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TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION

Proposed amendments to the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*

[Technical Working Document]



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for Animal Health

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Introduction

1. Since the 92nd General Session in May 2025, the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (the Code Commission) met twice from 9 to 18 September 2025 and from 3 to 13 February 2026. Among its activities, the Commission progressed work on the development of new and revised texts of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (the *Terrestrial Code*), in accordance with its work programme. Details of the Code Commission's meetings are available on the Delegate's website and the [WOAH website](#).
2. This document provides background information for each of the new and revised texts of the *Terrestrial Code* that will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026. When revising these texts, the Code Commission considered comments submitted by Members and by International Organisations that have a Cooperation Agreement with WOA, recommendations from several *ad hoc* Group reports, as well as subject-matter experts. The Code Commission also worked in cooperation with the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Scientific Commission), the Biological Standards Commission, the Aquatic Animal Health Standards Commission and WOA Working Groups.
3. Details of the Code Commission's most recent considerations of comments received on draft texts circulated for comment were provided in the Commission's [September 2025](#) and [February 2026](#) reports. **The Commission encourages Members to refer to these reports for more details on the revised texts to be proposed for adoption.**
4. The revisions to the *Terrestrial Code* presented in **Annexes 5 to 17** will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session. The annex numbers used in this document align with the annex numbers provided in the Code Commission's [February 2026](#) report. Proposed new or revised amendments are shown in the usual manner by 'double underline' and 'strikethrough'. For proposed new chapters, only amendments made since first circulation are shown.

1. *Terrestrial Code* texts to be proposed for adoption

1.1 *New Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' (Annex 7)*

5. A new Chapter 4.X. has been developed to include guidance with clear recommendations on biosecurity, general principles for implementation regarding roles and responsibilities, sources, pathways and components.
6. The revised text has been circulated four times, the first time was in the September 2023 Code Commission report.
7. The new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity' is presented in [Annex 7](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

1.2 *Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of commodities' and 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres' (Annexes 8 to 11)*

8. Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. has been revised to clarify management of the risks associated with the introduction of diseases through the international trade or movements of commodities.
9. The revised chapters include general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable when exporting, transit or importing, as well as applicable for border inspection posts and quarantine centres.
10. The revised texts have been circulated four or five times, the first time was in either the September 2023 or the September 2024 Code Commission report.

11. The revised Chapter 5.4. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities', Chapter 5.5. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities', Chapter 5.6. 'Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities' and Chapter 5.7. 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres' are presented in [Annex 8](#), [Annex 9](#), [Annex 10](#) and [Annex 11](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.
- 1.3 *Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter' (Annex 12)*
12. Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. has been revised to update the points that had been left [under study] such as parameters for electrical water-bath stunning for poultry.
13. The revised text has been circulated three times, the first time was in the February 2025 Code Commission report.
14. The revised Article 7.5.30. of Chapter 7.5. 'Animal welfare during slaughter' is presented in [Annex 12](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.
- 1.4 *Articles 8.8.3, 8.8.4. and 8.8.8. of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus' (Annex 13)*
15. Articles 8.8.3., 8.8.4. and 8.8.8. of Chapter 8.8. have been revised to harmonise the provisions for official recognition and maintenance of free status, and endorsement and maintenance of official control programmes with other disease-specific chapters with official recognition of status.
16. The revised texts were drafted by the Code Commission in collaboration with the Scientific Commission.
17. The revised texts have been circulated twice, the first time was in the September 2025 Code Commission report.
18. The revised Articles 8.8.3., 8.8.4. and 8.8.8. of Chapter 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus' are presented in [Annex 13](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.
- 1.5 *Articles 15.2.3. and 15.2.5. of Chapter 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus' (Annex 14)*
19. Articles 15.2.3. and 15.2.5. of Chapter 15.2. have been revised to harmonise the provisions for official recognition and maintenance of free status, and endorsement and maintenance of official control programmes with other disease-specific chapters with official recognition of status.
20. The revised texts were drafted by the Code Commission in collaboration with the Scientific Commission.
21. The revised texts have been circulated twice, the first time was in the September 2025 Code Commission report.
22. The revised Articles 15.2.3. and 15.2.5. of Chapter 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus' is presented in [Annex 14](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.
- 1.6 *Chapter 8.20. 'Infection with Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)' (Annex 15)*
23. Chapter 8.20. has been revised to Article 8.20.1. 'General provisions', including a definition of its occurrence and animal hosts, to provide Members with precise definitions to fulfil their notification obligations.

24. The chapter was also revised to align the text with the framework for disease-specific chapters. In addition, a new Article 8.20.2bis 'Recovery of free status' has been developed by the Code Commission.
25. The revised Article 8.20.1. was drafted by the Code Commission based on a case definition drafted by subject-matter experts that had been reviewed by the Scientific Commission.
26. The revised text has been circulated three times, the first time was in the February 2025 Code Commission report.
27. The revised Chapter 8.20. 'Infection with *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia)' is presented in [Annex 15](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

1.7 New Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' (Annex 16)

28. A new Chapter 8.X. has been developed to include a single Article 8.X.1. 'General provisions', including a definition of its occurrence and animal hosts, to provide Members with precise definition to fulfil their notification obligations.
29. The new chapter was drafted by the Code Commission based on a case definition drafted by subject-matter experts that had been reviewed by the Scientific Commission.
30. The revised text has been circulated four times, the first time was in the September 2024 Code Commission report.
31. The new Chapter 8.X. 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus' is presented in [Annex 16](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

1.8 New Chapter 10.X. 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chicken)' (Annex 17)

32. A new Chapter 10.X. has been developed to include a single Article 10.X.1. 'General provisions', including a definition of its occurrence and animal hosts, to provide Members with precise definition to fulfil their notification obligations.
33. The new chapter was drafted by the Code Commission based on a case definition drafted by subject-matter experts that had been reviewed by the Scientific Commission.
34. The revised text has been circulated four times, the first time in the September 2024 Code Commission report.
35. The new Chapter 10.X. 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chicken)' is presented in [Annex 17](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

1.9 Glossary: 'approved', 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan', 'border inspection post', 'container', 'disinfection', 'disinsection', 'isolation', 'laboratory', 'pathogenic agent', 'point of entry', 'point of exit', 'quarantine centre', 'seroconversion', 'swill', 'transit country' and 'means of transport' (Annex 5)

'Approved' and 'laboratory'

36. The Code Commission revised the Glossary definitions for 'approved' and 'laboratory' to expand the scope of the definitions.
37. The revised text of 'laboratory' was developed by the Code Commission, in collaboration with the Biological Standards Commission.

38. The revised text has been circulated twice, the first time was in the September 2025 Code Commission report.

'Biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan', 'disinfection', 'pathogenic agent' and 'swill'

39. As part of work to develop new Chapter 4.X. 'Biosecurity', the Code Commission revised the Glossary definitions for 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan' and 'disinfection'; and developed new Glossary definitions for 'pathogenic agent' and 'swill'.
40. The new and revised definitions have been circulated four or five times, the first time was in either the September 2023 or the September 2024 Code Commission report.

'Border inspection post', 'container', isolation', 'point of entry', 'point of exit', 'quarantine centre', 'transit country' and 'means of transport'

41. As part of work to revise Chapters 5.4. to 5.7. 'Measures and procedures applicable to exportation, transit and importation of commodities' and 'Border inspection posts and quarantine centres', the Code Commission revised the Glossary definitions for 'border inspection post', 'container', 'quarantine centre', 'transit country' and 'means of transport'; and developed new Glossary definitions for 'isolation', 'point of entry' and 'point of exit'.
42. The new and revised definitions have been circulated three or four times, the first time was in either the September 2023 or the September 2024 Code Commission report.

'Disinsection' and 'seroconversion'

43. The Code Commission developed new Glossary definitions for 'disinsection' and 'seroconversion' to clarify the use of these terms in the *Terrestrial Code*.
44. The new definitions have been circulated three times, the first time was in February 2025 Code Commission report.
45. The revised Glossary definitions for 'approved', 'biosecurity', 'biosecurity plan', 'border inspection post', 'container', 'disinfection', 'laboratory', 'quarantine centre', 'transit country' and 'means of transport'; and the new Glossary definitions for 'disinsection', 'isolation', 'pathogenic agent', 'point of entry', 'point of exit', 'seroconversion' and 'swill' are presented in [Annex 5](#) and will be proposed for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

1.10 Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.3. and 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAH' (Annex 6)

46. Amendments to the following listed diseases in Chapter 1.3. have been proposed to align with the proposed amendments to relevant disease-specific chapters:

In Article 1.3.1:

- replace 'Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever' with 'Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus';
- replace 'Tularemia' with 'Infection with *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia)';

In Article 1.3.3:

- replace 'Turkey rhinotracheitis' with 'Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chicken)';

47. 'Nairobi sheep disease' has been removed from Article 1.3.7. as it does not meet the criteria for listing described in Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

48. The revised text of Articles 1.3.1. and 1.3.3. has been circulated twice, the first time was in September 2025 Code Commission report, and the revised text of Article 1.3.7. has been circulated three times, the first time was in the February 2025 Code Commission report.
49. Revised Articles 1.3.1., 1.3.3. and 1.3.7. of Chapter 1.3. 'Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAH' are presented in [Annex 6](#) and will be presented for adoption at the 93rd General Session in May 2026.

.../... Annexes

2. Annexes

Annex 5. – ‘Glossary’

GLOSSARY

APPROVED

means officially approved, accredited, or registered or recognised by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authority.

BIOSECURITY

means a set of management, behavioural and physical measures designed to reduce the likelihood risk of entry of pathogenic agents into a given population and the exposure of *animals* to these pathogenic agents introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents animal diseases, infections or infestations in order to avoid their establishment and spread within and from and within an animal that population.

BIOSECURITY PLAN

means a plan document or series of documents that identifies potential sources and pathways and factors for entry of pathogenic agents into a given population, and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of these pathogenic agents the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents disease in a zone or compartment, and that describes the corresponding biosecurity measures to be implemented and the mechanisms to evaluate its performance and to update the plan it which are being or will be applied to mitigate the disease risks, if applicable, in accordance with the recommendations in the Terrestrial Code.

BORDER INSPECTION POST

means any airport, or any port, railway station or road check point international point of entry for commodities open to international trade of commodities, and associated facilities, where import veterinary official inspections can be is performed by Veterinary Services.

CONTAINER

means a non-self-propelled receptacle or other rigid structure for holding animals to carry hold commodities during transportation a journey by one or several means of transport.

DISINFECTION

means an action the application, after thorough cleansing, of procedures intended to inactivate or destroy pathogenic agents on potentially contaminated objects and surfaces, the infectious or parasitic agents of animal diseases, including zoonoses; this applies to premises, vehicles and different objects which may have been directly or indirectly contaminated.

DISINSECTION

means an action intended to kill or eliminate arthropods from establishments, means of transport, slaughterhouses or any other premises or equipment used for animals.

ISOLATION

means the placement physical separation of an animal or a group of animals separated from other animals under appropriate adequate biosecurity.

LABORATORY

means a properly equipped institution staffed by technically competent personnel under the control of a specialist in veterinary diagnostic methods, who is responsible for the validity of the results. The Veterinary Authority approves and monitors such laboratories with regard to the diagnostic tests required for international trade.

means an *approved* facility used for diagnosis, research, or to develop and manufacture *biological products*. Some *laboratories* may manipulate pathogenic agents *in vivo* or *in vitro*, and store and dispose of *biological products* and *pathological material*.

PATHOGENIC AGENT

means a biological agent that causes, or contributes to, the development of a disease in *animals*.

