Ad hoc Group on the Revision of Chapters on Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*

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The WOAH *ad hoc* Group on the revision of the chapter on Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis of the *Terrestrial Code* (hereafter the Group) met in-person from 8 to 10 April 2025 at the WOAH Headquarters in Paris following the recommendations from the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (hereafter the Specialist Commissions) to revise the current *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 12.11. on Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.

1. Opening

Dr Min-Kyung Park, WOAH Head of Status Department, thanked the experts and their institutions for their commitment and support to the work of the Group. Dr Park emphasised the importance of establishing implementable standards and workable provisions grounded in clear rationale, while also advocating for a One Health approach to address potential zoonotic aspects. Finally, she encouraged Group members to propose relevant recommendations to the *Terrestrial Code* and *Manual for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines (Terrestrial Manual)* chapters on equine encephalitis.

Dr Charmaine Chng, Deputy Head of the Science Department, presented the disease listing criteria (*Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2.) and the assessment results of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis against those criteria. Dr Mauro Meske from the Status Department provided a brief overview of the Terms of Reference (ToR) and the meeting of the Group and introduced the Secretariat supporting the Group's work.

2. Appointment of the Chair and Rapporteur

Dr Gaelle Gonzalez was appointed as chair and Dr Scott Weaver acted as rapporteur with WOAH Secretariat support. The ToR and list of participants are provided as **Annexes I** and **II,** respectively.

3. Revision of Chapter 12.11. Infection with Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus (Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis)

3.1. Initial considerations

The Group reviewed the remarks of the WOAH Specialist Commissions on the revision of chapters on equine encephalitides of the *Terrestrial Code*, and the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on Eastern and Western Equine Encephalomyelitis (EEE and WEE) and *ad hoc* Group on Japanese encephalitis (JE). The current Chapter 12.11. on Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) was noted to be limited, outdated, and inconsistent with the conventions for disease-specific chapters in the *Terrestrial Code*. Discrepancies were identified between the provisions in *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 12.11. (last updated in 1998) and Chapter 3.6.4. of the *Terrestrial Manual* (last updated in 2021). The Group agreed to completely revise Chapter 12.11. and include provisions following the framework for *Terrestrial Code* Standards.

The Group agreed to propose a complete revision of the chapter that primarily focuses on animal health while addressing the zoonotic nature of VEE and the role of animals in transmitting the Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV). Recommendations would aim to mitigate risks to both animal and public health, aligning with the Specialist Commissions' conclusions on maintaining VEE as a notifiable disease due to its public health implications and the impact on international movement of horses and other equids.

The Group agreed to use the term 'culicine mosquito' as it covers the whole range of currently known competent vectors for VEE, according to the *Terrestrial Manual* and other papers (1–3).

3.2. General provisions (Article 12.11.1.)

a) Definition of the disease

The Group discussed the possibility of renaming the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 12.11. to "*Infection with Alphavirus Venezuelan* (Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus)" in line with ICTV taxonomy (EC54, Online meeting, July 2022), but ultimately retained the name "*Infection with* Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus " due to its global recognition and concerns that a name change might lead to confusion. Coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO) would be required for any nomenclature adjustments.

Given the importance of this disease in relation to the international movement of horses and its implications for human health, the Group agreed to focus on the epizootic strains of VEEV I-AB and VEEV I-C as the target pathogenic agent of the WOAH listing. It decided not to list the enzootic strains of VEEV I-D and I-E, as equids do not act as amplifiers for these strains but rather serve as dead-end hosts.

The Group also noted that among viruses within the VEE complex, wild birds are reservoirs only for Tonate virus (Alphavirus tonate) among species in the VEE complex.

To avoid confusion, the Group agreed to adopt the abbreviation 'VEEV/IABC' when referring specifically to the epizootic strains, recommended as the pathogenic agent of the WOAH listed disease.

