

Report of the WOAAH Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases

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for Animal Health

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A meeting of the WOAHS Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Commission) was held from 10 to 14 February 2025.

1. Welcome

Dr Montserrat Arroyo, WOAHS DDG ISS welcomed the Commission on 10 February 2025.

Dr Arroyo shared some updates with the Commission, including the revised WOAHS organisational chart, the development of WOAHS's 8th Strategic Plan for the period 2026 to 2030 and the plan for the Animal Health Forum as part of the 92nd General Session that will be dedicated to vaccines and vaccination. The forum will create a platform for dialogue between WOAHS Delegates, subject matter experts, civil society and the private sector on barriers that are currently impeding the development and use of vaccines in animal disease prevention and control strategies, and to explore how existing and upcoming technologies may be combined with science-based vaccination policies to address animal health challenges. Dr Arroyo in particular thanked Dr Dungu for serving as rapporteur for the Technical Item of the Animal Health Forum.

In addition, Dr Arroyo emphasised the importance of Members having an official animal health status recognised by WOAHS, to demonstrate compliance with WOAHS standards under the disease-specific chapters or that alternative measures in place provide a level of protection that is equivalent, in accordance with Chapter 5.3.

2. Meeting with the Director General

Dr Emmanuelle Soubeyran, WOAHS Director General met with the Commission on 11 February 2025, to welcome the Commission members and thank them for their important work and contributions to the work of the WOAHS.

Dr Soubeyran provided a brief update on a number of topics complementing Dr Arroyo's updates. Dr Soubeyran also provided an update of the work of the Governance Review Committee (see Item 10.1.), [The Animal Echo](#) and the recent launch of the GF-TADs Global Strategy for highly pathogenic avian influenza, as well as the plan for a review and update of the Global Strategies for African swine fever and foot and mouth disease.

The Commission members thanked Dr Soubeyran for her appreciation and these updates.

3. Adoption of the agenda

The draft agenda was adopted by the Commission. The meeting was chaired by Dr Cristóbal Zepeda and the WOAHS Secretariat acted as rapporteur. The agenda and list of participants are attached as [Annexes 1](#) and [2](#), respectively.

4. Terrestrial Animal Health Code

4.1. Member comments received for Commission consideration

4.1.1. Proposal to remove the questionnaires for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) from the *Terrestrial Code*

At the meeting of the Bureaus of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission in February 2025, the Commissions considered comments by Members expressing concern on the proposal to remove the questionnaires for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) from the *Terrestrial Code* and maintain them on the WOAHS website. The Commissions reiterated the fact that the use of the questionnaires for the application of official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes by WOAHS remains mandatory through the relevant reference in Chapter 1.6. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAHS and through WOAHS's Standard Operating Procedures on official status recognition.

The Commissions further clarified the revision process of the questionnaires, should they be removed from the *Terrestrial Code* and maintained on the WOAHS website:

- any suggested modifications in a questionnaire and related discussions will be clearly captured in the Scientific Commission's February meeting report. Members can suggest modifications to the WOAHS Status Department (disease.status@woah.org) by 31 December of the previous calendar year for the Scientific Commission to consider at the following February meeting.
- accepted changes will be captured in the February meeting report and presented during the forthcoming General Session so that they can be addressed in the following evaluation cycle of applications.

4.1.2. Chapter 11.5. Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)

At the meeting of the Bureaus of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission in February 2025, the following comments by Members was considered:

Article 11.5.3.

The Commissions considered a comment proposing an addition under point 4 of Article 11.5.3. to clarify that the importations or movements of bovine commodities into a free country or zone could be carried out in accordance with any procedures as long as they result in the same level of protection as the ones described in Chapter 11.5. While the Commissions agreed that equivalent measures can be applied based on Chapter 5.3. 'WOAH procedures relevant to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization', the Commissions were of the opinion that the current text already includes reference to other horizontal chapters, such as Chapters 1.4. 'Animal health surveillance', 2.1. 'Import risk analysis' and 5.3. The Commissions agreed to add a reference to Chapter 2.1. under point 4 of Article 11.5.3.

The Commissions did not agree with a suggestion to remove the provision for annual submission of documented evidence for the reconfirmation of official animal health status under Article 11.5.3. in order to simplify the process. The Commissions reminded that the addition of this provision was part of the work for the harmonisation of requirements for recognition and maintenance of free status. Nevertheless, the Commissions acknowledged that the annual reconfirmation process can be perceived as burdensome for some Members and further reminded that the Scientific Commission is currently working to review the process to streamline it while still respecting the relevant requirements of the *Terrestrial Code*.

Article 11.5.5.

The Commissions agreed with a comment by Members that countries not having official disease-free status by WOAHP should not be considered as infected by default. The Commissions proposed an amendment under Article 11.5.5. to enhance clarity that a country should be considered as infected when the conditions in points 1 to 6 of Article 11.5.3. are not met.

Article 11.5.5bis.

In response to a comment by Members proposing the addition of a reference to other types of zoning under Article 11.5.5bis., the Commissions requested clarification from the Members on the type of zones they were referring to. The Commissions stressed that Article 11.5.5bis. only refers to a containment zone and not to any other types of zones under Chapter 4.4.

The Commissions noted that upon adoption of the revised Chapters 11.5. and 12.1., the modifications described above would also apply to the other chapters that underwent the harmonisation work on the requirements of recognition and maintenance of status namely, Chapters 8.8. 'Infection with foot and mouth disease virus', 14.7. 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus' and 15.2. 'Infection with classical swine fever virus'.

Article 11.5.10.

The Commissions did not agree with a Member's comment suggesting the removal under Article 11.5.10 of the provision for testing bovine semen imported from CBPP infected countries or zones for the detection of the agent. The Commissions made reference to the report of the [Scientific Commission's February 2016 meeting](#), explaining that, according to available scientific evidence¹, to guarantee the absence of the CBPP pathogen in the bovine semen collected for exportation from an infected country, the use of serology only was not enough and required an analysis of the semen. The Commissions stressed that this finding was further supported by more recent scientific literature².

¹ "Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides SC identification by PCR in sperm of seminal vesiculitis-affected bulls". Giuseppe Stradaoli, Lakamy Sylla, Francesco Mazzarelli, Riccardo Zelli, Veterinary Research, BioMed Central, 1999, 30 (5), pp.457- 466.

² "Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia: A Comprehensive Overview". Giovanni Di Teodoro, Giuseppe Marruchella, Andrea Di Provido, Anna Rita D'Angelo, Gianluca Orsini, Paola Di Giuseppe, Flavio Sacchini, Massimo Scacchia, Veterinary Pathology, 2020, 57(4), pp. 476-489.

4.1.3. Chapter 12.1. Infection with African horse sickness virus

The Commission noted that identical comments noted above in relation to Article 11.5.3., 11.5.5., and 11.5.5bis. were also made in Chapter 12.1. 'Infection with African horse sickness virus'. Please refer to these sections under Item 4.1.2. for the Commission's response.

4.2. Other considerations

4.2.1. Chapter 14.8. Scrapie

In September 2024, the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group that met to review *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 14.8. 'Scrapie' were presented to the Commission (see [report](#) of the *ad hoc* Group). The Commission was also informed that the recommendations of the Group about genotypic resistance and the need to have further guidance on ante-mortem surveillance and testing were presented to the Biological Standards Commission for input. Both Commissions noted the recommendations of the Group on genotypic resistance and requested the Secretariat to seek further clarification from subject-matter experts on the methods for genotyping and whether there is consensus in the scientific community on the resistant genotypes. The Commission also considered that the draft recommendations on surveillance would have to be adapted to the distribution of genotypes in the population and fitness of purpose of existing test methods for scrapie that could support surveillance programmes.

In addition to the above, the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group were also presented in September 2024 to the Code Commission. It requested further clarification on the epidemiology of the disease, notably the different risk pathways (i.e. recycling) and whether the proposed approach for a risk status was suitable, and to consider the inclusion of atypical variants (non-classical) in the case definition.

In this context, the Secretariat consulted WOA Reference Laboratories for scrapie (hereafter 'RLs') and received their opinion on the concept of genotypic resistance, the existence of validated ante-mortem tests, concept of risk status versus free/infected and the use of the terms 'atypical' versus 'non-classical' scrapie and their exclusion from draft *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 14.8. The opinion of the RLs was presented to the Commission, the Biological Standards Commission and the Code Commission at their respective February 2025 meetings.

The Commission noted that the RLs agreed with the Group's recommendations on genotypes which confer genotypic resistance to classical scrapie, and that there was consensus in the scientific community regarding resistant genotypes. The Commission also noted that the RLs had been invited to provide text to supplement *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.8.10. to describe standardised methods for genotyping but both the RLs and the Biological Standards Commission considered that the text was sufficient as written. Nevertheless, the Commission considered it was important to refer to standardised methods to guide countries should the concept of genotypic resistance be introduced to Chapter 14.8.

Regarding the use of ante-mortem tests, the Commission agreed with the RLs' opinion that there are no validated tests for ante-mortem diagnosis of scrapie that can replace the post-mortem diagnosis currently used in scrapie surveillance schemes and that all diagnostic TSE surveillance schemes are currently based on post-mortem testing of brain tissues. Therefore, it agreed with the RLs to not refer to ante-mortem tests in Chapter 14.8.

On the subject of risk status versus free/infected, the Commission agreed with the RLs' opinion that scrapie was a prion disease with a long incubation period and noted the difficulty in demonstrating freedom from scrapie by surveillance due to the long incubation period, low incidence, and slow spread of this disease. It therefore concurred with the proposal to incorporate the concept of risk status, similar to that used in *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 11.4. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy.

The Commission noted the RLs' clarification that the term 'non-classical' scrapie has a similar meaning to 'atypical' scrapie as understood by the scientific community and to use the term 'atypical' in alignment with *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.8.10. in draft Chapter 14.8. instead of 'non-classical' to avoid confusion.

Finally, the Commission noted a comment from the Code Commission that the risk pathways for scrapie should be comprehensively covered in the draft chapter.

The opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission.

5. *Ad hoc* and Working Groups

5.1. Meeting reports for consideration

5.1.1. *Ad hoc* Group on Japanese encephalitis

The Commission reviewed the report of the *ad hoc* Group on the revision of Chapters on Japanese encephalitis of the *Terrestrial Code* and agreed with the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group. The Commission commended the work of the *ad hoc* Group for the clear and well-researched report, enriched with numerous literature references.

The report of the *ad hoc* Group is available on the [WOAH website](#).

5.1.2. *Ad hoc* Group on sheep pox & goat pox

The Commission was informed that the WOA *ad hoc* Group on sheep pox and goat pox was convened in-person in November 2024 to undertake a comprehensive review of the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 14.9. 'Sheep pox and goat pox virus' and identify potential need for amendments to Chapter 11.9. 'Infection with lumpy skin disease virus', if any, taking into account its proposed changes to Chapter 14.9. The Group was also requested to highlight any knowledge gaps that may impact the development of the standards.

The Commission was informed that in reviewing Chapter 14.9. the Group had also proposed amendments to *Terrestrial Manual* 3.8.12. that were presented to the Biological Standards Commission at its February 2025 meeting.

At this meeting, the Commission reviewed the report of the Group and the proposed draft revised Chapter 14.9. The Commission also reviewed a clarification from the International Wool and Textile Organization (IWTO) on the processes involved in the production and processing of wool and hair that could impact the provisions of Chapter 14.9. The Commission thanked the IWTO for its input.

The Commission extensively discussed the risk associated with the importation of vaccinated live animals from infected countries or zones. The Commission was of the opinion that vaccination may not prevent infection and subsequent virus shedding in animals exposed to the virus and could mask clinical signs, making passive surveillance less sensitive. The Commission requested the Secretariat to obtain further clarification from experts on the sensitivity of clinical inspection in vaccinated populations and whether vaccination effectively prevents shedding by infected animals.

In addition, the Commission requested further clarification from experts on the risks associated with the importation of germinal products as well as wool and hair from animals from infected countries or zones and stressed the need to ensure that the risk mitigation measures proposed are proportionate to the risk associated to the importation of these commodities.

The Commission decided to capture its opinion on the *ad hoc* Group report on sheep pox and goat pox and lumpy skin disease at its September 2025 meeting after receiving expert opinion on the points above. The opinion will then be forwarded to Code Commission for its consideration.

5.1.3. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of BSE risk status: 1–4 October 2024

The Commission reviewed and endorsed the report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of applications from Members for the recognition or maintenance of their BSE risk status.

- *Evaluation of applications from a Member for the official recognition of zonal negligible BSE risk status*

The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly recognise the two zones of the United Kingdom as having a negligible BSE risk.

- *Evaluation of BSE risk assessments of two Members already having an official negligible BSE risk status*

The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended the maintenance of China and India's officially recognised negligible BSE risk status. The Commission encouraged China and India to take into consideration the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group, and to submit documented evidence of their implementation in the annual reconfirmation.

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- *Working procedure and annual reconfirmation forms*

In response to the *ad hoc* Group's question on whether the information on importations should be evaluated against the import recommendations at the time of the application or at the time of the relevant importation, the Commission was of the opinion that it should be evaluated against the current requirements of *Terrestrial Code*.

The Commission agreed with the proposals made by the *ad hoc* Group concerning the [annual reconfirmation form](#) and agreed to move question 1 on risk assessment after question 4, with further details to be asked only if changes were reported in the answers to preceding questions.

The endorsed report of the *ad hoc* Group is available on the [WOAH website](#).

5.1.4. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of official control programmes for dog-mediated rabies: 8 & 10 October 2024

The Commission reviewed and endorsed the report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of an application from a Member for the endorsement of its official control programme for dog-mediated rabies.

The Commission agreed with the conclusion of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly endorse the official control programme for dog-mediated rabies of Tanzania. The Commission encouraged Tanzania to take into consideration the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group, and to submit documented evidence of their implementation in the annual reconfirmation.

The endorsed report of the *ad hoc* Group is available on the [WOAH website](#).

5.1.5. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of AHS status: 9 & 11 October 2024

The Commission reviewed and endorsed the report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of an application from a Member for the recognition of its AHS-free status.

The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly recognise Saudi Arabia as having an AHS-free status. The Commission encouraged Saudi Arabia to take into consideration the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group, and to submit documented evidence of their implementation in the annual reconfirmation.

The endorsed report of the *ad hoc* Group is available on the [WOAH website](#).

5.1.6. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of FMD status: 4–7 November 2024

The Commission reviewed and endorsed the report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of applications from Members for the recognition of their FMD-free status and endorsement of official control programmes.

- *Evaluation of applications from two Members for the official recognition of an FMD-free zonal status where vaccination is not practised*

The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly recognise one zone of Bolivia and one zone of Brazil as free from FMD where vaccination is not practised.

The Commission noted that this recognition will result in the entire territory of Bolivia and Brazil to be officially recognised by WOAHP as FMD-free where vaccination is not practised.

- *Evaluation of applications from four Members for the official recognition of an FMD-free zonal status where vaccination is practised*

The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly recognise one merged zone of Argentina (from two zones already officially recognised as FMD-free zones where vaccination is practised), one zone of the Republic of Korea and one zone of Russia as free from FMD where vaccination is practised.

The Commission also considered the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on one other application and concluded that it did not meet the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code*. The dossier was referred to the applicant Member along with the rationale for the Commission's position. Suggestions on actions to be taken to comply with the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* were provided.

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- *Evaluation of an application for recovery of FMD-free status with change of vaccination status*

The Commission agreed with the *ad hoc* Group and concluded that the application did not meet the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code*. The dossier was referred to the applicant Member. Suggestions on actions to be taken to comply with the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* were provided.

- *Evaluation of an application for the endorsement of an official control programme for FMD*

The Commission had an in-person meeting with a delegation from Mongolia that provided clarification around some uncertainties with respect to its official control programme for FMD.

In accordance with the established procedures, the Commission member from South Africa and Congo (Dem. Rep. of the) expressed a possible conflict of interest and withdrew from the decision making on Mongolia's application.

The Commission agreed with the conclusion of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly endorse the official control programme for FMD of Mongolia. The Commission encouraged Mongolia to take into consideration the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group, and to submit documented evidence of their implementation in the annual reconfirmation.

The endorsed report of the *ad hoc* Group is available on the [WOAH website](#).

5.1.7. Ad hoc Group on PPR: 12–14 November 2024

Whilst no dossiers for official recognition of PPR-free status or endorsement of official PPR control programmes were submitted to WOAHA in this cycle, the meeting of the *ad hoc* Group was maintained to request experts' opinion on some provisions under the Chapter 14.7 'Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus', which were raised during the Code Commission's September 2024 meeting.

The Commission reviewed the report of the *ad hoc* Group. The report along with the opinion of the Commission was forwarded to the Code Commission for consideration at its September 2025 meeting.

5.1.8. Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of CSF status: 19 & 21 November 2024

The Commission reviewed and endorsed the report of the *ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of an application from a Member for the recognition of its CSF-free status.