POINT OF ENTRY

means any point-specific location at which *commodities* enter the territory of a country.

POINT OF EXIT

means any point-specific location from where *commodities* leave the territory of a country ~~the exporting country~~.

QUARANTINE STATION CENTRE

means an *establishment* under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* where *animals* are maintained in isolation for observation, and if appropriate, testing and treatment, during a specified length of time under appropriate adequate *biosecurity* to prevent with no direct or indirect ~~ensure no~~ contact with other *animals* and *vectors* when relevant, to ensure so that there is no transmission entry of specified pathogenic agents from entering outside into nor ~~escape~~ escaping out of the *establishment* while the *animals* are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and, if appropriate, testing or treatment.

SEROCONVERSION

means either the change from a seronegative to a seropositive state ~~condition~~ of an *animal*, demonstrated by a serological test specific for the antigen, or a four-fold or more rise in antibody titre in paired sera of an animal, sampled at an appropriate interval, ~~demonstrated by an ordinal test specific for the antigen.~~

SWILL

means food scraps or food waste, that contain or have been in contact with *animal products*, and which may be used as *feed*.

TRANSIT COUNTRY

means a country through which *commodities* destined for another country ~~an importing country~~ are transported or in which they make a stopover ~~is made at a border post~~.

VEHICLE/VESSEL MEANS OF TRANSPORT

means any means of conveyance including any land vehicle, a train, truck, trailer, aircraft or ship/vessel that is used for carrying transporting animals *commodities*.

Annex 6. – ‘Diseases, infections and infestations listed by WOAH’

CHAPTER 1.3.

DISEASES, INFECTIONS AND INFESTATIONS LISTED BY WOAH

[...]

Article 1.3.1.

The following are included within the category of diseases, *infections* and *infestations* of multiple species:

- Anthrax
- ~~Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever~~
- Heartwater
- Infection with Aujeszky's disease virus
- Infection with bluetongue virus
- Infection with *Brucella abortus*, *Brucella melitensis* and *Brucella suis*
- Infection with *Coxiella burnetii* (Q fever)
- Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
- Infection with *Echinococcus granulosus*
- Infection with *Echinococcus multilocularis*
- Infection with epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus
- Infection with foot and mouth disease virus
- Infection with *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia)
- Infection with *Leishmania* spp. (Leishmaniosis)
- Infection with *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* complex
- Infection with Nipah virus
- Infection with rabies virus
- Infection with Rift Valley fever virus
- Infection with rinderpest virus
- Infection with *Trichinella* spp.
- Infection with *Trypanosoma brucei*, *Trypanosoma congolense*, *Trypanosoma simiae* and *Trypanosoma vivax*

- Infection with *Trypanosoma evansi* (Surra)
- Infestation with *Chrysomya bezziana* (Old World screwworm)
- Infestation with *Cochliomyia hominivorax* (New World screwworm)
- Japanese encephalitis
- Paratuberculosis
- ~~Tularemia~~
- West Nile fever.

[...]

Article 1.3.3.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of aves:

- Avian chlamydiosis
- Avian infectious bronchitis
- Avian infectious laryngotracheitis
- Duck virus hepatitis
- Fowl typhoid
- Infection of birds other than *poultry*, including *wild* birds, with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity
- Infection of domestic and *captive wild* birds with low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses having proven natural transmission to humans associated with severe consequences
- Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)
- Infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses
- Infection with *Mycoplasma gallisepticum* (Avian mycoplasmosis)
- Infection with *Mycoplasma synoviae* (Avian mycoplasmosis)
- Infection with Newcastle disease virus
- Infectious bursal disease (Gumboro disease)
- Pullorum disease
- ~~Turkey rhinotracheitis.~~

[...]

Article 1.3.7.

The following are included within the category of diseases and *infections* of caprinae:

- Caprine arthritis/encephalitis
- Contagious agalactia
- Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
- Infection with *Chlamydia abortus* (Enzootic abortion of ewes, ovine chlamydiosis)
- Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus
- Infection with *Theileria lestoquardi*, *Theileria luwenshuni* and *Theileria uilenbergi*
- Maedi–visna
- ~~Nairobi sheep disease~~
- Ovine epididymitis (*Brucella ovis*)
- Salmonellosis (*S. abortusovis*)
- Scrapie
- Sheep pox and goat pox.

[...]

Annex 7. – Chapter 4.X. ‘Biosecurity’

SECTION 4.

DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 4.X.

BIOSECURITY

Article 4.X.1.

Introduction

Biosecurity is the cornerstone of animal health programmes and as such should be implemented to prevent and control diseases in *populations*. In addition to reducing the risk of disease, the expected benefits of *biosecurity* include a reduced ~~need for~~ use of veterinary medicinal products; reduced *killing* of *animals* for disease control purposes; reduced economic losses; protection of livelihoods; ~~assurance of sustainability of~~ improved and sustainable animal production; improved animal welfare; improved food security and food safety; promotion of animal, human and environmental health; ~~and assurance of safe trade and business continuity.~~

Article 4.X.2.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles and recommendations to allow for a consistent approach that could be applied to implement *biosecurity* for a *population* or *subpopulation* irrespective of the settings or scale, such as at ~~farm production or non-production establishment, herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, zone, compartment, herd/flock, farm or non-production establishment level.~~

The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance to the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant actors, as described in Article 4.X.4., on the principles, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of *biosecurity* to support disease prevention and control programmes. The chapter applies to *animals*, their gatherings and husbandry systems, to all components of animal keeping, ~~and transport and processing,~~ and to the interface between domesticated *animals*, wildlife, humans and wildlife and the environment.

More specifically, this chapter aims to:

- describe the general ~~guiding~~ principles of *biosecurity*;
- identify the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in *biosecurity*;
- describe the potential sources of pathogenic agents and the pathways involved in their introduction into and transmission within the population; ~~for entry of pathogenic agents into a population and the exposure of animals and factors for the transmission of pathogenic agents;~~
- describe the components of *biosecurity*;
- provide guidance on the design, application, monitoring, evaluation and training with regards to *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

This chapter should be read in conjunction with other relevant chapters in Section 3 ‘Quality of Veterinary Services’, Section 4 ‘Disease prevention and control’ and Section 5 ‘Trade measures, import/export procedures and veterinary certification’.

The chapter does not apply to laboratories, ~~whose a~~ Approaches to laboratory *biosecurity* are addressed in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 4.X.3.

General guiding principles

The specific desired objectives of biosecurity should be defined. To achieve these objectives of biosecurity, the following should be considered:

- 1) The *population* for which *biosecurity* is to be implemented, including its management, environmental and epidemiological context and size and its *animal health status*.
- 2) The identification of the ~~hazards~~ pathogenic agents of concern and from where and how they may be introduced, and how they may be ~~the pathogenic agents may be introduced,~~ established and spread within in and spread from the population.
- 3) The factors and frequency of events that influence the introduction, establishment and spread of pathogenic agents.
- 4) Scientific evidence to assess the risk.
- 5) ~~and~~ Proportionality and social acceptance of the measures to manage the risk.
- 6) ~~Sustainability, adaptability, and monitoring of measures.~~
- 7) ~~Human behaviour to maximise compliance and vulnerabilities.~~
- 7) ~~Evaluation of compliance built into the day to day operations.~~
- 8) Socio-economic impacts of *biosecurity*.
- 9) Impacts of measures on other *populations* and the environment.
- 10) Development of a biosecurity plan that supports ~~promotes~~ consistent implementation of *biosecurity*.
- 11) Engagement with, training and awareness of, and communication with, all actors involved in *biosecurity*.

These principles general principles provisions of biosecurity apply to any type of activity involving animals (~~intensive, extensive, commercial or non-production~~); only the measures comprising ~~the~~ biosecurity should be adapted to the ~~situation~~ settings and to the availability of resources.

Article 4.X.4.

Roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of different actors in *biosecurity* should be clearly defined and communicated ~~with consideration made and may vary depending on~~ to the population and level of application context (~~e.g. such as establishment, compartment, zone, or country~~ country, zone, compartment, establishment level), the scale and type of operations and existing potential public-private partnerships. Implementation of *biosecurity* requires adequate financial and human resources, and engagement, and collaboration and communication amongst all actors involved.

12) Veterinary Authority or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should be responsible for the development and oversight of ~~policy on and legislative frameworks and general policies~~ for biosecurity. These ~~policies~~ should include the relative contribution and roles of *veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* in both the private and public sectors, promote and provide guidance for the implementation of *biosecurity*. When required For for international trade purposes, the *Veterinary Authority* should have an active role in ~~enforcement,~~ oversight, and verification of *biosecurity* and *biosecurity plans*.

12) Veterinary Services should execute and implement policies and legislation on *biosecurity* under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities*.

23) Veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals and other relevant advisors should give advice on *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plans* to all relevant actors. This advice should be aligned with the policies and legislation, where available.

34) ~~Animal Breeders~~ breeders, owners, managers, keepers, and transporters, ~~feed producers and other relevant actors~~, are responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring *biosecurity* and the *biosecurity plan* and should seek advice from *veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals* or other relevant advisors.

45) Training entities should provide training in *biosecurity* for relevant actors. Coordination between the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, the *veterinary statutory body* and veterinary educational institutions may be required to ensure *biosecurity* training delivered to *veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals* and other relevant advisors meets relevant standards, especially the recommendations of Article 4.X.9.

56) Farmer associations, veterinary and ~~para-veterinary~~ veterinary paraprofessional associations, and other relevant associations should advocate and promote *biosecurity* among their members, and may become directly involved in leading, and overseeing and providing training for the biosecurity planning and implementation by their members.

Article 4.X.5.

Potential sources of pathogenic agents

Pathogenic agents can ~~be spread through~~ from different sources, which should be identified and considered when implementing *biosecurity* and developing a *biosecurity plan*. ~~The main~~ Potential sources of pathogenic agents ~~to be considered~~ include:

- 1) live animals,
- 2) germinal products,
- 3) animal secretions and excretions,
- 4) animal products,
- 5) dead *animals* and parts thereof and afterbirth materials,
- 6) arthropods such as mosquitoes, midges, flies, lice, ~~or~~ ticks or beetles,
- 7) fomites such as peoples' clothing, ~~and boots~~ footwear, vehicles means of transport, containers, crates, bedding, or farm equipment,
- 8) *feed* and *feed ingredients* ~~including~~ such as manufactured feed, forage, grazing pastures and swill,
- 9) water, soil and air,
- 10) *biological products*,
- 11) humans.

Article 4.X.6.

Transmission pathways

Transmission of pathogenic agents can occur either through *animal-to-animal* contact without an intermediate (direct transmission), or through an intermediate such as fomites, air, water, feed, animal products, germinal products, biological products, vectors, humans and the relevant animal environment (indirect transmission). Transmission pathways of pathogenic agents should be assessed based on scientific evidence and considered when implementing *biosecurity* or developing a *biosecurity plan*. Transmission pathways are not mutually exclusive and include:

- 1) ~~Vertical-Transmission~~transmission from parents to offspring *in ovo, in utero* or during birth (“vertical transmission”).
- 2) ~~Horizontal transmission from one animal to another that is not vertical.~~
- 3) Iatrogenic transmission.
- 34) Sexual transmission through reproductive secretions such as semen and vaginal fluids or transmitted directly between surfaces in contact during mating.
- 45) Vector-borne transmission via *vectors* including blood-feeding arthropods such as mosquitoes, flies, ticks, fleas and lice. *Vectors* may be mechanical with no biological association between the *vector* and pathogenic agent or biological where the pathogenic agent undergoes—a multiplication or—a developmental change within the *vector*, necessary for survival, transmission or host *infection*.
- 56) Droplets or airborne transmission of pathogenic agents through via particles of multiple sizes suspended in the air, inhaled or deposited on mucosal surfaces (e.g. respiratory tract or conjunctiva). Pathogenic agents may travel in particles of multiple sizes (droplets and droplet nuclei) that remain suspended in the air or deposited on surfaces. Airborne transmission may ~~occur over~~ include short or long distances (which may be referred to as aerosol transmission or wind-borne transmission, respectively).
- 6)7) ~~Transmission through fomites, germinal products, animal products and biological products. Transmission via water, feed, animal products and fomites,-~~
- 7) ~~Transmission through skin, the digestive tract (ingestion), or other mucosal surfaces, or breaches in the skin.~~

The relative importance of the different transmission pathways will vary depending on factors such as the epidemiological characteristics of pathogenic agents of concern, animal hosts, population structure, management practices and environmental conditions.