The Group acknowledged that, although rare, limited outbreaks have been associated with the VEEV enzootic strain I-E, affecting equids recorded in 1993 and 1996 in Mexico. However, these outbreaks were limited and showed no evidence of equine amplification. Additionally, experimental studies provided no evidence that horses are amplifiers for the strain I-E (4,5).

b) *Animal hosts*

The Group agreed that equids are the primary amplification hosts for VEEV/IABC for the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code.* Equids were specifically highlighted due to their potential to amplify the virus and trigger widespread outbreak. The Group acknowledged that there is documented evidence of VEEV I-AB and I-C infections in other species such as sheep, goats, dogs, and cats. However, there was no evidence indicating that these species play a significant role in the transmission of the virus (6). Therefore, the Group recommended that they should not be included in the case definition. Instead, the Group recommended that these species be listed in the *Terrestrial Manual* as susceptible species.

c) *Definition of the occurrence of the disease*

The Group decided not to include the detection of antigens or antibodies specific to VEEV/IABC as diagnostic criteria, as these methods alone are insufficient for confirming epizootic strains. Confirmation requires nucleic acid detection through sequencing methods, which are essential to differentiate known epizootic strains (VEEV/IABC) from enzootic ones. In addition, there are currently no commercially available kits for VEEV ELISA tests, and most tests are developed *in-house* with positive controls sourced from within affected zone, region and country.

The Group agreed to exclude serological findings as sole criteria for defining a case of VEEV/IABC, as sequencing methods are required to differentiate known epizootic (VEEV/IABC) from enzootic strains (VEEV I-D, I-E). It was agreed to maintain Plaque Reduction Neutralisation (PRN) tests and virus neutralisation tests as the recommended methods in the *Terrestrial Manual* as they should continue to be used while noting that definitive confirmation must rely on sequencing.

d) *Incubation period and infective period*

For the purposes of the chapter, the Group agreed that it is necessary to define the incubation periods only for equids, given their central role in virus transmission and their importance in the regulatory context of this chapter. In this regard, the Group concluded that current evidence supports a standard incubation period of maximum of 7 days in equids.

In addition, the Group highlighted that viraemia generally occurs from 1 to 6 days after infection with VEEV/IABC and proposed to define the maximum infective period as 7 days, extending the viraemic period slightly beyond the experimental results as a measure of safety (7–10). This reflects the critical importance of viraemia as an indicator of active infection and its role in facilitating mosquito-borne transmission (11). The Group noted this consideration is related to the recommendations for importation of live equids from infected countries or zones (see item 3.5.2. of this report).

3.3. Safety of commodities (Article 12.11.2.) Safe commodities

The Group evaluated equid commodities typically involved in international trade to determine their compliance with the criteria set out in Chapter 2.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

a) *Live equids*

As equids are considered amplifying hosts for infection with VEEV/IABC, the Group agreed that live equids should be considered as a commodity that can transmit virus to other animals and should be subjected to specific risk mitigation if they are to be traded (see item 3.5. of this report).

b) *Meat, meat products, milk, hides and skins*

Although no direct studies exist, the Group acknowledged a potential risk of human infection via aerosol exposure when handling meat or meat products from infected equids. This is a recognised route of transmission for other zoonotic arboviruses (e.g. from milk), supported by literature (12–15). As a result, the Group agreed not to list meat, milk, hides, and skins of equids from infected countries as safe commodities.

c) *Germinal products*

The Group noted the absence of documented evidence for VEEV transmission through equine semen, oocytes, or embryos. However, due to the theoretical risk associated with viraemia—since VEEV has been detected in multiple tissues and fluids during experimental infections—and reported cases of transplacental transmission and teratogenic effects in both animals and humans (16), these commodities cannot be considered definitively safe. Therefore, in the absence of robust studies demonstrating no transmission under natural conditions, the Group recommended not to list these as safe commodities.

Similarly, equine sterile filtered serum was not considered a safe commodity, as there is no standard method to remove alphaviruses from this commodity and VEEV is present at high titres in the serum of infected equids (7,8).

d) *Other products*

In contrast, the Group concluded that protein meal, collagen, and gelatine—when subjected to standard heat treatments—and collagen processed through alkaline or acid hydrolysis, as well as alcohol treatments used in hoof processing, are sufficient to inactivate VEEV. Therefore, these were designated as safe commodities.

The Group emphasised the need for further research to better understand VEEV transmission pathways, particularly the potential for aerosol transmission through equine products and the risk of transmission via semen, embryos, and oocytes.

