Article 1.2.1

The same rationale for amending the article in the *Terrestrial Code* was seen as appropriate in this instance.

Terrestrial Code: Article 1.2.2

Point 1. The Group was advised that two aspects of this article elicited Member comments – 'international spread' and 'proven'. After discussion the Group agreed that the term 'international spread' was clear and in need of no further elaboration. The Group also agreed that the term 'proven' had a clear scientific meaning in the context of the *Terrestrial Code* and that it was not to be considered as a legal term.

Point 2. The Group was advised by the Code Commission and agreed that the term 'demonstrated freedom' would incorporate historical disease freedom as per the provisions of Article 1.4.6. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Code Commission further advised and the Group agreed that 'impending freedom' would be applicable to countries with control programmes with eradication as the end point in an advanced stage. In addition the Group was advised by the Code Commission and agreed that the 'negligible risk' categorisation of certain countries in respect of BSE would be equivalent to 'freedom' for this Article. The Group recommended to simplify the wording related to surveillance provisions in the *Terrestrial Code*, as has been done in the *Aquatic Code*.

Point 3. a. The Group agreed to maintain this criterion as written.

Point 3.b. The Group was advised of comments by Members indicating a lack of consistent understanding of the terms 'significant morbidity and mortality'. Some members wished for quantification of incidence and some requested a specific definition for the term 'morbidity' as it applies to the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group discussed whether a definition of the term or further elaboration of its meaning within the article was the best way to improve clarity. After extensive discussion and review of a draft definition the Group agreed that simplification of the higher level statement and specification of the criteria that should be used within the article would be more useful. The use of the term 'significant impact on health' is now proposed to be accompanied by a mechanism by which it can be evaluated.

The Group also discussed the significance of positive serological results in relation to the listing criteria. A positive serological result, or titre, in an animal is evidence of prior exposure to an agent (micro-organism, protein, etc.) leading to an immunological response. However, exposure to an infectious agent may, or may not, result in illness in an individual. The Group agreed that positive serological results in the absence of clinical signs are not considered to be signs of disease or morbidity and are not to be considered as evidence of 'a significant impact on health'.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

During these discussions the Group also considered whether additional criteria were necessary. One suggestion was to allow for relisting of a disease that has been delisted but for which control measures remain in place in a number of countries. The Group discussed this proposal and did not support the suggestion. Countries are allowed to implement animal health-based measures under WTO rules for non-listed diseases if they provide a risk assessment and the measures are the least-trade-restrictive that are necessary to protect that country's status. Delisting decisions are agreed at General Session when a disease does not meet the listing criteria. However, delisted diseases could be proposed for relisting if their behaviour changed in such a way that they subsequently met the listing criteria, so the Group did not see any benefit to include this proposal.

The Code Commission advised that use of the term '*zone*' in this article would include *containment zones* established to control disease.

Point 3.c. The Group aligned the wording of this point with that of point 3.b. In addition the Group agreed to change the term 'wild animal populations' to '*wildlife*'. '*Wildlife*' is defined in the *Terrestrial Code* and includes other wildlife categories of economic value previously excluded, in particular *captive wild animals*. The Group further considered this aspect in relation to the equivalent requirement in the *Aquatic Code* (point A. 2.of Article 1.2.2) and agreed that addition of the term 'ecological threats' was of significant value here as well.

Point 4. The Group agreed to maintain this criterion as written.

Re-ordering of the Article 1.2.2: The Group considered it easier for Members to apply the criteria if the only 'or' options were at the end of the section. Reordering to suit the suggestion was performed by moving the previous point 4 of Article 1.2.2. to point 3 of Article 1.2.2.

Aquatic Code: Article 1.2.2

The Group reviewed the reason for having explanatory notes in light of recent proposed changes to the *Aquatic Code*, and agreed to incorporate relevant information into the assessment criteria**.** In addition it was noted that removal of the explanatory notes means that the table format is no longer required and the Group recommends to the Code Commission alignment of the format of this Article with the corresponding Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Group further agreed that the second paragraph of Article 1.2.2. that describes in detail how to apply the criteria was unnecessary and that alignment of the first sentence of the article with that in the equivalent section of the Terrestrial Code was appropriate.

No. A. 1. This article corresponds to point 3.b of Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group agreed that the new article in the *Terrestrial Code* was broader and should be proposed for use in this article of the *Aquatic Code*. The Group also agreed that the explanatory note referring to morbidity was liable to create confusion and was no longer required.