Article 4.X.7.

Components of biosecurity

Biosecurity can be applied to any type of *population*. The components of *biosecurity* focus on reducing the ~~likelihood~~ risk of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the *population* (external *biosecurity*) and on reducing ~~risk—the likelihood of~~ transmission of pathogenic agents within the *population* (internal *biosecurity*). The components of *biosecurity* aim at avoiding or breaking the transmission pathways described in Article 4.X.6. All relevant components of *biosecurity* should be applied to address all potential sources of pathogenic agents of concern, transmission pathways as well as unexpected events, and may vary according to the *population*.

1. Components of external biosecurity may include the following:
 - a) Introduction of *animals, animal products* and *germinal products* into a population should be limited to the extent necessary ~~minimised~~ and if undertaken, the *animal health status* of the source *population* should be assessed.
 - b) ~~Whenever~~ Before *animals of unknown or different animal health status* are ~~newly~~ introduced into the *population*, they should go through a monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures such as tests or treatments may be implemented to reduce ~~mitigate~~ the ~~risk-likelihood of~~ transmission of pathogenic agents.
 - c) Contact between *populations* of unknown or different *animal health status* should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, physical or natural barriers.
 - d) Human access to the *population* should be controlled. When humans come in contact with *animals*, they should take measures to reduce ~~mitigate~~ the ~~risk~~ likelihood of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, which includes as a minimum wearing dedicated clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene. When humans come in contact sequentially with different populations subsequently, the order and timing of the visits should be organised to minimise the likelihood of bi-directional transmission.

- e) Equipment and clothing used to handle or care for *animals* should not be shared between different *populations*. If shared, equipment and clothing should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* at least before each use and after use.
- f) ~~Transport vehicles~~ Means of transport and containers in contact with *animals* or their ~~animal products~~ should undergo cleaning and *disinfection* at least before each use and after use.
- g) *Animal products*, faeces, manure, bedding or other waste materials should be handled, stored and disposed of in a way to ~~mitigate~~ minimise the spread of pathogenic agents. Special care should be taken to avoid contact with or attraction of other *animals* and arthropods.
- h) Dead *animals* and parts thereof should be handled, stored and disposed of in a way to ~~mitigate~~ minimise the spread of pathogenic agents and to avoid contact with or attraction of other *animals* and arthropods.
- i) *Feed* should be produced in accordance with Chapter 6.4. and should be, stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents. Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided.
- j) Water should originate from low-risk sources, be stored and delivered in a way to minimise contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents, or be treated to remove or inactivate pathogenic agents. The safety of the water ~~and feed~~ should be checked regularly.
- k) Contacts between the *population* and other *animals* including pets, birds, rodents, insects, and other wildlife, as well as arthropods, or pests should be ~~minimised~~ avoided by selecting an appropriate sites and through using engineering, mechanical or chemical control.
- l) To ~~prevent~~ minimise airborne transmission of pathogenic agents, sufficient distance or physical barriers between *populations* and ~~possible potential~~ sources of pathogenic agents should be considered. In some circumstances, air treatments might be considered.
- m) When cleaning and *disinfection* or other measures are not feasible or effectiveness is undetermined, an ~~additional period~~ may be applied to avoid ~~of no~~ contact between a *population* to be introduced and potential sources of pathogenic agents (e.g. humans, buildings, ~~vehicles~~ means of transport, containers, equipment, materials, pastures) ~~and the *population* may be applied~~. The effectiveness of this measure will depend on the specific circumstances and should be verified.

2. Components of internal biosecurity may include the following:

- a) Sick *animals* should be detected, isolated, and their condition diagnosed to prevent other *animals* from being exposed. Treatments should be administered in a way that safely to avoid iatrogenic transmission.
- b) All-in all-out management should be applied, as appropriate, to all *animals* kept in the same space including cleaning and *disinfection* of the space between consecutive groups of *animals*.
- c) Stocking densities that result in ~~impaired health through~~ increased transmission rates, which and may cause higher virulence of pathogenic agents, or increased susceptibility to *infections*, should be avoided.
- d) Within the *population*, *units* with different characteristics impacting disease risk should be kept separately.
- e) When the management of the *population* involves contact with different *units*, the workflow should be organised from the lowest to the highest risk of *infection*, considering transmission of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the *units*. When moving between the *units*, measures to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents should be applied.
- f) Cleaning and *disinfection* of the equipment and surfaces should be applied between consecutive groups of *animals*.

Biosecurity plan

~~The aim of a *biosecurity plan* is to organise, structure and document *biosecurity* including its evaluation. A *biosecurity plan* promotes consistent implementation of *biosecurity*, while remaining based on scientific knowledge and field experience, scientifically justifiable, and it should balance the objectives and intended benefits with the practicality, cost, regulatory requirements and should include necessary provisions for its maintenance and continuous improvement. The aim of a *biosecurity plan* is to organise, structure and document *biosecurity* including its evaluation.~~

The *biosecurity plan* should include the following sections:

a) Purpose and scope

This section should provide an overview of the plan, its purpose and scope. In addition, it should outline the goals and objectives of the plan, as well as the *population* characteristics, including animal husbandry systems, and epidemiological context.

b) Roles and responsibilities

Design, implementation, and monitoring is a shared responsibility. Therefore, it is essential to identify and describe the roles and responsibilities of all actors, as well as the chain of command, to ensure for ensuring adherence and compliance with *biosecurity*.

c) Identification of pathogenic agents, sources and transmission pathways

In addition to the identification of the potential pathogenic agents of concern, this section should include their potential sources and transmission pathways.

d) Description of biosecurity

This section should describe the relevant components of *biosecurity* in accordance with Article 4.X.7. including corrective actions in response to biosecurity breaches.

~~It should also include relevant response procedures for emergencies.~~

e) Surveillance of pathogenic agents

The *biosecurity plan* should include the procedures for surveillance for early detection ~~to detect the presence of~~ pathogenic agents of concern, in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

f) Communication and reporting

This section should outline the procedures for communicating information about the *biosecurity plan* to all relevant actors. It should also include procedures for reporting incidents and sharing information with relevant authorities.

g) Training and education

This section should outline the training and education needs and identify programmes to ensure all relevant actors are aware of the *biosecurity plan* and clearly understand their roles and responsibilities to implement and maintain the *biosecurity* and the consequences of non-compliance.

h) Supporting documents

This section should outline the standard operating procedures (SOPs), checklists, and record-keeping templates which describe routine management processes and ensure that responsibilities and duties are consistently fulfilled and documented. It should also include relevant training materials for all actors involved in the implementation of the *biosecurity plan*.

i) Evaluation and continuous improvement

This section should describe the procedures for monitoring and evaluation of the *biosecurity plan* and its implementation in accordance with Article 4.X.10. Biosecurity incidents and breaches in *biosecurity*, as well as corrective actions taken, should be documented. The *biosecurity plan* should be reviewed and updated regularly to ensure its relevance and effectiveness.

Article 4.X.9.

Training and awareness

1. Training

Regular training on *biosecurity* should be undertaken according to the needs identified and should include all relevant actors. Training should be provided by those with sufficient qualifications and experience. The training should be in line with legislative and policy frameworks. Such training may include:

- Principles of *biosecurity*,
- Sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways and relevant factors to susceptibility,
- Components and implementation of *biosecurity*, ~~including emergency planning and response,~~
- Monitoring and evaluation of *biosecurity*,
- Purpose, development and implementation of a *biosecurity plan*,
- Competency-based training requirements should be identified and documented for each actor. The training achieved should be recorded and monitored to ensure the required level of competencies are obtained or maintained.

2. Awareness

All relevant actors described in Article 4.X.4. and the general public, when applicable, should be made aware of the importance of *biosecurity* (and the *biosecurity plan* if appropriate) at strategic places (e.g. *border inspection posts*, farm entrances, markets, veterinary clinics) and times (e.g. disease *outbreaks*, changes in the epidemiological situation) by effective tailored communication. Raising awareness may be the responsibility of the *Veterinary Authority*, other relevant *Competent Authorities*, or Veterinary Services, ~~or Producers~~, and other relevant actors may also be responsible depending on the context and extent of the *risk*.

Article 4.X.10.

Evaluation and continuous improvement

The implementation of *biosecurity*, the compliance with the *biosecurity plan* and the effectiveness of implemented measures should be subjected to evaluation for continuous improvement.

- 1) The evaluation of implementation should be based on predefined scope and criteria, taking into consideration the expected scale of the operation and the characteristics of the *population* concerned. This will determine at which level of responsibility the evaluation should be conducted, and at which frequency. The frequency should be adapted to changing circumstances such as *new animal health status*, newly identified pathogenic agents or changes in epidemiological situation, previous evaluations, changes in production or changes in the *biosecurity plan*. The evaluation should determine the level of implementation of *biosecurity*, through collected evidence that may include documentation of procedures, other routine records, monitoring technologies, onsite audits as well as interviews with personnel. Based on these findings, the evaluation may allow the establishment of a risk-based *biosecurity score* as a whole or for each measure.
- 2) Compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in production type, the epidemiological situation, or other significant changes that may affect the compliance.

Documented evidence of compliance should be collected routinely and be provided for any evaluation. The evaluation of compliance with the *biosecurity plan* should be executed preferably by an independent party, in accordance with the policies and legislation, where available.

- 3) The effectiveness of the *biosecurity plan* should be evaluated routinely or following a change in production type, epidemiological situation, or other significant change, to ensure the *biosecurity plan* is complete, fit for purpose and up to date. The evaluation should be based on animal health or performance data. The outcomes of the evaluations should be communicated to all relevant actors and should inform if the plan needs to be modified, and which risk mitigation or corrective actions are needed so that the *biosecurity plan* can be updated accordingly.
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Annex 8. – Chapter 5.4. ‘Measures and procedures applicable to the exportation of commodities’

CHAPTER 5.4.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE IN- TO THE EXPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.4.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~in to~~ the exportation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities, commercial or non-commercial*, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, covering from the facilities of origin (such as an establishment, slaughterhouse/abattoir, semen collection centre) to the *point of exit*.

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ refer to the ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ of the exporting country unless otherwise specified.

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

This chapter provides *exporting countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their the Veterinary Authority, or other relevant Competent Authorities, and of operators, business operators any natural or legal entity or person responsible for export of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter ‘operator’), in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.3. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~performance implementation of~~ official controls for exportation.

While this This chapter applies to all *commodities*; some recommendations are ~~specifically~~ addressed to ~~specific~~ certain of these *commodities*.

Article 5.4.2.