The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended that the Assembly recognise Chinese Taipei as having a CSF-free status. The Commission encouraged Chinese Taipei to take into consideration the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group, and to submit documented evidence on the actions taken in the annual reconfirmation.

The endorsed report of the *ad hoc* Group is available on the [WOAH website](#).

5.1.9. Ad hoc Group on emergency management

Due to time constraints, the Commission was not presented the report of the *ad hoc* Group on emergency management. A member of the Commission provided its comments to the Secretariat electronically after the meeting on providing guidance on a whole-of-government approach and when the Veterinary Services should take on the role of lead or support agency as well as reviewing the chapter against different hazards.

5.2. Meeting reports for information

5.2.1. WOAHA Working Group on Wildlife

Due to time constraints, the Commission was not presented the report of the Working Group on Wildlife at its meeting. However, together with the Code Commission at the Bureau meeting, the Commission was presented a general framework for assessing the impact of wildlife diseases on the international trade of domestic animals developed by the Working Group on Wildlife, that was annexed to its [April 2024 report](#) for opinion. The following text summarises their combined position.

Both Commissions noted that the framework in the form of a decision tree was tested on six WOAHA listed diseases, infections and infestations and thanked the Working Group for its effort to define how the occurrence of these diseases in wildlife could affect the trade of domestic animals.

The Commissions referred to the work done by the joint taskforce comprising members from both Commissions on animal hosts to develop a clear and consistent approach to defining how animal hosts for a listed disease, infection or infestation would be included in WOAH international standards, which had also been shared with the Working Group on Wildlife for input (see its [September 2024 report](#)).

The inclusion of animal hosts to be included in a *Terrestrial Code* chapter for a given disease, either domestic or wild, should be based on the role they play in the context of the criteria described in the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2. and the value that any concrete actions taken on that animal species would have for the objective of reducing the risks or impact of the disease on animal or human health. The taskforce had also emphasised that where relevant, the provisions for animal health status should be used to define the subpopulation relevant for international trade, so that the occurrence of the disease in selected animal hosts, such as wildlife species, should not impact trade in domestic species. This provision is present in some chapters, such as Chapter 10.4. Infection with avian influenza viruses and Chapter 15.1. Infection with African swine fever virus.

In addition, both Commissions considered that the decision nodes for zoning, compartmentalisation, commodity-based trade as well as considerations of vaccination and bilateral programmes are defined mechanisms in the *Terrestrial Code* to facilitate safe trade, even if the disease, infection or infestation may be present in selected subpopulations in the country or zone, including wildlife species. The Commission did not propose any specific changes to the framework but would refer to the existing relevant standards to ensure safe international trade in domestic animals when the disease is present in wildlife.

The opinion of the Commissions was forwarded to the Working Group on Wildlife.

5.3. Planned *ad hoc* Groups and confirmation of proposed agendas

- Ad hoc Group on Venezuelan equine encephalitis: 8-9 April 2025
- Ad hoc Group on zoning: 13-15 May 2025
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of FMD status: 7-9 October 2025 (to be confirmed)
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of the endorsement of dog-mediated rabies control programmes: 14-16 October 2025 (to be confirmed)
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of AHS status: 21-23 October 2025 (to be confirmed)
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of CBPP status: 28-30 October 2025 (to be confirmed)
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of PPR status: 4-6 November 2025 (to be confirmed)
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of BSE risk status: 18-20 November 2025 (to be confirmed)
- Ad hoc Group on the evaluation of CSF status: 25-27 November 2025 (to be confirmed)

5.3.1. *Ad hoc* Group on Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE)

The Commission noted that, following the *ad hoc* Groups on the revisions of the chapters on eastern equine encephalomyelitis and western equine encephalomyelitis, and Japanese encephalitis (see Item 5.1.1.), the next *ad hoc* Group on the revision of Chapter 12.11. on Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis was planned to take place in April 2025. The Commission agreed with the proposed composition of the Group.

5.3.2. *Ad hoc* Group on zoning

The Commission discussed the minutes of the Zoning Task Force, composed of members of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission. The Task Force had two meetings between September 2024 and February 2025. It discussed concerns with the current Chapter 4.4. 'Zoning and compartmentalisation', in order to better outline the Terms of Reference for an *ad hoc* Group on zoning. The Task Force would prefer to have two chapters in the *Terrestrial Code*, one for zoning and one for compartmentalisation. This will be decided after further study by the Secretariat and *ad hoc* Group.

The Commission noted that the Task Force determined a need for a holistic look at those chapters to include options of zoning not only for trade purposes but also for disease prevention and control.

In addition, the Commission noted the Task Force decision that the *ad hoc* Group should not address bilateral recognition of zones at this time, currently found in Article 4.4.8. of Chapter 4.4. This topic includes concerns about how the current WOAH official recognition status impacts the ability of trading partners to have independent zoning agreements. The Commission was of the opinion that this topic is addressed in Section 5

of the *Terrestrial Code*, rather than the zoning chapter. The Commission will continue to discuss this topic to determine the best resolution.

The Secretariat updated the Commission on the plan to convene the *ad hoc* Group on zoning. Plans are ongoing for WOAH to host a global zoning forum, at a time to be determined in 2025. The Chair of the *ad hoc* Group will be invited to attend the forum, and issues identified during the forum may inform future activities of the *ad hoc* Group.

The Commission reviewed and agreed with the draft Terms of Reference of the *ad hoc* Group on zoning based on the discussion of the Task Force minutes.

6. Official animal health status

6.1. Annual reconfirmations for maintenance of status

6.1.1. Comprehensive review of annual reconfirmations for pre-selected status and all WOAH-endorsed official control programmes

The Commission comprehensively reviewed the annual reconfirmations of the Members that were preselected at its last meeting in September 2024. A summary of the Commission's discussions and recommendations on this matter can be found in [Annex 3](#).

The Commission reemphasised the importance of timely submission of annual reconfirmations. According to the relevant Resolutions adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates and the Standard Operating Procedure on reconfirmation of animal health status and of endorsement of official control programmes of Members, Members should reconfirm during the month of November each year providing the information as prescribed in the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission further reminded Members that, according to Chapter 1.6. of the *Terrestrial Code*, retention on the lists of countries and zones having an official animal health status or of countries having an endorsed official control programme requires that changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events be notified to WOAH in accordance with the requirements in Chapter 1.1. The Commission highlighted that failure to comply with point 1.1., including non-submission of six-monthly reports, can result in suspension of a Member's status or withdrawal of WOAH's endorsement of an official control programme.

6.1.2. Report of the annual reconfirmation assessments by the Status Department

The Commission reviewed and endorsed the report prepared by the Status Department on the remaining annual reconfirmations (those that were not selected for comprehensive review). The Commission also reviewed the annual reconfirmations for which the Status Department required the Commission's scientific advice.

The report of all annual reconfirmations, including the recommendations and conclusion of the Commission, is attached as [Annex 3](#).

6.1.3. Chapters 11.4 and 1.8 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

The Commission discussed a Member's comment pointing out an inconsistency between the annual reconfirmation form, which is asking for information on imports of ruminant-derived protein meal under the entry assessment, and Article 11.4.13 which restricts recommendations to imports of bovine-derived protein meal. The Commission was of the opinion that the annual reconfirmation form should be aligned with Article 11.4.13.

Regarding the question on why the import requirements were restricted to bovine-derived commodities, the Commission referred the Member back to the [report of the *ad hoc* Group meeting on BSE risk assessment and surveillance of March 2019](#), Annex 7, point 5.13. Draft Article 11.4.12. 'Recommendations for importation of cattle-derived protein meal from a country, zone or compartment posing a negligible BSE risk.' According to this report, the Group recommended "revising the scope from "ruminant-derived meat-and-bone meal or greaves" to "cattle-derived protein meal" as cattle (*Bos taurus* and *B. indicus*) are the species of relevance for BSE as defined in draft Article 11.4.1. Furthermore, as stated in draft Article 11.4.1., "the recommendations in this chapter are intended to mitigate the human and animal health risks associated with the presence of the BSE agents in cattle only. As a result, the recommendations in draft Articles 11.4.6. to 11.4.18. [on recommendations for imports] are all about mitigating the BSE risks associated with the trade of commodities derived from cattle. Including "ruminants" more broadly in draft Article 11.4.14. would be beyond the scope of the BSE Chapter". Nevertheless, in its [November 2018 meeting](#) the *ad hoc* Group of experts confirmed that Members applying for a BSE risk status must show, through the risk assessment, that bovines were not fed ruminant-derived protein meal.

6.2. Specific update on official animal health status

6.2.1. Update on situation of countries/zone with suspended animal health status

The Commission noted the following suspension of official status since its September 2024 meeting:

HUNGARY – PPR-free country status

Following an immediate notification received from the Delegate of Hungary on an outbreak of PPR in Szentgyörgyvölgy, Lenti, Zala, the “PPR-free country” status was suspended with effect from 23 January 2025.

GERMANY – FMD-free where vaccination is not practised country status

Following an immediate notification received from the Delegate of Germany on an outbreak of FMD in Brandenburg, Germany, the “FMD-free country where vaccination is not practised” status was suspended with effect from 9 January 2025.

6.3. State of play and prioritisation of expert mission to Members requested by the Commission

6.3.1. State of play and prioritisation

The Commission took note of a mission that was taking place the following week of its meeting. The Commission reviewed the list of possible missions for official recognition and for maintenance of animal health status and the endorsement of official control programmes. At this meeting, the Commission did not consider that there was an urgent need for deployment of missions for verification of maintenance of disease status or for monitoring the progress of endorsed official control programmes.

6.4. Standards and procedures related to official status recognition

6.4.1. Streamlining the procedure for annual reconfirmations for maintenance of official status

The Commission was updated on the findings of the three-step plan endorsed at its September 2024 meeting and implemented during the 2024/2025 official recognition cycle in the framework for streamlining the annual reconfirmation procedure:

- i) Standardisation of the process: Guidance documents were developed for the annual reconfirmations of CSF, FMD, and PPR free status, presented in the form of an algorithm/deduction tree. These documents were designed to provide Members with a structured sequence of sub-questions and a description of complementary information needed based on their responses. The guidance documents were shared with Members during the 2024 annual reconfirmation campaign, and it was observed that less follow-up questions from WOAHP were required for the few Members who did use them.
- ii) Seeking disease experts' opinions: The *ad hoc* Groups on status evaluation were tasked with providing their opinion on the minimum documented evidence they would expect Members to submit when reconfirming their animal health status annually, demonstrating compliance with the relevant requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* for maintenance of official status.
- iii) Data collection from Members' annual reconfirmations: Status Department shared statistics of the different types of supportive information reported by Members having CSF, FMD and PPR-free status during the 2024 annual reconfirmation campaign.

After discussing the points above in length, the Commission requested the WOAHP Secretariat to propose:

- a revised and restructured annual reconfirmation form(s) eliminating redundant questions, asking more direct questions, whereby, depending on the response chosen, clear guidance is provided on the necessary information to be submitted by Members to substantiate their responses.
- clear criteria for when the submission of document evidence is required. The Commission was open to considering that Members whose status does not meet these criteria could submit a less detailed annual reconfirmation.

for a draft revised procedure and annual reconfirmation form will be presented to the Commission at its September 2025 meeting.

6.4.2. Development of the Disease Status Management Platform

The Commission received an update on the development of the online platform dedicated to disease status, which commenced in 2023.

The Commission was reminded that the Annual Reconfirmation component of the Disease Status Management Platform (DSMP) was first utilised during the 2023 annual reconfirmation campaign. The Commission noted that this year, this component was updated with new functionalities, guidance material including video tutorials and written manuals, as well as a new form for BSE to accommodate the updated standards in May 2023.

The Commission was further informed that the Status Department organised five regional webinars for all Members with official status/endorsed control programmes, to further promote the DSMP and support WOAHP Members with the use of the Annual Reconfirmation component of the DSMP.

The Commission noted that development is ongoing for the component on the submission of applications for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes, and planned for the component on publication of self-declarations.

7. Global control and eradication strategies

7.1. Update on the FMD global situation and activities of the Reference Laboratory Network FMD (TBD)

Dr Donald King (WOAH FMD Reference Laboratory, Pirbright Institute, United Kingdom) updated the Commission on the activities of the WOAHP/FAO FMD Reference Laboratory Network and on significant FMD-related events that occurred globally in recent years, with emphasis on the past 12 months.

Dr King confirmed that serotype O remained the dominant serotype. O/ME-SA/Ind-2001 continues to be a source for future spread as the source of multiple escapes from Pool 2 with many events involving long distance spread. Dr King highlighted that gathering information on the distribution of the FMD virus lineage in each of the seven pools of virus circulation is fundamental for vaccine matching in these regions and stressed the key role of the WOAHP/FAO FMD Reference Laboratory Network in sharing field samples, sequences and information. Dr King also mentioned published articles on phylogenetic analysis and risk of spread into new areas of SAT2/XIV and V topotypes, as well as O/EA-3 topotype.

Dr King informed the Commission about [OpenFMD](#). The website presents modules on curated FMDV sequences, online preparation of genotyping reports, information about FMD outbreaks and help to select FMD vaccines for antigen banks.

In terms of vaccines, Dr King noted that the WOAHP twinning project with AU-PANVAC highlighted poor efficacy of some FMD vaccines used in Africa. In addition, he mentioned that [reference antigens were being developed to facilitate harmonised heterologous testing of FMD vaccines](#).

Finally, Dr King mentioned that, since the COVID-19 pandemic, costs associated with shipping samples and logistics have significantly increased, challenging FMD control and surveillance in many regions.

The Commission commended the FMD Reference Laboratory Network for its continuous efforts.

8. Liaison with other Commissions and Departments

8.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission)

The Bureaus (i.e. the President and two Vice-Presidents) of the Code Commission and the Commission held a meeting chaired by Dr Montserrat Arroyo. The purpose of the meeting was to provide joint updates on relevant standing items, to agree on how to address any points that may impact the potential adoption of important standards and to agree on the plans to undertake work of common interest. At the meeting, the Bureaus were updated on ongoing work concerning listing decisions for pathogenic agents and assessments on whether a disease should be considered as emerging. The Bureaus discussed the categorisation of avian influenza in cattle as an emerging disease (see Item 9.1.1.) and agreed on the next tranche of case definitions to be developed for terrestrial animal listed diseases to support notification (see Item 9.3.).

The Bureaus discussed the following Terrestrial Code chapters to be proposed for adoption in May 2025:

- Infection with Nipah virus (Chapter 8.Y.)
- Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (Chapter 11.5.) and Infection with African horse sickness virus (Chapter 12.1.) (see Item 4.1.2.)
- Infection with African horse sickness virus (Chapter 12.1.) (see Item 4.1.3.)
- Infection with *Trypanosoma equiperdum* (dourine) (Chapter 12.3.)
- The Bureaus also discussed plans for the following work which requires the Commissions' coordination:
- Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information (Chapter 1.1.)
- Removal of questionnaire chapters (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) (see Item 4.1.1.)
- Zoning and compartmentalisation (see Item 5.3.2.)
- Potential impact of wildlife diseases on trade (see Item 5.2.1.)

1.1.1. Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information

At the Bureaus meeting, the Commission was presented with draft modifications to Chapter 1.1. to address issues with the appropriate pathways for notification arising from the discussion on HPAI in cattle (see Item 9.1.) as well as request from WOAHA Headquarters to clarify the stability of events to facilitate Member understanding and notification. The Commission provided its opinion that the draft modifications may be improved further prior to circulation.

8.2. Biological Standards Commission

The Commission and the Biological Standards Commission both have responsibilities in the ongoing work of developing case definitions and in the assessment of pathogenic agents against the criteria for listing in Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* (see Items 9.2.1., 9.2.2. and 9.3.2.1.). The Commission was also informed that the opinion of the Biological Standards Commission was sought on relevant issues raised by experts on Scrapie and the *ad hoc* Groups on Japanese encephalitis and sheep pox and goat pox (see Items 4.2.1., 5.1.1. and 5.1.2.).

9. Disease control: specific issues

9.1. Emerging diseases

The Commission was informed that currently there were no ongoing assessments and requests received for whether a disease should be considered emerging as per the [Standard Operating Procedure](#). However, there was a request from the Code Commission and WOAHA on whether the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza in cattle meets the definition of an emerging disease.

1.1.2. Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in cattle

In response to a request from the Code Commission at its September 2024 meeting, the Commission discussed the role of cattle (bovines) and other mammals (both domestic and wild) in the epidemiology of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and whether the occurrence of HPAI virus in bovines meets the criteria to be considered as an emerging disease.

The Commission expressed concern about the increasing pandemic threat posed by avian influenza viruses, which have now extended beyond their primary avian hosts to include domestic and wild mammals. The Commission also noted that in some instances, infections can cause mortality, including mass die-offs of wild mammals, leading to devastating impacts on biodiversity in localised areas.

