The online versions of the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Aquatic Animal Health Code, Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals have been updated as of 5 September 2025. These updates reflect all new and revised texts adopted at the 92nd WOAH General Session in May 2025.

Resolutions Behind the Updates

All amendments are based on Resolutions adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates during the 92nd General Session, specifically:

• – Resolution No. 23 Amendments to the Aquatic Animal Health Code
• – Resolution No. 24 Amendments to the Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals Resolution
• – Resolution No. 25 Amendments to the Terrestrial Animal Health Code
• – Resolution No. 26 Amendments to the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals

Accessing the Updated Standards

In addition to the dynamic, searchable online version, you can also download PDFs of the entire Terrestrial Code, Aquatic Code, Aquatic Manual or Terrestrial Manual, or of a specific chapter.

To access WOAH Standards, go to: Codes and Manuals – WOAH – World Organisation for Animal Health

Contact: WOAH Standards Department ([email protected]) 

Last updated 28 April 2025

What is HPAI in cattle? 

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) in cattle occurs when a bovine species is infected with an influenza A virus of high pathogenicity in poultry (or HPAI).

In March 2025, HPAI was detected for the first time in dairy cattle in the United States of America (USA). Since then, World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) has been notified of several cases. As of April 2025, the virus is predominantly circulating in the USA, and the dominant strand is H5N1. 

Clinical signs have primarily been observed in lactating dairy cattle, developing over 2–3 weeks. The virus is present mainly in mammary glands, digestive and respiratory systems, it has also been detected in milk and post-mortem in muscle tissue. In affected farms, the morbidity rate of HPAI in cattle typically ranges between 10% – 20%, reaching up to 40% in some cases. Although illness-related mortality remains low (below 5%), the total death rate in herds can surpass 5% due to selective culling of animals that do not return to their pre-disease production levels.

The current circulating strain has demonstrated the capacity to infect a wide range of species including cattle, wild and domestic birds, as well as aquatic and terrestrial wild and domestic mammals, including humans.  

HPAI in cattle is an emerging disease, according to Article 1.1.4 of the Terrestrial Code. Accordingly, upon detection, Veterinary Authorities have a responsibility to send an immediate notification, followed by regular updates, to WOAH through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). 

How is HPAI in cattle transmitted?

The routes and modes of transmission between cattle, the duration of virus shedding as well as the infectious period remain under investigation. Evidence suggests that cattle-to-cattle transmission may occur, likely via direct contact with infected milk, inhalation of the aerosolised virus, or indirect transmission through contaminated clothing and equipment. Additionally, there are also indications of horizontal virus transmission from infected lactating cows to other animals including calves, cats and poultry.

The clinical severity of the disease varies. Infected cattle can present as either asymptomatic or mild illness, or non-specific clinical signs such as reduced milk production with abnormal milk (thicker-colostrum‐like milk), reduced appetite, lethargy, fever, dehydration, altered faecal consistency, respiratory distress and abortions.  

Zoonotic potential: are humans at risk?

While the risk to humans remains low, the ongoing circulation of HPAI in cattle increases the risk of HPAI viruses’ potential adaptation to mammals and potentially spilling over to other livestock species or humans. To date, there is no evidence of specific viral adaptation of HPAI to humans and no evidence of human-to-human transmission.  

Studies have shown that commercial milk pasteurisation inactivates the virus making it safe for human consumption. 

Sporadic human infection with HPAI has been reported, especially in humans who have come into close contact with infected dairy cattle or wild or domestic birds. Those most at risk include professionals working closely with susceptible or infected animals, notably veterinary personnel and farmers. 

Recommended precautions for those at high risk include:  

• Wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), including eye protection, gloves and nose and mouth coverings 

• Regularly cleaning and disinfecting outerwear 

• Thoroughly washing hands after animal contact and before eating 

• Exercising caution when handling raw milk, faeces or bedding material from suspected or infected animals   

The general public is advised to:  

• Avoid direct contact with sick or fallen wild birds, and with sick wild or domestic mammals unless under veterinary supervision or as part of animal care responsibilities 

• Maintain regular good hygiene practices, including handwashing with warm water and soap, particularly after returning home and before handling food 

• Avoid consuming raw milk or dairy products from milk that has not been pasteurised or heat treated 

What is WOAH doing? 

