



**REPORT OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP
ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK ASSESSMENT¹
Paris, 20-22 November 2018**

The OIE *ad hoc* Group on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk assessment (hereafter the Group) met for the second time from 20 to 22 November 2018 at the OIE Headquarters to continue providing independent analysis and advice to the OIE on the risk-based provisions applicable to the categorisation of BSE risk status as well as on the recommendations for international trade.

1. Opening

Dr Neo Mapitse, Head of Status Department, welcomed the Group on behalf of Dr Monique Eloit, Director General of the OIE. He reported that the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (Scientific Commission) supported the direction taken by the Group at its July 2018 meeting with regard to the revision of the risk-based provisions for the categorisation of official BSE risk status, and commended the Group for its achievements to date.

Dr Mapitse reminded the Group that the remaining issues to be addressed were as follows:

- Finalisation of the revision of Chapter 11.4. of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code)*. To do so, he encouraged the Group to take into consideration the recommendations of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance which met in October 2018 and which works jointly with the present Group to achieve a comprehensive revision of the BSE standards. He also recommended the Group to give careful consideration to the recommendations of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE which met in August 2016, in particular with regard to the revision of trade requirements;
- Revisions of Chapter 1.8. - Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for BSE (i.e., “BSE Questionnaire”). For this, he emphasised that the BSE Questionnaire was a key tool for Members to document compliance with the requirements for the official recognition of a BSE risk status, and that a clear and concise questionnaire would not only support Members in providing well-documented dossiers, but would also consequently assist the OIE and the experts during the evaluation of the dossiers;
- Revision of the requirements for the maintenance of an official BSE risk status, including the BSE annual reconfirmation form.

Lastly, Dr Mapitse, thanked the experts for having signed the forms for undertaking of confidentiality and declaration of conflicts of interest, and noted that no potential conflict in the revision of BSE Standards was declared.

¹ Note: This *ad hoc* Group report reflects the views of its members and may not necessarily reflect the views of the OIE. This report should be read in conjunction with the February 2019 report of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases because this report provides its considerations and comments. It is available at: <http://www.oie.int/en/international-standard-setting/specialists-commissions-groups/scientific-commission-reports/meetings-reports/>

Dr Matthew Stone, OIE Deputy Director General for International Standards and Science, visited the Group during its meeting, and expressed the appreciation of the OIE of the extensive work being conducted in conjunction with the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance. Acknowledging the complexity and sensitivity of the issues being addressed, he commended the Group for its efforts to explain the detailed rationale supporting its proposals and recommendations in its meeting reports for the consideration of Members.

2. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of chairperson and rapporteur

Dr Noel Murray was appointed Chair and Dr Stephen Cobb was the rapporteur with the support of the OIE Secretariat. The Group endorsed the proposed agenda for the meeting.

The terms of reference, agenda and list of participants are provided as [Appendices I, II and III](#) respectively.

3. Revision of Chapter 11.4

3.1. General provisions (Article 11.4.1.)

The Group highlighted the uncertainty associated with the origin of all BSE agents, including atypical BSE, the potential transmissibility of atypical BSE through contaminated feed and any zoonotic risk that might result from the recycling of atypical BSE agent in ruminant feed. The Group agreed that these considerations should be emphasised in Article 11.4.1. as they support some of the revised provisions proposed in Article 11.4.2. and Article 11.4.3. (see sections 3.2. and 3.3.a.v. of this report). Experts volunteered to provide a literature review on the risks of transmission of atypical BSE to be presented at the next meeting.