General considerations

The *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* ~~should ensure that make~~ ensure operators are aware of the *importing country* requirements, if they are available to the Veterinary Authority in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. In addition, the Veterinary Authority should make operators aware of the processes required to meet the conditions of the international veterinary certificate including the importing country requirements, including all information required for the agreed international veterinary certificate, in accordance with Article 5.1.1. and Chapter 5.3., are available to exporters.

The *Veterinary Authority of the exporting country* ~~should be responsible for the implementation performance~~ of official controls in coordination with other relevant *Competent Authorities* in accordance with *veterinary legislation* to ensure that exported *commodities* ~~can be traded safely and meet the requirements of the importing country requirements. Its~~ Their legal mandate and responsibilities of the *Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities*, as described in Article 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the export official controls activities at any all steps in the export process and the opportunity to request from the operator exporter any necessary information. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority and or other relevant Competent Authorities may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the exporting country for the Veterinary Services to allow these effectively implement official controls ~~to be undertaken effectively and to properly apply the certification obligations and procedures laid down in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2., in accordance with the quality principles described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should cooperate closely with all relevant authorities, including the customs authority and other law enforcement authorities of the exporting country dealing with exports to ensure that official controls are implemented performed effectively; and to protect to maintain the status compliance of the commodities with importing country requirements without creating unjustified barriers to trade. This cooperation should also cover actions to prevent and combat fraud or illegal pathways.

The *Veterinary Authority* should have procedures, as applicable, for certification of the *animal health status* of the herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, zone, compartment, or herd/flock as well as of the disease situation in *establishments* and other premises and communicate with the operator-exporter regarding any additional documentary evidence that may be required to support such certification.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ should ensure that the applicable certified *animal health status* of the herd/flock, compartment, zone, or country, zone, compartment, or herds/flock or animals, is based on appropriate *surveillance* and reporting in accordance with Chapter 1.4.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities ~~in the exporting country~~ should have procedures for registration and approval of *establishments* of origin, where applicable, and other facilities used for production and handling of consignments, to comply with the agreed-international veterinary certificate. Operators should not hinder access by the *Veterinary Authority* to the *commodities*, the premises where they are located and the means by which they are transported of transport. During official controls, operators should assist and cooperate with the *Veterinary Authority Services* and make available all relevant information concerning the consignment.

The *Veterinary Authority* should have procedures in place for the international veterinary certification of sanitary conditions of individual animals.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should ensure that appropriate identification of *commodities* is in place to support traceability offer the consignment to comply with its the agreed-international veterinary certificate. *Animal identification* should be in accordance with Chapter 4.2. and Chapter 4.3.

Upon request from the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country* or from the *Veterinary Authority* of a the transit country, the *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should provide additional information on the process to ensure compliance with the conditions included in the agreed-international veterinary certificate, and undertake investigation and reporting, and give reasonable access for audit in case of repeated non-compliant consignments jeopardising the safety of trade. The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should take ensure that the appropriate and necessary preventive measures to ensure that the status of the *commodities* remain compliant is not jeopardised before and during transport to the point of exit. ~~The exporting country~~ It should suspend the export of a commodity when there is reason to believe that it may present a risk to for animal health or and public health or that if it does not comply with the agreed-international veterinary certificate.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should promptly communicate to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *importing country,* and of any transit country, any change of or situation, such as a change of the animal health status, that may affect its capacity to fulfil-certify the conditions of the agreed-international veterinary certificate.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should also inform without delay the *Veterinary Authority* of the importing country, and, where necessary, ~~the transit country where necessary,~~ of in the event that a particular issue such as the occurrence of a listed disease or a other disease referred to in the importing country requirements or any other relevant issues which may affects the compliance status of a commodity which has already left the exporting country. This information should be part of the relevant emergency response plan developed in accordance with Chapter 4.19.

In case of animals, operators should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the export process in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the exporting country~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant Competent Authorities, customs, and other law enforcement authorities, and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by the illegal or informal cross-border movement of commodities, e.g. i.e. the international movement of commodities done in a way that avoids official controls intentionally (illegal) or that may be unregulated but may present risks (informal), to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for exportation

1. Preparation for exportation

~~Operators~~Exporters should ~~announce~~ inform the Veterinary Authority of their intention to ~~the export to the Veterinary Authority~~ sufficiently in advance ~~as to allow for meet these~~ conditions of the agreed international veterinary certificate and the administrative requirements of the exporting, transit and importing countries to be met.

~~Operators~~Exporters should provide to the Veterinary Authority ~~the~~as required details of the consignment. The Veterinary Authority should outline to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures, standards and timeframe for preparation of the consignment, and the documentary evidence required to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Where relevant, the Veterinary Authority should identify eligible bodies or officers for ~~the implementation~~performance and certification of procedures specified in the agreed international veterinary certificate. Operators should also provide information relevant to safe handling of consignment, including any treatments that may pose risks to personnel.

The ~~operator~~exporter and the Veterinary Authority should coordinate the implementation, and its documentation, of the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate. Implementation of these conditions and its documentation should be in accordance with the procedures and standards communicated by the Veterinary Authority of ~~the exporting country~~ and will form the basis upon which the Official Veterinarian will issue the international veterinary certificate for the consignment.

The Veterinary Authority should ensure that the facilities and operational procedures required for isolation of animals or processing of products comply with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate, which may including include registration, approval, and inspection, in accordance with Chapters 4.6., 4.7. and 5.7. or other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code.

Testing of commodities required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate should be in accordance with Article 3.2.10. and with the Terrestrial Manual. The Veterinary Authority should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures for sample collection, identification and submission, the list of ~~approved~~laboratories and the approved diagnostic tests.

The Veterinary Authority should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the procedures for vaccination and treatment if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate. The ~~operator~~exporter should arrange for vaccination or treatment of animals in line with these conditions, noting timeframes relevant to the scheduled date of exportation. When animals require vaccination and or treatment, of animals should use veterinary medicinal products registered or allowed approved for use in the exporting country should be used., in line with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate.

The Veterinary Authority should define and communicate to the ~~operator~~exporter the standards and procedures for disinfection of and disinsection ~~disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors from of vehicles/vessels of the means of transport and containers in accordance with Chapter 4.14., if required to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate.

In the case of animals, ~~The operator~~exporter should also be able to provide to the Veterinary Authority a journey travel transport plan from the point of exit in the exporting country to the point of unloading in the importing country. ~~In the case of animals, it should be in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. or 7.4.~~Section 7, and in compliance with the importing country requirements as relevant.

2. Procedures of exportation

a) Verification and certification

The ~~operator~~exporter should cooperate with the Veterinary Authority to demonstrate that the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate have been met and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export. The ~~operator~~exporter should provide all documentary evidence of compliance with the importing country requirements conditions of the agreed and the international veterinary certificate as required by the Veterinary Authority, including an import permit where appropriate. There should be clear traceability and linkage, at every stage of preparation of animals and animal product/commodities, to the final consignment presented for export, as relevant to fulfil the conditions of the ~~agreed~~international veterinary certificate.

The *Official Veterinarian* should review the preparation of the export consignment to confirm that commodities animals and animal products have been clearly identified at every stage of their preparation, that the consignment complies with the conditions of the ~~agreed~~ *international veterinary certificate* and is in accordance with Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The *Official Veterinarian* should also review ~~all transport arrangements~~ the journey travel plan for the consignments of animals to ensure ~~it they support maintenance~~ compliance with the importing country requirements and relevant national regulations which may include the animal welfare recommendations in Section 7. of the commodity's status and animal welfare.

Once satisfied that preparations and ~~journey travel plan~~ transport arrangements are appropriate and that the consignment is eligible for certification and export, the *Official Veterinarian* should issue the *international veterinary certificate*.

b) Domestic transportation of commodities

The *Veterinary Authority* should collaborate with other relevant authorities and stakeholders to ensure that management of the consignment ~~pre-export before~~ and during transport to the point of exit is consistent with ~~agreed~~ established processes and standards.

The ~~operator~~ exporter should ensure that the assembly, *loading* and crating of ~~animals or other commodities~~ is appropriate to maintain compliance with the importing country requirements ~~preserving the status and animal welfare~~ of the consignment from the *place of shipment*, including adequate *disinfection of* and ~~disinsection~~ disinsection-elimination of arthropod vectors of ~~from~~ of the ~~vehicle/vessel~~ means of transport and *container*.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ may require health and welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*, which includes the possibility to deny permission to export if concerns are identified.

Article 5.4.4.

Specific recommendations depending on commodities

1. Animals

~~In the case of animals, the Veterinary Authority should ensure that animal welfare is maintained throughout the whole process of exportation, in accordance with Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. as relevant.~~

The ~~operator~~ exporter should ensure that ~~vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport used for transportation of *animals* throughout the ~~whole export process of exportation~~ undergo adequate disinfection and disinsection, and that measures are implemented to prevent and control vermin such as rodents, ~~or~~ arthropods. These measures should be applied before every *loading* of *animals*. ~~Vehicles/vessels~~ Means of transport should contain only *animals* meeting the same sanitary requirements of the same health status ~~except where effectively~~ adequately separated to prevent disease transmission.

Containers should be either new or cleansed and disinfected before every *loading* of *animals*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14., ~~or be for single use~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animals* ~~should be~~ subjected to a visual examination, at an appropriate place and time according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed international veterinary certificate ~~and the requirements of the exporting country~~. It should be ensured that, from the time of this visual examination inspection until the time of leaving the *exporting country*, the *animals* in the consignment are not in contact with other *animals* of a different health status.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~in the exporting country~~ may require welfare inspection of consignments of *animals* at the *point of exit*. Such inspections should be supported by *veterinary legislation*, which should also ascribe authority to deny permission to export if *animal welfare* requirements, in accordance with Section 7, concerns are not met identified.

2. Germinal products

Consignments of *germinal products* should be packed, dispatched, and transported in a way that preserves the viability and integrity of the products.

Consignments of *hatching eggs* should be dispatched from parental *flocks* establishments or hatcheries that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. *Containers* should be either new or cleaned and disinfected before every use, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

Cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos should be dispatched from *semen collection centres* or *collection centres* that meet the conditions of the ~~agreed-international veterinary certificate~~. They should be single-use cryogenic tanks or be cleaned and disinfected before use in accordance with Chapter 4.14. and use new liquid nitrogen.

Consignments of semen, oocytes or, embryos, should be identified in accordance with the relevant recommendations of Chapters 4.6. to 4.11.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *germinal products* ~~be~~ are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check and cryogenic tanks for semen, oocytes or, embryos ~~be~~ are sealed and marked, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

3. Animal products

Containers used for transporting *animal products* should be suitable for the type of product, protect the *animal products* from damage or contamination, and fulfil the conditions of the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that adequate measures are taken to clean and, where necessary after cleaning, to disinfect before use, *containers* and *means of transportation* in accordance with Chapter 4.14., particularly when conveying or transporting unpacked materials.

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that, before leaving the *exporting country*, consignments of *animal products* ~~should be~~ are subjected to a visual examination and documentary check, according to the procedures of the exporting country and the agreed-international veterinary certificate and the requirements of the exporting country.

Article 5.4.5.