In bovines particularly, based on Member notification to WAHIS and literature, the Commission noted that the current outbreaks of HPAI affect hundreds of dairy herds, causing clinical signs such as reduced appetite, fever, and a sudden drop in milk production. High levels of the HPAI virus were detected in the raw milk of sick dairy cows. Recent research demonstrated the efficient viral replication in the mammary glands. Epidemiological and genomic data revealed efficient cow-to-cow transmission. There have also been confirmed human cases linked to exposure to infected dairy cows causing mild clinical signs in the affected people. No specific virological adaptation of the virus to either humans or mammals has been identified to date. These findings demonstrated the transmission of the HPAI (H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus) at a non-traditional interface, highlighting the virus's ability to cross species barriers with associated risks to animal and human health. In view of the impacts to animal and public health as demonstrated by these outbreaks in cattle, the Commission considered that the occurrence of 'infection of bovines (*Bos taurus*) with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity' would meet the

Terrestrial Code glossary definition for 'emerging disease'. Thus, Members should notify the occurrence in accordance with *Terrestrial Code* Article 1.1.4.

With this, the Commission noted that as per section 5 of the [Standard Operating Procedure](#) for determining whether a disease should be considered as emerging (SOP), a discussion will occur at its next meeting to decide if based on the evidence collected, 'infection of bovines (*Bos taurus*) with influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity' should be assessed against the listing criteria of Chapter 1.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

With respect to the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in mammalian species other than bovines, the Commission considered that there was insufficient evidence at present on demonstrated significant impact to animal and public health to meet the *Terrestrial Code* glossary definition for 'emerging disease'. Most mammalian cases have been found in regions with a high number of HPAI infections in birds, making it difficult to determine whether transmission occurred through mammal-to-mammal infection, predation on infected avian carcasses, or environmental transmission. There is no evidence of human cases due to the exposure to infected mammals other than cattle.

The Commission, together with the Code Commission at the Bureaus meeting emphasised the importance of WOAHA, as the global authority on animal health, to collect and disseminate relevant epidemiological information on the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in all mammalian species to assist Members in minimising their spread and achieve better worldwide control of these viruses, supporting the global efforts in pandemic preparedness and prevention. The Commissions also stressed that WOAHA Members play a critical role in ensuring the sharing and availability of relevant disease information and encouraged them to report the occurrence of these cases in mammals other than bovines in accordance with *Terrestrial Code* Article 1.1.5. so that circulating strains may be monitored and their impacts on animal and human health assessed.

Notwithstanding, the Commissions noted that the trigger for the consideration of infection of bovines (*Bos taurus*) with highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses against the *Terrestrial Code* glossary definition for 'emerging disease' did not follow the described procedures as per point 1.1. of the [Standard Operating Procedure](#). Upon request of both Commissions, the Director General agreed to review and modify the current procedure to ensure it is sufficiently agile to address contemporary and emergent needs, by including the possibility that activation of assessments could also be based on needs identified by WOAHA.

The Director General acknowledged that Members are currently reporting cases of H5N1 in mammals, including cattle, to WOAHA. She also noted that Members would need time to adapt their reporting mechanisms to comply with the new reporting requirements. Therefore, WOAHA would request Members to report HPAI in bovines as an emerging disease in accordance with Article 1.1.4 starting from 1 April 2025. Infection with HPAI in other mammals should appropriately be reported to WOAHA in accordance with Article 1.1.5.; however, pending transitional arrangements, could still be reported through WAHIS against Article 1.1.3. 'unusual hosts'. WOAHA will issue a communication to Members on notification and reporting requirements, including a case definition to guide consistent notification for HPAI in bovines.

The Commission also considered its role in advising WOAHA and its Members on the notification of the listed disease 'infection of domestic and captive wild birds with low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses having proven natural transmission to humans associated with severe consequences'. It was noted that there are no defined criteria or guidelines for Members to interpret which LPAI cases with associated severe consequences to humans need to be notified to WAHIS. The Commission agreed to provide input when criteria and guidelines are drafted regarding this listed disease.

9.2. Evaluation of pathogenic agent against the listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2.

9.2.1. Infection with *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (paratuberculosis)

At its September 2024 meeting, the Commission had agreed to reconsider the assessment conducted by subject-matter experts that was reported in the Commission's [February 2022 meeting](#). In particular with regard to criterion 2 (at least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom from the disease, infection or infestation in populations of susceptible animals, based on the provisions of Chapter 1.4) and criterion 3 (reliable means of detection and diagnosis exist and a precise case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be distinguished from other diseases, infection or infestation). The Commission acknowledged and thanked a Member that had submitted a letter and a [report](#) on its strategy to control, eradicate and prevent the introduction of paratuberculosis in cattle in support of its claim of freedom from paratuberculosis in its cattle population. The Commission invited the Member to submit a self-declaration of freedom to WOAHA. Reflecting on the current available information, the Commission considered criterion 2 that at least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom to be fulfilled.

Regarding criterion 3, the Commission reiterated the limitations of the current available diagnostic tests, in particular for individual animals prior to movement to prevent the transboundary spread of the disease via the international movement of animals. Despite this, there are Members that have official programmes in place to

control paratuberculosis, using the diagnostic tests described in the *Terrestrial Manual*. Additionally, it was noted that several Members have been using the diagnostic tests described in *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.1.17. to control the disease and they notify the occurrence of paratuberculosis to WAHIS. For these reasons the Commission considered criterion 3 to be met and recommended to maintain the disease in the *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.3.

Consequently, the Commission discussed the case definition for paratuberculosis that was developed by a group of subject-matter experts (see Item 9.3.2.1.).

9.2.2. Infection with SARS-CoV-2

At its September 2024 meeting, in accordance with **point 5.1** of the [Standard Operating Procedure for determining whether a disease should be considered as emerging](#), the Commission considered that sufficient evidence exists on the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in animals and recommended subjecting this to an assessment against the listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2. The Commission had agreed to conduct the assessment intersession as per point 3.1. of the [Standard Operating Procedure for listing decisions for pathogenic agents of terrestrial animals](#) and to present the result of the assessment at its meeting in February 2025.

At this meeting, the Commission discussed the results of the listing assessment. It highlighted that SARS-CoV-2 has emerged as one of history's most significant global pathogens, with over 770 million human infections and seven million deaths reported worldwide according to WHO. At present, SARS-CoV-2 is classified as an emerging disease in accordance with *Terrestrial Code* Article 1.1.4., and Members must notify the occurrence of the virus in animals to the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). As of December 2024, 88 SARS-CoV-2 animal events had been reported in 34 countries and 36 animal species. Most of these events (68/88) involved a single species, while 14/88 involved two species. A small number of events (6/88) involved three or more species, including a notable outbreak in a Member involving 23 species. Across all species, 18,884 cases were reported, with a median of 2 cases per species.

In accordance with criterion 1 (international spread of the pathogenic agent via live animals or their products, vectors or fomites), the Commission noted that there is a documented case of international spread involving transmission of two different SARS-CoV-2 strains (B.1.258 and Delta variant AY.127) through imported Syrian hamsters from the Netherlands to Hong Kong. Notwithstanding, it considered that such a single documented case represents an extremely limited pattern of international spread via animals, particularly when compared to human transmission routes. Most animal infections represent reverse zoonotic events from infected humans, with infected animals typically acting as dead-end hosts. Other than hamsters, farmed mink, white-tailed deer and cats, none have shown potential for sustained transmission after human exposure. While their movement could facilitate transboundary spread, no such cases have been reported. The Commission considered criterion 1 to be met, although it clarified that animal movements represent a minor pathway for international spread relative to human transmission routes.

For criterion 2 (at least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom from the disease, infection or infestation in populations of susceptible animals, based on the provisions of Chapter 1.4.), the Commission noted that no countries that have demonstrated freedom from SARS-CoV-2 in animal populations based on *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.4. Additionally, the ongoing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in humans creates a constant risk of reverse zoonotic transmission to animals, especially since no country has achieved freedom in humans which makes it unfeasible to maintain freedom in animal populations. Unlike other listed diseases, infections or infestations where animal populations may achieve and maintain freedom through risk mitigation measures implemented by the Veterinary Authority, freedom from SARS-CoV-2 in animals remains inextricably linked to human epidemiology, creating an insurmountable barrier to meeting the surveillance provisions in *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.4. As a result, the Commission considered that no Member can reliably demonstrate freedom from SARS-CoV-2 and considered criterion 2 not met.

For criterion 3 (reliable means of detection and diagnosis exist and a precise case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be distinguished from other diseases, infection or infestation) the Commission noted that validated and reliable diagnostic tests exist, including antigen detection methods (e.g. RT-PCR and whole genome sequencing) and antibody detection tests. Despite variations in the clinical signs between different species, these tests could effectively differentiate between SARS-CoV-2 and other coronavirus and respiratory pathogens. The integration of multiple diagnostic approaches provides robust capabilities for case identification and disease monitoring across animal populations. Therefore, the Commission considered criteria 3 met.

For criterion 4a (proven natural transmission to humans with severe consequences), the Commission considered the criterion met, as documented cases of animal-to-human transmission have occurred (example: from mink, cats, and hamsters). However, these were isolated events, with animals acting as dead-end hosts (except for mink and white-tailed deer, where no significant transmission to humans was observed). The global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has been primarily driven by human-to-human transmission, resulting in high infection

rates with signs of disease ranging from flu-like symptoms through to severe illness and death. While criterion 4 was considered met as per the [Standard Operating Procedure for listing decisions for pathogenic agents of terrestrial animals](#), the Commission emphasised that animals have played a minor role in the overall transmission of the virus.

The Commission did not consider criteria 4b (significant impact on the health of domestic animals) and 4c (significant impact on the health of wildlife) to be met.

The Commission considered that despite the documented ability of SARS-CoV-2 to infect multiple animal species, the evidence indicates that human-to-human transmission remains the primary driver of transboundary spread. These fundamental characteristics place the most significant transmission pathway outside the mandate of Veterinary Authorities. Therefore, the Commission assessed that SARS-CoV-2 does not meet the key consideration for listing, as actions under Veterinary Authority would not reasonably prevent the transboundary spread of the disease.

Based on the above assessment, the Commission concluded that the listing assessment of SARS-CoV-2 does not meet the criteria for listing. In accordance with point 5.8 of the [Standard Operating Procedure for determining whether a disease should be considered as emerging](#), the Commission agreed with the next step of removing SARS-CoV-2 from the WOAHP Register of Emerging Diseases. The Commission noted that Members may still notify cases of SARS-CoV-2 in animals in accordance with Article 1.1.5.

The assessment of the Commission is provided as [Annex 4](#).

9.3. Development of case definitions

9.3.1. Case definition: State of play and next tranche

The Commission received an update from the Secretariat on the state of play of the development of case definitions and the proposal on the way forward for remaining listed diseases, infections or infestations for which a case definition is incomplete in the *Terrestrial Code*.

The Commission, in agreement with the Code Commission at the Bureaus meeting, supported the Secretariat's proposal to focus on the following diseases in the upcoming year: anthrax, Aujeszky's disease and chlamydia abortus. Both Commissions also considered that case definition development could be incorporated under a comprehensive review of the disease-specific chapter if the chapter has not been revised in recent times, as part of the work programme of the Code Commission. In addition, both Commissions agreed that selected diseases, with a low degree of notification to WAHIS, could be proposed for evaluation against the listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2. prior to embarking on case definition development.

9.3.2. Case definition

9.3.2.1 Infection with *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (paratuberculosis)

At this meeting, following the decision to continuing listing of paratuberculosis (see item 9.2.1.), the Commission reviewed the draft case definition for infection with *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (paratuberculosis) that had been prepared by experts, along with the accompanying technical report and the Biological Standards Commission's opinion on the case definition. The Commission noted that the opinion of the Biological Standards Commission had been sought at its September 2024 meeting. This report summarises their combined position.

Both Commissions agreed with the experts' opinion to refer to the pathogenic agent as '*Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (paratuberculosis)'.

The Commission acknowledged that a wide range of animal species are susceptible to paratuberculosis. For the purpose of case definition, it agreed with the expert's opinion that domestic ruminants and captive wild ruminants under the Orders Bovidae, which include sheep and goats, Cervidae as well as Camelids, should be considered the primary host species as they played an important role in the transmission dynamics of paratuberculosis. The Commission also agreed with experts to exclude wild animals, including wild ruminants, from the case definition.

Both Commissions noted and agreed with the expert's recommendation of three options (isolation, nucleic acid detection, and antibody detection (excluding seroconversion) as part of the diagnostic criteria to confirm a case of infection with '*Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (paratuberculosis)').

The Commission agreed with the Biological Standards Commission's recommendation that culture and microscopic identification through staining, despite being considered a gold standard test, does

not unequivocally identify *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (*paratuberculosis*) due to its low sensitivity and specificity. The possibility of cross reactivity with other species of *Mycobacterium* necessitates complementing this test with other diagnostic methods. In addition, it recommended deleting the text 'culture and microscopic identification as such through staining' and to replace this with the term 'identified as such' for consistency with other case definitions.

The Commission agreed with the Biological Standards Commission recommendation to specify that nucleic acid testing should only be conducted on clinical or post-mortem samples as faecal samples have a risk of environmental contamination, which may lead to false positives.

Both Commissions considered that point e) in all the options on 'cause to suspect that the animal host has previously been associated or had contact with *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis*' was moot as it considered this to be similar to the term epidemiological linked in point c) of all three options. Noting however that the point on epidemiological link is associated with a confirmed and suspected case, as defined in the Glossary of the *Terrestrial Code*, the Commission suggested using a more encompassing language on epidemiological link so that the text is more concise.

The Commission endorsed the proposed case definition and forwarded it to the Code Commission. Additionally, the Commission requested the Biological Standards Commission to update Table 1 in *Terrestrial Manual* Chapter 3.1.17 to reflect current capabilities and limitations in diagnostic tests.

The experts' report is provided as [Annex 5](#).

9.4. Development of guidelines

9.4.1. Guidelines for risk management practices at the domestic-wild animal interface

The Commission was informed that in response to a Member's request and funding, WOAAH had launched a consultancy project to develop guidelines that may provide Members with practical guidance on how to effectively manage risks at the domestic-wild animal interface according to WOAAH international standards to preserve animal health status of domestic subpopulations for disease control and business continuity.

The first draft of the guidelines developed by the consultants was peer-reviewed by an *ad hoc* Group that met in 21 – 23 January 2025. A member from the Commission participated as an observer. The Commission was invited to provide its feedback on draft of the guidelines. The report of the *ad hoc* Group may be found [here](#).

9.4.2. Guidelines for the implementation of avian influenza surveillance in smallholder poultry farming in resource-limited settings

The Commission was informed that WOAAH had launched a consultancy project to provide science-based recommendations to Members for effectively designing and implementing avian influenza surveillance programmes in small size (backyard) poultry farms in resource-limited settings. This consultancy project is in response to the recommendation in [Resolution No.28](#) 'Strategic challenges in the global control of high pathogenicity avian influenza' that was adopted at the 90th WOAAH General Session in May 2023.

The Commission was invited to provide its feedback on the draft of the guidelines once they has been developed.

10. For Commission information

10.1. Work of the Governance Review Committee

Dr François Caya, WOAAH DDG for Institutional Affairs & Regional Activities, updated the Commission on the work of the Governance Review Committee (GRC), which was established in December 2024 following a nomination process led by the five Regional Commissions. The objective of GRC is to analyse and evaluate WOAAH's legal framework, institutional, regional, technical and financial governance for improvement following the findings from an independent assessment that was presented at the WOAAH 91st General Session. The GRC comprises representatives from 16 Members and is an anticipated three-year project that will conclude at the General Session in 2027. Dr Caya highlighted key issues to be reviewed by the GRC, including formalising WOAAH's standard-setting procedures and streamlining other technical decision-making processes, transparency in statutory contributions from Members, and improving institutional and regional consultation processes.

11. Programme and priorities

11.1. Update and prioritisation of the work plan

The Commission updated its work programme, identified the priorities, and scheduled the dates for the various *ad hoc* Group meetings, which will be accessible to Members through the WOAHA website.

12. Adoption of the meeting report

The Commission adopted the report that was circulated electronically after the meeting.

13. Date of the next meeting

The next meeting of the Commission is scheduled to take place between 8 and 12 September 2025.

14. Meeting Review

A meeting review was conducted in accordance with the Commission Performance Management Framework.