Currently, Chapter 11.4. states in Article 11.4.1. “For the purposes of official BSE risk status recognition, BSE excludes 'atypical BSE' as a condition believed to occur spontaneously in all cattle populations at a very low rate”. The group acknowledged that while the eradication of classical BSE might be feasible assuming its transmissibility via contaminated feed, the eradication of atypical BSE might remain elusive if cases occur spontaneously. Consistent with the Group’s proposed revisions from its previous meeting in July and to avoid confusion, reference to occurrence of a case of atypical BSE in relation to a country’s official BSE risk status should be made in Article 11.4.2 rather than in Article 11.4.1. While the occurrence of a case of atypical BSE, regardless of the origin of each case, would not impact a country’s BSE risk status by itself, it is nevertheless important to consider the potential recycling of all BSE agents, including atypical BSE, in the exposure assessment (as emphasised in the following section in the report). As a result, atypical BSE is not disregarded in the recognition of a country’s BSE risk status as the existing Article 11.4.1 implies. The Group therefore recommended removing this statement and clarifying in Articles 11.4.2. and 11.4.3. how atypical BSE should be addressed.

3.2. Provisions applicable to the BSE risk status of the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment (Article 11.4.2.)

According to the current provisions of Article 11.4.2. point 1.b., an exposure assessment should be conducted if a risk factor is identified by the entry assessment (i.e., “*If the entry assessment identifies a risk factor, an exposure assessment should be conducted*”).

As emphasised by the Group at its July 2018 meeting, and in the previous section of this report, because of the significant uncertainty regarding the likelihood of the recycling of the atypical BSE agent, an assessment of the likelihood of the cattle population being exposed to the BSE agents (classical or atypical) should be performed regardless of the outcome of the entry assessment.

3.3. Provisions applicable to the categorisation of official BSE risk status (Articles 11.4.3. to 11.4.5.)

At its first meeting, the Group began drafting the provisions applicable to the recognition of BSE risk status (Articles 11.4.3. to 11.4.5.). These provisions were complemented by the *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance which drafted recommendations on the surveillance for BSE to be implemented in support of the recognition and maintenance of negligible and controlled BSE risk status.

The Group addressed outstanding issues and continued the revision of Articles 11.4.3. to 11.4.5., as follows.

a) *Negligible BSE risk (Article 11.4.3.)*

i. *Risk assessment*

As emphasised in draft Articles 11.4.2. and 11.4.3., the determination of a BSE risk status should be based on a risk assessment. The Group clarified that the assessment should evaluate the likelihood of the BSE agents (classical and atypical) entering the country or zone and being present and recycled in the cattle population leading to the exposure of indigenous cattle to the infectious agent, taking into consideration the impact of livestock industry practices or the measures that have been implemented to mitigate any identified risk factors.

ii. *Pathways to achieve a negligible likelihood of the BSE agent (classical or atypical) being recycled in the cattle population*

At its July 2018 meeting, the Group proposed that one pathway to achieve a negligible BSE risk status would be through a negligible likelihood of the BSE agent being recycled in the cattle population as a result of “husbandry and farming practices”. The Group further discussed this pathway and determined that husbandry and farming practices alone may not sufficiently allow the assessment of the likelihood of the BSE agent being recycled in the cattle population. For instance, the details of feeding, slaughtering and rendering practices would also need to be assessed. The Group therefore clarified that broader “livestock industry practices” should be taken into consideration to fully characterise a BSE risk status. The details of livestock industry practices to be considered were described in draft Chapter 1.8.

iii. *Duration to be covered by the risk assessment, surveillance, and risk mitigating measures*

The Group discussed the time period that the risk assessment, the surveillance programme, and the risk mitigating measures should cover to demonstrate a negligible BSE risk status. Consistent with previous *ad hoc* Groups on BSE, the Group recommended that an eight-year period would be appropriate considering that the upper 95th percentile incubation period for classical BSE is estimated to be seven years, and that the risk should have been mitigated for more than an incubation period. It was noted that in countries at the tail of the BSE epidemic, the incubation period may (artificially) appear to be longer as a result of the control measures that have been implemented. However, this should not be considered to be a globally applicable trend and would not justify a revision of the time period to be covered by the risk assessment and the risk mitigating measures.

