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Original: English
December 2017

REPORT OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP ON AVIAN INFLUENZA¹

Paris, 12–14 December 2017

A meeting of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on Avian Influenza (hereafter referred to as the Group) was held at the OIE Headquarters in Paris from 12 to 14 December 2017.

1. Welcome and adoption of the agenda

Dr Monique Eloit, Director General of the OIE, welcomed the participants and thanked them for making themselves available for the meeting on such short notice. Dr Eloit noted that avian influenza (AI) is one of the difficult diseases to manage because of significant disease control and trade issues arising from outbreaks, especially related to the role of backyard poultry flocks and wild birds in epidemics of highly pathogenic AI (HPAI), the lack of detailed vaccination provisions in the Terrestrial Code and clear understanding of the application and implementation of zoning and compartmentalisation concepts. To address these issues, Member Countries are looking to the OIE for improved tools and standards to manage AI.

Dr Eloit highlighted that in an effort to provide greater transparency of OIE activities, the Terms of Reference (ToR) for all *ad hoc* groups will be published on its website and this new approach has been received positively by Member Countries.

Dr Matthew Stone, Deputy Director General of the OIE, welcomed the *ad hoc* group members and acknowledged the representatives of three OIE Specialist Commissions in the *ad hoc* group as observers. Dr Stone noted that the last major revision of AI chapter in Terrestrial Code was completed in 2003 and considering developments in science, notifications and trading patterns the risk management measures need to be updated. To this effect, the OIE prepared a discussion paper on AI in order to identify the specific problems that needed to be addressed by a broad review of the AI chapter.

Dr Stone reminded the participants that they had been selected based on their scientific expertise and that they were not representing their own countries or institutions. Prior to the meeting all participants signed a confidentiality agreement and a declaration of conflict of interests. Dr Stone also emphasised that the discussions captured in the report would be attributed to the Group and not to the individual expert.

The *ad hoc* meeting was chaired by Dr David Swayne and the Group adopted the proposed agenda.

The Agenda, List of Participants and TORs are presented as Appendices I, II and III, respectively.

¹ Note: This *ad hoc* Group report reflects the views of its members and may not necessarily reflect the views of the OIE. This report should be read in conjunction with the February 2018 report of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission because this report provides its considerations and comments. It is available at <http://www.oie.int/en/international-standard-setting/specialists-commissions-groups/code-commission-reports/meetings-reports/>

2. Opening session on the global AI situation and the effective prevention and response to avian influenza outbreaks

In the opening session, experts gave presentations introducing the themes and topics closely related to the meeting: “*HPAI prevention and control strategies including the use of vaccination*” (Dr David Swayne); “*The current global threats for transboundary spread of AI including virus properties with relevance to safe trade*” (Dr Ian Brown); “*EFSA opinion on avian influenza*” (Dr Frank Verdonck); and “*An analysis of the AI-related trade concerns raised by Member Countries*” (OIE Headquarters).

3. Introduction to Chapter 10.4. on infection with avian influenza viruses

Dr Bonbon, President of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission (Code Commission) noted the Terms of Reference were the result of discussions between the Specialist Commissions and the OIE Headquarters. The discussions had raised questions concerning the definition of the disease, the need for further distinction between the different pathogenicities of the disease and the application of measures applied in cases of LPAI and HPAI reported in poultry and wild birds. Dr Bonbon further noted that the Code Commission did not expect the *ad hoc* group to provide a revised chapter after its first meeting, but to give advice to the Code Commission so that the chapter can be revised in order for it to be better implemented by Member Countries.

OIE Headquarters advised that report of the Group would be validated by the DG/DDG before being reviewed by the Specialist Commissions at their February 2018 meetings. The report could be circulated to Member Countries for comments as an annex to the Code Commission’s February 2018 meeting report.

Dr Bonbon reiterated that the AI chapter had been reviewed some 10 years ago and that further review had been proposed in response to Member Country concerns, to address numerous trade issues arising from notifications of LPAI and HPAI. There is also a need to address the lack of notification by some countries and the application of inappropriate risk mitigation measures. Finally, Dr Bonbon noted that prior to the addition of H5 and H7 LPAI in 2005, the chapter’s scope covered only fowl plague (HPAI). Measures related to vaccination, status and surveillance were also added to the chapter. In this regard, the intent of the amendments was the need to know where H5 or H7 were occurring in order to manage the risk, not specifically for purposes of restricting trade or production.