3.4. Provisions on animal health status

3.4.1. Countries or zones free from infection with VEEV/IABC (Article 12.11.3.)

The Group agreed that the historical freedom provisions in Article 1.4.6. of the *Terrestrial Code* would apply for VEEV.

Freedom from infection may also be established provided that the disease has been notifiable for at least the past two years and specific *surveillance* in accordance with the provisions defined in this draft chapter (see item 3.7. of this report). This timeframe considers the seasonal dynamics and life cycle of mosquito vectors. This approach is also consistent with provisions in the *Terrestrial Code* for similar vector-borne diseases, such as West Nile Fever (WNF) and Japanese Encephalitis (JE), and aligns with the recommendations in the *High Health, High Performance* (HHP) framework for the temporary movement of competition horses.

While no DIVA (Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals) vaccine currently exists for VEEV—as is also the case for JE—the Group agreed that vaccination in disease-free zones for horses traveling to endemic areas would not compromise the health status of the VEE-free country or zone. This is because the case definition for VEEV/IABC relies on sequencing-based confirmation, rather than serological tests.

3.4.2. Compartment free from infection with VEEV/IABC (Article 12.11.4.)

The Group agreed that VEEV-free compartments could be established, particularly in areas where the risk of vector-borne transmission is considered low. This assessment is based on environmental and climatic conditions—such as temperature, humidity, and altitude—that are not conducive to the sustained vector presence or activity, based on established entomological thresholds (17). The free status of the compartment could be supported by implementing measures such as vector exclusion, vaccination, and pre-entry testing of animals.

3.4.3. Country or zone infected with VEEV/IABC (Article 12.11.5.)

As the provisions for freedom from infection with VEEV/IABC are defined as above, the Group agreed that the definition of an infected country should follow the structure of other relevant chapters for consistency.

3.4.4. Recovery of free status (Article 12.11.6.)

The Group acknowledged that regaining free status following an outbreak would be challenging in areas with active mosquito populations and rodent reservoirs. The Group, therefore, concluded that if an outbreak occurs in a previously VEEV/IABC-free country or zone, the provisions in Article 12.11.3.would apply.

3.5. Provisions for international trade

3.5.1. Recommendations for importation of live equids from countries, zones or compartments free from infection with VEEV/IABC (Article 12.11.7.)

The Group concluded that importing live equids from VEE-free countries, zones or compartments poses minimum risks of VEEV/IABC introduction. The Group recommended that Veterinary Authorities request an international veterinary certificate attesting that equids were kept since birth or at least 90 days before shipment from such free areas.

If equids originated from an infected area prior to 90 days before shipment, the 90-day safety margin would ensure they are no longer capable of transmitting the virus. This provision is consistent with other similar disease-chapters and aligned with the Handbook for the management of high health, high performance horses.

The Group emphasised that, if equids transit through infected zones, they should be transported in mosquito-protected conditions, with this requirement documented in the health certificate. In this regard, the Group included recommendations in Article 12.11.9. to protect equids from culicine mosquito bites during transportation.

3.5.2. Recommendations for importation of equids from countries or zones infected with VEEV/IABC (Article 12.11.8.)

Firstly, the Group agreed that the quarantine of equids would not be necessary in the case of an equid vaccinated against VEEV because the protection of attenuated vaccines, as per the provisions of Chapter 3.6.4. of the *Terrestrial Manual*, is sufficient to ensure safe trade of these animals. The vaccinated animals can only be transported 60 days after vaccination to ensure sufficient immunity of the vaccinated equids against VEEV. The Group agreed not to add any time limit for vaccination as immunity provided through attenuated vaccines is largely life-long (18).

Secondly, the Group also concluded that unvaccinated equids may be imported safely if they are held for at least 7 days before shipment in a vector-protected quarantine station. This quarantine period allows any recently infected animal to develop detectable viraemia, which can then be identified by nucleic acid testing. For this reason, to enable detection at peak viraemia, the Group recommended the equids be tested for nucleic acids of VEEV in serum with negative result between 2 to 5 days after entering into the vector-protected quarantine (7). Because there is no latency period for VEEV in equids and vectors become infectious only from viremic animals, this 7-day holding period in quarantine ensures that any infected equid will clear the virus before transport, preventing VEEV/IABC transmission.