In accordance with the recommendation of the *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance, the Group determined that to improve the consistency of BSE standards, it would be appropriate that the duration for which surveillance has been conducted prior to the official recognition of a BSE risk status be aligned with the duration for which the BSE risk should have been effectively mitigated (i.e., 8 years).

iv. *Demonstration of the implementation of a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban*

The Group reviewed the provisions drafted at its July 2018 meeting which proposed that a risk assessment should have demonstrated that either the likelihood of cattle population being exposed to BSE agents has been negligible as a result of its livestock industry practices or each identified risk has been effectively and continuously mitigated, and, in addition, it should be demonstrated that neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants have been fed to ruminants. The Group re-affirmed their agreement that a feed ban may not always need to be legislated to provide an appropriate level of assurance.

While reviewing draft Article 11.4.2., some experts denoted that point 2 (i.e., “*It has been demonstrated through documented evidence that for at least 8 years neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants have been fed to ruminants*”) was, to a certain extent, redundant with point 1 (i.e., “*A risk assessment as described in Article 11.4.2., has been conducted and the Member Country has demonstrated that, for at least 8 years, either the likelihood of cattle population being exposed to BSE agent is negligible as a result of its husbandry and farming practices, or each identified risk has been effectively and continuously mitigated*”). Indeed, should meat-and-bone meal or greaves derived from ruminants have been fed to ruminants, the likelihood of cattle population being exposed to BSE agents would not be negligible as a result of its livestock industry practices, nor would each risk of exposure have been mitigated. These experts were of the opinion that the focus should be on the outcome of the consequence assessment, which is the likelihood of, and the extent of, any recycling of the BSE-agent in the cattle population. In consequence, it would not be necessary to have an independent provision under Article 11.4.3. explicitly requesting a feed ban.

Some other experts were of the opinion that it was justified to place an unambiguous emphasis on the need to demonstrate that neither meat-and-bone meal nor greaves derived from ruminants have been fed to ruminants, since (i) the presence of the atypical BSE agent in cattle populations is potentially ubiquitous, (ii) the oral route is the main route of transmission of classical BSE in cattle, and (iii) feed bans have proven to be effective in restricting BSE spread.

The Group could not reach a consensus on whether the need for a Member to demonstrate the implementation of a feed ban should be explicitly stated as an independent point within Article 11.4.3. (i.e., a separate point to the provision on risk assessment) or if it would be sufficient to rather implicitly consider it within the risk assessment (i.e., by indicating that the risk assessment should demonstrate a negligible likelihood of recycling). The Group decided that this issue would be further discussed at the next meeting.

v. *Impact of the occurrence of case(s) of BSE*

According to the current provisions of Article 11.4.3., the occurrence of a single indigenous case of classical BSE born less than 11 years ago not only prevents the recognition, but also leads to the suspension, of a negligible BSE risk status. The Group re-affirmed the opinion expressed at its July 2018 meeting that this requirement was not proportionate to the risk.

Considering that the occurrence of cases of atypical BSE and of imported cases of classical BSE would not necessarily imply a change in livestock industry practices nor a breach in the effective mitigation measures of identified risks in the country or zone, the Group recommended that these occurrences should not impact the official recognition or maintenance of a negligible BSE risk status, as long as those cases are completely destroyed. Consistent with the previous recommendations of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE which met in August 2016, the Group agreed that the destruction of cases of atypical BSE was necessary to mitigate the potential risk of recycling and amplification of the atypical BSE agent in the feed chain.

Regarding the occurrence of indigenous cases of classical BSE, as emphasised in the report of the July 2018 meeting of the Group, the current requirement covering an 11-year period is neither considered proportionate to the risk nor is supported by robust scientific evidence. The Group therefore recommended that, in support of the recognition of a negligible BSE risk status, it would be reasonable to require that indigenous cases of classical BSE have not been born within the preceding eight years, which corresponds to at least 95% of the incubation period for classical

BSE and ensures consistency with the time period recommend for surveillance and the implementation of risk mitigation measures.