Dr Swayne noted that the *ad hoc* group (2003) recognised that HPAI was the problem, but because H5 and H7 LPAI can mutate to HPAI they were added to the chapter to facilitate development of national control programs that managed this risk. Unfortunately, the result is they came to be seen as being of the same risk profile which has resulted in the negative impacts of the chapter through unfair trade barriers. Through the remainder of this document, the term “LPAI” will be used as defined in the current AI Code chapter as H5 and H7 LPAI virus strains unless clearly stated as pertaining to H1-16 LPAI virus strains.

4. Member Countries’ comments and concerns on the implementation of Chapter 10.4. infection with avian influenza viruses

The Group briefly reviewed the discussion paper on AI, which had been circulated to Member Countries. The discussion paper identified six key challenges for Member Countries when implementing the chapter, namely (1) inappropriate application or incorrect interpretation of the definition of AI in terms of making no distinction between HPAI and LPAI risk in trade; (2) the complexity of identifying LPAI viruses of zoonotic potential and its negative impact on trade when notifying LPAI outbreaks (including the lack of appropriate risk mitigation measures such as zoning around outbreaks); (3) difficulty of defining backyard poultry and its role in the epidemiology and transmission of the AI; (4) unclear requirements for demonstrating free status from LPAI and HPAI; (5) the need for guidelines on targeted surveillance for AI virus in wild birds; and (6) the unclear role of vaccination in the control and prevention of HPAI including its impact on maintaining or regaining disease-free status.

The Group considered that the discussion paper provided a comprehensive review of the current situation related to usage and application of the OIE AI standards and decided to use it as an initial springboard for the Group to initiate discussions on the key challenges identified in the discussion paper.

5. Discussion on the issues included in the Terms of Reference for the Group

The Group proceeded with its discussion of the various issues using the Terms of Reference as the basis for its work.

Part A of the Terms of Reference

a) Review scientific evidence and provide an opinion on the different risks and impacts of AI in respect of the pathogenicity of AI viruses

Incubation period of the AI virus (AIV) and the duration of waiting period for recovery of status

The Group reviewed and discussed the current science that supports the OIE requirements to recover disease free status of a country or zone and to verify whether or not the control measures taken and the length of the waiting period had a specific scientific basis.

Following discussions, the Group identified that a weak link and information gaps existed involving incubation periods and a three-month waiting period for the recovery of free-status.

The Group also discussed the current rationale to set the incubation period of AIV as 21 days for the purpose of the Code from the OIE Technical Disease Card on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza² as follows:

“The incubation period in poultry can be a few hours to a few days in individual birds, and up to 2 weeks in the flock. A 21-day incubation period was set taking into account the transmission dynamics of the virus in an avian population in the context of disease control measures”.

However, the Group considered that more recent epidemiological data on incubation periods of the AI virus from different regions needs to be collected and looked at more closely to determine if there is scientific evidence to support the three-month waiting period for recovery of status.

Recommendation for action

The Group recommended that experts from different regions conduct a review of the scientific literature and field data (Andrew Breed for Asia, Ian Brown for Europe and David Swayne for the Americas) to identify the rationale for having 21-day incubation period and re-evaluate the three-month waiting period for recovery status before the next meeting.

b) Review the current definitions of ‘AI’ and ‘poultry’ in order to ensure that the most appropriate and proportionate surveillance, notification and control measures and trade requirements are adopted in relation to the different risks posed by LPAI and HPAI chapter

The Group recognized that the OIE definitions of ‘AI’ and ‘poultry’ are fundamental concepts and terminologies that need to be more clearly defined to ensure a common understanding among Member Countries. It was acknowledged that often these definitions were not applied in an uniform way.

² OIE Technical disease card on [HPAI](#).

The Group conducted an indepth assessment of the definitions including how they had evolved and how they are used and applied. The Group discussed the various interpretations by different stakeholders.

Definition of ‘AI’

The Group acknowledged that ‘AI’ as defined in the AI chapter has broad implications for the sanitary measures applied by Member Countries, including disease notification, prevention and control of AI and trade conditions.