.../Annexes

Annex 1. Adopted Agenda

MEETING OF THE WOAHP SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 10 to 14 February 2025

1. **Welcome**
2. **Meeting with the Director General**
3. **Adoption of the agenda**
4. **Terrestrial Animal Health Code**
 - 4.1. Member comments received for Commission consideration
 - 4.1.1. Proposal to remove the questionnaires for official recognition of animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes (Chapters 1.7. to 1.12.) from the *Terrestrial Code*
 - 4.1.2. Chapter 11.5. Infection with *Mycoplasma mycoides* subsp. *mycoides* SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (if member comments)
 - 4.1.3. Chapter 12.1. Infection with African horse sickness virus
 - 4.2. Other considerations
 - 4.2.1. Chapter 14.8. Scrapie
5. **Ad hoc and Working Groups**
 - 5.1. Meeting reports for consideration
 - 5.1.1. *Ad hoc* Group on Japanese encephalitides
 - 5.1.2. *Ad hoc* Group on sheep pox & goat pox
 - 5.1.3. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of BSE risk status: 1–4 October 2024
 - 5.1.4. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of official control programmes for dog-mediated rabies: 8 & 10 October 2024
 - 5.1.5. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of of AHS status: 9 & 11 October 2024
 - 5.1.6. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of FMD status: 4–7 November 2024 (+meeting with Mongolian delegation)
 - 5.1.7. *Ad hoc* Group on PPR: 12–14 November 2024
 - 5.1.8. *Ad hoc* Group on the evaluation of CSF status: 19 & 21 November 2024
 - 5.1.9. *Ad hoc* Group on emergency management
 - 5.2. Meeting reports for information
 - 5.2.1. WOAHP Working Group on Wildlife
 - 5.3. Planned *ad hoc* Groups and confirmation of proposed agendas
 - 5.3.1. *Ad hoc* Group on Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE)
 - 5.3.2. *Ad hoc* Group on zoning
6. **Official animal health status**
 - 6.1. Annual reconfirmations for maintenance of status
 - 6.1.1. Comprehensive review of annual reconfirmations for pre-selected status and all WOAHP-endorsed official control programmes
 - 6.1.2. Report of the annual reconfirmation assessments by the Status Department
 - 6.1.3. Chapters 11.4 and 1.8 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
 - 6.2. Specific update on official animal health status

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- 6.2.1. Update on situation of countries/zone with suspended animal health status
 - 6.3. State of play and prioritisation of expert mission to Members requested by the Commission
 - 6.3.1. Follow-up of field missions
 - 6.3.2. State of play and prioritisation
 - 6.4. Standards and procedures related to official status recognition
 - 6.4.1. Streamlining the procedure for annual reconfirmations for maintenance of official status
 - 6.4.2. Development of the Disease Status Management Platform
 - 7. Global control and eradication strategies**
 - 7.1. Rabies. Global Strategic Plan to End Human Deaths from Dog-Mediated Rabies: Zero by 30
 - 7.2. Update on the FMD global situation and activities of the Reference Laboratory Network FMD (TBD)
 - 7.3. Avian Influenza. Global Control Strategy. OFFLU
 - 8. Liaison with other Commissions and Departments**
 - 8.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission)
 - 8.1.1. Animal hosts to be targeted by WOAAH standards for listed diseases (TBD)
 - 8.1.2. Chapter 1.1. Notification of diseases and provision of epidemiological information
 - 8.2. Biological Standards Commission
 - 9. Disease control: specific issues**
 - 9.1. Emerging diseases
 - 9.2. Evaluation of pathogenic agent against the listing criteria of *Terrestrial Code* Chapter 1.2.
 - 9.2.1. Infection with *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (paratuberculosis)
 - 9.2.2. Infection with SARS-CoV-2
 - 9.2.3. Avian influenza in cattle
 - 9.3. Development of case definitions
 - 9.3.1. Case definition: State of play and next tranche
 - 9.4. Development of guidelines
 - 9.4.1. Guidelines for risk management practices at the domestic-wild animal interface
 - 9.4.2. Guidelines for the implementation of avian influenza surveillance in smallholder poultry farming in resource-limited settings
 - 10. For Commission information**
 - 10.1. Updates on WAHIS platform
 - 10.2. Animal Health Forum at the WOAAH General Session
 - 10.3. Work of the Governance Review Committee
 - 11. Programme and priorities**
 - 11.1. Update and prioritisation of the work plan
 - 12. Adoption of the meeting report**
 - 13. Date of the next meeting**
 - 14. Meeting Review**

Annex 2. List of Participants

MEETING OF THE WOAHS SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 10 to 14 February 2025

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

Dr Cristóbal Zepeda
(President)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Prof Naomi Cogger
(Vice-President)
NEW ZEALAND

Dr Misheck Mulumba
(member)
ZAMBIA

Dr Silvia Bellini
(Vice-President)
ITALY

Prof Baptise Kimbenga Dungu
(member)
SOUTH AFRICA

Prof Jan Arend Stegeman
(member)
NETHERLANDS

WOAH HEADQUARTERS

Dr Gregorio Torres
Head
Science Department

Dr Monal Daptardar
Scientific Coordinator
Science Department

Dr Min Kyung Park
Head
Status Department

Dr Charmaine Chng
Deputy Head
Science Department

Dr Yuka Moribe
Young Professional Officer
Science Department

Dr Anna-Maria Baka
Senior Disease Status Officer
Status Department

Dr Natalie Moyon
Disease Status Officer
Status Department

Annex 3. Report of the annual reconfirmation assessments for maintenance of official animal health status and of the endorsement of official control programmes

MEETING OF THE WOAHP SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 10 to 14 February 2025

During its February 2025 meeting, the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (the Commission) comprehensively reviewed all annual reconfirmations provided by Members having an endorsed official control programme on the progress made, as well as a selection (approximately 10%) of the annual reconfirmations for officially recognised status. The Commission pre-selected these annual reconfirmations at its September 2024 meeting based on the list of technical and administrative considerations according to the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on reconfirmations: [Official Disease Status - WOAHP - World Organisation for Animal Health](#).

A reminder letter was sent in October 2024 by the Director General of WOAHP to the Delegates of Members having at least one officially recognised animal health status or an endorsed official control programme. The pre-selected Members were also informed of their official status being selected for a comprehensive review.

In accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures governing the official recognition of animal health status, all annual reconfirmations were screened by the Status Department. When necessary, additional information was requested in accordance with the relevant provisions of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)*. A report was prepared and provided for the Commission's consideration and endorsement, as presented below.

1. Maintenance of the AHS-free status

1.1. Annual reconfirmations comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of **Austria, China (People's Rep. of), Colombia, Egypt, New Zealand, Oman, Romania and the United States of America** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were:

Austria: The Commission noted that horses had been imported from countries not officially recognised AHS-free by WOAHP without following the import requirements of Article 12.1.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission reminded that according to the Commission's decision at its February 2024 meeting ([Section 5.4.1 of February 2024 meeting report](#)), Austria should provide, within five years (i.e. by the 2029 annual reconfirmation) documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 12.1. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 12.1.

China (People's Rep. of)³: The Commission commended China for maintaining its comprehensive surveillance efforts across the officially recognised territory. However, the Commission noted that commodities had been imported from countries not officially recognised AHS-free by WOAHP without following the import requirements of Article 12.1.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*, in particular in terms of testing and isolation in vector-proof facility prior to shipment. The Commission was further concerned that these imports included donkeys, which are unlikely to show clinical signs. The Commission reminded that, according to the Commission's decision at its February 2024 meeting ([Section 5.4.1 of February 2024 meeting report](#)), China should provide, within five years (i.e. by the 2029 annual reconfirmation) documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 12.1. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 12.1.

Colombia: The Commission commended Colombia for aligning the requirements for the imports of horses from countries not officially recognised AHS-free by WOAHP with Article 12.1.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*, even for cases of horses returning to Colombia after having been exported for a temporary period to such countries.

Egypt: The Commission commended Egypt for the actions taken in response to the recommendations made by the AHS ad hoc Group and the Commission when the application was evaluated, which included conducting a

3 Including Hong Kong and Macau.

comprehensive risk analysis and enhancing surveillance in the borders as well as vector surveillance. The Commission recommended that Egypt continue conducting periodic risk assessments and maintain the collaboration between the Veterinary Services and Egypt's equine industry, as well as the activities in place ensuring an early warning system, with particular attention to the risk of introduction at the borders. The Commission further recommended that Egypt conduct proficiency testing for AHS and provide the results when reconfirming in November 2025.

New Zealand: The Commission acknowledged that New Zealand has good knowledge of its equid population and its distribution across the country. While New Zealand does not maintain an individual animal identification system for equids, the Commission recognised the robust system in place to monitor equine populations and manage biosecurity risks, which allows tracking of internal movements for disease control purposes. The Commission also took note of the comprehensive import provisions in place, in compliance with the *Terrestrial Code*. Furthermore, the Commission appreciated New Zealand's efforts to raise awareness about exotic diseases, including AHS, through workshops and training programmes for veterinarians and veterinary students. The Commission would recommend that other relevant stakeholders, such as horse keepers, be reminded of the need to report any unusual signs of disease.

Oman: The Commission commended Oman for updating the conditions to align with Article 12.1.7 of the *Terrestrial Code* for temporary horse importation from countries not officially recognised AHS-free by WOAAH.

Romania: The Commission noted that Romania continued to import horses from countries not officially recognised AHS-free by WOAAH without fully complying with Article 12.1.7 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission noted that, while imported animals were not subject to diagnostic testing and isolation in a vector-protected establishment before importation as per Article 12.1.7., they were isolated in the destination farm where a certain percentage of the animals was tested. The Commission reminded that, according to the Commission's decision at its February 2024 meeting ([Section 5.4.1 of February 2024 meeting report](#)), Romania should provide, within five years (i.e. by the 2029 annual reconfirmation) documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 12.1. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 12.1.

United States of America⁴: In accordance with the established procedures, the President of the Commission expressed a possible conflict of interest and withdrew from the deliberations on the USA's annual reconfirmation. In response to the Commission's request of last year, the Commission appreciated the detailed information provided by the USA and concluded that the assessment provided by the USA for imports from countries not officially recognised AHS-free by WOAAH demonstrated that the risk of introduction of AHS through such imports was equivalent to the risk posed by imports from countries having an AHS-free status recognised by WOAAH.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised AHS-free status of the above-listed Members.

1.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for AHS-free status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission as follows:

4 Including American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Algeria	Czech Rep.	Kuwait	Portugal ⁵
Andorra	Denmark	Latvia	Qatar
Argentina	Ecuador	Liechtenstein	Singapore
Australia	Estonia*	Lithuania	Slovakia*
Azerbaijan	Finland ⁶	Luxembourg	Slovenia
Bahrain	France ⁷	Malaysia	Spain ⁸
Belgium	Germany	Malta	Sweden
Bolivia	Greece	Mexico	Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hungary	Morocco	Thailand
Brazil	Iceland	New Caledonia	The Netherlands
Bulgaria	India	North Macedonia (Rep. of)	Tunisia
Canada	Ireland	Norway	Türkiye
Chile	Italy	Paraguay	United Arab Emirates
Chinese Taipei	Japan	Peru	United Kingdom ⁹
Croatia	Kazakhstan	Philippines	Uruguay
Cyprus	Korea (Rep. of)	Poland	

The Status Department raised the Commission's attention to the Members marked with an asterisk (*). The corresponding annual reconfirmations were discussed during the Commission's meeting as follows:

Estonia: The Commission noted that horses were imported from countries not officially recognised as AHS-free by WOA. As a consequence of the different status recognition followed by the EU Member States, horses may have been imported without having been subjected to quarantine in vector-protected facilities and laboratory testing for AHS prior to shipment, as per Article 12.1.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission reminded that, according to the Commission's decision at its February 2024 meeting ([Section 5.4.1 of February 2024 meeting report](#)), Estonia should provide, within five years (i.e. by the 2029 annual reconfirmation) documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 12.1. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 12.1.

Slovakia: The Commission noted that horses were imported from countries not officially recognised as AHS-free by WOA. As a consequence of the different status recognition followed by the EU Member States, horses may have been imported without having been subjected to quarantine in vector-protected facilities and laboratory testing for AHS prior to shipment, as per Article 12.1.7. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission reminded that, according to the Commission's decision at its February 2024 meeting ([Section 5.4.1 of February 2024 meeting report](#)), Slovakia should provide, within five years (i.e. by the 2029 annual reconfirmation) documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 12.1. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 12.1.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised AHS-free status of the above-listed Members.

5 Including Azores and Madeira.

6 Including Åland Islands

7 Including French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Martin, Saint Pierre and Miquelon.

8 Including Balearic Islands and Canary Islands.

9 Including Cayman Islands, Guernsey (incl. Alderney and Sark), Isle of Man, Jersey, Saint Helena and Falkland Islands (Malvinas). (A dispute exists between the Government of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (see resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations).

2. Maintenance of BSE risk status

2.1. Maintenance of the controlled BSE risk status

2.1.1. Annual reconfirmation comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of **Ecuador**, **Russia** and the **United Kingdom** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Ecuador: The Commission acknowledged Ecuador's activities in relation to the maintenance of its BSE risk status through rigorous audits of feed mills and rendering plants, as well as legislative updates on the feed ban and surveillance. The Commission noted that during these audits some of the feed samples tested gave inconclusive results and appreciated the follow up actions taken by Ecuador, which included the ongoing development of the "Specific Test Procedure for the Detection of Bone Tissue in Bovine Feed" to enhance feed safety assessments. The Commission noted that the validation of the technique described under this procedure was scheduled for the last quarter of 2025. Nevertheless, the Commission would encourage Ecuador to explore using already validated techniques. The Commission further noted the progress on the revision of the BSE risk assessment as per Article 11.4.3, planned to be completed in 2025. The Commission recommended that Ecuador provide an update on these actions when reconfirming in November 2025.

Russia: The Commission commended Russia for starting to amend BSE regulatory documents to align with the BSE standards adopted in May 2023. The Commission noted that Russia had not participated in an interlaboratory comparison test since 2017. Acknowledging the challenges Russia is facing to participate in such tests, the Commission encouraged Russia to continue its efforts to secure participation in an interlaboratory comparison test. The Commission recommended that Russia provide an update on these actions when reconfirming in November 2025.

United Kingdom (one zone consisting of England and Wales as designated by the Delegate of the United Kingdom in documents addressed to the Director General in September and October 2016 and in November 2021): The Commission commended the UK for having continued its awareness raising efforts and having started to adapt to the surveillance reporting table of the new BSE annual reconfirmation form. The Commission also appreciated the ongoing efforts to remove all pre-1996 silos and analyse samples of feed residue from them, in order to collect evidence to inform the UK's assessment of the potential risk posed by those silos.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised BSE risk status of the above-listed Members and zone.

2.1.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for controlled BSE risk status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission as follows:

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Chinese Taipei United Kingdom¹⁰
Greece

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised controlled BSE risk status of the above-listed Members and zones.

¹⁰ One zone consisting of Scotland as designated by the Delegate of the United Kingdom in documents addressed to the Director General in September and October 2016 and in December 2018.

2.2. Maintenance of a negligible BSE risk status

2.2.1. Annual reconfirmations comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of **Brazil, China (People's Rep. of) and India** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Brazil: The Commission noted the information provided by Brazil in the annual reconfirmation. The Commission requested that Brazil provide, when reconfirming in November 2025, an update on the progress made with regard to the review of the BSE Surveillance Programme to align it with Chapter 11.4 and encouraged Brazil to continue its activities on the maintenance of its negligible BSE risk status.

China (People's Rep. of)¹¹: The Commission noted that bovines had again been imported from a country not having an officially recognised BSE risk status, without meeting the requirements of Chapter 11.4 of the *Terrestrial Code*. While the *ad hoc* Group on the BSE risk status of Members concluded that the BSE-specific mitigation measures implemented by China were adequate to ensure that the likelihood of bovines being exposed to the classical BSE agent, including through imported commodities was negligible, the Commission recommended China to align its import requirements with those of the *Terrestrial Code*. In addition, the Commission encouraged China to continue updating its BSE surveillance further to adoption of the revised requirements in 2023. The Commission requested China to provide updates on both these topics when reconfirming in November 2025.

India: The Commission appreciated that India had adapted its surveillance to the requirements of the revised Chapter 11.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission drew the attention of India to the detailed report of the *ad hoc* Group and recommended India to harmonise the requirements for importations of bovine commodities according to the current Chapter 11.4. of the *Terrestrial Code* (adopted in May 2023).

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised BSE risk status of the above-listed Members and zone.

2.2.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for negligible BSE risk status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission.

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Argentina	Hungary	Panama
Australia	Iceland	Paraguay
Austria	Ireland	Peru
Belgium	Israel	Poland
Bolivia	Italy	Portugal ¹²
Bulgaria	Japan	Romania
Canada	Korea (Rep. of)	Serbia ¹³
Chile	Latvia	Singapore
Colombia	Liechtenstein	Slovakia
Costa Rica	Lithuania	Slovenia
Croatia	Luxembourg	Spain ¹⁴
Cyprus	Malta	Sweden
Czech Republic	Mexico	Switzerland
Denmark	Namibia	The Netherlands
Estonia	New Zealand	United Kingdom ¹⁵

11 A zone designated by the Delegate of China in a document addressed to the Director General in November 2013, consisting of the People's Republic of China with the exclusion of Hong Kong and Macau.