With regard to the impact of the occurrence of indigenous cases of classical BSE in animals born less than 8 years ago in countries or *zones* recognised as having a negligible BSE risk status, the Group recommended that negligible BSE risk status could be maintained provided an investigation on the conditions of livestock industry practices or the measures for the effective and continuous mitigation of each identified risk, confirms that the likelihood of the BSE agent being recycled within the cattle population continues to be negligible. Pending the outcome of such an investigation following the confirmation of a diagnosis of classical BSE, the negligible BSE risk status would be suspended and the conditions for a controlled BSE risk status would apply. In accordance with the OIE Standard Operating Procedures on suspension, recovery or withdrawal of official status, the outcome of the investigation would have to be favourably assessed by the Scientific Commission, within a maximum of 2 years after the detection of the case, for the negligible BSE risk status to be re-instated.

The Group took note that the revised Article 11.4.3. point 2.b. would need to be further revised to clearly state that if there has been an indigenous case of classical BSE in an animal born 8 or less years ago in a country or zone already recognised with a negligible BSE risk status, the Member could retain the status as long as an investigation confirms that the likelihood of the BSE agent being recycled within the cattle population remained negligible.

b) *Controlled BSE risk (Article 11.4.4.)*

The Group re-affirmed that for recognition as controlled BSE risk status, all of the requirements of Article 11.4.3. should be in place, but at least one of them has not been met for the preceding eight years.

c) *Undetermined BSE risk (Article 11.4.5.)*

The Group was informed that whilst undetermined BSE risk status is a default category for countries or zones that have not submitted an application for recognition of a BSE risk status or for those countries whose applications have not met the requirements for neither controlled nor negligible BSE risk, some Members have expressed confusion on the conditions associated with being identified as posing an undetermined BSE risk. The Group reviewed the definition of an undetermined BSE risk as proposed in their previous meeting (i.e., “*The BSE risk arising from the cattle population of a country, zone or compartment can be considered to be undetermined if it cannot be demonstrated that it meets the requirements of another category*”), and recognised that the statement “*can be considered to be undetermined*” might be a source of confusion. The Group clarified that, if a BSE risk is not recognised as negligible or controlled, then it is considered undetermined. Article 11.4.5. was revised accordingly.

d) *Surveillance (Article 11.4.20.)*

The representatives of the Specialist Commissions, expressed their agreement with the recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance that a points-based surveillance system could no longer be justified, and concurred that a baseline level of passive surveillance for BSE should be continuously implemented to identify cattle with a clinical presentation consistent with BSE, and the elimination of the requirements to conduct active surveillance on the risk groups (i.e., fallen stock and casualty slaughter) and on animals from the healthy slaughter subpopulation destined for human consumption. It was noted that the proper implementation of a sensitive passive surveillance program for BSE should be monitored and documented.

The Group took note of the report of the meeting of the *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance, and the main conclusions of this Group were outlined by the chair. The Group determined that it would undertake a more detailed review of Article 11.4.20. on Surveillance at its next meeting.

4. Revision of Chapter 1.8. (Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for BSE)

The Group built on the recommendations outlined in section 5 of the report of its July 2018 meeting to undertake a detailed revision of the “BSE Questionnaire” (Chapter 1.8.) consistent with the proposed changes to Articles 11.4.2. to 11.4.4. pertaining to the categorisation of BSE risk status.

The Group agreed that the revised questionnaire should be more concise but still comprehensive enough to support a fully informed assessment of compliance with the requirements for the recognition of a BSE risk status defined in Articles 11.4.3. and 11.4.4.

The experience of the experts of the Group who also participate in the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE Risk Status Evaluation of Members assessing applications for official recognition was useful to highlight sections of the current questionnaire that lack clarity and are commonly misinterpreted by applicant Members, that are not comprehensive enough to support a fully informed assessment, or, that are not relevant for an evaluation of the BSE risk status.