It was therefore decided that the Group should address the following issues as particularly useful in its work to better define the definition of ‘AI, as shown below:

The Group agreed that LPAI should not be treated the same as HPAI in the Terrestrial Code, and there is a need to improve transparency of notifications of avian influenza while minimising unjustified trade restrictions arising from notification of strains of low pathogenicity.

The Group carefully considered three different options as follows:

- (1) two separate chapters for HPAI and LPAI viruses;
- (2) maintaining the status quo but implement other initiatives that may address this issue (e.g., improved information-sharing, training and cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO) to make sanitary measures employed proportional to the level of zoonotic risk of AI, etc.);
- (3) making a clear distinction between HPAI and LPAI in the same chapter. Defining AI as HPAI for immediate notification and having a separate article or articles that highlight the need for LPAI surveillance, the possibility of mutation to HPAI, public health consequences, only six monthly reporting and the application of appropriate risk management measures in order to avoid unjustified barriers to trade.

After examining the three options, the Group noted that the first option was not practical and would not solve the challenge of striking a balance between the potential zoonotic risk of LPAI and the trade implications. With regard to the second option, there is an acceptance on the part of the majority of Member Countries that the status quo cannot be maintained.

The Group agreed to recommend the third option of separating LPAI and creating new articles in the same chapter dedicated to LPAI addressing the following key areas:

- the importance of surveillance;
- the need for proportional responses to the potential zoonotic risk of AI viruses;
- the possibility of including recommendation or requirements for Member Countries to only notify LPAI in six-monthly reports;
- and avoiding unjustified barriers to trade caused by notification of LPAI outbreaks.

The Group believed that this approach would provide Member Countries with a degree of certainty and flexibility as to how to apply sanitary measures against LPAI, while maintaining continuity and stability for the existing AI chapter.

Definition of ‘poultry’

The Group discussed the definition of ‘poultry’ and the reporting obligations of Member Countries, and revised the definition taking into account Member Countries’ requests to clarify the use of the term ‘backyard poultry’, specifically to exclude this sector of the population or redefine them in the AI chapter.

The Group noted that the categories of birds listed in the definition of ‘poultry’ should have an epidemiological role in the spread of the disease. Based on the epidemiology of the disease, the Group discussed the definition of ‘poultry’ and the likelihood of spread of viruses rather than the likelihood of exposure in assessing the risks associated with all categories of birds listed in the AI chapter.

With regard to the term ‘backyard poultry’, the Group noted that because backyard production systems vary between Member Countries, it was not possible to define a term that could be uniformly applied to all situations. The Group suggested that the words ‘including backyard poultry’ be removed from the definition as these were covered by ‘all domesticated birds’.

In addition, given the much lower risk of transmission of viruses in these types of birds compared to commercially traded poultry, and the absence of any data to the contrary, the Group proposed that the category of birds that are used exclusively for self consumption be removed from the definition of ‘poultry’ and proposed additional modifications to improve the clarity of the text.

The Group consequently proposed to revise point 3) of Article 10.4.1., deleting the words ‘including backyard poultry’ and inserting the words ‘except those birds used exclusively for self-consumption’ from the definition, to read:

- 3) *Poultry* is defined as ‘all domesticated birds, ~~including backyard poultry,~~ used for the production of *meat* or eggs for consumption except those birds used exclusively for self-consumption, for the production of other commercial products, ~~for restocking supplies of game,~~ or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose or all birds used for restocking supplies of game’.

Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons referred to in the preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions or for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be *poultry*.

Recommendation for action

The Group recommended that the OIE Specialist Commissions work on revising text, taking into account its suggestion to redefine ‘AI’ and ‘poultry’. The Group also noted that it was essential to solicit Member Countries comments on its proposed approach on revising the definitions in order to advance these very critical concepts before proceeding on the revision of the chapter.

- c) **Propose specific measures for a disease-free zone or compartment with regard to the appropriate procedures and documented evidence applicable to such cases**

The Group drew attention to the fact that many of the AI-related trade disputes involved countries not having established zoning or compartments during “peacetime”. Establishment and approval of compartments can and should be done in peace time. Zoning cannot be done before an outbreak occurs, but preparation by laying down the country specific principles and procedures for zoning can be done in peacetime. The Group noted that Member Countries concerns on the implementation issues associated with zoning and compartmentalisation are beyond its purview and instead recommended that the OIE encourage and promote the application by its Members of the general principles of regionalisation as required in the Terrestrial Code.