12 Including Azores and Madeira.

13 Excluding Kosovo administered by the United Nations.

14 Including Balearic Islands and Canary Islands.

15 One zone consisting of Northern Ireland as designated by the Delegate of the United Kingdom in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2016 and one zone consisting of Jersey as designated by the Delegate of the United Kingdom in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2019.

Finland¹⁶
France
Germany

Nicaragua
Norway

United States of America
Uruguay

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised negligible BSE risk status of the above-listed Members and zones.

3. Maintenance of the CBPP-free status

3.1. Annual reconfirmations comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of the **Czech Republic, Mongolia** and **Norway** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Czech Republic: The Commission appreciated the Czech Republic's efforts to address the recommendations made by the CBPP *ad hoc* Group and the Commission when the application was evaluated, in particular, the development of a CBPP-specific contingency plan and the submission of a summarised abattoir surveillance report.

Mongolia: The Commission appreciated Mongolia's comprehensive report on the activities implemented in response to the Commission's recommendations. The Commission recognised that Mongolia resumed the serological surveillance. However, the Commission was of the opinion that the clinical and bacteriological surveillance already conducted at slaughterhouses was sufficient to maintain the CBPP-free status. The Commission further noted that Mongolia was actively planning the participation of its laboratories in proficiency tests for CBPP diagnosis with a WOAHA Reference Laboratory. The Commission requested Mongolia to provide an update on the progress in this regard when reconfirming in November 2025.

Norway: The Commission appreciated Norway's efforts to address the recommendations made by the CBPP *ad hoc* Group and the Commission when the application was evaluated. In particular, the Commission acknowledged Norway's development of a CBPP-specific contingency plan, including instructions for sample collection and transport, and the establishment of an agreement with a WOAHA Reference Laboratory for the analysis of samples, as well as the submission of detailed abattoir surveillance reports.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised CBPP-free status of the above-listed Members.

3.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for CBPP-free status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission as follows.

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Argentina
Australia
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Canada
China (People's Republic of)
Colombia
Ecuador

Eswatini
France¹⁷
India
Italy
Mexico
Namibia¹⁹
New Caledonia
Paraguay

Peru
Portugal¹⁸
Russia
Singapore
South Africa
Switzerland
United States of America
Uruguay

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised

¹⁶ Including Åland Islands.

¹⁷ Including French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte and Réunion.

¹⁸ Including Azores and Madeira.

¹⁹ One zone located south to the Veterinary Cordon Fence, designated by the Delegate of Namibia in a document addressed to the Director General in October 2015.

CBPP-free status of the above-listed Members and zone.

4. Maintenance of the endorsement of the official control programme for CBPP

The annual reconfirmations of **Namibia** and **Zambia** were comprehensively reviewed by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Namibia: The Commission acknowledged the information provided by Namibia in support of the reconfirmation of its endorsed official control programme for CBPP. The Commission commended Namibia for the updates and the timeline provided for the ongoing activities, as well as for the coordination activities undertaken with the neighbouring countries. The Commission noted that Namibia had initiated feasibility studies for the construction of physical barriers (veterinary fences, water provision along the northern borders) as well as biosecurity measures along the Namibia-Angola rivers, with completion planned for 2025. The Commission requested Namibia to provide a summary of the conclusions of these studies once they are finalised.

Zambia: The Commission acknowledged Zambia's good progress in implementing its official CBPP control programme, commending the country for its steady and consistent efforts. The Commission encouraged Zambia to continue providing updates on the progress of the legal framework supporting the animal identification system. The Commission also recognised positive strides in vaccination coverage, the strengthening of the veterinary services, the employment of veterinary staff, and the re-demarcation of veterinary camps. Furthermore, the Commission commended Zambia's swift response to the CBPP outbreak reported in May 2024 in the free zone, including the implementation of quarantine measures, depopulation, and comprehensive serosurveillance. The Commission invited Zambia to continue providing updates against the annual targets of the control programme when reconfirming in November 2025.

Conclusion: The Commission considered that the annual reconfirmations of the above-listed Members were compliant with the relevant provisions of Chapter 11.5. of the *Terrestrial Code* for an endorsed official control programme for CBPP.

5. Maintenance of the CSF-free status

5.1. Annual reconfirmations comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of **Kazakhstan**, **Latvia**, **Poland** and **the United Kingdom** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Kazakhstan: The Commission acknowledged the work done and the efforts made by Kazakhstan to address the majority of the recommendations of the WOAHA experts' mission. The Commission took note of the progress made, in particular, on the presentation of the activities performed, the presentation of the results of seropositive animals and tailored awareness activities aimed at raising awareness of lesions suggestive of CSF. However, the Commission expressed its concern about the 'clinical suspect case' definition and requested Kazakhstan to revise it to include clinical signs and pathological lesions suggestive of CSF according to Chapter 3.9.2 of the *Terrestrial Manual*. In addition, the Commission was concerned by the follow up protocol of seropositive animals as it did not fully comply with the provisions of Article 15.2.30 of the *Terrestrial Code*. It would, in particular, be important to consider that the tonsils are the tissues of choice for the diagnosis of CSF. The Commission also emphasised the importance of following the provisions laid out in Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* when importing pig commodities from countries not officially recognised by WOAHA as CSF-free. The Commission requested Kazakhstan to provide an update on the revision of the case definition and follow-up procedure for seropositive animals to include the collection of samples from in-contact animals as well as on the progress of the implementation of the remaining recommendations from the WOAHA experts' mission report when reconfirming in November 2025.

Latvia: The Commission noted that commodities had been imported from countries not officially recognised CSF-free by WOAHA and without following the import requirements of Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission took note of the rationale provided by Latvia that the commodities originated from CSF-free compartments. The Commission requested that Latvia provide the assessment undertaken to determine that these areas can be considered CSF-free compartments and that the risk of introduction of CSF through such imports was equivalent to the risk posed by imports from countries having a CSF-free status officially recognised by WOAHA.

Poland: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where CSF outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 15.2 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission

requested Poland to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 15.2. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Poland's CSF-free status.

The United Kingdom²⁰ : The Commission acknowledged the information provided by the UK in support of the annual reconfirmation of its CSF-free status, and the actions taken in response to the Commission's request from last year to comply with Article 15.2.24. The Commission recommended that the UK provide an update on the progress made with regard to the countrywide alignment of the import requirements for casings with Article 15.2.24. when reconfirming in November 2025.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised CSF-free status of the above-listed Members. The Commission will continue its assessment of the documented evidence requested to certain Members above electronically.

5.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for CSF-free status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission as follows:

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Argentina	Croatia	Liechtenstein	Slovakia*
Australia	Czech Republic*	Luxembourg	Slovenia
Austria	Denmark	Malta	Spain ²¹
Belgium	Ecuador ²²	Mexico	Sweden
Bulgaria*	Finland ²³	New Caledonia	
Brazil ²⁴	France ²⁵	New Zealand	Switzerland
Canada	Germany	Norway	The Netherlands
Chile	Hungary	Paraguay	United States of America ²⁶
Colombia ²⁷	Ireland	Portugal ²⁸	Uruguay
Costa Rica	Italy*		

The Status Department raised the Commission's attention to the Members marked with an asterisk (*). The corresponding annual reconfirmations were discussed during the Commission's meeting as follows:

Bulgaria: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where CSF outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 15.2 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Bulgaria to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative import

20 Including Guernsey (incl. Alderney and Sark), Isle of Man and Jersey.

21 Including Balearic Islands and Canary Islands.

22 One zone consisting of the insular territory of the Galápagos, as designated by the Delegate of Ecuador in a document addressed to the Director General in October 2018.

23 Including Åland Islands.

24 One zone composed of the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina as designated by the Delegate of Brazil in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2014 and one zone covering the States of Acre, Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goias, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Rondônia, São Paulo, Sergipe and Tocantins, Distrito Federal, and the municipalities of Guajará, Boca do Acre, South of the municipality of Canutama and Southwest of the municipality of Lábrea in the State of Amazonas as designated by the Delegate of Brazil in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2015 and in October 2020; and **one zone** consisting of the State of Paraná as designated by the Delegate of Brazil in a document addressed to the Director General in October 2020.

25 Including French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte and Réunion.

26 Including Guam, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

27 One zone designated by the Delegate of Colombia in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2015; and the central-eastern zone as designated by the Delegate of Colombia in a document addressed to the Director General in October 2020.

28 Including Azores and Madeira.

requirements applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 15.2. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Bulgaria's CSF-free status.

Czech Republic: The Commission noted that commodities had been imported from countries not officially recognised CSF-free by WOAHP without following the import requirements of Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission reminded that according to the Commission's decision at its February 2024 meeting ([Section 5.4.1 of February 2024 meeting report](#)), the Czech Republic should provide, within five years (i.e. by the 2029 annual reconfirmation), documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 15.2.

Italy: In accordance with the established procedures, the Vice-President from Italy expressed a possible conflict of interest and withdrew from the deliberations on the Italy's annual reconfirmation. The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where CSF outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 15.2 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Italy to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 15.2. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Italy's CSF-free status.

Slovakia: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where CSF outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Slovakia to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 15.2. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. has been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieve an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 15.2. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Slovakia's CSF-free status.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised CSF-free status of the above-listed Members. The Commission will continue its assessment of the documented evidence requested to certain Members above electronically.

6. Maintenance of the endorsement of the official control programme for dog-mediated rabies

The annual reconfirmations of **Namibia**, the **Philippines**, and **Zambia** were comprehensively reviewed by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Namibia: The Commission acknowledged the information provided by Namibia in support of the reconfirmation of its endorsed official control programme for dog-mediated rabies. It commended the advancements achieved in vaccination coverage, which included the successful trial of oral bait vaccination, and the awareness campaigns conducted. However, the Commission reiterated that Namibia should adopt the methods for population estimation and vaccination monitoring as outlined in Articles 7.7.5. and 4.18.9. of the *Terrestrial Code* and provide an update during the next annual reconfirmation. Noting that the five-year work plan, that was submitted at the time of WOAHP endorsement of the control programme, is coming to an end, the Commission requested Namibia to submit the work plan of the next three to five years as an extension of the current work plan, when reconfirming in November 2025, and to provide a detailed update and review of the objectives and indicators, including the stage of completion, covering the following:

- i) Progress on the implementation of IBCM and a summary of joint investigations undertaken;
- ii) Progress on dog vaccination and post-vaccination monitoring, including the use of oral bait vaccines;
- iii) Details on sharing data and the activities of NGOs, and private veterinarians, including rabies vaccination and dog population management;
- iv) Progress on the collection of data on dog bites and rabies post-exposure prophylaxis.

Philippines: The Commission acknowledged the information provided by the Philippines in support of the reconfirmation of their endorsed official control programme for dog-mediated rabies and appreciated the transparency demonstrated in recognising the challenges that hindered the ability to meet the initial timelines. The Commission also noted that, following very challenging previous years due to financial constraints, the Philippines had made commendable progress in 2024, by revising its workplan, and achieving a dog vaccination coverage of 30-50% by 2024. The Commission further acknowledged that all laboratories had undergone comprehensive diagnostics training and were now planning to participate in the WOAHP proficiency testing scheduled for 2025. Noting that the five-year work plan, that was submitted at the time of WOAHP endorsement of the control programme, is coming to an end, the Commission requested the Philippines to submit the work plan of the next three to five years as an extension of the

current work plan, when reconfirming in November 2025, and provide (i) the updated dog-mediated rabies control strategy (since the current one was until 2025), including information on plans for budgetary allocation to ensure the programme's sustainability, (ii) an update on dog vaccination programmes and (iii) an update on capacity building activities that fell short of their target.

Zambia: The Commission commended Zambia for the elaboration of guidelines for specimen referral related to zoonotic diseases, including rabies. The Commission noted that, due to a severe drought, and the emergency response it required, resources had been limited for rabies control in 2024. Nevertheless, the Commission encouraged Zambia to continue its efforts to progress according to the work plan and to address its recommendations from last year. This includes implementing IBCM, strengthening the rabies laboratory network and considering establishing FAT facilities in only some of the laboratories while developing a reliable inter-laboratory transport system of samples, and moving towards using the laboratory tests that are recommended in the *Terrestrial Manual* (i.e. Fluorescent Antibody Tests) rather than Lateral Flow Devices. The Commission requested Zambia provide an update on these items when reconfirming in November 2025, as well as on the results of baseline studies conducted and detailed information on the estimation and management (reduction) of the free-roaming dog population.

Conclusion: The Commission considered that the annual reconfirmations of the above-listed Members were compliant with the relevant provisions of Chapter 8.15. of the *Terrestrial Code* for an endorsed official control programme for dog-mediated rabies.

7. Maintenance of the FMD-free status

7.1. Annual reconfirmations comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of **one zone of Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, five zones of Kazakhstan, Lesotho, one zone of Malaysia, one zone of Russia and one zone of Türkiye** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Colombia (one zone, namely Protection Zone I (PZ I) covering 29 municipalities of the Department of Norte de Santander, as designated by the Delegate of Colombia in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2022): The Commission recognised Colombia's significant efforts in maintaining its FMD-free status with vaccination. It acknowledged the detailed information provided on surveillance, animal movement control, and awareness activities. The Commission encouraged Colombia to maintain its activities with regard to implementation of individual animal identification and strict import control measures, as well as investigation of immunity disparities in Zone PZ1. The Commission recommended that Colombia provide an update on these key areas, when reconfirming in November 2025.

Cuba: The Commission acknowledged Cuba's efforts to enhance FMD surveillance and to progress towards addressing its recommendations on aligning import requirements with provisions of Chapter 8.8. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended that Cuba i) review the surveillance strategy in place to focus on strengthening passive surveillance in farms and slaughterhouses instead of conducting serological surveillance. The Commission emphasised that active surveillance should be based on clinical signs rather than serology ii) should serological surveillance continue to be applied, review the surveillance design and follow-up protocols for NSP-positive reactors to align with the provisions of Article 8.8.45. of the *Terrestrial Code* and iii) participate in FMD proficiency testing. The Commission requested Cuba to provide an update on these measures when reconfirming in November 2025.

Guatemala: The Commission commended Guatemala for its efforts to improve the time between notification of suspicion and laboratory results. However, the Commission urged Guatemala to revise the protocol for the investigation of suspected cases of vesicular disease, so that the procedures for the investigation of FMD suspicions and follow-up includes both virological and serological laboratory testing of all suspect cases and in-contact animals following Articles 8.8.43. to 8.8.45. of the *Terrestrial Code*. - Guatemala is encouraged to amend this protocol prior to the simulation exercise in order to assess its impact, and to take this opportunity to train staff on the testing protocol. The Commission requested Guatemala to submit the results of the simulation exercise, and provide documented evidence of the alignment of the protocol for the investigation of vesicular diseases with requirements laid out in Articles 8.8.43. to 8.8.45. of the *Terrestrial Code* when reconfirming in November 2025.

Guyana: The Commission acknowledged Guyana's efforts to comply with notification requirements as per Chapter 1.1. and encouraged the country to maintain timely reporting. However, the Commission remained concerned that no clinical suspicions had been reported through Guyana's surveillance system over the past four years. Additionally, the follow-up of NSP reactors identified during the sero-survey was insufficient to rule out

infection, as required by Articles 8.8.43 to 8.8.45 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission reiterated that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8.8.45. of the *Terrestrial Code*, the epidemiological investigation of each herd with NSP reactors should include testing a second serological sample from the animals tested positive in the initial survey and testing the animals in direct contact or epidemiologically linked to the reactors. Thus, the investigation should include the reactors, susceptible animals of the same epidemiological unit, and susceptible animals that have been in contact or otherwise epidemiologically associated with the reactor animals. For this reason, the animals initially sampled should remain in the establishment pending confirmation of the results; they should be clearly identified and accessible and should not be vaccinated before all test results are available. The Commission requested Guyana to review the procedures for follow-up of NSP reactors and provide documented evidence of the epidemiological investigations conducted.

The Commission further requested Guyana to provide detailed results of its syndromic (passive) surveillance system mentioned in the annual reconfirmation, as well as an update on how the several ongoing projects with foreign institutions have contributed to enhancing the country's laboratory capacity for FMD diagnosis when reconfirming in November 2025.

Haiti: The Commission acknowledged Haiti's ongoing efforts to improve awareness and capacity among veterinary professionals, farmers, and other stakeholders through extensive training and outreach campaigns. However, the Commission expressed strong concerns about the absence of any clinical suspicions for FMD or other vesicular diseases in the past years, despite the increased awareness campaigns. In light of the absence of tested samples in recent years and the decision to utilise the PANAFTOSA laboratory for any suspected cases, the Commission requested that Haiti provide documented evidence of its capacity to send samples for FMD testing and receive results in a timely manner, as well as evidence of an arrangement with the PANAFTOSA laboratory or any other WOAHA Reference Laboratory for FMD when reconfirming in November 2025.