As defined in current Article 11.4.3., a BSE risk assessment described in Article 11.4.2. should be conducted and documented by the applicant Member. However, based on the experience of the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE Risk Status Evaluation of Members, applicant Members tend to provide extensive amounts of data, information, tables, and figures in their applications without undertaking a risk assessment. The Group extensively debated if the revised questionnaire should explicitly require the applicant Member to perform and document a risk assessment, or alternatively, if the questionnaire should require specific data to allow the *ad hoc* Group on BSE Risk Status Evaluation of Members to perform the risk assessment. The Group would refine the type, amount and granularity of the data and information to be included in the questionnaire at its next meeting.

4.1. Article 1.8.1. Veterinary system

Consistent with the current provisions of the BSE Questionnaire, the Group agreed that compliance of the Veterinary Services with the provisions of Chapters 1.1. (Notification of diseases, infections and infestations, and provision of epidemiological information), 3.1. (Veterinary Services) and 3.2. (Evaluation of Veterinary Services) of the *Terrestrial Code* would importantly contribute to achieving official recognition of a BSE risk status. However, the Group pointed out the difficulty of thoroughly assessing these horizontal capacities through the BSE questionnaire. The Group advised that, when possible, recent (i.e., not older than five years) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Evaluation Reports, Evaluation Follow-up Reports and Gap Analyses should be provided to the OIE *ad hoc* Group on BSE Risk Status Evaluation of Members, in line with the Standard Operating Procedures for official recognition of disease status of Members, highlighting the information that supports compliance with the requirements for the requested risk status.

4.2. Article 1.8.2. Risk assessment

a) *Entry assessment*

The Group re-affirmed its previous position that detailed quantitative information (e.g., volume, statistics, etc.) on imported commodities was not informative for the entry assessment as long as they were either imported under conditions consistent with the recommendations laid out in Chapter 11.4. or where it can be demonstrated that an equivalent level of assurance was provided. The emphasis should be on documenting the measures applied to imported commodities depending on the BSE risk status of the country or zone of origin together with how the Competent Authority verifies compliance through supporting legislation, certification, and regulations.

The Group noted that in the Glossary of the *Terrestrial Code*, meat-and-bone meal is defined as “the solid protein products obtained when animal tissues are rendered, and includes any intermediate protein product other than peptides of a molecular weight less than 10,000 daltons and amino-acids”. The Group wondered if for the purposes of the Chapters 1.8. and 11.4., meat-and-bone meal and greaves should be defined differently. Two experts volunteered to propose revised definitions and to evaluate if these should apply to Chapters 1.8. and 11.4. only or throughout the *Code* (i.e., implying a revision of the Glossary definition). The outcome of this review will be presented at the next meeting.

The Group discussed the list of imported commodities which should be addressed in the entry assessment in light of their possibility of harbouring or being contaminated by the classical BSE agent. The Group agreed that for the entry assessment the importations of relevance were: live cattle, rendered products containing ruminant material (meat-and-bone meal, bone meal, blood meal, meat meal, greaves), feedstuffs containing rendered products of ruminant origin, and also fertilizers containing rendered products of ruminant origin as they may be used for a different purpose other than as a fertilizer).

The Group drafted questions for the applicant Members to document the measures applied to imported commodities of relevance depending on the BSE risk status of the country or zone of origin as well as the supervision of the implementation of these measures. The Group also drafted a table for the relevant information on these importations to be summarised by applicant Members (without having to provide detailed statistics on importations).

b) *Exposure assessment*

The section of the questionnaire addressing the exposure assessment was comprehensively reviewed, acknowledging that: (i) based on the applications submitted by Members, it was apparent that the current questionnaire did not provide sufficient guidance, and (ii) the need of a new section providing a framework for a detailed description of livestock industry practices that is relevant for all applications as well as for those countries seeking recognition via the newly proposed pathway for negligible BSE risk status.