- d) **Propose the list of safe commodities in respect of the pathogenicity and transmission pathways of AI viruses, in particular reflecting that fresh meat and table eggs present a much lower likelihood of transmitting LPAI than HPAI viruses / g) revise the commodity articles, taking into account the biological differences between low and highly pathogenic AI regarding the likelihood of transmission of virus via various commodities and the likely consequences**

The Group examined the potential commodities that could be considered safe to trade because of their preparation or purpose, using criteria set out in Article 2.2.2. of the Terrestrial Code. The Group reviewed the scientific progress made in understanding the likelihood of LPAI virus transmission via commodities (such as fresh meat and table eggs, hatching eggs and live animals) since the previous *ad hoc* Group meeting.

From the preliminary search for literature, the Group found a study showing detection of low levels of RNA from some H5, H7 and H9 LPAI viruses in tissues and organs—e.g. heart, kidney, liver and brain—outside the respiratory tract (Systemic distribution of different low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in chicken, Post *et al.*, *Virology Journal*, 2013, 10:23) while other studies found no viable H7 live virus in meat and other internal tissues except those of the respiratory (including air sacs) and digestive tract. By contrast, HPAI viruses consistently produced very high quantities of viable virus in internal tissues, inside eggs and in meat. Since the degree of evidence and supporting data vary considerably, the Group concluded that there were insufficient data from the literature review to determine the commodities that could be considered safe for trade and be included in the AI chapter. As more information becomes available on LPAI viruses, it would be necessary to review this assessment.

Recommendation for action

The Group recommended that the OIE Headquarters conduct a literature review of the presence of AI viruses in poultry commodities including skeletal muscle, eggs, semen, visceral organs, brain, feather, skin, bone and blood. The information would be available prior to the next meeting to allow the Group to see if there are clear differences in infectivity, persistence and commodity-based risk between HPAI and LPAI viruses.

- e) **Propose new articles for commodities imported from HPAI infected countries or zones**
- f) **Review the procedures for virus inactivation to more accurately incorporate recent scientific data**
- g) **Revise the commodity articles, taking into account the biological differences between low and highly pathogenic AI regarding the likelihood of transmission of virus via various commodities and the likely consequences**

The Group considered that in order to allow the safe trade of animals and commodities from HPAI infected countries or zones, commodity-specific risk mitigation measures should be applied such as procedures for virus inactivation. The Group noted that if commodities were considered not to require any disease-specific measures, they would be listed under the category of safe commodities by default.

The Group therefore suggested to first seek advice and information on the latest standardized industrial procedures for virus inactivation from the relevant international organisations or associations.

Recommendations for action

The Group requested the OIE Headquarters to consult with the relevant industry or associations to gather the latest scientific information on standard processing procedures that may impact virus inactivation including times and temperatures for the following commodities:

- feathers and down;
 - feather meal and poultry meal/blood meal;
 - pasteurisation of egg and egg products;
 - canned and sterilized meat/pasteurised meat;
 - fats (pet food)/extruded pet food;
 - skins and trophies.
- h) Propose risk management measures for trade in commodities from vaccinated poultry or a country, zone or compartment practicing vaccination**
- i) Review the procedures for virus inactivation to more accurately incorporate recent scientific data**
- j) Consider the possibility of including vaccination tool within the requirements of AI chapter (developing new requirements for HPAI free with vaccination status along with the corresponding surveillance requirements by taking into account of the relevant OFFLU recommendations on AI vaccine strategies)**

The group recognised vaccination in certain circumstances can contribute to preventing AI virus introduction or reducing its spread, decreasing potential economic losses and reducing zoonotic risk. The Group also reaffirmed that vaccination alone does not affect the status of an AI free country or zone as the AI chapter has specific provisions that would allow trade in vaccinated poultry and their products.

With regard to trade implications, although the Group recognised that the AI chapter recommends the continuation of trade in the presence of vaccination, it was of the opinion that an introductory text on the purposes of vaccination in the section on general provision could be useful to help Member Countries understand how vaccination could be applied in an AI free country or zone. The Group also emphasised that the implementation of an appropriate surveillance program in accordance with the Terrestrial Code is a pre-requisite for demonstrating freedom from infection with AI virus for trade in poultry commodities originating from the country, zone or compartment.