Emergency pPlanning for unexpected events

~~The *Veterinary Authority* should develop a plan to address the occurrence within the *exporting country* after the *commodities* have been exported, of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements, which may have impacted the status of the exported *commodities*. The *Veterinary Authority* should be guided by *importing country* requirements in implementing the plan.~~

The *Veterinary Authority* should ensure that the ~~operator~~ exporter develops and documents a plan to address ~~emergencies~~ unexpected events which may impact the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations in Chapter 7.1. and chapters in Section 7 relevant to transport, being exported, failure of transport arrangements, The plan should address concerns such as deviation from the journey plan for animals, incidents compromising the sanitary conditions or other characteristics of the commodities including those captured described in the international veterinary certificate, failure to reach the transit or importing country, or rejection of the consignment by them ~~transit or importing country~~. The ~~emergency~~ plan may be generic or specific to each type of consignment, ~~and should focus on preserving the status of the consignment and animal welfare in accordance with Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~

The ~~emergency~~ plan should identify responsibility for development and communication of alternative transport arrangements when necessary. The relevant *Competent Authority* in the *exporting, transit and importing countries* should be consulted as appropriate by the operator regarding revised transport arrangements to assess the implications for the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements and animal welfare recommendations. ~~The Veterinary Authority in the exporting country should be consulted on alternative transport arrangements for consignments of animals to ensure that animal welfare is preserved.~~

The ~~emergency~~ plan should include procedures for managing exported consignments that fail to reach the designated *transit or importing countries* or are rejected by them.

Annex 9. – Chapter 5.5. ‘Measures and procedures applicable to the transit of commodities’

CHAPTER 5.5.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE TRANSIT OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.5.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through international trade, commercial or non-commercial, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, when *commodities* destined for another country are either making a stopover in, or transported through a *transit country*, covering from the *point of entry* to the *point of exit*.

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ refer to the ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ of the transit country unless otherwise specified.

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

This chapter provides *transit countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority, and other relevant Competent Authorities and of operators ~~any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter (hereafter ‘operator’)~~. An international movement of *commodities* may be considered a ‘transit’ if *commodities* are transported from an *exporting country* through a *transit country* to an *importing country*. The transit period should not exceed the time necessary for transport and logistics, ~~and commodities~~ and all relevant conditions as ~~stated~~ described in the certificate issued by the *exporting country* should remain unchanged, ~~otherwise the operation movement should be interpreted as an importation and exportation.~~

This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation of official controls for transit.

Article 5.5.2.

General considerations

The Veterinary Authority ~~and~~ other relevant Competent Authorities ~~of the transit country~~ should ensure that *transit country* requirements and procedures, including a list of the *border inspection posts* designated for the transit of *commodities*, are made available to operators and to the Veterinary Authority of the *exporting country*.

A *transit country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry into and exit from its territory of *commodities*, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, *means of transport* and the *point of entry* or *border inspection post*, route, holding locations and *point of exit* to be used.

Operators should be aware of the *transit country* requirements and procedures before shipment, which may include announcing to the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities ~~of the transit country~~ the arrival of consignments at the *point of entry*. Operators should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official controls, including the original official certificates or documents, or digital equivalents, in accordance with *transit country* requirements, and that requirements and procedures defined by the Competent Authorities ~~of the transit country~~ are met.

Operators should ensure that the *commodities* are separated from any other commodities in the *transit country* not meeting the same sanitary requirements, that all relevant conditions as stated in the certification issued by the *exporting country* remain unchanged, and that the Veterinary Authorities of the transit country and the importing country are informed of any unforeseen unloading of commodities in the transit country ~~is informed to the Veterinary Authorities of the transit country and the importing country.~~

In the case of *animals*, operators should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the transit process, in accordance with Section 7 as relevant.

Article 5.5.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for official controls for transit

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should implement official inspection, with appropriate frequency, based on risk assessment and ~~with appropriate frequency~~ to ensure compliance with the *transit country* requirements. ~~By way of derogation, the The Veterinary Authority may exempt from inspection safe commodities or commodities posing a negligible risk and for which inspection is not considered necessary.~~

A *transit country* may refuse ~~not accept~~ the transit of *commodities* not complying with its requirements.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that conditions included in the *international veterinary certificate at origin* are maintained during official controls, stopover, storage and transport, that *biosecurity* is applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents throughout the transit process and that unnecessary delays are avoided. They should also ensure animal welfare is maintained during transit in accordance with Section 7. Original documentation intended for the *importing country* should remain with the consignment.

Article 5.5.4.

Planning for the unexpected events

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the operator develops and documents a plan to address unexpected events which may impact ~~compromise~~ the compliance of the transited *commodities* with the requirements of the *transit country* or the *importing country*. The plan may be generic, or specific to each type of consignment, and should focus on preserving the sanitary conditions of the consignment, and preventing the introduction to the transit or the importing country of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the transit or the importing country requirements, ~~and~~ The plan should also focus on ensuring animal welfare recommendations in Chapter 7.1. and chapters of Section 7 relevant to transport are addressed. The plan should identify responsibilities and include procedures for *commodities* not complying with the *transit or the importing country* requirements.

Article 5.5.5.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by informal or illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* ~~and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should coordinate and cooperate with the customs or relevant law enforcement authority as described in Articles 5.4.2. and 5.6.8.

Annex 10. – Chapter 5.5. ‘Measures and procedures applicable to the importation of commodities’

CHAPTER 5.6.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE INTO THE IMPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.6.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable to in the importation of commodities to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through international trade of commodities, commercial or non-commercial, without creating unjustified trade restrictions, covering from the time of arrival at the point of entry border of the importing country until clearance of commodities.

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ refer to the ‘Veterinary Authority’ and ‘Competent Authorities’ of the importing country unless otherwise specified.

For the purposes of this chapter, ‘operator’ means any natural or legal entity or person responsible for transit import of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter.

This chapter provides importing countries with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of their Veterinary Authority, and other relevant Competent Authorities, and of operators, any natural or legal entity or person responsible for import of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter business operators (hereafter ‘operator’), in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.2. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and implementation performance of official controls for importation. This chapter not only covers legal importation, including non-commercial movements of commodities accompanying persons, but also provides general recommendations for illegal or informal entry of commodities.

The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post.

Article 5.6.2.

General considerations

The Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should ensure that the importing country requirements, which may be included in international veterinary certificates, and as well as up-to-date information relevant to the import procedures, including a list of the border inspection posts designated for the import and transit of those commodities, are made available to operators and to the exporting countries. Operators should collaborate to ensure the documentation complies with the importing country’s requirements.

The Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should be responsible for the performance implementation of official controls in accordance with veterinary legislation to ensure that imported commodities can be safely imported. They should also ensure animal welfare is maintained in accordance with Section 7 as relevant. Their legal mandate and responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority and other relevant Competent Authorities, as described in Articles 3.4.5. and 3.4.13., should include the import official controls activities at any all steps of the import process and the possibility to request from the operator importer any necessary information. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities may delegate certain tasks in accordance with point 2 of Article 3.4.5. Adequate human, technical, physical and financial resources should be available in the importing country for the Veterinary Services to effectively implement perform official controls inspection in accordance with the quality principles described in Article Chapter 3.2.2.

An *importing country* may require adequate advance notice or approval regarding the date of entry of commodities into its territory of ~~commodities~~, stating the type of *commodity*, species, quantity, means of transport and the *border inspection post* to be used.

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* when relevant, should perform~~ Official inspections ~~should be implemented, with appropriate frequency, in accordance with Article 3.2.12. regularly, based on a~~ risk assessment ~~basis and with appropriate frequency to ensure compliance with the *importing country* requirements. By way of derogation, ~~t~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* may exempt from the inspection, safe commodities or commodities posing a negligible risk ~~and for which inspection is not considered necessary.~~~~

Biosecurity should be applied to prevent transmission of pathogenic agents from *commodities* throughout the import process.

An *importing country* may prohibit the ~~introduction~~ entry into its territory of a consignment of *commodities* not complying with the *importing country* requirements.

~~Operators~~ Importers should be aware of the *importing country* requirements and import procedure before the importation and ~~inform~~ announce, in advance, to the *Veterinary Authority* or other *relevant *Competent Authorities** of the arrival of consignments at the *border inspection post*, in accordance with *importing country* requirements. ~~Operators~~ Importers should ensure that *commodities* are presented for official controls ~~inspection~~ at the *border inspection post*, together with the original official *international veterinary certificates* or documents, or digital equivalents, which are required to accompany the consignments.

In case of *animals*, ~~operators~~ importers should ensure that *animal welfare* is maintained throughout the ~~whole import process of importation~~, in accordance with Chapters 7.1., 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4. Section 7 as relevant.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~of the *importing country*~~ should carry out collaborative activities with other relevant *Competent Authorities*, customs, and other *law enforcement* authorities, and operators, and with *Veterinary Authorities* in other countries, to control the risk posed by ~~the illegal or informal~~ cross-border movement of *commodities*, ~~i.e. e.g. international movement of *commodities* done in a way that avoids official controls intentionally (illegal) or that may be unregulated but may still present risks (informal). to expressly and intentionally avoid official controls.~~

Article 5.6.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for import official controls for importation

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ~~take~~ control of the imported *commodities* to ~~decide~~ determine whether or not the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

~~Import~~ Official controls should be ~~performed~~ implemented at an appropriate place which might include a *border inspection post*, a point of entry, *quarantine centre*, the place of destination, or premises of the operator responsible for the consignment. The consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance and release.

In case of emergency, ships and aircrafts may be granted access to a port or airport ~~which that~~ are not their intended destination. In those cases, they should be subjected to the animal health and *animal welfare* measures which the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* may consider necessary based on the potential risk.

1. Official inspection

Where official inspections of *commodities* are ~~performed~~ implemented, they should always include a documentary check and, depending on the risk to human health ~~and~~ animal health and or *animal welfare*, should also include identity checks and physical inspection ~~checks~~. When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* Services needs ~~to have~~ full access to the consignment for the purpose of identity checks or physical inspection, consignments should be partially or fully unloaded from the means of transport.

a) Documentary check

A documentary check should be ~~implemented~~ performed on all consignments presented for official ~~controls inspection~~ to ensure that they meet the *importing country* requirements.

~~A D~~documentary check should include examination of the *international veterinary certificate*, and possibly of laboratory reports or other documents, including those of a commercial nature, which are required to ~~accompany~~ match the consignment.

When ~~implementing~~ performing a documentary check, the *Veterinary Authority* or other ~~Competent Authorities~~ Services should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents as agreed between the *importing* and *exporting country*, to ensure that:

- i) the *international veterinary certificate* has been issued by the *Official Veterinarian* of the *exporting country*; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds as relevant to the model ~~established~~ established by the importing country or agreed between the exporting and the importing country for that *commodity* and intended use, ~~based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.;~~ and
- ii) the information contained in the checked documents complies with the *importing country* requirements.

b) Identity check

~~An i~~identity check should be ~~implemented~~ performed upon arrival of the consignment at the point of ~~entry inspection~~, as a visual inspection to verify that the content and the labelling of a consignment, including the identification of *commodities*, seals and means of transport, correspond to the information declared in the *international veterinary certificate* and accompanying documents.

The frequency of identity checks, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for ~~sampling~~ selection for checking should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant ~~Competent Authorities of the importing country~~ based on *risk assessment*.

c) Physical inspection

i) To verify compliance with importing country requirements and physical integrity. ~~P~~physical inspection should include, as appropriate:

~~i) clinical examination of an~~ animals for evidence of ~~transmissible~~ diseases and *animal welfare* issues

~~ii) and~~ physical checks of animal products and germinal products,

~~iii) and, as appropriate, checks on packaging, seals, brand and labelling.~~

iv) checks on the means of transport, ~~labelling~~ and temperature records,

v) the sampling for analysis, testing or diagnosis, and

vi) any other checks required by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* to verify compliance with the *importing country* requirements.

ii) The frequency of physical inspection, the quantity of commodities to be inspected as well as the criteria for sampling selection for physical inspection should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities of the importing country* based on *risk assessment*, and considering the following:-

i) For animals:

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should determine the number of animals to be clinically examined~~ should be determined in accordance with the overall number of *animals* in the consignment and the declared purpose of the animals; ~~which it~~ may be increased if the physical checks carried out have not been satisfactory.