No. A. 2. This article corresponds to point 3. c. of Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group aligned the wording of this clause with that in point A.1 of Article 1.2.2. The Group decided following review of the explanatory notes that consideration of ecological aspects of the disease impact was of significant value given the broad mandate of the OIE. As the term 'ecological' also incorporates consideration of environmental factors the Group did not feel it was appropriate to add 'environmental' as was previously in the explanatory note. The explanatory note was no longer seen as necessary given these changes to the article.

No. A. 3. This article corresponds to point 3. a of Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group noted that this article did not incorporate the concept of severity of consequences, which the Group agreed was important. The Group reviewed use of the corresponding article in the *Terrestrial Code* and agreed to recommend that the same wording be used in the *Aquatic Code*.

No. B. 4. This article corresponds to no article in the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group agreed this article was no longer necessary as the glossary definition of 'disease' in the *Aquatic Code* specifies an infectious aetiology.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

No. B. 5. This article corresponds to no article in the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group agreed this Article was not appropriate as a disease with a suspected infectious aetiology would be reported as an emerging disease (as defined in the glossary to the *Aquatic Code*).

No. B. 6. This article corresponds to point 1 of Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group noted when discussing this point that, in light of removal by the Code Commission of the article on emerging diseases from this chapter, the current wording was no longer appropriate. The Group agreed that use of the same wording as in the *Terrestrial Code* would be appropriate and that the information in the guidance note was not needed.

No. B. 7. This article corresponds to point 2 of Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The use of the term '*zone*' in this context was explained as covering bodies of water within a country as well as those that may be shared by a number of countries. The Group agreed that the competent authority of at least one country would need to propose 'freedom' as the term 'several countries' is undefined and if a single country is free then this status is worth protecting. The Group also discussed that the minimum requirement in the *Terrestrial Code* was the important feature. If one country could be free, others could take action to gain that same status and may be encouraged to do so. For these reasons the Group agreed to harmonise the text with that used in point 2 of Article 1.2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* and remove the explanatory text.

No. C. 8. This article corresponds to point 4 of Article 1.2.2.. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group discussed the terms 'repeatable and robust' in relation to diagnostic testing. The single term ''reliable' is often used in relation to test performance and the Group agreed that this term could be used here together with some information on the criteria that can be applied when selecting a test for use. The Group reviewed the explanatory notes for this article and agreed that the appropriate chapter of the *Aquatic Manual*, Chapter 1.1.2, should provide that information for application by Members. It was further agreed that this would be best placed in the Introduction, under Article 1.2.1. Following these changes it was seen that the wording of the equivalent article in the *Terrestrial Code*, that includes specification of the need for case definition in the explanatory note, would be appropriate for the *Aquatic Code* as well. The explanatory note was then removed.

Re-ordering of points of the Article 1.2.2 of the *Aquatic Code*: For the same reason that reordering of these points was performed in the *Terrestrial Code*, and for harmonisation, reordering of the revised Article 1.2.2 was performed, as shown in Appendix VII (in tracked changes) and Appendix VIII (as a clean version with all suggested changes to that chapter accepted).

Terrestrial Code: Article 1.2.3

While no changes to the text were made, the Group agreed that it was worthwhile asking the Code Commission to consider splitting Article 1.2.3. of the *Terrestrial Code*, which includes all diseases currently listed in the *Terrestrial Code*, into a separate chapter. This has been done in the *Aquatic Code*, where Chapter 1.3 is the disease list. The Group considered there could be advantages in that approach as a change suggested to the *Terrestrial Code*'s disease list would then purely affect the list and not open the criteria for review without reason.

2. Assessment of the need for further definition of disease notification obligations of Member Countries for emerging diseases

The Group sought clarification of what the OIE was seeking by raising this agenda item. Dr Caceres presented the current situation related to the *notification* of *emerging diseases* and a flow chart describing the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). The Group was informed that, once an *emerging disease* has been declared as endemic or stable, a country is no longer required to provide the OIE with further information concerning the disease. Is there a need to change point 1.1.4 in the *Terrestrial Code* to facilitate on-going reporting of information on these diseases?