During transportation to the shipment location, equids must remain protected from mosquito bites. The Group agreed to add an article providing details on the measures applicable to vector-protected-quarantine (see item 3.6. of this report).

3.6. Protecting equids from culicine mosquito bites (Article 12.11.9.)

Building on the preceding items, the Group agreed to issue general recommendations for protecting equids from mosquito bites during both quarantine and transport. These recommendations were developed by adapting the equivalent provisions from the revised Japanese encephalitis *Terrestrial Code* chapter, which was appended to the Code Commission's February 2025 report.

3.7. Surveillance (Article 12.11.10.)

The Group emphasised that the aim of the surveillance for VEEV is mainly to support measures to mitigate animal and public health risks (as per the recently drafted Code chapters on EEE and WEE, and JE), and secondarily to ensure safe international trade of animal commodities.

The Group also emphasised the importance of conducting awareness campaigns targeting key stakeholders including the horse industry, private veterinarians that play a critical role in implementing surveillance activities, as well as owners and keepers of equids.

The Group recommended that clinical and syndromic surveillance be included as essential components of an early warning system for equids. Such a system should be implemented not only in endemic areas, but also in non-endemic regions, to ensure early detection in the event of disease emergence.

Given the high mutation potential of VEEV, the Group highlighted the importance of closely monitoring the epidemiological situation, since genetic sequencing alone may not detect newly emerging epizootic strains with unique new mutations. In this context, the Group agreed that surveillance should not be limited to epizootic strains (VEEV IABC), as enzootic viruses may mutate into epizootic forms for which equids could act as amplifying hosts (19,20). Thus, the epidemiological context remains critical during VEEV events.

The Group also stressed the need to consider environmental and agricultural factors in VEEV surveillance. Since mosquito eggs can remain latent in dry conditions and emerge following rainfall or increased humidity, weather patterns and agricultural practices (e.g. rice cultivation) should be factored into risk assessments. Although entomological surveillance—such as monitoring adult mosquitoes for the presence of VEEV—can provide insights into vector activity, the Group noted that this method currently has limited sensitivity and should not be relied upon as a standalone surveillance tool.

4. Review of *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.6.4.

In June 2024, a comprehensive revision of the *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.6.4. on *Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern, Western and Venezuelan)* was recommended by the *ad hoc* Group on Eastern and Western equine encephalitides. Particular emphasis was placed on VEEV, with a call to refine diagnostic approaches capable of distinguishing epizootic from enzootic strains. The Group underscored the importance of evaluating molecular and epidemiological data suggesting shifts in viral transmission dynamics and genetic variability, particularly among endemic lineages.

The chapter's revision was also aimed at enhancing the characterisation of the viral lifecycle. This includes more robust descriptions of vectors and hosts, as well as mentioning rodents (Family *Rodentia*), serving as reservoirs for enzootic strains.

Following endorsement by the Biological Standards Commission (BSC) in September 2024, the revision process of the *Manual* chapter commenced in October 2024. Updates were applied across the entire chapter. In the 'Summary' and 'Section A. *Introduction'*, the description of the disease transmission cycle was significantly enhanced to include detailed information on vectors, host species, and reservoir species, with the corresponding Latin binomial nomenclature incorporated. 'Section B. *Diagnostic Methods'* underwent a major restructuring. The original Table 1, which summarised diagnostic methods, was split into two distinct tables: one dedicated to EEEV and WEEV, emphasising antigen detection techniques due to the typically acute nature of these infections, and a second table focusing on VEEV, offering stratified diagnostic recommendations. Furthermore, the Group proposed the addition of a subsection on sample collection and preparation, aimed at promoting best practices and ensuring consistency in diagnostic procedures.

The Group had one expert designated to finalise the revised draft, which will be submitted for review by the BSC in September 2025. Subject to approval, the plan would be for the draft to be circulated for Member comment and presented for potential adoption at the 2026 General Session.