~~In some cases, such as for animals that are not required to be identified individually and animals considered to be dangerous, clinical examination~~ should ~~could~~ consist of observation of the state of health and behaviour of the entire group or of a representative number of *animals*.

~~If the clinical examination reveals an anomaly, a~~ more thorough clinical examination investigation may be carried out, including sampling and testing, where appropriate especially if the clinical examination reveals an anomaly.

ii) Germinal products:

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out~~ Physical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including, when relevant, temperature records ~~when relevant~~ and the integrity of the seals, packaging material and cryogenic tanks.

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should determine the number of items to be checked, which may be increased if the checks carried out have not been satisfactory.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include laboratory testing of the *germinal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

iii) Animal products:

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities should carry out~~ Physical checks of the consignment should be carried out to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material and seals.

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with importing country requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include sensory examination and laboratory testing of the *animal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

2. Sampling and testing

Sampling and testing of imported *commodities* ~~with a view to checking compliance with the health importing country requirements laid down in the international veterinary certificate,~~ may be implemented ~~performed~~ following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of *commodities*; ~~without creating unjustified barriers to trade~~. Testing should be implemented ~~performed~~ in an ~~approved~~ laboratory.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* may develop a risk-based sampling plan for imported consignments, that should specify the percentage of consignments to be sampled, taking into account the animal health status of the importing and exporting country, the species concerned, the nature and declared purpose of the *commodities*, the number of incoming consignments and the results of previous sampling.

Where no immediate danger to animal health or public health is suspected from *commodities* sampled in accordance with a sampling plan, a consignment may be released before the results of laboratory tests are available. A traceability mechanism to recall *commodities* system should be in place to recall *commodities* if needed.

3. Sanitary measures at import

To meet the *importing country* requirements, in addition to the *sanitary measures* implemented in the *exporting countries*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing country may require *sanitary measures* to be implemented ~~at importation~~ before release of the *commodities* ~~from official controls~~. Measures may include ~~disinfection of and disinsection of~~ disinsection or elimination of arthropod vectors from ~~of vehicles/vessels/means of transport~~ and *containers* used in the transportation and *unloading* of *commodities*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

In the case of *animals*, measures may include *vaccination*, testing, *treatment* or *isolation*. In the case of other *commodities*, measures may include a holding period or the application of physical or chemical treatment.

4. Release of consignments

Based on the ~~implement~~ performed import official controls implemented, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing countries should decide whether the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

When the decision is made that the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements and has been cleared for release, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should notify the operator/importer and the information should be made available to the customs authorities.

Article 5.6.4.

Further action for non-compliant commodities

Commodities identified as non-compliant based on the ~~implement~~ performed import official controls implemented should not be released by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities and should be ~~isolated~~ detained under appropriate conditions including isolation for animals, pending further decision ~~by the Competent Authority~~.

Depending on the type of *commodity* and the *risk* the *commodity* represents to animal health, human health and animal health, and the environment, or for due to animal welfare reasons, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities, should identify the options for the disposition of the *commodities* and notify the operator/importer. Disposition of *commodities* may include:

- a) ~~re-dispatching~~ re-shipping the *commodity* back to the *exporting country* or another country, with the agreement, where appropriate, of the receiving *Competent Authority*;
- b) subjecting the *commodity* to treatment or to other risk mitigation measures necessary to allow importation;
- c) *killing* and disposal of *animals*, or ~~destruction~~ disposal of other *commodities*.

Any action applied to consignments of *animals* should comply with ~~Chapters 7.1. and 7.6~~ the relevant provisions of Section 7.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country should notify any decision and reasons to refuse entry of a *commodity* to the customs authorities and the Veterinary Authority ~~are~~ is encouraged to communicate it to the *Veterinary Authority* of the *exporting country*. Where appropriate, the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country should be given the opportunity to explain the situation in an attempt to have the consignment released.

Following decisions taken in relation to non-compliant *commodities*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should supervise the effective ~~disposition~~ disposal of the *commodities* and apply measures to prevent the introduction into the country of *commodities* which have been refused import, and the reuse of the *international veterinary certificate* that accompanied the consignment.

The Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authority of the importing country should inform the exporting country and the transit country where necessary, of any the occurrence case of a listed disease or other disease referred to in the importing country requirements in a consignment of animals.

Article 5.6.5.

Emergency planning for unexpected events

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities of the importing country should develop a plan to address the occurrence, within the exporting country after the commodities have been exported or within the transit country after the commodities have transited, of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements which may have impacted the status of the exported commodities.~~

~~The Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities may also develop a plan to address the occurrence of a listed disease, or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, within the importing country before the animals have been released.~~

The Veterinary Authority ~~or~~ and other relevant Competent Authorities should ensure that the operator/importer develops and documents a plan to address unexpected events/emergencies which may impact the compliance status of the commodities with importing country requirements being imported, and non-compliant commodities described in Article 5.6.4. The emergency plan may be generic, or specific to each type of consignment, and should focus on preventing the introduction to the *importing country* of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements, and on animal welfare recommendations in Chapter 7.1. and chapters of accordance with Section 7 relevant to transport ~~Chapters 7.2., 7.3. and 7.4.~~ The emergency plan should identify responsibility and include procedures for actions taken for non-compliant commodities described in Article 5.6.4.

Article 5.6.6.

General recommendations applicable to vehicles/vessels/means of transport and containers that transported infected animals

~~Vehicles/vessels/Means of transport~~ and *containers* that transported *animals* found to be infected with a pathogenic agent of a *listed disease* or a disease referred to in the *importing country* requirements should be considered ~~as~~ contaminated, and the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should apply the following measures as appropriate to the risk:

- a) treatment ~~or safe disposal~~ of the litter, forage and any other potentially contaminated material, by its removal from the ~~vehicles/vessels/means of transport~~ and *containers* for immediate transportation to an establishment assigned in advance, where the animal health measures required by the *importing country* should be strictly applied;
- b) *disinfection* of all parts of the ~~vehicles/vessels/means of transport~~ and *containers* which were used in the transport, feeding, watering, moving and *unloading* of the *animals*, as well as all baggage of travelling attendants, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.;
- c) ~~disinsection~~ disinsection elimination of arthropod vectors from ~~of vehicles/vessels of means of transport~~ and *containers* in case of vector borne diseases.

Article 5.6.7.

General principles applicable to disposal of international catering waste

International catering waste that may contain or may have been in contact with animal products, or other forms of untreated including swill, is are considered a high-risk category of product and should therefore be subject to strict controls to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that all all high risk international catering waste entering the country from the international means of transport is handled, collected and disposed of in a way to minimise the risk of introduction of pathogenic agents.

Article 5.6.8.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities at border inspection posts

To control the *risks* posed by informal or illegal cross-border movement at *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority* ~~or and other relevant law enforcement~~ *Competent Authorities* should coordinate and cooperate closely with all relevant authorities, including the customs authority ~~and other law enforcement authorities~~ to ensure that the official controls inspection of for commodities entering the country are is implement performed in accordance with the rules of this chapter and national legislation, including when fraud is suspected.

For that purpose, the *Veterinary Authority* ~~or and other relevant~~ *Competent Authorities* should ensure the timely exchange with all relevant authorities, including the customs ~~and other relevant law enforcement authorities~~ authority, including via electronic means, of relevant information and decisions ~~made relevant to the organisation and conduct of their respective activities for commodities~~ entering the country. The *Veterinary Authority* ~~or and other relevant~~ *Competent Authorities* should collaborate with all relevant authorities, including the customs ~~and other relevant law enforcement authorities~~ authority to ensure immediate ~~notification reporting~~ to the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* ~~of if of circumstances where a declaration is submitted to the customs authority for a consignment of those categories of commodities that should be subject to official inspection control but with no evidence of demonstrating that the required an official inspection control having been was conducted~~.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities*, in collaboration with all relevant authorities, including ~~the customs authority and other relevant law enforcement~~ authorities, should have practical arrangements in place to ensure ~~the~~ implementation of the measures described in Article 5.6.4. in case of detection of illegal cross-border movement of *commodities* at a *border inspection post*.

Article 5.6.9.

General recommendations on measures to address identified informal or illegal movement of commodities outside border inspection posts

To effectively control the *risks* posed by the informal or illegal cross-border movement of *commodities* outside of *border inspection posts*, the *Veterinary Authority*, in collaboration with ~~or~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should:

- 1) coordinate with border authorities (police, customs, transport, immigration) to provide technical support for identification of informal or illegal cross border movement of *commodities*;
- 2) develop and implement practical mechanisms to address informal or illegal cross border movement of *commodities* ~~and implementation thereof~~ in close collaboration with border authorities.

Annex 11. – Chapter 5.7. ‘Border inspection posts and quarantine centres’

CHAPTER 5.7.

BORDER INSPECTION POSTS AND QUARANTINE CENTRES

Article 5.7.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides recommendations on *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* to support effective implementation of measures and procedures applicable to the exportation, transit and importation of *commodities*, in order to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through international trade, of commodities commercial or non-commercial, without creating unjustified trade restrictions.

Quarantine centres may be used for isolation of *animals* either pre-exportation in accordance with disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code* or post-arrival. The *Veterinary Authority* ~~or~~ and other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that the application of *biosecurity* at *quarantine centres* is appropriate to the type of isolation being undertaken, and effectively mitigates risks in accordance with disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* (pre-export isolation) or via *risk analysis* (post-arrival quarantine).

Border inspection posts are meant to keep *commodities* contained under adequate *biosecurity* until inspections are complete and decisions are taken on their destination.

Article 5.7.2.

General considerations

Appropriate legislation should be in place, in accordance with Chapter 3.4., to define the facilities, the resourcing and operation of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*, and for their approval.

Material and financial resources should be available at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary to undertake the relevant functions of the facility while managing official controls, *biosecurity*, health and safety risks and *animal welfare* associated with the type and volume of *commodities* presented for inspection.

Appropriate administration systems should be available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* as necessary for the functions of the facility, including record keeping and information and communication technology, to support decision-making and communication.

Biosecurity consistent with Chapter 4.X. is critical to fulfil the functions of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*.

The *Veterinary Authority* and ~~or~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that:

- Operations at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are supported by sufficient authorised personnel who are operating under the principles of Chapter 3.2., appropriately qualified with access to regular training, consistent with the intended use and the type and quantity of *commodities* presented.
- Operational details for *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* are made available to operators described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. or 5.6., including the intended use and the categories of *commodities* for which they are designated, exact locations, contact details, hours of operation, booking requirements and costs.

- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* describing the procedures undertaken there. Auditable records documenting the performance of these procedures should be kept, including the maintenance of *biosecurity*. Records should include the results of official controls, regular *surveillance* and *monitoring* in the facilities and the surrounding areas.
- *Border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* have access to *laboratories* and other *approved* service providers with SOPs as necessary to support the implementation of official controls and the measures described in Chapters 5.4., 5.5. and 5.6. consistent with Article 3.2.6.

Article 5.7.3.

Cooperation with other agencies

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~or and~~ other relevant *Competent Authorities* should engage with other ~~governmental authorities agencies~~ with responsibilities at international borders in the design and operation of *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres*, to ensure that official inspection and clearance of transit or import consignments is streamlined where possible. Co-use of facilities and equipment at international borders with other authorities could be considered as long as it does not hinder ~~normal~~ operations and measures described in this chapter. Key principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement should be considered to facilitate importation and transit of *commodities*.