The Group discussed the provisions of Article 1.1.4 of the *Terrestrial Code* regarding *notification* of *emerging diseases*. The Group agreed that the phrase in point 2 of Article 1.1.4. 'as described under point 1' was unnecessary and poorly referenced. The Group proposed it be deleted.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

A suggestion was made that point 2 of Article 1.1.4. might benefit from having a time period specified during which countries would be required to continue submitting reports. That would be cut short if listing was proposed or the disease became sufficiently stable. The Group discussed this point in relation to whether a net benefit would be gained from the additional reporting that may occur. The Group agreed that the existing criteria for reporting ensure that the situation on a country is well described for other Members. In addition, the existing criteria allow for a return to reporting of the disease under appropriate circumstances so there is no net benefit by mandating a time period. The discussion did include however that there needs to be reliability of reporting up to the time a disease was sufficiently stable, or eradicated. The Group agreed to incorporate the phrase 'sufficient time to have reasonable certainty that' in the first sentence of point 2 of Article 1.1.4. for that reason and amend the punctuation of sub points a., b. and c. to clarify that reporting should continue until either the disease has been eradicated or becomes sufficiently stable within the country, or until it has been assessed for listing. The Group agreed that determining whether a disease was emerging and whether it had met either of the first two of those criteria for ceasing reporting was the responsibility of the Member country's Delegate.

The Group considered whether the WAHIS/WAHID system facilitates reporting in line with the *Terrestrial Code* requirements of 1.1.3 and 1.1.6. After discussion it was agreed the existing system does not support countries to supply the data mandated in point 4 of Article 1.1.3. In addition, the level of detail requested in WAHIS is not reflected in the mandatory reporting requirements of Article 1.1.3.

The Group recommends that the OIE consider appointing an *ad hoc* Group to refine WAHIS and Article 1.1.3. of the *Terrestrial Code* in order to define clearly for Members the level of compulsory data that is expected in reports. The Group agreed that this *ad hoc* Group should also consider changes to the WAHIS system to facilitate the agreed reporting in an appropriate manner. This should include facilitation of reporting of non-listed diseases (including those previously delisted) under Article 1.1.6 that Members consider would be of use to other Members and should also be consistent with Member's obligations under Article 1.1.4.

3. In case of significant proposed changes in criteria, analyse and comment on the results of recent *ad hoc* Groups on some emerging diseases (e.g. PED, MERS, Schmallenberg)

The Group analysed the newly proposed criteria for the listing of diseases and agreed that the changes it recommended were to clarify already existing criteria. As there were no major modifications proposed the Group was not requested, under its Terms of Reference, to review the reports on *emerging diseases* such as PED, MERS and Schmallenberg.

4. Analyse new emerging diseases such as Ebola and the consequences for disease information reporting

Dr Marija Popovic, chargée de mission at the World Animal Health Information and Analysis Department, gave a brief background and on the evolution on the voluntary reporting of non OIE listed wildlife diseases using the spread sheet questionnaire and lately by the *WAHIS –Wild* platform. She stated that Ebola virus disease is classified under the disease "*infection with filovirus*" and that this include Marburg virus. The reporting was developed to provide Member Countries with an early warning system as the diseases involved had an impact on livestock health, human health, wildlife conservation, biodiversity and environmental integrity.

Dr Popovic advised that no quantitative data has been received so far from any Member Country on Ebola. The OIE followed up unofficial information in the last quarter of 2014 regarding domestic pigs affected by Ebola disease but the respective Member Country advised the information was incorrect.

The Group critically assessed the consequences of reporting on new *emerging diseases* by Members. Regarding Ebola, as specified by the Terms of Reference, the Group agreed it was not competent to assess Ebola disease (*infection with filovirus*). The Group then considered whether listing would be of value to Members if Ebola could be seen to meet the amended listing criteria.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

The Group acknowledged that Ebola is an important disease due to its potential impact on human health. However, it needs to be considered in the framework of Article 1.2.1 with the purpose of listing in mind. If listing and consequent mandatory reporting of information on a given disease facilitates the taking of appropriate action by Members to prevent transboundary spread of that disease then listing is consistent with the mission of the OIE. The Group agreed that, for Ebola, it was difficult to see how listing would achieve that outcome. The Group discussed that this situation illustrated how important it was, not to apply the listing criteria to a disease without considering the broader context of the OIE's mission in terms of official notification, particularly as captured in the revised Article 1.2.1. Members with Ebola can nevertheless provide reports as it could be considered an emerging disease or voluntary reporting may be considered under Article 1.1.6 as an important animal health event. The Group agreed in relation to Ebola that Members should be encouraged to report.

5. Consider the deletion of reporting non-OIE-listed diseases in the annual report (Article 1.1.3 point 4) and consider replacing it by the information on emerging diseases declared endemic (Article 1.1.4).

The Group reviewed point 4 of Article 1.1.3. of the *Terrestrial Code* regarding the *notification* of diseases, *infections* and *infestations*, and provision of epidemiological information particularly related to the annual report.