The scope of the exposure assessment was defined considering that for all practical purposes, the principal route of transmission of classical BSE is through the ingestion of contaminated feed (as emphasised in Article 11.4.1.). The Group noted that rendering represents a critical risk factor in the exposure pathway. The exclusion of specified risk material (SRM) from rendering and the parameters of the rendering process should therefore be carefully assessed. Another factor relevant to the exposure assessment is the age of cattle that may be exposed to feed potentially contaminated with the BSE agent, as animals 12 months old or less are considered to be much more susceptible to infection.

Overall, the Group determined that the following components should be addressed in the exposure assessment:

- An assessment of the livestock industry practices with a particular emphasis on the practices related to feeding, slaughtering and rendering practices, and associated likelihood that cattle may be exposed to potentially contaminated feed; or
- An assessment of the effective and continuous mitigation of each identified risk, that includes:
 - o the assessment of the slaughter practices with a particular emphasis on the management of materials listed in Article 11.4.14. (i.e., “*commodities that should not be traded*”, also commonly referred to as “specified risk material (SRM)” by Members), and the associated likelihood that these materials, or other material cross contaminated by them, may enter the feed chain;

- an assessment of the nature and enforcement of a feed ban, and the associated likelihood that ruminants may be fed with meat-and-bone meal or greaves derived from ruminants;
- an assessment of the rendering industry (if any), and the associated likelihood that rendered products containing ruminant material may retain BSE infectivity;
- an assessment of feed industry, and the associated likelihood that feed for ruminant may be contaminated with ruminant material, including as a result of cross contamination.

5. Additional considerations

The Group could not complete its Terms of Reference at this meeting. It was agreed that a third four-day meeting would be convened to: finalise the revisions of Chapter 11.4. (Article 11.4.3 (i.e., demonstration of the implementation of a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban), Article 11.4.1ter, Articles 11.4.6. to 11.4.19, Article 11.4.20.), Chapter 1.8 (consequence assessment, risk estimation, Articles 1.8.3., and 1.8.4.), review the provisions for the annual reconfirmation of an official BSE risk status (i.e., annual reconfirmation form for BSE), assess the impact of the proposed revisions on the status of countries and zones having an official BSE risk status, and consider a request from the European Serum Products Association.

The Group emphasised the importance of effective communication, education and training that would need to be undertaken by the OIE on the proposed revised BSE standards to ensure an adequate understanding by Members in support of their adoption, and subsequent implementation.

6. Finalisation and adoption of the report

The Group reviewed and amended the draft report. The Group agreed that the report reflected the discussions.

**SECOND MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP
ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK ASSESSMENT
Paris, 20-22 November 2018**

Terms of Reference

Purpose

The purpose of this *ad hoc* Group is to provide independent analysis and advice to OIE on the risk-based provisions applicable to the categorisation of BSE risk status as well as on the subsequent recommendations applicable for international trade.

Functions

This *ad hoc* Group will report to the Director General of the OIE, and approved reports will be considered by the relevant Specialist Commissions (the Scientific Commission or the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commissions) when necessary, in accordance with the OIE Basic Texts.

This *ad hoc* Group previously met from 3 to 5 July 2018 at the OIE Headquarters, and assessed:

- The risk with regard to the BSE agent, by revising Articles 11.4.1., 11.4.2., and 11.4.23. to 11.4.29. of the *Terrestrial Code*, and
- The relevance of the current categorisation of BSE risk status (Articles 11.4.3. to 11.4.5. of the *Terrestrial Code*), considering factors such as the different requirements applicable to the recognition and maintenance of a risk status, the prevailing epidemiological situation, the impact of the duration of an effective feed ban, and the relevance of a zoning or compartmentalisation approach.