Article 5.7.4.

Requirements for a border inspection post

Design and operation of a *border inspection post* should be based on *risk analysis* and *biosecurity* including the following:

- 1) Separation between public areas and restricted areas for inspection of consignments.
- 2) Perimeter security of restricted areas to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals, with access control for entry and exit of authorised personnel and *means of transport*.
- 3) Facilities and equipment suitable for the type and volume of *commodities* presented, necessary for implementation of the official control procedures described in Article 5.6.3, including secure unloading and loading, inspection, sampling and storage or detention of *commodities*, including adequate lighting and temperature control with surfaces appropriate for cleaning and *disinfection*.
- 4) Facilities and equipment for cleaning, ~~and disinfection~~ and disinsection ~~elimination of arthropod vectors~~ of *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of *commodities*, consistent with Article 5.6.6.
- 5) Waste management for restricted areas with storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste ~~and, including discarded feed, rejected consignments, dead animals and used bedding,~~ with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.
- 6) Operational procedures SOPs for cleaning and disinfection, management of non-compliant, sick or dead animals, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.

Article 5.7.5.

Additional requirements for a border inspection post for animals

In addition to the principles described in Article 5.7.4., a *border inspection post* for consignments of *animals* should be designed and operate in accordance with *animal welfare* principles in Section 7 and should specifically include the following:

- 1) Separate access to restricted animal inspection areas via road infrastructure, to minimise delays.

- 2) Facilities and equipment necessary for the management of consignments of *animals* according to Article 5.6.3, including containment, feeding, watering, restraint and inspection, consistent with the type, age and number of *animals* presented.
- 3) Facilities for temporarily holding *animals*, with adequate housing or restraint mechanisms, space, light, ventilation and separation as appropriate between consignments, ~~and~~ species or treated and untreated animals.
- 4) Separate facilities to isolate non-compliant or sick animals.
- 5) Facilities and equipment for the management of non-compliant, sick or dead animals, Animal animal waste management for dead animals, discarded feed, solid and liquid waste and used bedding.

Article 5.7.6.

Facilities involved in official inspection other than the border inspection post

When the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authority* defines that official inspection could be implemented at an appropriate place other than a *border inspection post*, the facilities involved should be *approved* following the principles outlined in Articles 5.7.4. and 5.7.5., and the consignment should remain under *biosecurity* and the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* until formal clearance.

Article 5.7.7.

Requirements for a quarantine centre

Design and operation of a *quarantine centre* should be based on consideration of the following:

- 1) The disease situation of the country, *zone* or area surrounding the *quarantine centre*.
- 2) Location of facilities at a distance from other *establishments*, sufficient to avoid transmission of diseases of concern, taking into account relevant risk factors.
- 3) Site topography, to minimise disease risks associated with the flow of contaminated water.
- 4) Perimeter security to prevent entry of unauthorised people and *means of transport*, and unwanted animals.
- 5) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of authorised personnel, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls including changing rooms and showers. Controls for exit of authorised personnel may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation or clearance.
- 6) Controls, including sanitary requirements, for entry and exit of *means of transport* and equipment, including veterinary instruments and supplies, and the facilities necessary to apply these controls. ~~Controls for exit of *means of transport* and equipment may not be necessary for the isolation of *animals* before exportation or clearance.~~
- 7) Controls for entry of supplies, including the sources, sanitary status and entry process for *feed* and bedding, and facilities necessary to handle and store these supplies.
- 8) Facilities and equipment for cleaning and *disinfection*, ~~and removal of arthropod vectors disinsection~~, including and control of waste and effluent, for *means of transport* and *containers* that have been used in transportation of import consignments of *animals*.
- 9) ~~Waste management~~. In the case of isolation of *animals* after arrival, waste management should be in accordance with a *biosecurity plan* including storage facilities as necessary, for solid and liquid waste, including discarded *feed*, rejected consignments, dead *animals* and used bedding, with access and secure transportation to facilities for treatment of waste.

- 10) Facilities and equipment for the containment and management of consignments of *animals*, including as appropriate to the animal species separation between consignments, unloading and loading, housing, feeding, watering, yards, restraint and handling, isolation, vector control, and for undertaking interventions required by *risk analysis* ~~and/or~~ relevant disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including sample collection, testing, *vaccination*, treatment and veterinary inspection.
- 11) Equipment for cleaning, ~~and disinfection~~ and disinsection ~~removal of arthropod vectors~~ in the facility between consignments of *animals*.
- 12) SOPs Operational procedures for cleaning and disinfection, management of non-compliant, sick or dead animals, waste management, and control of rodents and potential vectors.
- 13) Separate facilities to isolate non-compliant or sick animals.

A *quarantine centre* for isolation of *animals* before exportation should be used to address the specific requirements in disease-specific chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*. Unless specified in those chapters or importing country requirements, isolation of *animals* before exportation may be performed in other approved facilities.

Article 5.7.8.

Planning for unexpected events

The management of consignments at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that have failed clearance and have thus been refused transit or import is covered in Chapters 5.4. to 5.6.

The *Veterinary Authority* ~~or~~ and other relevant *Competent Authorities* should ensure that plans are available to personnel at *border inspection posts* and *quarantine centres* that support responses to foreseeable but uncommon events. The plans should address communication, *biosecurity*, health and safety, and *animal welfare* in each instance, and may cover:

- Unexpected arrival of *commodities*.
- Evidence of a *listed disease* or a disease included in the *transit* or *importing country* requirements in a consignment of imported or transiting *animals* at a *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.
- Veterinary emergency in *animals* at a *border inspection post* or undergoing post-arrival isolation in a *quarantine centre*.
- Escape of *animals* or unwanted entry of animals.
- Evidence of *animal products* presenting a risk to animal or public health.
- Natural disasters and interruption of critical services threatening the operation of the *border inspection post* or *quarantine centre*.

Annex 12. – Chapter 7.5. ‘Animal welfare during slaughter’

CHAPTER 7.5.

ANIMAL WELFARE DURING SLAUGHTER

[...]

Article 7.5.30.

Electrical water-bath stunning for poultry

1. Animal welfare concerns

In electrical water-bath *stunning* poultry are inverted and shackled by the legs from a shackle line. The bird's head has direct contact with the water-bath, and an electric current is passed from the water through the bird to the leg shackle. *Hazards* that may prevent effective electrical *stunning* are: lack of contact between head and water, differences in individual bird resistance, improper system grounding, pre-stun shocks due to wings contacting water before the head, and the use of inappropriate electrical parameters (low voltage/current or high frequency).

Hazards that increase the likelihood of animals experiencing pre-stun shocks are: poor handling at shackling, inappropriate line speed, physical contact between birds, incorrect angle of entry ramp, entry ramp wetted by charged water, incorrect water-bath height, and shallow immersion.

Factors affecting individual bird resistance include the resistance between the shackle and the leg (leg/shackle interface), shackling on top of a severed foot, shackling by one leg, poor shackle position, incorrect shackle size, dry shackles, scale on the shackle surface, and keratinised skin on the legs (e.g. older birds).

Where ~~insufficient~~ inappropriate electrical *stunning* parameters (intensity-current, voltage and frequency, and exposure time) are used, conscious animals are at risk of being electro-immobilised or paralysed causing *pain* and suffering.

2. Animal-based and other measures

Multiple indicators should be used to determine whether a stun is effective and the animal is unconscious. Animal-based measures of an effective stun are: tonic-clonic seizures; apnoea; and absence of corneal or palpebral reflex.

Animal-based measures of ineffective stun or recovery of consciousness are: vocalisation; spontaneous blinking; righting reflex; presence of corneal or palpebral reflex; rhythmic breathing; spontaneous swallowing; and head shaking.

3. Recommendations

The height of the water-bath stunner should be adjusted so that the birds' heads are completely immersed in the water. Avoid distractions such as people walking under the birds because this can cause birds to pull up.

Personnel should watch for short or stunted birds as these birds will not be able to make contact with the water and will not be stunned. These birds should be stunned in the slaughter line (e.g. penetrative captive bolt) or removed and euthanised.

The rail of the shackle line should run smoothly. Sudden movement such as jolts, drops or sharp curves in the line may cause birds to flap and avoid the stunner.

To minimise any disturbance to birds during shackling, where shackles are wet to improve conductivity, they should be wetted only prior to birds' legs being placed in them.

Pre-stun shocks should be avoided and can be reduced by having a smooth shackle line and entry to the water-bath and by adjusting the water level of the bath to minimise overflow.

In the case of ineffective *stunning* or recovery, animals should be re-stunned using a backup system or be killed immediately. Ineffective *stunning* or return to consciousness should be systematically recorded and the cause of the failure identified and rectified.

Stunning equipment should be used, cleaned, maintained and stored following the manufacturer's recommendations.

Constant current stunners should be preferred to constant voltage stunners because the former ensure that the minimum current is provided to the animals independently from their impedance.

Regular calibration of the equipment according to the manufacturer's procedure is recommended. Effectiveness of the *stunning* should be monitored regularly.

Slaughterhouses/abattoirs should have standard operating procedures that define key operating parameters or follow the manufacturer's recommendations for *stunning*, such as:

- water level, salinity and temperature;
- number of birds in the water-bath;
- contact between water and head, as well as between the legs and the leg shackle;
- electrical parameters (current intensity [A], waveform type [AC and DC], voltage [V] and frequency [Hz]);
- visual or auditory warning system to alert the operator to proper or improper function, such as a device that monitors and displays voltage and applied current.

~~Ensure an optimum~~ The combination of intensity-current, voltage and frequency (for AC and pulsed DC), of current and exposure time during electrical water-bath *stunning* practices, ~~to maximise should ensure~~ the effectiveness of *stunning*. In general ~~Lower frequencies ensure an effective stunning, while~~ Higher frequencies provide the lowest probability of a successful stun even at the highest intensity current. Parameters may be validated when the outcome of effectively stunned birds is demonstrated to be met.

Hazards to *animal welfare* such as inversion of conscious birds, pre-stun shocks, and variability in electrical current delivered to each bird are inherent risks of electrical water-bath *stunning*. Thus, alternative *stunning* systems which avoid these associated *hazards* should be preferred.

4. Species-specific recommendations

Effective electrical parameters should be based on scientific evidence for different species of birds.

Effective electrical parameters should be based on scientific data with field evidence on the welfare outcomes for different types and conditions of animals in accordance with point 5 of Article 7.1.4.

~~For water-bath *stunning* depending on the frequency, minimum recommended parameters minimum intensities-current per frequency are recommended for the following and species are:~~

- For frequency below 200 Hz:
 - 100 mA for chicken,
 - 250 mA for turkeys,
 - 130 mA for ducks and geese,
 - 45 mA for quails.

- For frequency from 200 to 400 Hz:
 - 150 mA for chicken,
 - 400 mA for turkeys.
- For frequency from 400-600 Hz:
 - 200 mA for chicken,
 - 400 mA for turkeys.

Birds should receive the current for at least 4 seconds.

~~For ducks, geese and quails should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 200 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].~~

~~For chickens and turkeys should not be stunned at frequencies higher than 600 Hz will not achieve effective stunning and therefore are not recommended. [under study].~~

[...]

Annex 13. – Chapter 8.8. ‘Infection with foot and mouth disease virus’

CHAPTER 8.8.

INFECTION WITH FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE VIRUS

[...]

Article 8.8.3.