Dr Cáceres briefly informed the Group about the current content of the annual report.

The Group discussed the content of the annual report on the non OIE-Listed diseases. The Group agreed that the information requested in the annual report on non-listed diseases is not supported by point 4 of Article 1.1.3. The discussion included consideration of how useful this information is for Members on the basis of advice from the OIE advisers present that the reports are rarely if ever interrogated by Members. The Group agreed that it was no longer appropriate to include these diseases in WAHIS and suggested that the WAHIS form be changed to reflect this.

The Group agreed that the WAHIS system for gathering disease information should be flexible, facilitating the input of information on the reporting form that Members consider may be of use for other Members, and reiterated that this was not the case at present. The Group agreed that allowing provision of free text in an 'other comments' box could also be considered to encourage the Member Countries to provide information as per Article 1.1.6. The Group considered a suggestion that OIE should encourage Members to provide data on emerging diseases and that this be done by providing a specific area on the OIE website where emerging diseases are listed. While not covered by the Terms of Reference, the Group discussed this point and considered that its usefulness could be assessed by the suggested *ad hoc* Group for the WAHIS system if appointed by OIE.

The Group agreed that the official data collection should be focused on the OIE-Listed and *emerging diseases*. Previous recommendations by the group on appointing an *ad hoc* Group to review the WAHIS and WAHID systems were reiterated.

Annex XXXIV (contd)

6. Other business

The Group discussed the definitions of *emerging disease* in the *Terrestrial* and *Aquatic Codes*. The Group agreed that, while it would be better for Members if the definitions were consistent, it did not have sufficient background information to consider whether there were necessary reasons for the differences in the definitions. The Group suggested both Code Commissions to work together to assess whether and how it would be possible to more closely harmonise the definitions of 'emerging disease' in both Codes.

7. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

The Group finalised and adopted the draft report.

…/Appendices

Annex XXXIV (contd)

Appendix I

MEETING OF THE

***AD HOC* GROUP ON NOTIFICATION OF ANIMAL DISEASES AND PATHOGENIC AGENTS**

Paris, 6–8 January 2015

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Annex XXXIV (contd)

Appendix I (contd)

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Annex XXXIV (contd)

Appendix II

TERMS OF REFERENCE
OF
THE *AD HOC* GROUP ON NOTIFICATION OF ANIMAL DISEASES AND PATHOGENIC AGENTS

Paris, 6–8-January 2015

The *ad hoc* Group is kindly requested to:

1) On the basis of Chapter 1.2 of the OIE *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* and *Aquatic Animal Health Code*, assist the OIE in addressing the following points:

   a) Examine and evaluate the disease listing criteria for inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the OIE List.

   b) Assess the need for further definition of disease notification obligations of Member Countries for emerging diseases and modification of the reporting obligations when an emerging disease becomes endemic.

   c) In case of significant proposed changes in criteria, analyse and comment on the results of recent *ad hoc* Groups on some emerging diseases (e.g. PED, MERS, Schmallenberg).

   d) Analyse new emerging diseases such as Ebola and the consequences for disease information reporting.

2) On the basis of the adopted amended Chapter 1.1 during the OIE World Assembly of May 2014, assist the OIE in addressing the following point:

   a) Consider the deletion of reporting non-OIE-listed diseases in the annual report (Article 1.1.3. point 4) and consider replacing it by the information on emerging diseases declared endemic (Article 1.1.4.).

3) Any other business

Annex XXXIV (contd)

Appendix III

MEETING OF THE

***AD HOC* GROUP ON NOTIFICATION OF ANIMAL DISEASES AND PATHOGENIC AGENTS**

Paris, 6–8 January 2015

Agenda

1. Opening

2. Appointment of chairperson and rapporteur

3. Terms of reference for the *ad hoc* Group meeting

   3.1. Examine and evaluate the disease listing criteria for inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the OIE List.

   3.2. Assess the need for further definition of disease notification obligations of Member Countries for emerging diseases and modification of the reporting obligations when an emerging disease becomes endemic.

   3.3. In case of significant proposed changes in criteria, analyse and comment on the results of recent *ad hoc* Groups on some emerging diseases (e.g. PED, MERS, Schmallenberg).

   3.4. Analyse new emerging diseases such as Ebola and the consequences for disease information reporting.

   3.5. Consider the deletion of reporting non-OIE-listed diseases in the annual report (Article 1.1.3. point 4) and consider replacing it by the information on emerging diseases declared endemic (Article 1.1.4.).

4. Any other business

5. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

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