The Commission was further concerned with the repeated and excessive delay in submitting the annual reconfirmations and the lack of submission of the six-monthly reports as described in Chapter 1.1 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission underlined the importance of the timely submission of updated information and documented evidence associated with the reporting year to substantiate the responses and statements made in the annual reconfirmation following Article 8.8.3. of the *Terrestrial Code*. In accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure on the reconfirmation of officially recognised animal health status, the Commission stressed that failure to submit the six-monthly reports and the annual reconfirmation with supportive information in a timely manner could result in the suspension of official status.

Kazakhstan (five zones with vaccination)²⁹: The Commission acknowledged the progress made on the implementation of its recommendations and encouraged Kazakhstan to continue addressing, in 2025, the ones remaining from the WOAHA experts' mission. In addition, the Commission highlighted that Kazakhstan should consider recommendations made following the aforesaid mission and apply them, as relevant, to the zones already officially recognised FMD-free. The Commission requested Kazakhstan provide an update on progress made when reconfirming in November 2025. Failure to do so could result in the suspension of the zones' FMD-free status.

Lesotho: The Commission noted that Lesotho had taken the first steps towards addressing the Commission's 2024 recommendations regarding the tests to be used on clinical FMD suspects, and enhancement of laboratory capacity. The Commission encouraged the country to continue its efforts, and provide updates, including documentary evidence, on progress made, when reconfirming in November 2025. In addition, the Commission reiterated its request for an update on the procedure in case of positive FMD test results, as it was previously noted that this protocol was not compliant with Article 8.8.45 of the *Terrestrial Code*.

Finally, the Commission noted that commodities had been imported from a country where FMD outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Lesotho to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to

²⁹ Five zones with vaccination as designated by the Delegate of Kazakhstan in documents addressed to the Director General in August 2016 as follows: one zone consisting of Almaty and Zhetisu regions; one zone consisting of Abay and East Kazakhstan regions; one zone including part of Kyzylorda region, northern part of South Kazakhstan region, northern and central parts of Zhambyl region; one zone including southern part of Kyzylorda region and south-western part of South Kazakhstan region; one zone including south-eastern part of South Kazakhstan region and southern part of Zhambyl region.

such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 8.8. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Lesotho's FMD-free status.

Malaysia (one zone without vaccination consisting of the provinces of Sabah and Sarawak as designated by the Delegate of Malaysia in a document addressed to the Director General in December 2003): The Commission appreciated the comprehensive information provided and commended Malaysia on the progress achieved with regard to the recommendations of the WOAH expert mission. The Commission encouraged Malaysia to continue its efforts in addressing these recommendations and provide an update when reconfirming in November 2025.

Russia (one zone with vaccination - Zone V 'Far East' - consisting of five Subjects: Amur Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, Zabaykalsky Krai, as designated by the Delegate of Russia in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2022): The Commission acknowledged the comprehensive and supportive information provided by Russia, along with the actions taken in response to the Commission's recommendations. The Commission encouraged Russia to continue sharing the results of investigations into low immunity levels (below 80%), the corrective actions implemented, and any further adjustments to the serological survey design when reconfirming in November 2025.

Türkiye (one zone with vaccination designated by the Delegate of Türkiye in a document addressed to the Director General in November 2009): The Commission acknowledged the prompt response and control measures implemented by Türkiye after the FMD SAT2 incursion in Anatolia. The Commission took note of the post-monitoring vaccination studies in Anatolia in animals vaccinated against SAT2 prior to their movement to Thrace for the Kurban festival and highlighted the importance of continuing implementation of intensified measures for the movement of animals into the FMD-free zone for the Kurban festival.

Conclusion: the Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised FMD-free status of the above-listed Members and zones. The Commission will continue its assessment of the documented evidence requested to certain Members above electronically.

7.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for FMD-free status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission as follows:

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Albania	Dominican Republic	Luxembourg	Romania
Australia	El Salvador	Madagascar*	San Marino
Austria	Estonia	Malta	Serbia ³⁰
Belarus	Eswatini	Mexico	Singapore
Belgium	Finland ³¹	Montenegro	Slovakia*
Belize	France ³²	New Caledonia	Slovenia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Greece	New Zealand	Spain ³³
Brunei	Honduras	Nicaragua	Suriname
Bulgaria	Hungary	North Macedonia (Rep. of)	Sweden
Canada	Iceland	Norway	Switzerland
Chile	Ireland	Panama	The Netherlands
Costa Rica	Italy	Paraguay	Ukraine
Croatia	Japan	Peru	United Kingdom ³⁴
Cyprus	Latvia	Philippines	United States of America ³⁵
Czech Rep.	Lithuania	Poland	Uruguay
Denmark ³⁶	Liechtenstein	Portugal ³⁷	Vanuatu

30 Excluding Kosovo administered by the United Nations

31 Including Åland Islands.

32 Including French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, Saint Pierre and Miquelon.

33 Including Balearic Islands and Canary Islands.

34 Including Guernsey (incl. Alderney and Sark), Isle of Man, Jersey and Falkland Islands (Malvinas). (A dispute exists between the Government of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (see resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations).

35 Including American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

36 Including Faroe Islands and Greenland.

37 Including Azores and Madeira.

Argentina: Three zones without vaccination

- one zone designated by the Delegate of Argentina in a document addressed to the Director General in January 2007;
- the summer pasture zone in the Province of San Juan as designated by the Delegate of Argentina in a document addressed to the Director General in April 2011;
- Patagonia Norte A as designated by the Delegate of Argentina in a document addressed to the Director General in October 2013;

Two zones with vaccination designated by the Delegate of Argentina in documents addressed to the Director General in March 2007 and October 2013, and in August 2010 and February 2014;

Bolivia: One zone without vaccination consisting of:

- one zone in the Macro-region of the Altiplano designated by the Delegate of Bolivia in documents addressed to the Director General in November 2011;
- one zone consisting of the Department of Beni and the northern part of the Department of La Paz merged with the zone consisting of the Department of Pando (August 2018), as designated by the Delegate of Bolivia in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2022;

One zone with vaccination covering the regions of Chaco, Valles and parts of Amazonas and Altiplano as designated by the Delegate of Bolivia in documents addressed to the Director General in October 2013, February 2014 and August 2018;

Botswana: Four zones without vaccination designated by the Delegate of Botswana in documents addressed to the Director General in August and November 2014 as follows:

- one zone consisting of Zones, 3c (Dukwi) 4b, 5, 6a, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13;
- one zone consisting of Zone 3c (Maitengwe);
- one zone covering Zone 4a;
- one zone covering Zone 6b

One zone without vaccination covering Zone 3b designated by the Delegate of Botswana in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2016;

One zone without vaccination covering Zone 7 designated by the Delegate of Botswana in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2018;

Brazil: One zone without vaccination – State of Santa Catarina designated by the Delegate of Brazil in a document addressed to the Director General in February 2007;

Three zones without vaccination as designated by the Delegate of Brazil in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2020 as follows:

- State of Paraná;
- State of Rio Grande do Sul;
- one zone (Block 1) including the States of Acre and Rondônia and 14 municipalities in the State of Amazonas and five municipalities in the State of Mato Grosso;

One zone with vaccination consisting of two merged zones designated by the Delegate of Brazil in documents addressed to the Director General in August 2010, September 2017 and September 2019, covering the States of Alagoas, Amapá, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Roraima, São Paulo, Sergipe, Tocantins and Distrito Federal, with the exclusion of the municipalities of the States of Amazonas and Mato Grosso that are part of the zone of Block 1 (free from FMD where vaccination is not practised) as addressed to the Director General in August 2020;

Chinese Taipei: **One zone without vaccination** covering Taiwan, Penghu and Matsu areas, as designated by the Delegate of Chinese Taipei in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2019;

One zone with vaccination: one zone consisting of Kinmen County as designated by the Delegate of Chinese Taipei in a document addressed to the Director General in September 2017;

Colombia: **Two zones without vaccination:**

- one zone designated by the Delegate of Colombia in documents addressed to the Director General in November 1995 and in April 1996 (Area I - Northwest region of Chocó Department);
- one zone designated by the Delegate of Colombia in documents addressed to the Director General in January 2008 (Archipelago de San Andrés and Providencia).

Three zones with vaccination designated by the Delegate of Colombia in documents addressed to the Director General in September 2019 as follows:

- Zone I (Northern border) consisting of Departments of La Guajira, Cesar and part of the Department of Norte de Santander;
- Zone III (Trade) consisting of the Departments of Atlántico, Córdoba, Magdalena, Sucre and part of Antioquia, Bolívar and Chocó Departments;
- Zone IV (Rest of the country), consisting of the Departments of Amazonas, Caldas, Caquetá, Cauca, Casanare, Cundinamarca, Guainía, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Quindío, Putumayo, Risaralda, Santander, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, Vaupés and part of Antioquia, Bolívar, Boyacá, and Chocó Departments.

One zone with vaccination consisting of two merged zones designated by the Delegate of Colombia in documents addressed to the Director General in September 2019 and in August 2020, which includes Zone II (Eastern border) and the former high surveillance zone covering the Departments of Arauca and Vichada and the municipality of Cubará of the Department of Boyacá;

Ecuador: **One zone without vaccination** consisting of the insular territory of the Galápagos, as designated by the Delegate of Ecuador in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2014;

One zone with vaccination consisting of the continental Ecuador, as designated by the Delegate of Ecuador in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2014;

Moldova: **One zone without vaccination** designated by the Delegate of Moldova in a document addressed to the Director General in July 2008;

Namibia: **One zone without vaccination** designated by the Delegate of Namibia in a document addressed to the Director General in February 1997;

Russia: **One zone without vaccination** designated by the Delegate of Russia in documents addressed to the Director General in August 2015 and March 2016;

Two zones with vaccination designated by the Delegate of Russia in documents addressed to the Director General in August 2020 as follows:

- Zone-South including Southern and North Caucasian Federal Districts, consisting of 13 Subjects: Rostov Oblast, Stavropol Krai, Krasnodar Krai, Volgograd Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, Republic of Kalmykia, Chechen Republic, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Republic of Adygea;
- Zone-Sakhalin consisting of the Island of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands;

One zone with vaccination - Eastern Siberia consisting of two Subjects (Republic of Tuva and Republic of Buryatia) and one administrative Raion of the Republic of Altai (Kosh-Agachsky Raion) designated by the Delegate of Russia in a document addressed to the Director General in August 2021;

The Status Department raised the Commission's attention to the Members marked with an asterisk (*). The corresponding annual reconfirmations were discussed during the Commission's meeting as follows:

Madagascar: The Commission acknowledged Madagascar's efforts to maintain its FMD-free status, including progress in expanding the electronic identification system for small ruminants and collecting a significant amount of serum samples for testing. The Commission was of the opinion that the widespread clinical surveillance and strong border controls already in place could suffice to maintain the free status. Considering the inability to test the collected samples due to lack of reagents in the country, the Commission urged Madagascar to ensure that in case of suspect cases, samples are sent in a timely manner to the WOA Reference Laboratory with which Madagascar already has arrangements in place for such cases and to consider reallocating the resources dedicated to sampling to other highlighted recommendations from the 2017 WOA expert mission. The Commission stressed the need to address these outstanding recommendations and requested documented evidence of progress towards effective implementation when reconfirming in November 2025.

Slovakia: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where FMD outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Article 8.8.41. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Slovakia to provide, documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 8.8. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Slovakia's FMD-free status.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised FMD-free status of the above-listed Members. The Commission will continue its assessment of the documented evidence requested to certain Members above electronically.

8. Maintenance of the endorsement of the official control programme for FMD

The annual reconfirmations of **Botswana, India, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Namibia** and **Thailand** were comprehensively reviewed by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Botswana: The Commission commended the actions taken by Botswana in Zone 6b, which led to the recovery of FMD-free status without vaccination since April 2024. The Commission acknowledged the information submitted by Botswana on progress made on FMD risk analysis and control activities in the northern part of the country. While some progress was made in some zones, there was lack of surveillance activities in particular in Zones 2a and 2b. The Commission noted that some surveillance activities were ongoing, and laboratory results were pending. The Commission encouraged Botswana to continue its FMD control activities in the northern parts of the country, particularly by addressing challenges in Zones 2a and 2b, and to report any changes in terms of the timeline and aimed FMD-free status to be achieved in the different zones, or whether the overall objective of the FMD control programme had been modified. The Commission also recommended that Botswana complete the necessary laboratory testing, including a detailed data analysis, and provide an update when reconfirming in November 2025.

India: The Commission acknowledged the information submitted by India regarding the progress made in implementing its official FMD control programme. The Commission noted that the post-vaccination monitoring (PVM) results revealed relatively low immunity levels and recommended India to investigate the cause(s). The Commission further noted that India continued its efforts to implement appropriate follow-up investigations on NSP positive reactors, which included establishing a capacity building programme countrywide with online and field training on oesophageal-pharyngeal fluid (OPF) collection and dispatch and follow-up of FMD NSP reactors. The Commission also noted that, as part of these efforts, serum samples and OPF samples were randomly collected from two states and tested for the presence of antibodies against NSP and for genome detection by RT-mPCR. Nevertheless, the Commission was of the opinion that the investigation of NSP positives should not be conducted as a stand-alone exercise, but India should rather follow up with OPF sampling and clinical inspections of the animals already detected as NSP-positives under the 'National FMD NSP surveillance'. The Commission emphasised that this approach would be more in line for the national control programme to progress towards demonstrating freedom from FMD in certain areas or states. Furthermore, the Commission welcomed India's plan to use goats as sentinels for the 2025 FMD surveillance, to address the issue of NSP positive reactors. The Commission requested India to submit, when reconfirming in November 2025, the following: i) progress made in implementing appropriate follow-up investigations on NSP positive reactors over all States, ii) progress achieved along the updated work plan.

Kyrgyzstan: The Commission acknowledged the information provided by Kyrgyzstan. With regard to the follow-up investigations of NSP reactors and related epidemiological investigations, the Commission reiterated that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8.8.45. of the *Terrestrial Code*, the epidemiological investigation of each herd with NSP reactors should include testing a second serological sample from the animals tested positive in the initial survey, and testing of the susceptible animals that have been in contact with or epidemiologically linked to the reactor animal. For this reason, the animals initially sampled should remain in the establishment pending confirmation of the results; they should be clearly identified and accessible and should not be vaccinated during the investigations so that they can be retested after an appropriate time. In this regard, the Commission requested Kyrgyzstan to review the procedures for follow-up of NSP reactors and provide documented evidence of the epidemiological investigations conducted. In addition, the Commission noted that, given the test used, 2-3% reactors would be expected in a disease-free vaccinated population. Indeed, the target percentage of reactors can be predicted using the specificity of the test used (i.e. 1-specificity); thus a target of 0 reactors cannot be obtained with the test used. The Commission therefore recommended that Kyrgyzstan modify the target proportion of reactors according to the specificity of the test used and provide an update on the implemented activities and progress made against the work plan and performance indicators when reconfirming in November 2025.

Morocco: The Commission acknowledged the information submitted by Morocco regarding the progress made in implementing its official FMD control programme and appreciated its efforts to address the Commission's recommendations. However, the Commission was of the opinion that the follow-up procedure of reactors was unclear and requested that Morocco provide the official procedure for follow-up of NSP reactors and related epidemiological investigations. The Commission reiterated that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8.8.45. of the *Terrestrial Code*, the epidemiological investigation of each herd with NSP reactors should include testing a second serological sample from the animals tested positive in the initial survey, and testing of the susceptible animals that have been in contact with or epidemiologically linked to the reactor animal. For this reason, the animals initially sampled should remain in the establishment pending confirmation of the results; they should be clearly identified and accessible and should not be vaccinated during the investigations so that they can be retested after an appropriate time. The Commission therefore requested Morocco to review the procedures for follow-up of NSP reactors and provide documented evidence of the epidemiological investigations conducted for each reactor by providing results of investigations carried out on reactors and their in-contacts.

Namibia: The Commission acknowledged the information provided by Namibia in support of the reconfirmation of its endorsed official control programme for FMD. The Commission noted that Namibia had initiated feasibility studies for the construction of physical barriers (veterinary fences, water provision along the northern borders) as well as biosecurity measures along the Namibia-Angola rivers, with completion planned for 2025. The Commission requested Namibia to provide a summary of the conclusions of these studies once they are finalised. The Commission further noted that Namibia customised the vaccine used in the infected zone to match the circulating FMD virus and included serotype O. However, the Commission emphasised that attention must be paid to the possibility of serotype O spreading to the protection zone and entering a naïve population against this serotype. Regarding the longitudinal post-vaccination monitoring (PVM), the Commission noted that another study was planned for 2025 and reminded Namibia of the flaws revealed in the previous study's design and logistics, which impaired the analysis and interpretation of the results. The Commission reiterated the need to implement corrective measures before the next PVM study. The Commission requested Namibia to provide the results of this study as well as of the ongoing FMD-sero surveillance study on sheep and goats, when reconfirming in November 2025.