WOAH is committed to supporting its Members in mitigating the risks associated with avian influenza and is closely monitoring the evolution of HPAI in cattle. Close Collaboration with WOAH’s expert network, OFFLU, continues to be a priority. We are also working with other International Organisations to assess the broader implications for animals and for public health within the framework of the One Health Quadripartite and the Global Framework for Transboundary Animal Diseases
(GF-TADs). 
 
We strongly encourage our Members to monitor the occurrence of avian influenza in animals other than birds and to promptly notify relevant events to WOAH through its information system WAHIS.   

Related news

The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), through its EBO-SURSY Project, worked alongside countries for seven years to build their knowledge and design of surveillance networks. With the support of the European Union, the project is dedicated to preventing future outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs), 
and to saving lives while also protecting wildlife health.

Establishing disease surveillance protocols are crucial in saving the lives of human and animals, and the basis of any well-functioning surveillance system. With no system in place, by the time society realises that a viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) like Ebola is present in their community, it is often too late. Each death signals a missed opportunity for a surveillance system to anticipate and effectively prevent an outbreak in the first place.  

The building blocks of a system of surveillance 

While disease surveillance can be achieved in many ways, it can also be prohibitively expensive for some countries. So what makes a surveillance system successful? Professionals in a variety of disciplines are needed, all with a high level of education and frequent trainings to keep them current. In addition, countries must have a regular supply of personal protective equipment, reagent for samples of specific pathogens, and have a functioning cold chain supply, efficient laboratories, and a functional road network. 

And even when a pathogen is correctly identified, the job is not finished. A country must be able to communicate about the pathogen accurately and have channels to share preventative measures with the public. Altogether, these factors create major hurdles. 

EBO-SURSY Project started in 2017 to help countries overcome these barriers. Committed to helping countries develop professional skills, the project has held 11 One Health trainings across 10 countries. The project even developed communication tools to help the Veterinary Services raise awareness about disease and how to protect themselves, and shared them during trainings. Helping professionals all over Western and Central Africa, the project gave trainings on laboratory diagnostics, animal sample collection, ecological factors for diseases and more. By gathering professionals across human, environmental, and animal health (including both wildlife and livestock), EBO-SURSY encouraged developing skills and connections, while also providing a sturdy foundation for the building blocks of a surveillance system.  

EBO-SURSY Project workshops on how to create a disease surveillance protocol 

Of course, not every country and its professionals have the same needs. Each country is uniquely impacted by the diseases that exist in their environment. The EBO-SURSY Project convened three regional workshops (one for Central Africa, francophone West Africa, and anglophone West Africa) to train Veterinary Service and wildlife professionals on how to develop a disease protocol step by step. And each country came prepared knowing their national priority diseases. The goal of instating a disease surveillance protocol is for a country to have a ‘masterplan’ for monitoring a pathogen, and a guideline for how to react in the case of an outbreak to best control the disease from spreading. 

The workshops focused on helping participants think through a protocol in a holistic manner. With professionals engaged from across the One Health spectrum from each country, the representatives from each sector could think through solutions and communication tactics in real time. WOAH stakeholders also played an important role in the workshops, and included Focal Points who are specialists in wildlife, laboratories, communications and disease notifications, as well as each Member’s Veterinary Services and Delegates. This high level of dedication was needed, because putting a disease protocol into place is no easy task, even when there is support. 

Barriers to proper surveillance 

Given the critical nature of a disease surveillance protocol, one might ask, why would a country not already have one? Mostly because it requires a country to have the ability to sample, test and communicate on results. Different types of surveillance sampling also necessitate various levels of effort and financial commitment.   

For example, targeted surveillance in wildlife requires that regular samples are taken from animal populations. This can become expensive, as people would need to regularly locate and access these animals, have a way to trap them, and only then, sample them and submit the sample to a lab. Less wealthy countries might prioritise other diseases, or diseases impacting humans only. Otherwise, there is also passive surveillance, which while requiring similar laboratory capacities, takes samples on an ad-hoc basis from animals found unusually sick or dead. It is therefore less expensive to cover a wider area. 