In response to the requests for updating surveillance articles concerning vaccination requirements and the need for a provision on the importation of vaccinated poultry, the Group proposed that the issues would be dealt with when the revision of the text of the AI chapter was undertaken.

Recommendations for action

The Group recommended that the OIE Specialist Commissions work on revising text, taking into account the Group's suggestion to modify the text in a way to make it more clear for the Member Countries to understand the purposes of systematic vaccination and their obligations to implement surveillance programmes.

- k) **Propose an approach to provide an incentive for Member Countries to carry out intense surveillance for AI viruses and that detection of low pathogenicity viruses and AI in wild birds would not lead to unjustified barriers to trade**

The Group noted that the above concerns were already addressed in the point 8) of the Article 10.4.1 of the Terrestrial Code. However, the Group considered that, by moving this point to the beginning of the same article and rewording the text to clearly articulate the differences in managing risks and making notification between poultry and birds other than poultry, the Member Countries would better understand the purposes of the chapter.

The Group emphasised the need to continue immediate notifications of HPAI in wild birds as part of an early warning system that helps to implement preventive biosecurity measures.

Recommendations for action

The Group recommended that the OIE Specialist Commissions work on revising text, taking into account its suggestions to modify and relocate the text.

Tables and figures at the end of surveillance chapter in the Code can be moved to the AI Manual Chapter and the relevant information can be incorporated into the surveillance articles.

Part B of the Terms of Reference

- a) **Review relevant scientific literature on the epidemiology of current AI outbreaks and propose effective prevention and control measures during outbreaks (e.g. poultry confinement, movement control, preventive culling)**
- b) **Review the virus dynamics of AI introduction via wild birds with respect to critical number of wild birds and presence of water bodies required for AI virus amplification and propose effective biosecurity measures to be implemented by the poultry farmers to prevent the introduction of AI virus from wild birds into poultry**
- c) **Review the process for regaining country or zone freedom, including recommendations on the use of zoning and other risk mitigating measures taking into account the specificities of the respective viruses involved**
- d) **Propose targeted surveillance focusing on areas of high poultry density, free-range poultry and establishments lying along wild bird migration pathways**

The Group considered that these issues were already covered in the AI chapter—though not in sufficient detail. In this respect, the Group proposed that the following activities could be envisaged in following years in order to provide more guidance to Member Countries:

- i) a publication in a plurithematic issue of the OIE Scientific and Technical Review of a paper providing a comprehensive review of the literature (by end of 2018), as either:
 - a review that updates the paper³ already published; or
 - a short paper addressing the four points mentioned above in collaboration between several members of the group.

³ The scientific rationale for the World Organisation for Animal Health standards and recommendations on avian influenza. Review article. Pasick J. *et al.*, *Rev. Sci. Tech.*, 2014.

- ii) a publication in the OIE Bulletin—shortened paper to fit the format of the Bulletin (by end of August 2018);
- iii) a dedicated themed issue on influenza A (swine, avian, equine) to present an update of our scientific understanding of this family of viruses, including covering the critical issues raised by Member Countries – (by 2019– 020).

The group also identified that some of the issues raised by the Member Countries were caused by difficulty in accessing relevant information on the OIE website and requested that the OIE Headquarters consider the following actions to address this:

- i) The ‘Checklist on the Practical Application of Compartmentalisation for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease’, published in 2007 should be updated; and
- ii) More effective communication to educate the Member Countries where to locate the information on AI.

6. Next steps

The Group recommended that the OIE Headquarters engage with the Member Countries to obtain their comments on how to move forward on the specific approach proposed in the report, especially on its proposal to revise the definitions of ‘AI’ and ‘poultry’ as the reaction of Member Countries to these proposals was an important step before commencing the comprehensive review of the chapter.

In the meantime, the Group agreed to continue to work on the scientific and literature reviews in order to ensure the latest scientific knowledge on epidemiology of AI viruses, surveillance and biosecurity was available for the next meeting.

The Chair closed the meeting and thanked the experts for their active participation and the useful discussions.