Thailand: The Commission took note of the significant decrease in the number of FMD outbreaks in Thailand compared to the previous years. The Commission further noted that the results from the study on vaccine stability for 2024 were positive so far and that the study was planned to be completed in 2025. The Commission appreciated Thailand's efforts to study the effectiveness of the vaccine booster programme in young beef calves by conducting post-vaccination monitoring (PVM) in this population and the corrective measures implemented in response to the outcomes of the study. However, the Commission noted that the overall PVM results still revealed low immunity levels, even though slightly increased compared to 2023. The Commission reiterated its recommendation that Thailand should conduct further analysis of the overall PVM results (not just young beef calves), including age-specific stratification of dairy and beef cattle up to slaughter age, to potentially revise the PVM study design and vaccination strategy. The Commission requested Thailand provide an update in this regard when reconfirming in November 2025.

Conclusion: The Commission considered that the annual reconfirmations of the above-listed Members were compliant with the relevant provisions of Chapter 8.8. of the *Terrestrial Code* for an endorsed official control programme for FMD.

9. Maintenance of the PPR-free status

9.1. Annual reconfirmations comprehensively reviewed by the Commission

The annual reconfirmations of **Azerbaijan, Germany, Italy, North Macedonia (Rep. of), Madagascar and Mauritius** were selected for comprehensive review by the Commission. Specific comments made by the Commission were as follows:

Azerbaijan: The Commission appreciated the information on the actions taken by Azerbaijan in addressing the recommendations made by the PPR *ad hoc* Group and the Commission when the application was evaluated. The Commission appreciated Azerbaijan's efforts to progress with the integration of small ruminants in the Animal Identification and Registration System and encouraged Azerbaijan to prioritise the finalisation of their registration. The Commission recommended Azerbaijan to provide an update on the progress achieved in this regard when reconfirming in November 2025.

Germany: The Commission noted that commodities had been imported from countries where PPR outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 14.7 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Germany to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 14.7. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Germany's PPR-free status.

Italy: In accordance with the established procedures, the Vice-President from Italy expressed a possible conflict of interest and withdrew from the deliberations on the Italy's annual reconfirmation. The Commission noted that commodities had been imported from countries where PPR outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 14.7 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Italy to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 14.7. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Italy's PPR-free status.

North Macedonia (Rep. of): The Commission considered the measures implemented by North Macedonia in response to PPR outbreaks in neighbouring countries to be appropriate and appreciated its efforts to enhance its early warning system in place. The Commission encouraged North Macedonia to remain vigilant, regularly assess its epidemiological situation and adjust its measures as necessary. Furthermore, the Commission emphasised that the epidemiological investigation of each herd with positive reactors should include also clinical inspection and testing of animals in direct contact with the reactors, in addition to the supplementary testing and clinical inspection of the seropositive animals.

Madagascar: The Commission acknowledged Madagascar's efforts to maintain its PPR-free status, including progress in expanding the electronic identification system for small ruminants and collecting a significant amount of serum samples for testing. However, the Commission was of the opinion that the widespread clinical surveillance and strong border controls already in place could suffice to maintain the free status. Considering the inability to test the collected samples due to lack of reagents in the country, the Commission urged Madagascar to ensure that in case of suspect cases, samples are sent in a timely manner to the WOAHP reference laboratory with which Madagascar already has arrangements in place for such cases and to consider reallocating the resources dedicated to sampling to other highlighted recommendations from the 2017 WOAHP expert mission. The Commission stressed the need to address these outstanding recommendations and requested documented evidence of progress towards effective implementation when reconfirming in November 2025.

Mauritius: The Commission acknowledged Mauritius' efforts to procure diagnostic kits for serological and virological testing of PPR, as well as to address last year's recommendations. The Commission also appreciated the detailed description of the follow-up actions undertaken to exclude PPR following the seropositive results. However, the Commission noted the slow progress in enacting the Animal Health Bill and drafting regulations for imports and requested Mauritius to provide updates on the final approval of the Bill and submit drafts of the import regulations as soon as they become available. Furthermore, the Commission recommended that Mauritius include PCR testing results in its November 2025 annual reconfirmation to confirm the effective implementation of this diagnostic tool.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised PPR-free status of the above-listed Members. The Commission will continue its assessment of the documented evidence requested to certain Members above electronically.

9.2. Annual reconfirmations screened by the Status Department

The Status Department reviewed the rest of the annual reconfirmations for PPR-free status and reported the outcome of its analysis to the Commission as follows:

The annual reconfirmations for the following Members were reviewed:

Argentina	Cyprus	Liechtenstein	Portugal ³⁸
Australia	Czech Republic	Lithuania	Russia
Austria*	Denmark	Luxembourg	Singapore
Belgium*	Ecuador	Malta	Slovakia*
Bolivia	Estonia	Mexico	Slovenia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Eswatini	Namibia ³⁹	South Africa
Botswana	Finland ⁴⁰	New Caledonia	Sweden
Brazil	France ⁴¹	New Zealand	Switzerland
Canada	Iceland	Norway	The Netherlands
Chile	Ireland	Paraguay	United Kingdom ⁴²
Chinese Taipei	Korea (Rep. of)	Peru	United States of America ⁴³
Colombia	Latvia	Philippines	Uruguay
Croatia	Lesotho	Poland*	Spain ⁴⁴

The Status Department raised the Commission's attention to the Members marked with an asterisk (*). The corresponding annual reconfirmations were discussed during the Commission's meeting as follows:

Austria: The Commission noted that commodities had been imported from countries where PPR outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 14.7 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Austria to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 14.7. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Austria's PPR-free status.

Belgium: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where PPR outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 14.7 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Belgium to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial*

38 Including Azores and Madeira.

39 One zone located south of the Veterinary Cordon Fence, designated by the Delegate of Namibia in a document addressed to the Director General in November 2014.

40 Including Åland Islands.

41 Including French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, Saint Barthélémy, Saint Martin, Saint Pierre and Miquelon.

42 Including Cayman Islands, Guernsey (incl. Alderney and Sark), Isle of Man, Jersey, Saint Helena and Falkland Islands (Malvinas). (A dispute exists between the Government of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (see resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations).

43 Including American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

44 Including Balearic Islands and Canary Islands.

Code or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 14.7. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Belgium's PPR-free status.

Poland: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where PPR outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Chapter 14.7 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Poland to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 14.7. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Poland's PPR-free status.

Slovakia: The Commission noted that commodities might have been imported from countries where PPR outbreaks had occurred without following the import requirements of Article 14.7.26 of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Commission requested Slovakia to provide documented evidence demonstrating full compliance with Chapter 14.7. of the *Terrestrial Code* or that Chapter 5.3. had been followed to determine that the alternative measures applied to such imports achieved an equivalent level of risk mitigation as the provisions of Chapter 14.7. Failure to do so will result in the suspension of Slovakia's PPR-free status.

Conclusion: The Commission recommended the maintenance of the officially recognised PPR-free status of the above-listed Members. The Commission will continue its assessment of the documented evidence requested to certain Members above electronically.

Annex 4. Listing assessment for infection with SARS-CoV-2

MEETING OF THE WOAHP SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 10 to 14 February 2025

Date 21 January 2025

The criteria for the inclusion of a disease, infection or infestation in the WOAHP list are as follows:

- 1) **International spread of the pathogenic agent (via live animals or their products, vectors or fomites) has been proven.**

Yes No

Scientific rationale:

The criterion for proven international spread of SARS-CoV-2 through animal movement is technically met, though with important qualifications regarding its significance in global disease spread.

One clearly documented case exists of international spread via animals, involving transmission through imported Syrian hamsters from the Netherlands to Hong Kong. The case is particularly notable as it involved two different SARS-CoV-2 strains (B.1.258 and Delta variant AY.127) (Chan *et al.*, 2022; Yen *et al.*, 2022). Such a single documented case represents an extremely limited pattern of international spread via animals, particularly when compared to human transmission routes.

A broader examination of animal infections provides crucial context for understanding their role in international spread. Most animal infections represent reverse zoonotic events from infected humans, with infected animals typically serving as dead-end hosts (Dunowska 2023; Qiu *et al.* 2023). Other than hamsters only farmed mink, white tail deer and cats three species have demonstrated significant potential for sustained transmission after initial human exposure. For detailed information on the transmission in these species see the review articles Dunowska (2023) and Qiu *et al.* (2023). While movement of these species could spread the virus transboundary, no such cases have been reported. Animal movement therefore represents a minor pathway for international spread relative to human transmission routes.

AND

- 2) **At least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom from the disease, infection or infestation in populations of susceptible animals, based on the provisions of Chapter 1.4.**

Yes No

Scientific rationale:

No country has demonstrated freedom from SARS-CoV-2 in animal populations, as outlined in Chapter 1.4 of the Terrestrial Code. Further, such demonstration would be difficult due to fundamental epidemiological and surveillance challenges.

Ongoing global transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in humans creates a constant risk of reverse zoonotic transmission to animals (Dunowska 2023; Qiu *et al.* 2023). Given that no country has achieved sustained freedom from human SARS-CoV-2 cases, maintaining freedom in animal populations is impossible. Multiple susceptible species have demonstrated sustained transmission following human introduction, including mink with efficient transmission and viral evolution patterns (Lu *et al.* 2021), white-tailed deer maintaining transmission in wild populations (Kuchipudi *et al.* 2022), and domestic cats showing limited transmission capacity (Dunowska 2023; Qiu *et al.* 2023).

Unlike other listed diseases where animal populations can achieve and maintain freedom through veterinary controls, SARS-CoV-2 freedom in animals remains inextricably linked to human epidemiology, creating an insurmountable barrier to meeting the surveillance principles outlined in Chapter 1.4 of the Terrestrial Code..

AND

- 3) **Reliable means of detection and diagnosis exist and a precise case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be distinguished from other diseases, infections or infestations.**

Yes No

Scientific rationale:

Clear and reliable diagnostic capabilities and case definitions exist for SARS-CoV-2 in animals. A comprehensive diagnostic toolkit includes validated RT-PCR protocols for respiratory and fecal samples, serological testing methods, and whole genome sequencing capabilities (Dunowska 2023). Case definitions effectively combine laboratory test results with epidemiological links and clinical signs when present. While clinical presentations vary significantly between species, from asymptomatic to severe respiratory disease, the established diagnostic methods allow reliable differentiation from other coronaviruses and respiratory pathogens (Lu *et al.* 2021; Qiu *et al.* 2023). The integration of multiple diagnostic approaches provides robust capabilities for case identification and disease monitoring across animal populations.

AND

- 4a) **Natural transmission to humans has been proven, and human infection is associated with severe consequences.**

Yes No (based on meeting proven severe consequences in humans when infected, but with important caveats the limited ability for infection to be caused by animal transmission)

Scientific rationale:

While SARS-CoV-2 infection undoubtedly causes severe consequences in humans, with over 770 million infections and 7 million deaths reported worldwide, documented cases of animal-to-human transmission are extremely rare. The overwhelming majority of human infections result from human-to-human transmission.

Natural transmission from animals to humans has been conclusively documented in only a few specific scenarios. The most significant events involved farmed mink, where genetic analysis confirmed mink-to-human transmission of variant strains that had evolved within mink populations (Lu *et al.* 2021; Oude Munnink *et al.* 2021). Beyond mink, there is one confirmed case of cat-to-human transmission in Thailand, where a veterinarian was infected while examining an infected cat from a COVID-19 household (reported in Qie *et al.* 2023). Additionally, there is evidence suggesting hamster-to-human transmission in Hong Kong associated with imported pet hamsters (Chan *et al.* 2022; Yen *et al.* 2022).

These documented cases of animal-to-human transmission must be viewed in context. They represent isolated events against a backdrop of predominantly human-to-human transmission. Most animal infections represent dead-end events resulting from human-to-animal transmission (Dunowska 2023). Even in species that show sustained transmission within their populations, such as white-tailed deer, there is no evidence of significant transmission back to humans (Kuchipudi *et al.* 2022).

Therefore, while the criterion is technically met as animals can in rare cases transmit disease to human and SARS-CoV-2 can have severe consequences animals play a minimal role in human infection. The key driver of human infection and associated severe consequences remains human-to-human transmission, with animal sources representing an extremely minor contribution to the overall burden of human disease.

OR

-
- 4b) The disease has been shown to have a significant impact on the health of domestic animals at the level of a country or a zone taking into account the occurrence and severity of the clinical signs, including direct production losses and mortality.**

Yes No

Scientific rationale:

SARS-CoV-2 has not demonstrated significant impact on domestic animal health at the country or zone level. Most infected animals exhibit mild or asymptomatic infections, with approximately 48% of documented cases being subclinical and a case fatality rate of just 1.5% excluding culled animals (Nerpel *et al.* 2022). In domestic cats and dogs, which represent the majority of reported cases, infections typically resolve without specific treatment (Dunowska, 2023).

While isolated outbreaks with respiratory disease and mortality have occurred in mink farms (Lu *et al.* 2021), these represent localized events rather than sustained impact at country level. Global surveillance data supports this assessment - as of December 2024, WAHIS reported only 88 events across 34 countries, with most events (68/88) involving single species and a median of 2 cases per species (See Appendix A). Even accounting for significant underreporting, with surveillance systems estimated to capture less than 50% of cases (Nerpel *et al.* 2023), the evidence shows no sustained negative effects on animals.

OR

- 4c) The disease has been shown to, or scientific evidence indicates that it would, have a significant impact on the health of wildlife taking into account the occurrence and severity of the clinical signs, including direct economic losses and mortality, and any threat to the viability of a wildlife population.**

Yes No

Scientific rationale:

While SARS-CoV-2 infections have been documented in multiple wildlife species, most cases have occurred in captive settings, with white-tailed deer being the notable exception showing sustained transmission in wild populations (Chandler *et al.* 2021). Most cases demonstrate mild or asymptomatic infections, with most discovered through targeted surveillance rather than disease investigation. There is no evidence of significant population-level impacts. Even in white-tailed deer populations with documented transmission, there are no observed effects on population viability or dynamics. While infections have occurred in endangered species in zoo settings, such as gorillas and tigers (Qiu *et al.* 2023), these cases have not translated into concerning patterns in wild populations or threats to species conservation.

Conclusion regarding SARS-CoV-2 :

Does **SARS-CoV-2** match the listing criteria that are described in the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* [Chapter 1.2](#).?

Yes No

Summary Conclusion:

Based on the listing assessment, SARS-CoV-2 does not meet the criteria for listing. The reason is that Criteria 2 (disease freedom in a country) has not been met. Further, it is unlikely to be met due to the continuous risk of reintroduction from human populations and significant surveillance challenges across multiple susceptible species. With ongoing global human transmission, maintaining and demonstrating true freedom in animal populations is fundamentally impossible.

It is also noteworthy that while criteria 1 (international spread) and 4a (severe human consequences) are technically met, both come with significant caveats that undermine their relevance for listing purposes. Most notably, the documented international spread via animals is limited to a single case involving imported hamsters, while the severe human health impact stems from human-to-human transmission rather than animal to human transmission.

The practical limitations of veterinary authority control measures further reinforce why listing is not appropriate. Since the primary driver of disease spread - human-to-human transmission - falls entirely outside veterinary jurisdiction,

standard control measures would have minimal impact. Though specific actions like quarantine and testing could theoretically be implemented for animals, their effect would be insignificant given the dominance of human transmission pathways. Moreover, preventing human-to-animal transmission requires public health interventions beyond what veterinary authorities can implement.

Any veterinary authority actions would not meaningfully prevent transboundary spread given the disease's epidemiology. Combined with the impossibility of demonstrating freedom in any country, the evidence clearly shows that SARS-CoV-2 does not meet the fundamental requirements for listing.

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Appendix A: Analysis of WAHIS SARS-CoV2 reporting

Table A-1: Summary of the number of SARS-CoV-2 events by country and the animal species involved. Data reflects reports submitted to WAHIS as of December 2024. Countries are listed in descending order of the number of reported outbreaks.