5. Recommendations for future revision of *Terrestrial Code* chapters on West Nile Fever

As the Code Commission included the revision of Chapter 8.21. 'West Nile Fever' (WNF) in its work programme, the Group recommended aligning the chapter with other arboviral disease chapters in the *Terrestrial Code*, such as those on EEE and WEE, JE, and VEE. A One Health approach was encouraged, reflecting the relevance of WNF to both animal and human health.

Key recommendations included:

1. Updating the list of animal hosts to reflect current scientific knowledge, including removing references to species no longer considered primary hosts.

2. Revising or removing outdated articles, including provisions on seasonal freedom and species vaccination, to better reflect the disease's year-round presence and available vaccines.

3. Introducing surveillance guidance that considers diagnostic challenges posed by cross-reactivity with other flaviviruses.

4. Addressing the evolving epidemiological landscape of WNF, particularly in relation to climate change and the global spread of the disease.

5. Clarifying the status of horses and equine-derived products as safe commodities in the context of trade.

6. Highlighting the growing public health significance of WNF and the need for harmonised approaches to disease control and prevention.

These recommendations aim to ensure the chapter remains scientifically current and relevant to both animal health authorities and public health stakeholders.

The Group proposed to revise articles on freedom from WNF because of the widespread distribution of the disease and its epidemiological evolution in recent years. The Group also suggested to remove provisions on seasonality freedom. In addition, WNF should not focus on geese and ducks.

The Group provided further rationale to support the revision of the WNF chapter.

a. Expansion and clarification of susceptible species and safe commodities

The current list is outdated. It should remove geese and ducks as primary species, and include key affected bird families: raptors, corvids, and passerines.

The chapter should acknowledge other susceptible species, including reptiles, felines, and dogs (as dead-end hosts) and their potential use as sentinels.

It should also clarify that equine-derived products (e.g. semen, embryos) and live horses are safe commodities.

b. Obsolete or inaccurate articles require deletion or revision

Article 8.21.4 (Seasonal freedom) should be deleted, as WNF cases occur year-round (e.g. April in France, January in Hamburg and Florida).

Article 8.21.5 (Vaccination and susceptible species) should be adapted or removed as it refers to bird vaccination, though only horse vaccines are currently available.

c. Surveillance gaps

The chapter currently lacks any provision on surveillance, despite WNF being primarily monitored via serological surveillance, which is impaired by cross-reactivity with other flaviviruses (e.g., Zika, dengue, JE, Usutu virus, Saint Louis). Surveillance recommendations must consider diagnostic limitations, especially in areas where multiple flaviviruses co-circulate and the use of alternative surveillance methods, including environmental samples.

d. Epidemiological changes and climate impact

WNF distribution has expanded significantly, especially in Europe, with increasing numbers of equine and human cases since 2018 (21–24). Climate change is altering vector dynamics, challenging the applicability of the current concepts of country or zone freedom.

e. Trade and vaccination policy implications

The lack of vaccination guidance affects trade restrictions and vaccine implementation, especially in regions like the EU (e.g. Denmark), where WNF is considered absent. Recommending horse vaccination could help harmonise control measures and ease import restrictions.

f. Public health importance

WNF has become one of the most reported vector-borne zoonoses in recent years. In the USA, WNF cases have far exceeded those of Eastern or Western equine encephalitis.

6. Next steps

The Group's report and draft Chapter 12.11. will be considered by the Specialist Commissions at their September 2025 meetings.

…/Appendixes

Annex I Terms of reference

MEETING OF THE *AD HOC* GROUP ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS

ON EQUINE ENCEPHALITIDES OF THE *TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE*

PARIS, 8- 10 APRIL 2025

Purpose

The purpose of the *ad hoc* Group on the Revision of the *Terrestrial Code*. Chapter 12.11. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.

Background

The *Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission* (the Code Commission) considered requests from Members to review Chapters 8.10. Japanese encephalitis (JEE) and 12.11. Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis (VEE), which were raised during the 89th General Session in May 2022, and several considerations presented by the Secretariat, including the impact on trade for the movement of horses from infected countries, the discrepancies observed between the chapters of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*, as well as the opinion of the International Horse Sports Confederation (IHSC) and discussions of the Scientific Commission at its September 2015 meeting.