During its second meeting, this *ad hoc* Group will continue to review:

1. The requirements applicable to the categories of BSE risk status and corresponding requirements for risk-based categorisation, with particular attention to:
 - i. The durations to be covered by the risk assessment and the feed ban (as recommended by the surveillance *ad hoc* group),
 - ii. The recommendations of the *ad hoc* Group on BSE surveillance (3 to 5 October 2018) with regard to the surveillance provisions to obtain and maintain a BSE risk status,
 - iii. The comments from the European Serum Product Association (ESPA), and
 - iv. The potential impact of the new requirements on the status of countries or *zones* already having an officially recognised BSE risk status.
 2. The requirements for trade applicable to the different categories of BSE risk status (revision of Articles 11.4.6. to 11.4.19. of the *Terrestrial Code*).
 3. The list of safe commodities if appropriate in light of the recent scientific knowledge (revision of Article 11.4.1. of the *Terrestrial Code*) taking into consideration the recommendations made by the *ad hoc* Group on BSE which met in 2016.
 4. The list of specified risk materials (SRMs), if appropriate, in light of the recent scientific knowledge (revision of Article 11.4.14. of the *Terrestrial Code* on recommendations on commodities that should not be traded).
 5. The revision of the BSE Questionnaire (Chapter 1.8. of the *Terrestrial Code*) and the annual reconfirmation form to ensure their full consistency with the proposed revisions to Chapter 11.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*.
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**SECOND MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP
ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK ASSESSMENT
Paris, 20-22 November 2018**

Agenda

1. Opening.
2. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of chairperson and rapporteur.
3. Review of the Terms of Reference and definition of the work plan:
 - Revision of Chapter 11.4.
 - Revision of Chapter 1.8.
 - Revision of the annual reconfirmation form
4. Adoption of the report

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List of participants

MEMBERS

Dr Stephen Cobb
Manager (New Organisms)
Environmental Protection Agency,
NEW ZEALAND
Tel: +64 474 55 22
stephen.cobb@epa.govt.nz

Dr Hae-Eun Kang
Director of the Foreign Animal Disease
Division, Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency
QIA, Mafra
KOREA
Tel: +82 54 912 0884
kanghe@korea.kr

Dr Ximena Melón
Directora de Comercio Exterior Animal
Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad
Agricultaria (SENASA)
Paseo Colón 367, CABA (1063)
ARGENTINA
Tel: +54 11 41 21 5425
xmelon@senasa.gob.ar

Dr Letlhogile Modisa
Director Veterinary Services
Private Bag 0032
Gaborone
BOTSWANA
Tel: +267 318 15 71
lmodisa@gov.bw

Dr Noel Murray
Senior Advisor on Risk Analysis
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
1400 Merivale Road, Ottawa,
K1A0Y9 Ontario
CANADA
Tel: +1 613 773 5904
noel.murray@canada.ca

Dr Ángel Ortiz-Pelaez
Senior Scientist Officer
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
Via Carlo Magno 1A,
43126 Parma
ITALY
Tel: +39 0521 036 640
angel.ortizpelaez@efsa.europa.eu

Dr Eric Thévenard
Head of Unit
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
BELGIUM
Tel: +32 2 296 99 66
Eric.thevenard@ec.europa.eu

Representatives from the Specialist Commissions

Dr Baptiste Dungu
Member of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases
26 Dalrymple Crescent
Edinburgh EH9 2NX
Scotland
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: +212 523 30 31 32
b.dungu@mci-santeanimale.co

Dr Masatsugu Okita
Member of the Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
Director of the International Animal Health Affairs Office, Animal
Health Division, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau
1-2-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, 100-8950
JAPAN
Tel: +81 3 3502 8295
masatsugu_okita130@maff.go.jp

OIE HEADQUARTERS

Dr Neo J. Mapitse
Head
Status Department
n.mapitse@oie.int

Dr Morgane Dominguez
Project officer
Status Department
m.dominguez@oie.int

Dr Fernanda Mejía-Salazar
Chargée de mission
Status Department
f.mejia-salazar@oie.int

Dr Charmaine Chng
(observer)
Chargée de mission
Standards Department
c.chng@oie.int



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