Country	Number of events	Species involves
Spain	15	Mustelidae
Poland	12	Mustelidae
Hong Kong	8	Cats, <i>Cricetidae (incognita)</i> , Dogs
United Kingdom	5	Cats, Dogs, <i>Panthera tigris</i>
Argentina	4	<i>Chaetophractus villosus</i> , Cats, Dogs, <i>Panthera tigris</i> , <i>Puma concolor</i>
Canada	3	Mustelidae, <i>Odocoileus virginianus</i> , <i>Panthera leo</i>
Slovenia	3	<i>Mustela furo</i> , Mustelidae
Italy	3	Cats, Mustelidae
United States of America	2	<i>Aonyx cinereus</i> , <i>Arctictis binturong</i> , Cats, <i>Crocota crocuta</i> , Dogs, <i>Gorilla gorilla</i> , <i>Lynx canadensis</i> , <i>Lynx rufus</i> , <i>Mandrillus sphinx</i> , Mustelidae, <i>Nasua nasua</i> , <i>Neovison vison</i> , <i>Odocoileus hemionus</i> , <i>Odocoileus virginianus</i> , <i>Panthera leo</i> , <i>Panthera onca</i> , <i>Panthera pardus orientalis</i> , <i>Panthera tigris</i> , <i>Panthera uncia</i> , <i>Prionailurus viverrinus</i> , <i>Puma concolor</i> , Rabbits, <i>Saimiri sciureus</i> , Swine
Thailand	2	Cats, Dogs
Switzerland	2	Cats, Cattle, Dogs, Equidae, <i>Vulpes vulpes</i>
South Africa	2	<i>Panthera leo</i> , <i>Puma concolor</i>
Latvia	2	Cats, Mustelidae
Uruguay	2	Cats, Dogs
Ecuador	2	<i>Ateles fusciceps</i>, Dogs, <i>Lagothrix lagotricha</i>
Finland	2	Cats, Dogs
Croatia	2	Cats, Dogs, <i>Felis lynx</i> , <i>Panthera leo</i>
Greece	1	Mustelidae
Brazil	1	Cats, Dogs, <i>Mico melanurus</i> , <i>Myrmecophaga tridactyla</i> , <i>Nasua nasua</i> , <i>Trichechus manatus</i>
Bulgaria	1	Mustelidae
Chile	1	Cats
Colombia	1	<i>Panthera leo</i>
Sweden	1	Mustelidae
Denmark	1	<i>Panthera tigris</i>
Singapore	1	<i>Panthera leo</i>
Indonesia	1	<i>Panthera tigris</i>
Russia	1	Cats
Estonia	1	Cats
Myanmar	1	Dogs
Mexico	1	Cats, Dogs
Lithuania	1	Mustelidae, <i>Neovison vison</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	Dogs
France	1	<i>Neovison vison</i>
Japan	1	Cats, Dogs, <i>Panthera leo</i>

Table A-2: Summary of SARS-CoV-2 events in animals showing the number of events reported and total number of cases by species. Data ordered alphabetically by the total number of cases. Data reflects reports submitted to WAHIS as of December 2024.

Species	Number of Events	Total Cases
<i>Mustelidae (Dom)</i>	38	17,844
<i>Neovison Vison</i>	3	538
Dogs	26	145
Cats	25	143
<i>Odocoileus Virginianus</i>	2	48
<i>Panthera Tigris</i>	6	39
<i>Panthera Leo</i>	8	38
<i>Ateles Fusciceps</i>	1	16
<i>Gorilla Gorilla</i>	1	13
<i>Cricetidae (Incognita)</i>	1	11
<i>Panthera Uncia</i>	1	10
<i>Aonyx Cinereus</i>	1	7
Cattle	1	4
<i>Chaetophractus Villosus</i>	1	3
<i>Nasua Nasua</i>	2	3
<i>Puma Concolor</i>	3	3
<i>Crocuta Crocuta</i>	1	2
Equidae (Dom)	1	2
<i>Trichechus Manatus</i>	1	2
<i>Vulpes Vulpes</i>	1	2
<i>Arctictis Binturong</i>	1	1
<i>Felis Lynx</i>	1	1
<i>Lagothrix Lagothricha</i>	1	1
<i>Lynx Canadensis</i>	1	1
<i>Mandrillus Sphinx</i>	1	1
<i>Mico Melanurus</i>	1	1
<i>Mustela Furo</i>	1	1
<i>Myrmecophaga Tridactyla</i>	1	1
<i>Odocoileus Hemionus</i>	1	1
<i>Prionailurus Viverrinus</i>	1	1
<i>Saimiri Sciureus</i>	1	1
<i>Lynx Rufus</i>	1	NR
<i>Panthera Onca</i>	1	NR
<i>Panthera Pardus Orientalis</i>	1	NR
Rabbits	1	NR
Swine	1	NR

NR = Not cases or a zero was reported.

Table A-3: Summary of SARS-CoV-2 events in animals, highlighting the total number of deaths (i.e., not due to human intervention), animals killed as part of disease control measures (e.g., slaughter), and the combined total number of animals dead or killed. Data is ordered by the total number of animals that died or were killed. Data reflects reports submitted to WAHIS as of December 2024.

Species	Total Deaths	Total Killed	Total dead / killed
<i>Neovison vison</i>	16,562	170,094	186,656
<i>Mustelidae (dom)</i>	1,359	106,125	107,484
<i>Cricetidae (incognita)</i>	-	995	995
<i>Odocoileus virginianus</i>	1	399	400
Dogs	4	7	11
Cats	7	3	10
<i>Vulpes vulpes</i>	1	3	4
<i>Panthera leo</i>	3	b	3
<i>Ateles fusciceps</i>	2	-	2
<i>Lagothrix lagotricha</i>	1	-	1
<i>Panthera uncia</i>	1	-	1
<i>Saimiri sciureus</i>	1	-	1
<i>Panthera tigris</i>	-	1	1

Appendix B: Screen shots from SARS-ANI




Figure 1. Geographic distribution and relative frequency of SARS-CoV-2 infections/exposures in different animal species. The circle diameter is proportional to the number of cases per country.

Annex 5. Report of the Development of the Case Definition for infection with mycobacterium avium subsp. Paratuberculosis (paratuberculosis)
(2nd May 2024 to 28th August 2024)

MEETING OF THE WOAHP SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 10 to 14 February 2025

The objective of this report is to provide the rationale and scientific justification for elements of the case definition for infection with *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis*: (paratuberculosis), which was developed via videoconference and email exchange between May 2024 to August 2024.

1. Background

Paratuberculosis (Johne's disease) is a chronic enteritis of ruminants caused by *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* (MAP). Paratuberculosis is listed in the *Terrestrial Code* [Chapter 1.3](#). Diseases, infections, and infestations listed by the WOAHP in Article 1.3.7. in the category of 'multiple species'. There is a corresponding disease-specific chapter in *Terrestrial Code* ([Chapter 8.14.](#)), but there is no case definition to guide consistent notification by WOAHP Members. The corresponding *Terrestrial Manual* is [Chapter 3.1.16.](#) which was last adopted in 2021.

2. Discussion

2.1. Disease name

The experts agreed to use the term 'paratuberculosis' to describe the disease caused by MAP.

2.2. Pathogenic agent

The experts agreed that the pathogenic agent for 'paratuberculosis' is *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *Paratuberculosis* (MAP).

2.3. Hosts

The experts identified that domestic ruminants such as cattle, sheep, goats, deer, alpaca, water buffalo, and camels are the primary host species for *Mycobacterium avium* subsp. *paratuberculosis* [1,2]. The experts noted that there was increasing evidence of the disease being reported in Asian and South American camels and an increasing demand for vaccines for these species, indicating the significant burden in this species. A broad range of domestic ruminants are identified as host species, and the experts recommend including Bovidae, which include sheep and goats, Cervidae as well as Camelids in the case definition.

The experts acknowledged reports of MAP in other species such as leporids, equines, carnivores, and primates, which could potentially act as sources of infection [3–5]. Among these species, leporids have been the most frequently discussed as a possible source of infection to domestic ruminants. However this detection was supported by some pathological and molecular evidence, but the cultural isolation of MAP has not been successful [6–9]. Although there is some evidence of MAP in wild rabbits, its viability and potential for transmission to domestic ruminants remains unproven. Additionally, the minimal impact of MAP within the wild rabbit population without causing high mortality or morbidity suggests that the pathogen may have lower virulence and lower prevalence in this population. Given the limited and inconclusive evidence of MAP from rabbits and hares [10] leporids were recommended to be excluded from the case definition.

The experts discussed the potential role of wild ruminants in the transmission of MAP in the domestic-wildlife interface. However due to limited research exploring such transmission pathway, the actual risk is still not well

understood [11]. Furthermore, existing national control programmes for paratuberculosis in animals focus only on domestic species and do not generally include risk mitigation measures for preventing transmission from wild to domestic ruminants [2]. While the experts acknowledged that contact between wild and domestic ruminants cannot be entirely excluded, considering the overall prevalence in the wild species, the epidemiology of MAP, the limited role of wild ruminants in current disease control strategies, and the lower likelihood of transmission to domestic ruminants, it would be justified to exclude wild ruminants from the case definition.

In contrast, one of the experts was of the opinion that the risk from wildlife should not be overlooked as there is some evidence on interspecies diseases transmission. This expert suggested reconsidering the inclusion of free wild ruminants in the case definition citing a study from northern Italy where in the genomic profile of MAP isolated from a cohort of red deer population matched that identified in the local cattle [12]. This finding suggests a potential link between wildlife and domestic ruminants, which could suggest transmission in either direction. Despite this, the Group did not agree with this suggestion, maintaining that the overall evidence remains limited and inconclusive besides this isolated case in northern Italy.

When it comes to captive wild ruminants and camelids, particularly those in zoological collections, it was agreed to include them in the case definition. This decision was based on the recognition of risk of MAP transmission from one country to another through the trade of animals from zoological collections especially since these animals can have subclinical infection and harbor MAP. In addition, local outbreaks could threaten the survival of the affected species in enclosed habitats as these animals are managed in limited space at higher than natural densities. One expert highlighted the increasing number of queries about managing paratuberculosis in wild goats in zoological parks indicating a growing concern about this issue. It was also pointed out that a positive case in captive wild animals does not reflect the overall epidemiological situation of a country, due to the low risk of contact between captive wild ruminants and domestic livestock outside the zoo. However, given the risks associated with the trade and movement of zoo animals between countries, there is risk of international spread and recommended including captive wild ruminants from the Families Bovidae, and Cervidae, and also Camelidae in the case definition.

2.4. Epidemiologic and diagnostic criteria

The experts identified **three options** (either/any one of which is sufficient) for confirming a case of infection with *MAP* for the purposes of notification to WOAHA.

2.4.1. Option 1

The experts agreed that culturally isolating the organism from a sample of a host species alone is insufficient to confirm a case since that animal might be a latent carrier with a very low risk of transmission. This has been attributed to the potential pass-through phenomenon, wherein it is theoretically possible that faecal culture testing of non-infected animals on contaminated premises can lead to false-positive reactions [13,14]. Furthermore, they noted that using Ziehl-Neelsen (ZN) staining for microscopic identification of the agent is considered an obsolete method with low specificity and sensitivity, although this method is a cost-effective option and is easier to perform. Therefore, combining isolation by culturing and staining using the ZN method with other supporting evidence such as compatible clinical signs, in conjunction with other tests and epidemiological risk, was recommended. The experts also referred to the *Terrestrial Manual* [Chapter 3.1.16.](#), Table 1, wherein the use of the fecal ZN staining method is recommended as a confirmatory method for clinical cases but only in limited circumstances.

The experts discussed other diagnostic methods such as histopathological examination antibody detection and PCR tests which are more routinely employed and recommended that histopathological examination could be relied upon as a standalone diagnostic test only when tissue samples exhibit multifocal or diffuse lesions. One of the experts noted that if pathological lesions are identified through histopathological examination, it would be considered strongly indicative of paratuberculosis but insufficient for a definitive diagnosis. In such situations and in the absence of other confirming evidence, diagnosticians report these findings as cases consistent with paratuberculosis. This implies that while the histopathological examination results would match those expected in paratuberculosis, they are not definitive means of diagnosis on their own. Therefore, it was recommended that histopathological examination is not sufficiently specific and that it be combined with other epidemiological evidence and laboratory tests for the same sections.

Whilst the experts retained this option for isolation, they noted that because of the expertise, infrastructure and time required to perform these tests, isolation has largely been superseded by PCR or antibody methods.

2.4.2. Option 2

The experts discussed that nucleic acid test methods could sometimes provide non-specific results due to genetic similarities between MAP and other subspecies of the *Mycobacterium avium* complex [15]. Therefore, it was recommended to include the need for supporting epidemiological evidence or additional tests to confirm a case through Option 2.

Additionally, they did not recommend the inclusion of antigen detection tests because tests are currently limited to experimental settings and assays are not commercially available. This is aligned with the *Terrestrial Manual* which does not refer to antigen detection tests.

2.4.3. Option 3

The experts noted that antibody-based tests can cross-react with other *Mycobacterium* species, causing animal tuberculosis and resulting in false positive cases. Therefore, recommended inclusion of epidemiological link or association with contaminated material, or in conjunction with other tests to confirm a case. Furthermore, since there are currently no specific serological (DIVA) tests for the detection of infection in vaccinated animals, supported the inclusion of the text 'that are not a consequence of vaccination' in the case definition. Knowledge by the local authorities of vaccinated animals through record-keeping could support the differentiation between infected and vaccinated animals. The experts deliberated the value of including seroconversion as featured in other case definitions and concluded it as a redundant term for this case definition. Seropositive animals should be considered cases when assessed in conjunction with other supporting evidence, and there is no need to demonstrate seroconversion.

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REPORT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE DEFINITION FOR INFECTION WITH MYCOBACTERIUM
AVIUM SUBSP. PARATUBERCULOSIS (PARATUBERCULOSIS)

2 MAY TO 30 AUGUST 2024

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Annex 6. Work Programme

MEETING OF THE WOAHP SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES

Paris, 10 to 14 February 2025

Abbreviations: BSC: Biological Standards Commission; SCAD: Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases; TAHSC: Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission).

Priority	Work programme item	Progress
Update of WOAHP standards		
	Glossary	
1	Ch. 1.3. Diseases, infections and infestations listed by the WOAHP	Ongoing
1	Ch. 1.6. Procedures for official recognition of animal health status, endorsement of an official control programme, and publication of a self-declaration of animal health status, by WOAHP	Not on agenda
1	Removal of Chs. 1.7.-1.12. (Questionnaires for application of official animal health status and endorsement of official control programmes)	Ongoing (SCAD opinion forwarded to TAHSC at its Feb. meeting)
1	Ch. 4.X. New chapter on biosecurity	Not on agenda
1	Ch. 4.4. Zoning and compartmentalisation and new chapter on implementation of zoning	Ongoing
1	New chapter on emergency management	Ongoing
1	Ch.8.8. Infection with foot and mouth disease virus	Not on agenda
1	Ch. 8.10. Japanese encephalitis	Ongoing (circulated for comments)
1	Ch. 8.13. New world screwworm and old world screwworm	Ongoing (circulated for comments)
1	Ch. 8.Y. Infection with Nipah virus	Ongoing (circulated for comments)
1	Ch. 10.X. Infection with avian metapneumovirus (Turkey rhinotracheitis and swollen head syndrome of chicken)	Ongoing (circulated for comments)
1	Ch. 11.5. Infection with <i>Mycoplasma mycoides</i> subsp. <i>mycoides</i> SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)	Ongoing (SCAD opinion forwarded to TAHSC at its Feb. meeting)
1	Ch. 12.1. Infection with African horse sickness virus	Ongoing (SCAD opinion forwarded to TAHSC at its Feb. meeting)
1	Ch. 12.3. Dourine	Ongoing (circulated for comments)
1	Ch. 12.4. Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western)	Ongoing
1	Ch. 12.11. Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis	Not started
1	Ch. 14.8. Scrapie	Ongoing (SCAD opinion forwarded to TAHSC at its Feb. meeting)

Priority	Work programme item	Progress
1	Ch. 14.9. Sheep pox and goat pox	Ongoing (SCAD opinion forwarded to TAHSC at its Feb. meeting)
Official animal health status recognition		
1	Evaluation of Member applications for official recognition of animal health status/endorsement of control programmes	Regular activity
1	Evaluation of annual reconfirmations	Regular activity
1	Streamlining the procedure for annual reconfirmations for maintenance of official status	Ongoing
1	Expert missions to Members	Regular activity
1	Evaluation of Members applications for recovery of a suspended official status	Regular activity
Disease control issues		
2	Advise on global strategies and initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FMD • PPR • Rabies • ASF • AI • zTB 	SCAD to receive updates on global strategies and initiatives at its Sep. 25 meeting
2	Assess recent developments in control and eradication of infectious diseases	None as of now
2	Disease prevention and control guidelines <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guidelines on surveillance of AI in smallholder setting • Guidelines on risk management practices at the domestic-wild animal interface 	In progress
1	Evaluation of emerging diseases <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SARS-CoV-2 • HPAI in cattle 	Completed (Feb. 25, no longer emerging) Completed (Feb. 25, meets definition of 'emerging disease')
1	Evaluation of pathogenic agents against the listing criteria of Chapter 1.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nairobi sheep disease • SARS-CoV-2 • Paratuberculosis 	Completed (Sep. 24) Completed (Feb. 25) Reviewed and completed (Feb. 25)
1	Development of case definitions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New World and Old World screwworms • Maedi visna/ caprine arthritis encephalitis • Paratuberculosis • Anthrax • Aujesky's disease • Chlamydia abortus 	Completed Completed (Sep. 24) Completed (Feb. 25) Not started Not started Not started

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