.../Appendices

OIE AD HOC GROUP ON AVIAN INFLUENZA

Paris, 12–14 December 2017

Adopted agenda

1. Introductory session: Scene-setting effective prevention of and response to current and future avian influenza outbreaks
 - Current global threats for transboundary spread of AI including virus properties with relevance to safe trade;
 - HPAI prevention and control strategies including the use of vaccination: add in “Risk of Spread through trade in poultry and poultry products and the mitigation steps to reduce such risk”;
 - EFSA opinion on avian influenza;
 - An analysis of the AI-related trade concerns raised by Member Countries.
 2. Introduction of Participants (*and housekeeping*)
 3. Adoption of the agenda
 4. President of Terrestrial Animal Health Code Commission - introduction to the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* Chapter 10.4. Infection with avian influenza viruses
 5. Member Countries’ comments and concerns on the implementation of Chapter 10.4.
 6. Discussion (based on terms of reference)
 7. Conclusions
 8. Next steps
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REPORT OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP ON AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUSES

Paris, 12–14 December 2017

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Appendix II

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**TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR THE *AD HOC* GROUP ON AVIAN INFLUENZA**

Purpose

The purpose of the *ad hoc* Group is to provide independent analysis and advice to OIE on avian influenza (AI) in order to provide Member Countries with the appropriate AI standards to engage in safe trade and carrying out effective risk management using the existing tools to monitor, control and eradicate the disease, as well as actively notifying outbreaks.

Functions

The *ad hoc* Group on AI will be constituted by and report to the Director General of the OIE, although it may provide advice directly to the relevant Specialist Commissions when necessary.

It will be tasked with reviewing scientific evidence, providing guidance and making draft recommendations on issues related to the updating of Terrestrial Code chapter on infection with AI viruses.

The responsibilities of the *ad hoc* Group on AI will be:

- Provide technical advice on definitions of ‘AI’ and ‘poultry’, zoning and compartmentalisation, commodity-based trade requirements and risk management measures; this includes but is not limited to:
 - a) review scientific evidence and provide an opinion on the different risks and impacts of AI in respect of the pathogenicity of AI viruses;
 - b) review the current definitions of ‘AI’ and ‘poultry’ in order to ensure that the most appropriate and proportionate surveillance, notification and control measures and trade requirements are adopted in relation to the different risks posed by LPAI and HPAI;
 - c) propose specific measures for a disease-free zone or compartment with regard to the appropriate procedures and documented evidence applicable to such cases;
 - d) propose the list of safe commodities in respect of the pathogenicity and transmission pathways of AI viruses, in particular reflecting that fresh meat and table eggs present a much lower likelihood of transmitting LPAI than HPAI viruses;
 - e) propose new articles for commodities imported from HPAI infected countries or zones;
 - f) propose risk management measures for trade in commodities from vaccinated poultry or a country, zone or compartment practicing vaccination;
 - g) revise the commodity articles, taking into account the biological differences between low and highly pathogenic AI regarding the likelihood of transmission of virus via various commodities and the likely consequences;
 - h) review the procedures for virus inactivation to more accurately incorporate recent scientific data;
 - i) consider the possibility of including vaccination tool within the requirements of AI chapter (developing new requirements for HPAI free with vaccination status along with the corresponding surveillance requirements by taking into account of the relevant OFFLU recommendations on AI vaccine strategies);

Appendix III (contd)

- j) propose an approach to provide an incentive for Member Countries to carry out intense surveillance for AI viruses and that detection of low pathogenicity viruses and AI in wild birds would not lead to unjustified barriers to trade.
 - Provide scientific advice on epidemiology of AI viruses, surveillance and biosecurity; this includes but is not limited to:
 - a) review relevant scientific literature on the epidemiology of current AI outbreaks and propose effective prevention and control measures during outbreaks (e.g. poultry confinement, movement control, preventive culling);
 - b) review the virus dynamics of AI introduction via wild birds with respect to critical number of wild birds and presence of water bodies required for AI virus amplification and propose effective biosecurity measures to be implemented by the poultry farmers to prevent the introduction of AI virus from wild birds into poultry;
 - c) review the process for regaining country or zone freedom, including recommendations on the use of zoning and other risk mitigating measures taking into account the specificities of the respective viruses involved;
 - d) propose targeted surveillance focusing on areas of high poultry density, free-range poultry and establishments lying along wild bird migration pathways.
-