The Code Commission noted that Chapter 8.10. was first adopted in 1992, and the most recent update was adopted in 2000, but the corresponding *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.61.10. was updated in 2021. It also agreed that the current Chapter 8.10. was partly obsolete, given the latest information in Chapter 3.1.10. on Japanese encephalitis of the *Terrestrial Manual*.

The Code Commission also noted that the revisions of Chapter 12.4. Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) (EEE and WEE) (no update since its first adoption in 1968) and Chapter 12.11. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (the most recent update adopted in 1998) was included in its work programme in February 2020, but that work had not yet been initiated. Considering the epidemiological similarities across these three diseases, the Code Commission agreed to approach the revisions of these three disease-specific chapters together to ensure a consistent logic is applied to all three chapters. It also agreed that Chapter 8.21. West Nile fever (WNF) should also be considered, even if updated more recently.

The Code Commission requested to first undertake a scientific assessment of the susceptible animals, their epidemiological role and their relevance for surveillance and disease prevention and control. The assessment of these diseases against the criteria for the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations in the WOAH list of notifiable terrestrial animal diseases in accordance with Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*, was conducted by subject matter experts, and considered by the Scientific Commission at its meeting of September 2023.

At its February 2024 meeting, the Code Commission agreed to revise *Terrestrial Code* chapters on equine encephalitides, and an *ad hoc* Group was convened in June 2024. At the meeting, the Group drafted a revised Chapter 12.4. (Eastern and western equine encephalitis) and provided further guidance for the revision of the Chapters 8.10. and 12.11. The Group recommended that, considering the differences in terms of animal hosts and epidemiology, a dedicated *ad hoc* Group be convened to undertake the revision of *Terrestrial Code* Chapters 8.10. Japanese encephalitis.

At the TAHSC September meeting, the Code Commission considered the report of the Group and agreed to proceed with the revision of *Terrestrial Code* Chapters 8.10. Japanese encephalitis, following the abovementioned recommendations.

Considerations

When developing this work, the *ad hoc* Group should consider:

1. the general structure and content of the *Terrestrial Code*, in particular the guidance provided in the *Framework for Terrestrial Code standards* (disease-specific chapters);
2. the use of Glossary definitions in the *Terrestrial Code*;
3. previous opinions of WOAH Specialist Commissions' and the *ad hoc* Group on equine encephalitides;
4. the current Chapters 3.1.10. (JEE) of the *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals*;
5. all working documents provided by the WOAH Secretariat.

Expectations

Ad hoc Group members should:

- be familiar with the structure of the *Terrestrial Code* and the use of Glossary definitions and the *Framework for Terrestrial Code standards*.
- have read and considered the current Chapter 8.10. of the *Terrestrial Code*.
- have read all working documents provided by the WOAH Secretariat.
- contribute to discussions, and.
- contribute to drafting text for the revised chapter and the meeting report.
- be familiar with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (especially Article 8 and Annex C), the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the Codex Alimentarius Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification (CAC/GL 20-1995) Guidelines for the Design, Operation, Assessment and Accreditation of Food Import and Export Certification Systems (CAC/GL 26-1997) (to be provided in the Working Documents); and any other relevant international standards.

(<u>Only for new members</u>) *Ad hoc* Group members should:

- sign the WOAH Undertaking on Confidentiality,
- complete the WOAH Declaration of Interest form,
- read and acknowledge the WOAH personal data management policy.

Deliverables

1. a report presenting the rationale for decisions and proposed texts and supporting references when relevant;
2. the draft revised *Terrestrial Code* chapter on Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis;
3. any recommendations that, from the revision of this chapter, may be useful to complete the revision of other chapters on equine encephalitides;
4. any points that require guidance from the Code Commission for the next steps in the development of the revised draft chapter.

Reporting / timeline

The work of this *ad hoc* Group will likely be completed within one meeting but could require follow up meetings and may meet virtually or in person according to the needs. After a meeting, the Group should finalise the relevant deliverables within 5 weeks after the completion of the meeting.

Annex II List of Participants

MEETING OF THE *AD HOC* GROUP ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS

ON EQUINE ENCEPHALITIDES OF THE *TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE*

PARIS, 8- 10 APRIL 2025

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Annex III- References:

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