Country or zone free from FMD where vaccination is not practised

A country or *zone* may be considered free from FMD where *vaccination* is not practised when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the country or *zone* for at least the past 12 months:

- 1) there has been no case of infection with FMDV;
- 2) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all *herds* of domestic and *captive wild* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
- 3) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the distribution and habitat of *wild* and *feral* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
- 4) appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 8.8.43. to 8.8.45. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated, which includes the detection of clinical signs of FMD and demonstrates:
 - i) no *infection* with FMDV in unvaccinated animals;
 - ii) no transmission of FMDV in previously vaccinated animals;
- 5) measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and~~ or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. ‘Import risk analysis’. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, movements of *commodities* within a country between *zones* of different *animal health status* should comply with the same requirements as for importation;
- 6) *vaccination* against FMD is prohibited and the prohibition has been effectively implemented and supervised.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from FMD, where *vaccination* is not practised in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for all points above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOAHP in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

Provided the conditions of point 4 are fulfilled, the status of a country or *zone* will not be affected by applying official emergency *vaccination* to susceptible animals in zoological collections in the face of a FMD threat identified by the *Veterinary Authorities*, provided that the following conditions are met:

- the zoological collection has the primary purpose of exhibiting animals or preserving rare species, has been identified, including the boundaries of the facility, and is included in the country's contingency plan for FMD;
- appropriate *biosecurity* is in place, including effective separation from other susceptible domestic *populations* or *wildlife*;
- the susceptible animals are identified as belonging to the collection and any movements can be traced;
- the vaccine used complies with the standards described in the *Terrestrial Manual*;
- *vaccination* is conducted under the supervision of the *Veterinary Authority*;
- the zoological collection is placed under *surveillance* for at least 12 months after *vaccination*.

A country or *zone* free from FMD where *vaccination* is not practised may maintain its free status despite an incursion of African buffaloes from a neighbouring infected country or *zone* provided that it is demonstrated that the provisions in this article continue to be met and documented evidence has been submitted to and accepted by WOAAH.

Article 8.8.4.

Country or zone free from FMD where vaccination is practised

A country or *zone* may be considered free from FMD where *vaccination* is practised when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the country or *zone*:

- 1) for at least the past 12 months:
 - a) there has been no transmission of FMDV;
 - b) there has been no case of infection with FMDV;
 - c) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all *herds* of domestic and *captive wild* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
 - d) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the distribution and habitat of *wild* and *feral* susceptible animals in the country or *zone*;
 - e) compulsory systematic *vaccination* in the target *population* has been carried out to achieve adequate *vaccination* coverage and population immunity; based on the epidemiology of FMD in the country or *zone*, the target *population* should be defined in accordance with Chapter 4.18.;
 - f) *vaccination* has been carried out following appropriate vaccine strain selection;
 - g) measures to prevent the introduction of *infection* have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and~~ or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';
- 2) for the past 24 months:

appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with Articles 8.8.43. to 8.8.45. and demonstrates points 1 a) and 1 b) above.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from FMD where *vaccination* is practised in accordance with Chapter 1.6. Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for all points above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOAAH in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

[...]

Article 8.8.8.

Country or zone infected with FMDV

A country or *zone* shall be considered as infected with FMDV when the conditions in points 1 to 6 of Article 8.8.3 or points 1 and 2 of 8.8.4 requirements for acceptance as a country or *zone* free from FMD either ~~where vaccination is not practised or where vaccination is practised~~ are not fulfilled met.

[...]

Annex 14. – Chapter 15.2. ‘Infection with classical swine fever virus’

CHAPTER 15.2.

INFECTION WITH CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER VIRUS

[...]

Article 15.2.3.

Country or zone free from CSF

A country or *zone* may be considered free from CSF when the relevant provisions in point 2 of Article 1.4.6. have been complied with, and when within the proposed free country or *zone* for at least the past 12 months:

- 1) there has been no *case of infection* with CSFV in domestic and *captive wild* pigs;
- 2) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of, and authority over, all domestic and *captive wild pig herds* in the country or *zone*;
- 3) the *Veterinary Authority* has current knowledge of the distribution, habitat and indication of disease occurrence through passive *surveillance* of *wild* and *feral* pigs in the country or *zone*;
- 4) appropriate *surveillance* has been implemented in accordance with:
 - a) point 2 b) of Article 1.4.6. where historical freedom can be demonstrated; or
 - b) Articles 15.2.28. to 15.2.33. where historical freedom cannot be demonstrated;
- 5) measures to prevent the introduction of the *infection* have been in place: in particular, the importations or movements of *commodities* into the country or *zone* have been carried out in accordance with this chapter ~~and~~ or other relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Code*, including Chapter 2.1. ‘Import risk analysis’;
- 6) no *vaccination* against CSF has been carried out in domestic and *captive wild* pigs unless there are means, validated according to Chapter 3.8.3. of the *Terrestrial Manual*, of distinguishing between vaccinated and infected pigs;
- 7) if relevant, the domestic and *captive wild* pig populations have been separated by appropriate *biosecurity*, effectively implemented and supervised, from the *wild* and *feral* pig populations, based on the assessed likelihood of spread of the disease within the *wild* and *feral* pig populations and *surveillance* in accordance with Article 15.2.33.

The country or *zone* will be included in the list of countries or *zones* free from CSF in accordance with Chapter 1.6.

Retention on the list requires annual reconfirmation of compliance with all points above and relevant provisions under point 4 of Article 1.4.6. Documented evidence should be resubmitted annually for points 1 to 5 above. Any changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be notified to WOAHP in accordance with Chapter 1.1.

[...]

Article 15.2.5.

Country or zone infected with CSFV

A country or *zone* is considered as infected with CSFV when the conditions in points 1 to 7 of Article 15.2.3. requirements for acceptance as a free country or zone are not fulfilled met.

[...]

Annex 15. – Chapter 8.20. ‘Infection with *Francisella Tularensis* (Tularemia)’

CHAPTER 8.20.

INFECTION WITH FRANCISELLA TULARENSIS (TULAREMIA)

Article 8.20.1.

General provisions

The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by tularemia. While a wide variety of mammals, including humans, and some birds are known to be susceptible, have been reported to be infected, but tularemia is primarily a vector-borne disease of the orders Lagomorpha and Rodentia.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, tularemia is defined as an *infection* of lagomorphs and rodents (hereafter ‘animal hosts’) with *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* or *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *holarctica*.

Hereafter ‘*Francisella tularensis*’ is used to collectively refer to both *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* and *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *holarctica*.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with *Francisella tularensis*:

- 1) *Francisella tularensis* has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid or antigen specific to *Francisella tularensis* has been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with *Francisella tularensis*; or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with *Francisella tularensis*, or giving cause for suspicion of association or contact with *Francisella tularensis*; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to *Francisella tularensis* has been detected in an animal host; or
- 4) antibodies specific to *Francisella tularensis* have been detected in a sample from an animal host showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with *Francisella tularensis*, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case or a human infected with *Francisella tularensis*, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with *Francisella tularensis*.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for tularemia (in hares, genus *Lepus*) shall be 15 days.

Standards for diagnosis ~~diagnostic tests~~, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Article 8.20.2.

Tularemia free country Country or zone free from tularemia

A country or zone may be considered free from tularemia when:

- 1) the *infection* has been notifiable in the entire country it has been shown that tularemia has not been present for at least the past two years;
- 2) either:
 - a) the country or zone is historically free as described in point 2) b) of Article 1.4.6.; or

- b) ~~for at least the past two years, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been in place in the entire country or zone, and there has been no case in the country or zone for at least the past two years; and when bacteriological or serological surveys in previously infected zones have given negative results.~~
- 3) ~~appropriate biosecurity and sanitary measures to prevent the introduction of infection have been in place; in particular, the importations or movements of animal hosts and other commodities into the country or zone have been carried out in accordance with this chapter or other relevant chapters of the Terrestrial Code, including Chapter 2.1. 'Import risk analysis';.~~

Article 8.20.2.bis

Recovery of free status

~~Should a case of infection with *Francisella tularensis* occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may be recovered in accordance with Article 8.20.2 one year after the disinfection and disinsection of the last affected establishment, provided that in the entire country or zone, specific surveillance in accordance with Chapter 1.4. has been carried out and has demonstrated the absence of any case of infection with *Francisella tularensis*.~~

~~Otherwise, Article 8.20.2. applies.~~

Article 8.20.3.

Tularemia infected zone-Country or zone infected with *Francisella tularensis*

A country or zone should be considered as infected with *Francisella tularensis* when the conditions for freedom from tularemia are not met fulfilled tularemia until:

- 1) ~~at least one year has elapsed after the last case has been confirmed;~~

AND

- 2) ~~a bacteriological survey on ticks within the infected zone has given negative results; or~~
- 3) ~~regular serological testing of hares and rabbits from that zone have given negative results.~~

Article 8.20.4.

Trade in commodities

~~Veterinary Authorities of tularemia free countries may prohibit importation or transit through their territory, from countries considered infected with tularemia, of live hares.~~

Article 8.20.54.

Recommendations for importation of hares from countries considered infected with *Francisella tularensis*tularemia

For live hares

Veterinary Authorities of importing countries should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

- 1) ~~showed no clinical sign of tularemia on the day of shipment;~~
- 12) ~~do not come from a zone kept in an tularemia-infected with *Francisella tularensis*.zone;~~
- 23) ~~have been were treated against ectoparasites arthropod vectors upon entry into the quarantine centre; and~~
- 34) ~~were kept in a quarantine station centre for the at least 15 days prior to shipment and during this period the animals showed no clinical signs of infection with *Francisella tularensis*.~~

Annex 16. – Chapter 8.X. ‘Infection with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus’

CHAPTER 8.X.

INFECTION WITH CRIMEAN-CONGO HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUS

Article 8.X.1.

General provisions

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a zoonotic disease, resulting in severe illness or death in humans. It is caused by a tick-borne virus (CCHFV) that can infect, in general subclinically, a wide variety of vertebrate animals, in general causing no clinical signs in animals. Some of them these animals playing a significant role in the amplification and virus-transmission of the virus to humans.

The aim of this chapter is to mitigate the animal health and public health risks posed by CCHF.

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is defined as an *infection* of ruminants, dromedary camels and ostriches (hereafter ‘animal hosts’) with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus ~~Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus ((CCHFV))~~.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with CCHFV:

- 1) CCHFV has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from an animal host; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to CCHFV has been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with or exposure to CCHFV; or
- 3) antibodies specific to CCHFV have been detected in a sample from an animal host epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case, or to a human infected with CCHFV, or giving cause for suspicion of previous association ~~or contact~~ with or exposure to CCHFV.

Standards for diagnosis and information on the epidemiology are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

Annex 17. – Chapter 10.X. ‘Infection with metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chickens)’

CHAPTER 10.X.

INFECTION WITH AVIAN METAPNEUMOVIRUS (TURKEY RHINOTRACHEITIS AND SWOLLEN HEAD SYNDROME OF CHICKENS)

Article 10.X.1.

General provisions

For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, *infection* with avian metapneumovirus is defined as an *infection* of *poultry* with avian metapneumovirus.

The following defines the occurrence of *infection* with avian metapneumovirus:

- 1) Avian metapneumovirus, excluding vaccine strains, has been isolated and identified as such in a sample from *poultry*; or
- 2) nucleic acid specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in a sample from *poultry* showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with avian metapneumovirus or is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case; or
- 3) seroconversion specific to avian metapneumovirus, which is not the consequence of *vaccination*, has been detected in *poultry*; or
- 4) antibodies specific to avian metapneumovirus, which are not the consequence of *vaccination*, have been detected in a sample from *poultry* showing clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with *infection* with avian metapneumovirus, or epidemiologically linked to a confirmed or suspected case.

Standards for diagnosis and vaccines, as well as information on the epidemiology, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.