Despite this complexity, the EBO-SURSY Project was not deterred in helping countries build a surveillance protocol. After the success of the regional workshops, the participants were encouraged to bring their draft disease protocols home to share with their national Veterinary Services.  

Some countries then asked for EBO-SURSY’s support in holding national-level workshops. Led by the national Veterinary Services, they refined the protocols involving multisectoral stakeholders in the country. Three days were needed for the technical development of the protocols, and two days to present the draft plans to national Ministries. The workshops gave countries the opportunity to broaden the health horizon to include animal and environmental health within national plans, while also building personal and professional networks across the One Health sectors.  

Successfully implementing disease surveillance protocols 

By the final year of the EBO-SURSY Project, many countries have achieved their goals. Sierra Leone, the Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic have put Rift Valley Fever protocols into place. Côte d’Ivoire now has one for Lassa fever. Even in countries where a finalised protocol was not adopted, they still made important strides in thinking critically about developing disease protocols, and these drafts could still be implemented in the future.

In other countries, such as Cameroon who already had a finalised protocol for zoonotic diseases, they used EBO-SURSY’s involvement to deepen existing plans and build the capacity of surveillance system stakeholders. The national Veterinary Services in several countries adopted EBO-SURSY VHF communication tools to build awareness in communities. By educating their populations on these diseases, community members can directly participate in surveillance, signaling to authorities when there are unusual animal health events. 

The future of the health of animals, humans and even environments depend on such protocols with One Health principles. They are put into place to protect all of us. They can signal changes in disease patterns, new outbreaks, and hopefully prevent the death of humans and animals alike. While EBO-SURSY Project is soon ending, these disease surveillance protocols will improve health for years to come.

Monkeypox has become the star of recent health news, affecting over 16,000 people in at least 75 countries around the world. Like many other diseases, such as COVID-19 which affected 23 different animal species, monkeypox could cross the species barrier and jump to domestic and wild animals, putting everyone’s health at risk. At the World Organisation for Animal Health, our mission is to improve animal health globally. As monkeypox endangers us all, we must insist on why and how precautions should be taken to reduce the risk of transmission to animals.

Although the current outbreak of monkeypox is driven by human-to-human contact, the disease is known to be of animal origin and can therefore be passed on to certain species.  Various wild mammals have been identified as susceptible to the monkeypox virus, such as rope squirrels, tree squirrels, Gambian pouched rats, dormice and non-human primates. While some of these species exhibit signs and symptoms of the disease, others might not show any external or visible signs, which makes it more challenging to identify spillover events.

Very recently, monkeypox was detected in a dog most likely as a result of human to animal transmission following close direct contact with its owners who were symptomatic with the disease. This was the first documented case of human to animal transmission of the virus. We must remain vigilant. In case of further spillback of the virus from infected humans to animals, new animal reservoirs could be established, and the virus could become endemic in new geographic areas, heightening future risks for public health as well.

The World Organisation for Animal Health is closely monitoring the situation, in coordination with its experts because the heightened prevalence in humans may increase the risk of transmission to animals, and affect the epidemiology of the disease.

Dr Monique Eloit, Director General at the World Organisation for Animal Health

Viral transmission from humans to animals is a possibility that we need to further investigate to understand how likely this is to happen. All settings where we interact closely with animals, like zoos, wildlife rehabilitation facilities, hiking trails or at home with our pets, can facilitate the virus jumping from us to them. The monkeypox virus can enter the body through skin lesions (even those invisible to the naked eye), respiratory tracts, or mucous membranes.

A few (and simple!) precautions must therefore be taken. Always ensure that all waste, including medical waste, is safely disposed of and made inaccessible to rodent or other scavenger animals. And, if you are suspected or confirmed to be infected with the monkeypox virus, you should avoid all direct contact with animals, including livestock, wildlife, and even your pets.

We all need to be cautious. Monkeypox is yet another example of how human and animal health are interconnected. Only with strong multi-sectoral collaboration between public health experts, veterinarians, and wildlife authorities can we tackle diseases such as monkeypox, and ensure a safe future for us all.